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ABSTRACT
For most of this century, and despite the fact that there was no
agreement among economists as to why interest should be paid, it was
almost unanimously held by most if not all economists that interest is
necessary for banking and consequently necessary for financial and
economic development and that any religion, like Islam, that prohibits
interest, is an obstacle to economic growth and development. This view
was not exclusively held by Western economists who may not know much
about Islam, but even by some Muslim thinkers who, repeating the
controversial arguments justifying interest, claimed that there is no
other way to develop except to leave the religion of Islam aside or at
least its economic and political aspects because it stands in the way
of progress and development. However, there were some other Muslim
scholars who were not so convinced of the Western and pro-Western idea
that interest is a necessary component of any financial and economic
development and were convinced that if Allah has forbidden interest
then there must be something wrong with it and when He allowed trade
and PLS (Profit and Loss Sharing) system of finance as alternatives,
then these must, perhaps, lead to the achievement of greater financial
and economic development 'without tears' (Kahf 1978). They sought in
the Koran and Sunnah a way of doing banking and encouraging development
that is not only complying with Shariah but that may lead to a morejust and more beneficial way of development. They dug into the
historical practices of the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH), his companions and
the early followers and found that the alternatives, to interest, that
were acceptable to, maintained and encouraged by, Islam, are trade
(profit) and the PLS system which were practiced long before the rise
of Islam, so they just applied the principles to today's banking
practices and called it 'Islamic Banking'.
This study aims to show that interest is not a necessary component
of banking, as was widely held before, and that Islam, by prohibiting
interest and permitting profit and Profit sharing as alternatives, is
not an obstacle to, but a promoter of, economic growth and development
with social justice.
This study also attempts to distill and refine the theoretical
bases of Islamic Banking. It critically surveys and discusses the
different theories that have been advanced to justify interest and
profits and compares the functions and institutions of the Islamic
Financial and Banking Systems with their Interest-Based counterparts.
It also discusses the likely impact of the Profit and Loss Sharing
(PLS) system, and empirically analyses the performance of some of the
oldest Islamic Banks vis-a-vis the performance of the Interest-Based
Banks of the same countries.
The empirical analyses undertaken showed that Islamic banking is
more appropriate and more relevant to the economic growth and
development of the Muslim World. Despite the fact that they are
operating in hostile and non Islamic environments, the existing Islamic
Banks have managed to mobilise substantial amounts of deposits and
contributed greatly to the finance of many economic sectors and
projects of the countries they are working in.
xii
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The question of economic development has assumed unprecedented im-
portance and financial development has long been considered as a very
important factor, if not the most important one in furthering and imp-
roving the economic development of any country. Consequently the effi-
cient mobilisation of savings have been identified as crucial in achie-
ving rapid and effective economic development (see chapter 2 below).
Banks are perhaps the most important and vital financial interme-
diaries in any economy. They mobilise savings and idle funds from the
Surplus Economic Units (SEUs) and make them available to the Deficit
Economic Units (DEUs) who can make better and fuller use of them.
However, until the recent emergence of the so called 'Islamic Banks',
'Islamic Insurance Companies' and 'Islamic Investment Companies' based
on Profit and Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS), instead of interest in the
late 1970s and the 'Islamisation' of the banking systems of Pakistan,
Iran and Sudan in the early 1980s, it was almost unanimously held by
most, if not all, economists that no financial or banking system can
develop very far or develop at all without recourse to interest and
that any religion, like Islam, which categorically prohibits interest,
is an obstacle to economic growth and development.
The last few years have witnessed a resurgence of calls for a re-
examination or perhaps even a reform of the International Economic and
Monetary Order. In contribution to this and in reconciling the need for
an efficient banking system that mobilises savings for investment and
brings about economic growth and development in Muslim countries with
the Islamic Shariah (law) which prohibits interest, Muslim economists
developed the concept of Islamic Banking that is not based on interest
but on Profit and PLS system. And so, within the last thirty years or
so, many Muslim economists have developed theoretical models of Islamic
Banking in order to find, on one hand, a solution to the problem of mo-
bilising savings from devout Muslims who do not deal with interest ba-
sed banks because of the Islamic injunctions against interest, and on
the other, to find a solution to the world economy which has entered a
phase of extraordinary instability and whose course is uncertain and to
the International Financial System which is in a state of disarray.
They showed that all the banking services could be carried out on the
basis of PLS and other non interest based financial instruments which
are compatible with Islamic Shariah (see survey by M.N. Siddiqi 1980).
These models have been put into practice by the recently emerged
'Islamic Banks', 'Islamic Insurance Companies' and 'Islamic Investment
Companies'. Writing about these, R. Cooper (1981:44) contended that:
Perhaps the most remarkable phenomenon in the Middle East fi-
nancial world in recent years, and one which has implications
stretching far beyond the region, has been the growth of
Islamic Financial Institutions. The central feature that
differentiates such institutions from the conventional modern
financial institutions, is the prohibition of Riba (interest)
and the permission of Profit and Loss Sharing system.
Now despite the somewhat successful working and performance of
these Islamic Financial Institutions (see Chapters 8-11 below), there
are still those who, like Pryor (1985), think that interest is neces-
sary for any banking system to work properly and mobilise savings
efficiently and consequently consider any religion like Islam that
prohibits interest as an obstacle to economic growth and development.
The purpose of this study is manifold:
Firstly, to show that, contrary to what most economists hold about
interest as the necessary and the best way to mobilise savings for eco-
nomic development and for doing banking, interest is neither necessary,
nor is it the best way to mobilise savings for economic development,
especially in Islamic countries, where devout Muslims are reluctant to
give or take interest, because of the Islamic injunction against it;
Secondly, to show that Islam, by prohibiting interest, is not an
obstacle to economic development but by allowing the principles of Pro-
fits and PLS as alternatives to interest, is a promoter to economic de-
velopment and perhaps to a greater extent and with greater justice than
by allowing interest; not only that, but it has its own economic system
that is different from all other economic systems;
Thirdly, to survey and critically discuss the different theories
advanced to justify interest and profits and introduce 'The Islamic
Solution' to the problem.
Fourthly to distil the different models of Islamic banking presen-
ted over the years with the view to refine and improve them and put
them in the perspective of a pure Islamic economy where all aspects of
the Islamic ghariah are applied because as Khurshid (1985:11) argued:
Any element of the Islamic system, however important, cannot
produce the desired results, if it is allowed to operate in
isolation. It must lead to other complementary changes to
complete the process. Elimination of Riba is only one aspect
of the Islamic economic programme. It must be accompanied by,
and strengthened through, other motivational and structural
changes. Islamic banking is only a part of the process, and
not the be-all and end-all of the process.
Fifthly, to look at the likely economic implications of the
interest and PLS based financing systems; and finally, to assess the
performance of some of the oldest established Islamic banks and demons-
trate how they have managed to mobilise savings and finance investments
despite the fact that they are working in hostile environments with
competition from interest based banks, with no lender of last resort
and with no promise of a guaranteed return to their depositors (see
case studies in Chapters 9-11), which prove the feasibility of the sys-
tem and its success in mobilising savings for economic development.
The hypotheses of this study, therefore, are:
1) Is interest really necessary to do banking and to
mobilise savings for economic development?
2) If not, is there any other alternative? And if there is,
what is it? How does it work? And what are its likely
implications on the economy as compared to interest? And
what is wrong with interest?
3) Is Islam an obstacle to economic development? Why? and
4) What are the results obtained by the already established
"Islamic Banks" and to what extent have they contributed
to the saving-investment process in the countries, they
are working in? How efficient are they?
OUTLINE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
In addition to the general introduction and the general conclusion
of this thesis, this study is divided into three parts:
The first part, which is divided into three chapters, chapter one
to chapter three is a background to the subject. Chapter one introduces
the reader, who is assumed to know nothing about Islam, Islamic Econo-
mics or Islamic Banking, to what Islam is, what it stands for and what
it has to do with economics and presents the salient features of the
Islamic Economic System (IES) as compared to the salient features of
the Capitalist and Communist systems. The methodology here is theoreti-
cal, comparative and descriptive. Chapter two reviews the relationship
between financial and economic development and examines the different
hypotheses advanced by different economists about the role of banks in
the saving-investment process and examines the relevance of these hypo-
theses to a number of Islamic and non Islamic, Developed and Less deve-
loped countries. The methodology used is theoretical, statistical and
analytical using cross-section and time-series data analysis.
Chapter three traces the origin of banking operations to earlier
times than is held by most economists and shows that banking is not
'Italian by Birth' as many would think, but banking operations were
known to Muslims, Romans, Greeks, Egyptians, and even to Babylonians
and Sumerians long before 13th century Italy. This chapter also traces
the origin and development of the newly emerged Islamic banking. The
methodology here, is historical and descriptive.
The second Part is divided into four chapters: chapter four to
chapter seven. Chapter four deals with the theoretical and juridical
bases of Islamic Banking and Finance: The prohibition of interest and
the permission of profits and PLS system. It critically reviews the
theories of interest and profit and introduces the 'Islamic Solution'
to the problem. The methodology is obviously historical, theoretical,
critical and analytical.
Chapter five is an attempt to describe, analyse and compare the
financial claims, institutions and markets that may exist in an Islamic
Financial System (IFS) and their functions vis-a-vis those of an
Interest Based Financial System (IBFS). Because for the moment there is
no fully fledged IFS anywhere in the world, the research procedure is
therefore, theoretically descriptive and analytically comparative.
Chapter six deals with the working of a model of an Islamic Ban-
king System (IBS) as compared to a model of a non Islamic one. It shows
how the IBS could be applied, managed, controlled and supervised and
how it would implement monetary policies without recourse to interest.
The methodology followed here is also theoretically descriptive and
analytically comparative.
Chapter seven, however, looks at some of the implications of PLS
system vis-a-vis those of interest based finance and shows how the
implementation of a PLS system in an Islamic economy could improve the
economy in question. Once again, the methodology used is theoretical
for the same reasons advanced earlier.
Part three, however, is an empirical study about the performance
of some of the oldest Islamic banks where some data could be obtained.
These are: the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), established in 1975 in
Saudi Arabia and 3 Islamic commercial banks chosen from 3 different
countries: (1) Kuwait Finance House (KFH), established in 1977, from a
a high per capita income country (Kuwait); (2) Faisal Islamic Bank of
Egypt (FIBE) established in 1978, from a middle per capita income coun-
try (Egypt) and (3) Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan (FIBS), established in
1978, from a very poor country (Sudan), with a low per capita income.
Since there is no agreement among economists as to what constitute
a bank input or output or as to how measure its performance or effi-
ciency (see Elhadeff (1954), Gorman (1966), Bell and Murphy (1968),
Powers (1969), Benston (1972), Revell (1980) and Heggestad (1980), to
name but a few) and since most if not all banking researchers use items
of the balance sheet like total assets, total deposits, total loans,
etc., in their research in order to assess banking performance, the
methodology followed in analysing the performance of IDB, KFH, FIBE and
FIBS, in chapters eight to eleven respectively, is the use of proxies
for bank input/output, such as capital and reserves (K&R), Total Assets
(TLA), Total Deposits (TLD), Total Finance (TLF), and ratios, such as
TLF/TLD, TLF/TLA, TLD/TLA, etc., in tabular and graphical analysis.
However, it is very important to note, at the outset of this study,
that Islamic Banking and Finance has emerged only very recently in form
of Islamic banks, insurance companies and investment companies here and
there, and that the steps that have been taken towards the Islamisation
of the financial systems of some of the Islamic countries such as those
of Pakistan, Sudan and Iran, are doubtful or still in their early sta-
ges, it should be emphasised that conclusion based on such a study must
of necessity be preliminary in nature because theoretical discussion of
the issues involved is also at a relatively early stage among Muslim
economists and beset by several methodological concepts.
CHAPTER ONE
WHAT IS ISLAM AND WHAT HAS IT TO DO WITH ECONOMICS?
1.1 INTRODUCTION
As Khurshid (1980b:XV) noticed: "The world has suffered from the
folly of the social sciences following almost unreservedly the model of
the natural sciences, with the result that technocratic solutions are
being imposed in the name of science, often legitimising the status quo
to the neglect of all moral ideological and political options available
for social policy". For instance, economics was often emphasised as a
positive science that has nothing to do with religion and moral values
which are normative par excellence. Recently, however, and as Hodgson
(1983:237) reported: "Two disputes have continually frustrated attempts
to provide a tenable method of enquiry for economic science: a) should
theory construction in economics include a commitment to moral princi-
ples? or should economic theory remain value-free?; b) does the pecu-
liar subject matter of economics demand a 'teleological' or a 'mecha-
nistic' pattern of explanation?".
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the relationship
between Islam and economics by answering the following questions:
1-) Can economics be really value-free ?
2-) What is Islam and what are its main sources ?
3-) What has Islam to do with Economics and what are the salient
features of the Islamic Economic System, if there is any, as
compared to the salient features of Capitalism and Communism?.
1.2 CAN ECONOMICS BE REALLY VALUE-FREE?
This problem has troubled economists of all schools. Even the great
neo-classical economist and mathematician, Alfred Marshall (cited by
Gruchy 1987: XI), expressed his concern of the difficulties to be found
in adopting too high a level of mathematical abstraction to economics
as he wrote: "In my view every economic fact, whether or not it is of
such a nature to be expressed in numbers, stands in relation as cause
and effect to many other facts; and since it never happens that all of
them can be expressed in numbers, the application of exact mathematical
methods to those that can, is nearly always a waste of time, while in
the large majority of cases it is particularly misleading". Economics
is only a tiny part of the all related social sciences and as is the
view of Myrdal (1968), concrete problems are never simply economic,
sociological, psychological or political. Even concerning the objecti-
vity of research in social sciences, Myrdal (ibid:31-2) argued that:
The problem of objectivity in research cannot be solved simply
by attempting to eradicate valuations. Every study of a social
problem, however limited in scope, is and must be determined
by valuations. A disinterested social science has never exis-
ted and never will exist. Research like every other rationally
pursued activity, must have a direction. The viewpoint and the
direction are determined by one's interest in a matter. Valua-
tions enter into the choice of approach, the selection of pro-
blems, the definition of concepts, and the gatherin7 of data,
and are by no means confined to the practical or political in-
ference drawn from theoretical findings. The value premises,
that actually and of necessity, determine approaches in the
social sciences can be hidden. In fact, most writings, parti-
cularly in economics, remain in large part simply ideological.
Nienhaus (1985b:1) noted that: "The strict separation of positive
and normative economics and the neglect of the latter became the gene-
ral practice not before the second or third decade of the 20th century.
This separation lead to the development of a kind of economic theory
which makes economics more a branch of applied mathematics than a
science of human action".
"Muslim economists believe that the reorientation of approach and
the reconstruction of the entire framework of economic analysis and po-
licy are needed to harness economics once again to the service of huma-
nity. The Muslim economist starts from the assumptions that economics,
neither is, nor can be, totally value-free" (Khurshid ibid). Thus, they
say that it is wrong to isolate the economic behaviour of Man from his
moral, spiritual, social, psychological, political and cultural beha-
viour. Mawdudi (1984:9-10) argued that: "If economics is isolated and
segregated from the whole of which it is a part and an attempt is made
to solve all the problems of life by means of economic panaceas, as if
man were no more than an economic animal and his moral and spiritual
aspirations had no reality apart from his economic endeavours, we
should not be surprised if chaos and confusion are the final result".
1.3 WHAT IS ISLAM? AND WHAT ARE ITS MAIN SOURCES?
Islam, literally means Submission, Surrender, Obedience and Peace.
Technically it means complete submission and obedience to the Will of
Allah and to his Shariah. This signifies that one can achieve real
peace of body and mind only through submission to the will of Allah and
obedience to his Shariah. Islam is the Last Message or the Last Testa-
ment revealed by Allah to all Mankind, through the last messenger
Mohammed (PBUH) to urge them to submit themselves wholly to Him and
surrender to His Divine Will in every detail of their every day life.
This message, in essence, was the message revealed to every prophet
throughout the history of Mankind to be delivered to his own people.
For instance, Allah said in Koran 2:130-131 about Abraham (PBUH):
He, who turns away from the religion of Abraham is but a fool.
We chose him and rendered him pure in this world, and in the
hereafter he will be in the ranks of the righteous. His Lord
said to him: "surrender to My Will (ie be a Muslim)". He said:
"I surrender and bow myself to the will of the Lord and Cheri-
sher of the universe". And this was the legacy that Abraham
left to his sons, and so did Jacob: "0 my sons! Allah has cho-
sen the faith for you, then do not die except in a state of
Islam (obedience, surrender and submission to Allah).
So Islam is not a new religion, but the culmination of the earlier
monotheistic religions or the final version of the sakl3H message which
was being sent gradually to different peoples in different times and
places to prepare them for the last version. Thus, it is one and the
same faith and way of life consistently revealed by Allah to Mankind
through messengers from the beginning. As Khurshid (ibid:IV) described:
Islam is not a religion in the limited sense of the word inte-
rested only in Man's salvation in the life to come or only a
relationship between Allah and Man and has nothing to do with
this life. Islam is a complete way and code of life and aims
at instructing the entire fabric of human life and culture in
the light of values and principles revealed by Allah for man's
guidance. Human life is looked upon as an organic whole and
its problems are approached not in a purely mechanistic way,
but in the light of the moral values and social ideals that
Islam expounds. Man is treated as a human being possessing a
moral personality and not just a complex of molecules.
There are three main sources of Islam. These are:
1-) The Koran which is the last and complete version of Islam,
revealed by Allah to His last messenger Mohammed (PBUH) to guide all
humanity. Allah says in Koran 5:48: "To you (0 Mohammed) we revealed
the Book (Koran) in truth confirming the truth of whatever there still
remains of earlier revelations (eg the Torah and the Gospel) and deter-
mining what is true therein.
2-) The Sunnah, literally means a way, a rule, a manner of
acting, etc.. The Sunnah of the Prophet (PBUH) takes 3 forms:
a) Oawl or Hadith (saying of the prophet Mohammed (PBUH)
b) Fi'l or Anal (an action or practice of his)
c) Igrar (silent approval about an action made in his presence)
The Koran deals with the broad principles or essentials of Islam
going into detail in very rare cases. Details were generally provided
by the prophet Mohammed (PBUH) in his Sunnah. Only authentic Sunnah is
binding on every Muslim (male/female). Sahih El-Bukhari (the collection
of El-Bukhari) and Sahih Muslim (the collection of Muslim) contain
only authentic Hadiths but other collections may contain all sorts of
Hadiths authentic and doubtful, though it is mentioned which is which.
3-) The rtihad: The word rtihad is derived from the Arabic verb
rtahada meaning to exert efforts to one's best ability. It also means
to persevere or to struggle. Technically it is applicable to a scholar
exerting the faculty of reasoning to his utmost for the purpose of
forming an opinion respecting a point on which there is little or no-
thing about in Koran or the Sunnah. Reasoning plays a very important
part in Islam. The value of reason is expressly recognised in the
Koran which appeals to reason again and again and is full of exhorta-
tions like "Do they not reflect?"; "Do they not understand?"; "Have
you no sense?"; etc.. rtihad is also recognised by the Sunnah. For
instance, appointing Muadh Ibn Jabal as governor to Yemen, the prophet
Mohammed (PBUH) asked him: "How would you judge cases?". Muadh rep-
lied: "I will judge by the laws of the Koran". Then the prophet (PBUH)
asked him: "What if you do not find any direction therein?". Muadh
then answered "then I will act according to the Sunnah of the prophet
(PBUH). The prophet (PBUH) asked him once again: "But if you do not
find any direction therein, what would you do?" and Muadh replied:
"Then I will exercise my judgement and act on that". The prophet
(PBUH), then raised his hands and said: "Praise be to Allah who guides
the messenger of his messenger as he pleases" (M.M. Ali nd:98).
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This event also shows the priority of Koran over both Sunnah and
rtihad and that the latter should only be applied in case there is no
Nas Saheeh Wa Sareeh (clear cut quotation) neither in the Koran nor in
the Sunnah. The highest form of rtihad and one that has priority over
individual rtihad is rmaa (consensus: decision reached by a majority
of Muslim scholars). Oiyas (analogy) is one way of making rtihad.
1.4 THE SALIENT FEATURES OF THE ISLAMIC ECONOMIC SYSTEM (IES)
AS COMPARED TO THE CAPITALIST AND THE COMMUNIST SYSTEMS
There are a number of economic systems and the choice of this or
that system has far reaching implications on production, consumption,
saving, investment, finance and distribution both at the micro and ma-
cro levels. This choice also affects the social and political structure
of the country where that choice takes place. Thus, before studying the
Islamic Banking System, it is very important to determine the Islamic
Economic System (IES) or the framework where this is to be implemented.
Halm (1974:273) defined an economic system as: "the sum total of
institutions and patterns of behaviour that organise economic activity
in society". In this respect the IES differ from all other economic
systems in its nature, form, purpose and means. Presley (1988a:67) says:
Islam possesses its own paradigm of economic relations within
the context of an entire Islamic system based on injunctions
and norms called the Shariah. The Shariah specifies, inter
alia, rules that relate to the allocation of resources,
property rights, production and consumption, the workings of
markets and the distribution of income and wealth. Similarly,
rules and requirements have been specified that define the
framework within which the underlying monetary and banking
system can be designed.
1.4.1 The Economic Philosophy
Any economic system is founded on one ideology or another, or one
philosophy or another, which provides it with its basis and objectives
on one hand, and with its axioms and principles on the other. This is
true even for the Marxian economics which claims to reject religious
and moral principles and considers them as the 'opium of the people'.
The process, followed by the set of axioms and principles in order to
bring the economy closer to the objective of the system, represents the
testable ground of the system (Kahf 1978:6). Gruchy (1987:1) pointed
out that: "nothing distinguishes different types of economics from one
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another more than the varying views on what is considered to be the
proper subject matter of economics... What determines how an economist
looks at the real social world around him and what he takes to be the
proper subject matter of economics, is the philosophical position or
intellectual orientation that underlines his work".
The validity of an economic system can be tested, as Kahf (1978:6)
argued, by its internal consistency, its compatibility with the systems
organising the other aspects of life and its provision for improvement
and growth. Consequently a system for the Islamic economy must be for-
mulated on the basis of the Islamic doctrine of life, because, as Abu-
Saud (1980:59) argued: "It is dangerous to adopt an economic system
that does not emanate from and correspond with the ideology, in fact
such a trial is doomed to failure. Thus, there is no Islamic Economics
(or Islamic Banking) per se unless there is an Islamic Ideology prevai-
ling and applied in a Muslim community".
Capitalism, is a Man-made economic system based on the principle of
laissez faire laissez passer, the corner stone of capitalism, which
indicates, at least theoretically, that Man can do whatever he likes,
and that no one including God, State or Society should intervene in his
business. As such, "the economic questions of human civilisation are",
as Khurshid (1980b:xii) described: "grappled with, without reference to
God and his guidance. God may be worshipped in one's personal life.
Nonetheless the affairs of society and the economy are to be conducted
according to Man's own discretion and sovereign wisdom".
Capitalism was boosted by, if not developed as a result of, dif-
ferent factors which preceded its appearance such as the rise of Calvi-
nism, the Puritan Movement, the Industrial Revolution, the Reformation,
the Repeal of Usury, the French Revolution, etc.. It is also called the
private enterprise economy or the free market economy which is built
upon the private ownership and control of the means of production, free
choice of occupation and consumer sovereignty.
Despite rejecting all moral and religious norms, Communism, which
is also a Man-made economic system, "has been accepted by millions as a
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gospel truth and enhanced as a religion which promises paradise on this
side of the grave" (Schumpeter 1950:5). It developed as a reaction to
the inequality and injustice of capitalism which are believed to be the
results of the private ownership of the means of production and not of
the lack of religious or moral teachings that might regulate them. In
fact communism denies the very existence of God and rejects all reli-
gious and moral beliefs and considers them as 'the opium of people' but
at the same time, makes of 'Matter' a god in the sense that it attri-
butes everything to it and assume that it had always been in existence,
that it is imperishable, that it preceded 'Thought' and that 'Thought'
and everything else are but its products. Marx (1911) argued:
In the social production which men carry on they enter into
definite relations that are independent of
n, 
will, these
relations of production correspond to a definite state of de-
velopment of their material powers of production. The sum to-
tal of these relations of production constitutes the economic
structure of society, the real foundation on which rise legal
and political superstructures and to which correspond definite
forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in mate-
rial life determines the general character of the social,
political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the cons-
ciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the
contrary their social existence determines their consciousness
Islam, also, has its own philosophy, according to which, the nature
and purpose of Man's life on earth and his relationship with Allah, the
people and the universe are defined. According to the Islamic doctrine,
Allah created Man and subjected to him all that is in the universe and
endowed him with all the faculties he needs to fulfill the temporary
purpose of Tawheed Ibadat Allah (worshiping Allah alone) and the mis-
sion of Rhalifah (trustee) on earth as a test. The test is for Man to
follow Allah's Shariah with full freedom of choice through Tazkiyah
(Purification and growth) in order to achieve Saada (happiness) and
Falah (prosperity), or not to follow it and bear the consequences of
Shaqawah (unhappiness) and Rhusraan (failure) in this temporary life
and in the eternal hereafter. "Life on earth, being a test and all the
provision available to Man being in the nature of a trust, Man is
accountable to Allah and his success in the life hereafter depends on
his performance in this life on earth. This add a new dimension to the
valuation of things and deeds in this life" (M.N. Siddiqi 1980:195).
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Naqvi (1981:18) argued that: "In the climate of Islamic philosophy,
it is ethics that dominates economics and not the other way round.
Hence the Islamic system differs from all other economic systems by an
ethical factor". This difference, according to him, is fundamental
because "ethics epitomise the common values of a society and determine
the preference structures of the members of that society. The key to a
thorough understanding of the originality of the Islamic economic sys-
tem lies, therefore, in its ethical value system. However, the predomi-
nance of ethics in the universe of Islamic thought does not exclude the
possibility that economic conditions may in certain cases influence the
ethical behaviour of human beings".
According to Khurshid (1980b:174): "The major contribution of Islam
lies in making human life and effort purposive and value orientated.
The transformation it seeks to bring about, in human attitudes and pari
passu in that of the social sciences, is to move them from a stance of
pseudo-value neutrality towards open and manifest value commitment and
value fulfillment" because as Naqvi (1981:27) argued: "the dichotomy of
man's life into mundane pursuit and his spiritual aspirations has con-
tributed immensely to the schizophrenic confusion prevailing in the
modern world. Dualistic cultures, riddled with inherent contradictions
have sprung up, spreading social tensions. The Islamic solution is to
destroy this artificial schism by providing a unitary philosophy of
life, according to which no moral vacuum can exist on the plane of
social existence. Accordingly, in the context of the immaculate Islamic
vision of unity, the distinction between the secular and the spiritual
becomes both meaningless and inconsequential". The Koran 2:201 advises
Mankind to seek Allah's bounties in both this life and in the here-
after. Presley (1988a:14) acknowledged this fact when he wrote:
Islam is not a religion in the limited sense of the word but
covers all aspects of human life and wants. It seeks to deve-
lop a new moral personality in man, an integrated social exis-
tence and a new socio-economic and political order. It has its
own approach to economic concepts, objectives, methods, laws
and instruments. The Islamic economic system is not directly
related to either capitalism or any variants of socialism or
communism. The fundamental difference is that the Islamic
economy rests upon Divine guidance whereas capitalistic and
socialist economics propose particular human action without
reference to religion.
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1.4.2 The Economic Problem
"The economic problem of Man has", as Afzalur -Rahman (1974:1) poin-
ted out: "always attracted great attention from individuals as well as
communities. Various attempts have been made to solve this difficult
but important problem". However, although nobody denies the existence
of the economic problem, there is no agreement as to what this problem
is, what causes it, or how to solve it. For instance in capitalism,
the economic problem is the relative scarcity of the natural resources
which are limited and insufficient to satisfy the endless succession of
Man's wants. Robbins (1935:16) defined economics as: "the science which
studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means
which have alternative uses". Man's insatiable 'wants' are Robbins's
'ends' which exist to be satisfied. The resources of the Earth are the
'scarce means' which are available to satisfy these ends. Since the
utilities (goods and services) that can be produced are limited compa-
red with the insatiable wants of Man, then some sort of choice as to
what shall be produced and in what quantities is necessary. The choices
of millions of people take effect through the free market.
According to Communism which developed as a reaction to the ills of
Capitalism, the economic problem lies in the conflict between the form
of production and the relations of production. In other words, there is
economic problem when there is conflict between owners of means of
production and workers who do not own the means of production. Joan
Robinson (1947:1) pointed out that: "While orthodox economists argued
in terms of harmony of interest, Marx conceives economic life in terms
of conflict of interests between owners of property who do not work and
workers who own no property". Individual or private ownership of the
means of production is assumed to be inconsistent with basic human
nature and that it is basically and solely the cause of all conflicts
in human life. In order that human life be improved and human conflicts
be wiped out from the earth, individual ownership should be abolished
and replaced by collective or common ownership (see Nasseef nd:4).
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In Islam, however, the economic problem is neither the scarcity of
the natural resources nor the conflict between the forms and relations
of production but lies with Man himself (ie his belief, his economic
and social behaviour, etc.,). Allah says in Koran 14:32-34:
It is Allah who created the Heavens and the Earth and sent
dawn rairrliom the sky, and with it brought out fruits where-
with to feed you. It is He who has made the ships subject to
you, that you may sail through the sea by His command and the
rivers also has He made subject to you. He has made subject to
you the Sun and the Moon both diligently pursuing their
courses and the Night and the Day has He made subject to you.
and He gave you all that you ask for. But if you count the
favours of Allah, never will you be able to number tlumn.
Verily Man is unjust and ungrateful.
And said in Koran 15:19-21:
And He spread out the Earth for you set thereon firm mountains
and produced therein all kinds of things in due proportion and
we have provided therein means of subsistence for you and for
whose sustenance you are not responsible. And there is not a
living thing but its sources and treasures are with Us. But
We only send down thereof in due and ascertainable measure.
And also said in Koran 11:6:
There is no moving creature on Earth but its provision is upon
Allah. He knows the time and place of its definite abode and
its temporary deposit: all is in a clear record.
And again said in Koran 30:4:
Mischief has appeared on Land and on Sea because of what the
hands of Man have earned, so that Allah may give them a taste
of some of their deeds in order that they may stop doing evil.
Last but not least Allah says in Koran 67:15:
It is He Who made the Earth manageable for you so walk through
its tracts and eat of his sustenance (to you) and to Him is
your resurrection.
From the above mentioned Koranic verses and others (see for example
Koran 3:14 6:151 10:31 17:31 29:60 65:3 67:21 72:16, etc..), we
understand that Allah has created and subjected all that is in the
Heavens and in the Earth to Man and gave Man the reason, the ability
and the skills to benefit of these bounties and showed him the best way
to reach Falah (prosperity and success) in this life and in the here-
after through Tazkiyah (purification and growth). Now it is for Man to
seek the satisfaction of his spiritual and material needs according to
Allah's ghariah or according to his own desires, bearing, however, the
consequences of his choice. These bounties, though they are like all
the other creatures of Allah, limited by time and space, are countless
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and more than sufficient to give a relatively balanced satisfaction to
all the needs of human beings, if these are managed and distributed
justly as recommended by Allah albeit some preferences may inevitably
follow as it is said in Koran 16:71: "Allah has bestowed His gifts of
sustenance more freely on some of you than on others, as a test". But
this should never creates any deprivation whatsoever. If however, the
management and the distribution of these material resources is contrary
to the Shariah, then injustice, exploitation and oppression are likely
to be present giving rise not only to economic problems such a inequa-
lity, the existence of different classes in the society with different
standards of living, unemployment, inflation, etc., but also to politi-
cal, social, psychological and judicial problems. And in this case, the
human beings, themselves, are to be blamed because it is they who have
thrown the fate of a part of their own society in jeopardy by means of
an unjust distribution system. So, according to the Islamic teachings,
the economic problem is not of scarcity of the natural resources which
are provided by Allah in due proportion, since this is a fact of life,
that everything is limited by space and time except Allah. So why
should they be unlimited if Human Beings themselves for whom they are
created, are limited?, nor is it the private ownership of the means of
production, since this may be regulated by moral religious and legal
means, but it is one of management and distribution.
Islam, in fact, does recognise the insatiability of Man's wants,
for instance, the prophet Mohammed (PBUH) said: "If Man had a valley of
gold, he would want a second one and if he had a second one he would
want a third one, and nothing satisfies Man's wants except dust". But
Allah wants Man to restrict his wants to Taybats (good and pure things)
that He made Halal (lawful) and to avoid Ehabayths (bad and impure
things) that He has made Haram (unlawful) as a test for Man. Allah says
in Koran 21:35: "We test you by good and evil by way of trial and to us
must be your return". And says in Koran 7:157: "He commands them what
is just and forbids them what is evil, He allows them what is good and
pure and prohibits for them what is bad and impure".
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Besides, Islam discourages Israf (extravagance) even in what is
lawful and encourages moderation. Allah says: "Eat and drink but do not
waste by excess for Allah does not like the extravagants" (Koran 2:31).
The Islamic stress on moderation as pointed out by Mannan (1984:61)
"makes the act of satisfying wants as a means to end rather than an end
itself. By implication, acts of satisfying wants may not necessarily
create new wave of wants... The moral and social responsibility imposed
on a Muslim as part of his faith puts a limit to the emergence of more
wants requiring satisfaction for himself". Thus, in Islamic society,
wants are restricted because constraints are imposed not only by in-
come but also by social and moral norms. So the real economic problem,
from the Islamic point of view is, as Mawdudi (1984:13) contends:
If we look at the question in a plain straightforward manner,
avoiding terminological and professional complications we find
the economic problem... to be no more than this: with a view
to sustaining and advancing human civilisation, how to arrange
economic distribution so as to keep all men supplied with the
necessities of existence and see that every individual in so-
ciety is provided with opportunities adequate to the develop-
ment of his personality and the attainment of the highest
possible development according to his capacity and aptitude.
1.4.3 The Principle of Ownership
Capitalism is characterised by the private ownership of the means
of production, in other words the individual can, according to the prin-
ciple of laissez faire laissez passer, own, purchase, produce or sell
any property he likes without any external intervention. The public or
common ownership of some means of production in some capitalist coun-
tries is an exception recognised only under social pressure which led
to the nationalisation of this or that sector.
The Communist economic system, on the other hand, is directly oppo-
sed to the capitalist system and is characterised by the common or col-
lective ownership of the means of production. The right of the
individual to own property of means of production is neither allowed
nor recognised except in some very limited circumstances when there is
no other way to raise the productivity or efficiency of this or that
sector without allowing some sort of limited private ownership. But the
general rule is that all means of production must be owned by the state
or the collectivity and not privately.
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Contrarily the Islamic economic system recognises and allows three
distinct forms of ownership to prevail side by side at the same time,
these are: private property, common property and state property, thus,
allowing a triple nature of possession and defines and determines the
field of each of these different forms of ownership, the detail of
which is beyond the scope of this study but briefly we can say that:
1-) Islam recognises the individual's right to ownership of all
types of property acquired by lawful means. It allows him to earn as
much wealth as he can get by his knowledge, skill and labour. This inc-
ludes all the rightly owned means of production and natural resources
like arable land, land for building, firms that produce or offer Halal
goods and services, machinery, crops, industrial products, livestock
etc.. The norms of acquisition and disposal of private and business
property and the purchase and sale of merchandise, are all discussed in
great detail in the Koran, the Sunnah and the rtihad and so are the
institution of Zakat (welfare due) and Mirath (inheritance) which would
not have been done in such detail if the institution of private owner-
ship of most productive resources had not been recognised by Islam.
Allah says in Koran 4:29: "0 you who believe! Devour not the property
of each other wrongfully, except that it be trading or by your mutual
consent. And says in Koran 4:2: And give to the orphans their property
and substitute not worthless things for their good ones".
2-) The state or public ownership includes the properties that are
not allowed to be owned by the private sector and not left to be used
freely for the common use. These include the energy and mineral resour-
ces like oil, coal, iron, gold, copper etc.. No individual singly or in
association with others should be given any right to own them or use
them for his (their) own personal benefit because these are gifts from
Allah to the whole society and every citizen of the Islamic state has
an equal right in it. The Islamic Flog' (jurisprudence) discussed in
detail which properties should be private and which should be public.
3-) The common or collective ownership includes all the remaining
natural resources that are not allowed to be owned by the private sec-
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tor and that have not been explored by the government such as rivers,
forests, pastures, etc.. These are to be used by anyone to the extent
that is judged by the society as non detrimental to the property itself
or to the society. Most Muslim scholars include these properties under
the ownership of the state but others like Sadr (1980) separate them
from the properties of the state because anyone can use them freely
with no need of a permission, whereas no one is allowed to use the
properties of the state, except the state itself by hiring labour from
the private sector. The prophet Mohammed (PBUH) said: "People are to
share three things: water, pasture and fire".
1.4.4 The Principle of Economic Freedom
The Capitalist Economic System allows, at least theoretically, al-
most unlimited Economic Freedom to the individual to initiate, organise
and establish any enterprise he likes and to purchase, produce or sell
anything he likes according to the principle of 'laissez faire, laissez
Dasser'. In other words the individual has freedom of choice with res-
pect to consumption, occupation, saving and investment. For example, he
can gamble, speculate or do whatever he likes to realise the maximum
profit possible and the government should not intervene in his business.
In Communism, Economic Freedom is almost completely abolished, as
is the right of ownership. Halm (1974:275) contended that: "The most
thorough going form of 'the centrally planned economy', 'Authoritarian
Socialism' or 'Common Economy' features the public ownership of a con-
trol over all productive resources, including labour, and the direction
of the economy by command from the centre according to all inclusive
plans. But this extreme form of central planning is not likely ever to
exist in real life nor can it be assumed that any government would
insist on distributing national income without allowing any choice on
the part of the consumers". Under the pressure of the impossibility to
achieve this goal, the Communist Economies were obliged to combine
public ownership of the means of production and central planning, with
as much personal freedom as this framework permits in terms of occupa-
tion and consumption but not in terms of ownership and production.
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The Islamic Economic System, however, recognising that the market
system cannot be relied upon in providing adequately for both private
and social needs, does not give individuals almost total freedom as in
Capitalism, nor does it abolish freedom almost completely as in Commu-
nism but allows Economic Freedom to the extent that it is within the
Shariah and that it is not detrimental to the society. Individuals are,
on one hand, allowed to engage in Halal transactions and contracts with
full free choice in the sense that any contract or transaction lacking
free mutual consent is considered to be void and invalid. But on the
other hand, they are not allowed to engage in Haram transactions and
contracts that are not permitted by Shariah and that are detrimental to
the society such as gambling, speculation, monopoly, taking and giving
interest, the production, distribution and consumption of pork, wine,
intoxicants and all other unlawful things. Mannan (1984:25) pointed out
that: "Islam allows private ownership of property but subjects the
owner to restrictions preventing him from using the property as a tool
of exploitation of the poor. His ownership of anything and everything
is relative, not absolute... Under Islamic state, anybody who is using
the private property as a tool of exploitation may be deprived of his
ownership... therefore, violation of any of the principles justifies
the intervention of the state to regulate and control private property
to the advantage of the greatest number of the people in a community".
In Islam, and as pointed out by Chapra (1979:23), the market mecha-
nism may also be considered to be an integral part of the Islamic eco-
nomic system because, on the one hand, the institution of private pro-
perty, that Islam allows, is not workable without it; and on the other,
it offers the consumers a chance to express their desires for the pro-
duction of Halal goods of their liking by their willingness to pay the
price, and also gives resource owners an opportunity to sell their re-
sources in accordance with their free will". This market however, is not
left to itself but the government stands ready to intervene at any time
to prevent Ihtikar (speculation and monopoly), Gharar (ambiguity and
deception), Istighlal (exploitation), Riba (interest), etc...
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El -Hisba is one of such institutions developed by the Muslims to
help regulate the society and economy and ensure the full flowering of
the Islamic norms of behaviour. The function of El -Hisba, as described
by Khurshid (1982:7): "consists in maintaining public law and order and
supervising the behaviour of the buyers and sellers in the market with
a view to ensure right conduct, and protect people from dishonesty and
malpractices. The purpose was to regulate public life in such a way
that a high degree of public morality is attained and the society is
protected from bad workmanship, fraud, extortion, exploitation, etc.".
1.4.5 The Principle of Social Justice
All schools of economics agree that the purpose of the economy is
to meet human needs and realise optimum social justice, but disagree
over how that meeting of needs and achieving of social justice does and
should take place. In a general way, every society must decide what to
produce, how to produce it and how to distribute it, a process that
Gruchy (1987) refers to as 'social provisioning'. For instance, before
Capitalism was compelled, under social pressure and fear of Communism
spread, to introduce labour laws that include the right to trade union,
insurance and social security, it was believed that economic justice is
best achieved through individual activities in the market place where
everybody is free to maximise his profit and utility, then and only
then when every individual intending to maximise only his own gain that
the interests of society achieve maximum utility because "every indivi-
dual intending only his own gain is", as believed by Adam Smith (1936)
"led by an 'invisible hand' to promote an end which was no part of
his intention, the interest of society". In Practice this proved to be
wrong because, in early Capitalism, and as Qardawi (1981:4) described:
Every man was responsible to earn what he likes and to spend
to his wishes. They observe that there is no compulsion for
the poor to live in poverty, nor there is any force to fling
them far from striving hard to earn their livelihood. Society
is not responsible for any person who lags behind intentional-
ly sitting idle pinning his faith on mere hope from the hea-
vens; that the rich are not bound to assist them and if they
do it is due to sheer pleasure for reward in the hereafter and
that is all. This system gave a fillip to greed, selfishness,
egoism, cruelty and exploitation. This made the women and
children to work in the factories and elsewhere (in very bad
conditions and for very long times) on meagre wages.
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Communists consider the private ownership of the means of production
and the economic freedom as the causes of all economic ills and injus-
tice and so they abolished the private ownership and replaced it with
collective ownership of the means of production and suppressed the eco-
nomic freedom of the individuals. "The bargain is very costly for the
individual who has to sacrifice his individuality, his rights to free-
dom and private property to get two meals a day" (Afzalur-Rahman 1974).
In a true Islamic state, social and economic justice should
neither be achieved by giving almost absolute liberty to individuals to
do what they like so that the rich become richer and the poor poorer,
nor by nationalising all means of production and curbing all human
rights and freedom. S. Qutub (1980:127) pointed out that:
Islam affirms that just as encroachments upon society by the
cupidity and ambition of the individual are a kind of social
oppression which is inconsistent with justice. Similarly, enc-
roachments upon the nature and ability of the individual by
society are also a kind of injustice. It is an injustice, not
only to the individual, but to the society also. For the evil
effects of suppressing the activity of the individual by cru-
shing his natural trends and propensities do not only result
in the deprivation of that one individual of his due but also
results in precluding the whole society from availing itself
of his maximum abilities.
Thus an Islamic economy is neither a 'laissez faire' economy nor a
'centrally-controlled command economy'. In other words the Islamic eco-
nomic system does not believe in the 'invisible hand' of capitalism nor
does it believe in achieving social and economic justice by nationali-
sing all means of production and curbing freedom. "Islam admits the
right to private ownership but does not consider it to be an absolute
and unconditional right which is bound to cause disorder on earth"
(Shafi 1975:6). It regards social and individual welfare as complemen-
tary rather than competitive and antagonistic. It therefore encourages
cooperation instead of competition and rivalry and develops an intimate
relationship between individuals (see Afzalur-Rahman 1982:350).
Islam prescribes a number of instruments that must be applied if
the society is to achieve real social and economic justice and reduce
the disparity that might appear between the rich and the poor as a con-
sequence of private ownership and of the difference in physical and in-
tellectual ability of the members of the society. It curbs the accumu-
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lation and concentration of wealth in few hands by positive and nega-
tive means. Among the negative means it prohibits, hoarding, interest,
gambling, monopoly, speculation and extravagance and among the positive
ones, it implements Allah's laws of Takafol (mutual help and solida-
rity), Waqf (dedication of private property for the general social use),
Mirath (inheritance), Zakat (welfare due), Sadaqat (charity) and PLS
finance. But first and foremost it enjoins on every individual to work
in one way or another, in Halal occupations to earn his livelihood and
the livelihood of his family and poor close relatives but if, for phy-
sical, social or economic handicap, he is unable to get much to satisfy
his basic needs, then, he has a right in the wealth of the community,
first in form of a pension from Bayt El-Mal (the Treasury) and second
in form of Takafol (mutual help from close relatives and friends).
Besides, the Islamic state must make sure that every capable citizen
has a job. In other words anyone who needs a job, the government should
either employ him in its public sector, or help him get a job in the
private sector or help him to set up his own business by lending him
capital on Oardh Hassan (interest free credit) basis. In the meantime
he should get unemployment benefit from Bayt El-Mal. By the way, social
benefits such as unemployment benefit, child benefit, old age benefit
(pension), which have been implemented only recently in capitalist
countries under social pressure, were all known and practiced in Islam,
more than 1400 years ago. It is the duty of the Islamic government to
collect Zakat (the welfare due) and distribute it to its beneficiaries,
and collect any other necessary taxes to reduce social inequality.
Abu Zahra (1957) asserted that Muslim jurists have unanimously held
that catering to the welfare and prosperity of the people and relieving
them from hardship is the basic objective of the Shariah and hence of
the Islamic state. Hassanu-Zamman (1981) indicated that the focal point
of the economic function of the Islamic State is the institution of
Bayt El-Mal whose very concept, as Doi (1984:387) remarked: His the
concept of trust: the wealth of Bavt El-Mal is to be treated as Mal-
Allah (Allah's wealth) or Hal-El-Muslimeen (the Muslims' wealth), as
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against the imperial treasury or the emperor's wealth as used to be
known during the Medieval period. This concept implied that monies paid
into the treasury were Allah's trust and the common property of all the
Muslims" and that the Khalifah (Caliph) was only in the position of
trustee whose duty was to expend them on the common concerns of all
Muslims while allowing for himself nothing more than a salary,
determined by Ma . lis El-Shurah (council of consultation) and which must
not exceed the income of an average citizen. This way, and as Shafi
(1975:9) put it: "The wealth instead of becoming concentrated in few
hands would be allowed to circulate in the society as widely as
possible, so that the distinction between the rich and the poor could
be narrowed down, as far as is natural and practicable.
1.5 CONCLUSION
From the above brief investigation of the relationship between
Islam and economics and of the features of the IES as compared to Capi-
talism and Communism, it is quite clear that no economic system can be
totally value-free, even Communism which claims to reject all moral and
religious principles is based upon certain values and concepts that
govern its institutions and working and that Islam has its own distinct
economic system which has nothing to do with Capitalism or Communism.
Thus, when Islam allows the private ownership of most of the means of
production, it does not mean that it is a capitalist system and when it
forces its welfare policies that narrow the gap between the have and
the have-nots, it does not mean that it is a communist or socialist
system but has its own distinct ideology, goals and means that are
drawn from the divine Shariah of Islam.
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CHAPTER WO
THE IMPORTANCE OF SAVINGS AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Postwar literature on economic development has confirmed the cent-
ral importance of domestic savings for capital accumulation and focus-
sed considerable attention on the process of financial intermediation
and its impact on growth and development though with differing emphasis
on the relative magnitudes of the impact attributed to financial insti-
tutions in the development process (see Porter 1966; Patrick 1966;
Gurley and Shaw 1967; Goldsmith 1966, 1969; Adelman and Morris 1967;
Cameron et al. 1972; McKinnon 1973; etc..).
The purpose of this chapter is: first, to stress the importance of
saving and intermediation for economic growth and development; second,
to examine the different hypotheses about the role of financial insti-
tutions in the saving investment-process and introduce what I call:
'The Islamic Hypothesis' as yet another alternative hypothesis; and
finally to investigate the relevance of these alternative hypotheses to
the financial and economic development of some Islamic and non Islamic
countries by using cross-section and time series-data analysis.
2.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF SAVINGS
Perhaps it is not an exaggeration to say that most if not all of
the economic growth theories, whether Classical, Keynesian, Marxist,
Neo-Classical or Islamic, agree on the fact that mobilisation of sa-
vings for investment is one of the most important pre-conditions for
accelerated economic development albeit in varying degrees. The central
importance of savings for capital accumulation and output growth was
emphasised in almost all discussions of economic development. For ins-
tance Mathias (1973:122) summed the Classical view in the following:
A long intellectual tradition emphasised that capital was the
critical factor of production and that shortage of savings and
hence capital, was a critical constraint upon the growth of an
economy. This certainly was the main emphasis of Classical
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economists led by Adam Smith who emphasised that expansion was
limited by the powers of 'accumulation' and that capital was
created by parsimony sparing resources from consumption.
In the Keynesian theory capital plays a central role in determining
the level of investment, production and employment and is considered to
be the most volatile component of the aggregate effective demand of the
economy. Keynes (1936) considers the investment of capital as an essen-
tial explanatory variable of economic progress, decline and stagnation.
The Harrod-Dommar growth theory, which is an important extension of the
Keynesian theory, relates the rate of income growth of a country to
its marginal propensity to save and its marginal capital-output ratio.
According to Marxian economics, although capital accumulation leads
to the ultimate destruction of the capitalist economy, the investment
of capital, however, leads to positive growth. Marx (1911) attributes
the positive growth to the reinvestment of the surplus expropriated by
the capitalists from the workers, as a result of their desire for
further accumulation of wealth.
According to Islamic economics, although the central key to econo-
mic dynamism and development depends on Man himself and on his Jihad
(effort, strive, struggle) within the collective will of the society,
the role of capital is neither denied nor neglected. In fact it is well
recognised that capital is necessary to accelerate the changes though
not sufficient to achieve the desired economic development that brings
about not only an increase in the national product but realises social
justice as well. To achieve this, other things are needed beside capi-
tal such as the Islamic education of people, the strong belief of the
concerned people in Islam, the right economic and monetary policies
that promote economic development and that comply with the Shariah, the
good management and efficiency of the financial and non financial ins-
titutions, etc.. But because these are seldom possible without capital
investment, Muslim economists, agree that savings are a necessary,
though not a sufficient condition for more growth and development.
Postwar economic development literature also emphasised the impor-
tance of savings for capital accumulation and economic growth. For ins-
tance, A. Lewis (1954:155) contended that: "The central problem in the
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theory of economic development is to understand the process by which a
community, which was previously saving and investing 4 or 5% of its na-
tional income or less, converts itself into an economy where voluntary
savings is running at about 12 to 15% of national income or more".
Rostow (1960), in analysing the stages of economic growth, adopted
Lewis' view and defined the state of 'take-off' into self-sustaining
growth as requiring, among other things, a rise in the rate of savings.
The United Nations (1980:8) report of the first group of experts on
programming techniques for economic development reported that:
The general rate of development is always limited by shortage
of productive factors. If any one scarce factor associated
with underdevelopment should be singled out, it would be capi-
tal. The final goal of development programming is, therefore
to find the best way of breaking the vicious circle between
capital shortage and underdevelopment and to design the most
efficient and optimum rate of capital accumulation. It would
be an over-simplification of course, to regard economic
development as a matter of capital accumulation alone. Other
things are needed in addition, such as the entrepreneurship
and training of workers and public administrations, technical
and managerial skills, other natural resources and the exis-
tence of a political, social and institutional framework
which exploits the impulses of expansion. Yet these are
seldom possible without some increase in capital formation.
It is also argued that capital increases by investment, and more in-
vestment necessitates more savings or foreign assistance. Foreign
assistance, if not in the form of grants, means some burden in the
future. Domestic savings are therefore the more reliable source of in-
vestment to break the vicious circle of poverty and underdevelopment.
How much capital will in fact be accumulated depends in the first place
on how much, out of current income, is saved rather than consumed.
Hence, the importance attached in discussions of economic development
to the rate of savings as well as to the specific forms of investment
such savings take (Taha 1976:1 and El-Zubair 1983:3).
As Meier (1976:267) pointed out: "The process of capital formation
involves three essential steps:
1- An increase in the volume of real savings so that resources
can be released for investment purposes;
2- The channeling of savings through a finance and credit
mechanism, so that investible funds can be collected from a
wide range of different sources and claimed by investors;
3- The act of investment itself, by which resources are used for
increasing the capital stock".
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To achieve the first step, there are many alternative but not
mutually exclusive techniques which may be compressed into two main
classes: internal and external sources (see Gurley and Shaw 1967:260;
Meier 1976:268 and Ragazzi 1981:50).
From internal sources, an increase of savings may be generated,
as Meier (1976:267-68) put it: "voluntarily through a reduction in con-
sumption, involuntarily through additional taxation, compulsory lending
to the government or inflation, or finally by the absorption of under-
employed labour into productive work". And from external sources, "the
financing of development may be met by the investment of foreign
capital, restriction of consumption imports, or an improvement in the
country's terms of trade" (ibid).
The policies relating to savings mobilisation depends on the poli-
tical and economic structure of the society. Government's savings, that
is the excess of current revenues over current expenditures, rarely ex-
ceeds 2 or 3% of GDP and often is negative in LDCs where the level of
real income is very low and large areas are still in the subsistence
economy, thus government revenues through taxation can hardly be inc-
reased because a country's taxation potential depends on a variety of
conditions: the level of real per capita income, the degree of inequa-
lity in the distribution of income, the structure of the economy, the
political leadership and administrative powers of the government (see
Meier 1976, Taha 1976 and Ragazzi 1981). Kaldor (1963:9) noticed that:
Many LDCs suffer not only from lack of revenue but also from
an international scale of priorities in the allocation of pub-
lic funds. Too much may be spent on the (real or fancied)
needs of defence or for ostentatious purposes of various
kinds, such as public buildings and ornaments, lavish diplo-
matic missions, etc..
Fiscal policy as a means of mobilising resources by the government
should, as Taha (1976:5) put it, be carefully manipulated so as not to
adversely affect the savings potential of the other sectors because, as
Meier (1976:268) argued: "The saving that is forced by additional taxa-
tion, is likely to be less than the additional tax revenue since there
may be a reduction in private voluntary savings institutions or a fall
in consumption by the amount of the tax". Besides, taxation is never
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popular and especially in the LDCs. It is clumsy, costly, and sometimes
involves bureaucracy, corruption, disputes, litigations, etc..
The government can also finance investment through compulsory lend-
ing or credit expansion. But in LDCs where there is little or no capi-
tal or money markets, there is only narrow scope for practicing compul-
sory lending through purchase of government bonds. Besides this may
also result, if practiced in poor countries, in reducing private volun-
tary savings instead of a fall in consumption by the full amount of the
compulsory lending. As for credit expansion, this method is inflationa-
ry and though the deliberate use of inflationary policies to promote
economic development has been recommended on theoretical grounds by
certain economists, inflation, as H. Johnson (1966:28) pointed out, is
likely to reduce and impede growth by distorting the allocation of re-
sources and wasting the inflation gathered development resources on
consumption, by increasing uncertainty and reducing incentives for in-
novation and improvement, and through their balance of payments effects
by fostering the inefficiencies of protectionism and exchange control.
Another internal source of savings is represented by the 'inves-
tible surplus' of underemployed labour. If this 'investible surplus' is
utilised in productive activity, the national output would be increased,
and the required savings might be generated from the additional output.
It should also be noted that the direct formation of capital through
the use of underemployed labour can be obtained by what is termed the
'unit multiplier' method. If labour does have zero productivity in
agriculture, it can be withdrawn and put to work on investment projects
(construction, irrigation works, and buildings etc..) without a drop in
agricultural output. Most of the payment of the additional wages will
be directed towards foodstuffs, and agricultural income will rise. The
higher income may then be taxed, and the tax revenue can finance the
investment projects... This method depends upon the ease with which
labour can be attracted to investment projects, the • degree to which
labour can form capital without requiring additional investment expen-
diture, the absence of an adverse effect on agricultural output, and
the capacity to offset the investment with taxation (Meier 1976:268).
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Corporate savings too, as Ragazzi (1981:50) noticed, is limited in
many LDCs because of the smallness of this sector. It is the savings of
the non corporate (household) sector that is of crucial significance in
most middle and low income LDCs, because this is the only surplus
sector in the sense that its savings exceed its investment. Thus, the
growth of the government and corporate sectors is critically related to
the mobilisation of savings from this surplus sector.
But most LDCs are generally characterised by low levels of savings
because of low per capita incomes and lack of sound financial institu-
tions and instruments that are compatible with the beliefs and customs
of the majority of the people. Nevertheless, however poor an economy
may be, households save in one form or another. Thus, the need for the
institutions which allow such savings to be collected and invested con-
veniently and safely and which ensure that these savings are channeled
into the most useful purposes. Keynes (1936:107-08) lists eight main
motives of a subjective character which lead individuals to save:
1-) To build up a reserve against unforeseen contingencies;
2-) To provide for an anticipated future relation between the
income and the needs of the individual or his family,
different from that which exists in the present as for
example in relation to old age, family education, or the
maintenance of dependents;
3-) To enjoy interest and appreciation, because a larger real
consumption at a later date is preferred to a smaller
immediate consumption
4-) To enjoy a gradually increasing expenditure since it gra-
tifies a common instinct to look forward to a gradually
improving standard of life rather than the contrary, even
though the capacity for enjoyment may be diminishing;
5-) To enjoy a sense of independence and the power to do
things, though without a clear idea or definite intention
of specific action;
6-) To secure a masse de manoeuvre to carry out speculative
or business projects;
7-) To bequeath a fortune;
8-) To satisfy pure miserliness, ie unreasonable but insis-
tent inhibitions against acts of expenditure as such.
2.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERMEDIATION
There are among economists those who attribute a positive role to
financial institutions in the development process, and there are those
who regard it as a passive factor. Among those who attribute a positive
role, mention may be made about Adam Smith (1937:281) who once wrote:
"I have heard it asserted that the trade of the City of Glasgow doubled
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about 15 years after the first erection of the banks there and the
trade of Scotland has more than quadrupled since the first erection of
the two public banks in Edinburgh... that the banks have contributed to
this increase cannot be doubted".
Schumpeter, who (1949) argued that two factors are essential for
economic development: financial institutions and availability of entre-
preneurs. Regarding the former he hold that: "financing as a special
act is fundamentally necessary in practice and in theory".
Porter (1966:347) who pointed out that: "the visible correlations
in the world between financial and real development are indeed comman-
ding whether one relates the development of the nation's financial
system (however measured) to its per capita income across countries at
a moment of time or across time for a particular country, the relation-
ship between real and monetary variables, is undeniable".
Adelman and Morris (1967) who showed in their study of 74 LDCs for
the years 1950-63 that financial development has been associated fairly
closely to the capacity of these nations to develop, compared to other
39 economic and non-economic factors, with differences in the level and
rate of growth of real national product per head. Out of 14 purely
economic variables, they found that the level of financial development
is the best indicator of a country's development potential.
Goldsmith (1969), who quantified, in his study of 35 DCs and LDCs,
the association between the financial superstructure and the real eco-
nomic infrastructure by what he called the 'financial interrelations
ratio (FIR) which is equal to the value of outstanding financial inst-
ruments divided by the value of national wealth (physical assets plus
the net foreign balances) for each of these countries. He found that
the FIR is in the range of 1 and 1.5 for DCs and in the range of 2/3 to
1 for LDCs. He also found that the FIR increases over the course of
industrialisation up to a certain level and then remains fairly stable,
which indicates that the role of financial institutions is especially
very important during the early stages of industrialisation and deve-
lopment. From these observations he concluded that, with the exception
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of the centrally planned economies, there is only one major path of fi-
nancial development associated with economic development. He contended
that the financial superstructure in the form of both primary and secon-
dary securities accelerates economic growth and improves economic per-
formance to the extent that it facilitates the migration of funds to
the best user". Thus, he considers the relationship between financial
and real development as direct and visible and concludes that:
the evidence now available is more in favour of the hypothe-
sis that there exists only one major path of financial deve-
lopment, a path marked by certain regulations in the course of
financial interrelations ratio in the share of financial ins-
titutions in the total financial assets, and in the position
of the banking system. From that path countries have deviated
only to a minor extent.
Other proponents of the positive view of the role of financial ins-
titutions include: Gerschenkron (1962), Patrick (1966), Minsky (1972),
Cameron et al. (1972), McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973) to name but a
few. All of these are strong advocates of the efficiency of financial
development in contributing significantly to the real growth of the
LDCs, though in varying degrees.
The negative view of the contribution of financial institutions to
economic development is particularly associated with Gurley (1967) who
explicitly expressed skepticism and challenged the prominence of finan-
cial development in economic development. Unlike Goldsmith (1966) who
emphasised the role of financial development towards economic develop-
ment, Gurley, though not questioning the efficiency of the development
of financial institutions per se, insisted on the existence of alterna-
tive techniques that may prove more feasible in a country's comprehen-
sive aggregate planning approach, such as central planning, fiscal or
tax subsidy techniques and transfer of foreign savings and pointed out
that: "the actual choice among these techniques depends on the social
cost and benefits of each". He argued that economic costing may prove
secondary and the overriding criteria may be whether the chosen tech-
nique is generally compatible with the ideology of the country. He did
not consider any of these techniques as best for all countries or for
one country over its entire development path and admitted that he has
not performed any systematic analysis of the costs and benefits of
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these alternatives for a country over time or for a group of count-
ries. He just contended that such choices are subject to change as the
balance of benefits and costs is altered over time and concluded that:
"recent experiences strongly suggest that banking systems as interme-
diaries are not highly essential to the growth process".
The passive contribution of financial institutions to economic de-
velopment is also based on the experience of socialist countries where
central planning is considered to be the central key to economic deve-
lopment and on the experience of some LDCs where financial institutions
have played little or no role in promoting growth and development.
The controversy over the relationship between financial and real
development is most thoroughly discussed by Patrick (1966) in his ana-
lysis of finance in developing economies in which he distinguishes the
two opposing viewpoints by delineating them as 'demand-following' and
'supply-leading' finance. He defined the former as "the phenomenon in
which the creation of modern financial institutions, their financial
assets and liabilities and related financial services is in response to
the demand for these services by investors and savers in the real
economy" (p.174) and defined the latter as: "the creation of financial
institutions and the supply of their financial assets, liabilities and
related financial services in advance of demand for them" (p.175).
According to him, the 'demand-following' approach implies that
finance is essentially passive and permissive in the growth process.
Thus its contribution to economic development is minimal. He cites late
18th and early 19th century England as a historical example and those
modelled after it, though as Abdi (1977:19) pointed out: "economics'
historians differ in their assessment of the contributions of these
banking systems to their respective economies" and "whether the English
banking system contributed only minimally to the early industrialisa-
tion and economic growth of the country is disputed".
'The supply-leading' finance is, according to him, associated with
positive growth inducing of developing economies through its allocative
efficiency and encouragement of enterprise. It fulfills 2 functions:
34
1- transfer resources from traditional (non growth) sectors
to modern sectors, and
2- promote and stimulate an entrepreneurial response in these
modern sectors (pp.175-6).
He contended that: "New access to such supply-leading funds may in
itself have substantial, favourable expectational and psychological
effects on entrepreneurs. It opens new horizons as to possible alterna-
tives, enabling the entrepreneur to 'think big'. This may be the most
significant effect of all, particularly in countries where entrepreneur-
ship is a major constraint on development" (p.176). 'Supply-leading'
finance, however, may play a more direct role in the development of the
entrepreneurial impulse by extending financial and non financial servi-
ces to DEUs than 'demand-following' finance. Germany and Japan where
enterprises receive both financial and non financial assistance from
banks and where banks participate actively in the success of the enter-
prises operations, are associated with 'supply-leading' finance.
Patrick, however, realised that these phenomenon are not rigid to a
country over time and that in actual practice, there is likely to be an
interaction of 'supply-leading' and 'demand-following' phenomena with
the former dominating at the early stages of the development, becoming
less important as the process of growth progresses. He contended that:
"this sequential process is also likely to occur within and among speci-
fic industries or sectors. One industry may, initially be encouraged
financially on a 'supply-leading' basis and as it develops, have its
financing shift to 'demand-following' while another industry remains in
the 'supply-leading' phase".
2.4 THE ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES ABOUT THE trrECTIVE ROLE
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
According to Abdi (1977:26) and Gupta (1984:1), the hypotheses put
forward on the role of commercial banks in the savings-investment pro-
cess may be classified into two distinct hypotheses: the structuralist
hypothesis and the financial repression hypothesis. But with the recent
emergence of Islamic Economics and Islamic Banking one could add a
third hypothesis which may be called 'The Islamic Hypothesis' and which
I attempt to present and discuss after discussing the former ones.
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2.4.1 The Structuralist Hypothesis
According to this hypothesis, the positive role of banks in the
saving-investment process, depends on how widespread is the network of
these financial institutions and on the overall structure of the finan-
cial system which in turn depends on the relative backwardness of the
country's economy in question.
This hypothesis is associated with Gerschenkron's analysis of the
role of banking systems in the capital formation processes of early
industrialisation of Western European countries and the Soviet Union.
Using "the relative degree of backwardness" not only as an indicator of
the potential of a country's industrialisation, but also as a determi-
nant of the behaviour of its economic institutions, Gerschenkron (1962)
classified European countries on the basis of their relative backward-
ness, with Britain coming first in the list as the most developed,
Germany coming mid-way in the classification and Russia as the most
backward economy coming last. Despite the questionable criteria he used
and the lack of precision of the classification of relative states of
backwardness, Gerschenkron concluded that: "As the relative backward-
ness of an economy increases, the role of the banks in industrial capi-
tal formation declines so that in the extreme case of backwardness
where the need for capital is large and the confidence in the banking
system is low, the structure of the economy is such that not even the
banks could supply the necessary capital and entrepreneurship required
for industrialisation and development citing Russia as an example of
such a case he contends on p.22:
The scarcity of capital in Russia was such that no banking
system could conceivably succeed attracting sufficient funds
to finance a large scale industrialisation. The standard of
honesty in business were so disastrously low, the general
distrust of the public so great that no bank could have hoped
to attract even such capital funds as were available, and no
bank would have successfully engaged in long term credit
policies in an economy where fraudulent bankruptcy had been
almost elevated to the rank of a general business practice.
For this type of economy the structuralists holds that the mobili-
sation and allocation of savings would have to be accomplished through
substitute institutions such as the state (MIDdi 1977:16). Gerschenkron
also found that in the more developed economies like Britain, the role
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of the banks in financing development was minimal because of the avai-
lability of alternative sources of finance. Only in moderately balanced
economies where the level of business trust increases and banks' risk
aversion decreases, will the banks have an impact on the economic deve-
lopment. Citing Germany as the best example of such category where the
banks, in essence, were the prime source of capital and entrepreneur-
ship for this type of industrialisation he contended:
A German bank, as the saying went, accompanied an industrial
enterprise from 'cradle to grave' from establishment to liqui-
dation throughout all the vicissitudes of its existence
through the device of formally short term but in reality long
term current accounts credits... the banks acquired a formi-
dable degree of ascendancy over industrial enterprises which
extended far beyond the sphere of financial control into that
of entrepreneurial and managerial decisions. According to this
approach, the pattern of industrialisation in an economy and
the contribution of institutions such as the state and the
banks is determined by its relative backwardness.
Goldsmith (1966), who takes the structuralist view using a single
equation model, argued that the size of a country's financial structure
as proxied by the FIR (Financial Interrelations Ratio) which is equal
to the ratio of total financial assets to total wealth, was determined
by its per capita income, its rate of growth and the actual rate of inf-
lation. He reached almost the same conclusions reached by Gerschenkron.
Bhatia and Khatkhate (1975), however, examined the relationship of
financial development to economic development in 11 African countries,
using a narrower definition of FIR because of lack of data, and using
alternately currency, demand deposits, time and savings deposits and
also their total, as a proportion of GDP, but they did not find any
systematic pattern or definitive relationship discerned between finan-
cial intermediation and growth in many of the African countries.
2.4.2 The Financial Repression Hypothesis
The financial repression hypothesis is associated with the works
of Cameron et al. (1972), McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), Galbis (1976),
Fry (1982) and others. These authors are strong advocates of the
efficacy of financial development in contributing significantly to the
real growth of LDCs. They emphasise that the financial sector of any
economy is invariably growth inducing and that is only when it is
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repressed, which, in their view, is often the case, that would it fail
to make a positive contribution or acts as an obstacle to real growth.
According to them, without distortions of interest rates, the banks
will have the largest impact on developing economies. They suggest what
they call 'financial liberalisation' or 'financial deepening' as the
right solution to the problem (Abdi 1977:26).
The financial repression hypothesis explains the poor performance
of banks and other financial institutions in LDCs as being related to
the fragmentation of the financial markets caused by administrative
constraints on interest rates that impede them to reflect the relative
scarcity of resources, ceilings on deposits and loan rates which are in
nominal terms and which result in low and often negative real rates of
return on financial assets, lending policies which place exclusive em-
phasis on short term lending and on collateral security, inflation and
attempted deflation which aggravates the situation and make it even
worse. In such situation, "it is hardly surprising that savers respond
to low real returns by reducing their holdings of money and near monies
far below what might be considered socially optimum" (McKinnon 1973:69).
The proponents of this hypothesis advocate an increase in the
efficiency of bank lending in the form of positive real interest rates
policy, in the effective mobilisation of savings and their efficient
allocation to alternative investment projects, which is, according to
McKinnon (1973:26): "a necessary condition for enlarging the real size
of the monetary system and for alleviating financial repression". Thus,
according to them, free market forces and financial liberalisation
would bring about an optimum financial structure and development which
would eliminate the fragmentation of markets and realise the desired
economic development. In other words, government should abandon inter-
vention policies, particularly in the financial sphere, thereby crea-
ting the conditions for the emergence and growth of financial insti-
tutions and let the market forces free to guarantee maximum financial
deepening and best efficiency in credit allocation.
Vogel and Buser (1976) tested the repressionist hypothesis for 16
Latin American countries using pooled time-series data for the period
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1950-71 and using as proxies for financial deepening currency/GDP; de-
mand deposits/GDP and time deposits/GDP. In one set of regressions, the
independent variables were the current and one period lagged values of
the actual rate of inflation and real GDP. In another set of regres-
sions, a simple average of the two period values of the independent va-
riables was used. They found in both cases that inflation has a consis-
tently significant and negative effect and concluded that: "these high
levels of significance confirm the contribution of inflation to finan-
cial repression while the low elasticities for currency and demand de-
posits strongly support Shaw's view that financial repression may pro-
ceed to the point where the willingness to hold those assets that are
used for transaction purposes is no longer very responsive to inflation
because of the high cost of reversion to barter". But their model and
results were criticised of being suffering from serious limitations.
It is argued that, although their estimating equations are derived from
a portfolio selection model no effort is made to incorporate a variable
measuring uncertainty which appears in the theoretical version. Further
the real rates of interest were approximated by the actual rates of in-
flation, a highly questionable assumption (see Gupta 1984:10).
Williamson (1968) using cross-section data for 6 countries (Burma,
India, Japan, Korea, Philippines and Taiwan) to examine the effect of
real interest rates on savings, found the effect to be either negative
or statistically insignificant. He found the effect to be significantly
negative for half of the countries (Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines)
and speculated that this was probably due to the interdependence bet-
ween savings and investment decision making in the Asian households. If
their saving decisions were dependent on their investment decisions,
higher interest rates by discouraging investment would also reduce
their savings. This assumed, as Snyder (1974:146) pointed out that:
"capital markets are so important that the entrepreneur has no safe
outlet for his savings other than in his own business or firm".
In a more elaborate study, Wai (1972) examining the effect of the
real interest rates on savings in DCs and LDCs, found only 3 signifi-
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cant cases among the LDCs (Tunisia, Brazil and Nicaragua) and all of
these cases were negative, thus supporting Williamson's findings. Using
two alternate interest rate variables for Latin America, bond yield and
deposit rate, he found that both variables had significant and positive
effects and that actual inflation had a significantly negative effect.
As for the other 23 LDCs from Africa, Asia and the Middle-East neither
real nor nominal interest rate and nor inflation rate were significant.
For this group interest rate was proxied mostly with the discount rate.
From his time-series regressions for both DCs and LDCs he concluded
that: "for the overwhelming majority of both developed and developing
countries, there were no significant results, either way for both real
interest rates or prices. Therefore one cannot draw conclusions from
the evidence of the country equations about the influence of prices and
interest rates on real savings" (p.127).
In a recent study, Gupta (1984), estimating the real interest rate
(ex-ante) and their relationship with the nominal interest rate in 11
Asian countries -to examine the validity of the repressionist's policy
prescription that nominal deposits rates should be raised high, which,
ceteris Daribus, would lead to high real (ex-ante) rates-, found that
for 8 of the 11 countries (Burma, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philip-
pines, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand) the correlation between the
nominal interest rate and the real (ex-ante) rates, is negative and
that only for Indonesia, Korea and Taiwan is the correlation positive
and concluded by saying: "It is clear that for 8 of the 11 countries,
increases in nominal deposit rates are no guarantee that the real rate
(ex-ante) will also increases. In fact, our results suggest something
even stronger, namely that high nominal rates may rather lead to lower
or negative real rates (ex-ante). To the extent that financial deepen-
ing is a function of real rates, it follows that a policy of high nomi-
nal interest rates may not always lead to greater financial deepening".
2.4.3 The Islamic Hypothesis
This hypothesis, about the role of banks in economic development
can be inferred from the Koran, the Sunnah, the I'tihad and the recent
literature on Islamic economics and Islamic banking. As mentioned ear-
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her, all the sources of Islam prohibit Riba and allow profit because
Allah says in Koran 2:275: Allah has allowed trade and prohibited inte-
rest. This led to the fact that the majority of Muslim populations are
reluctant to give or take interest and thus, are unwilling to deposit
their savings with Interest Based Banks (IBBs). Among those who deal
with these banks, do so only in some very confined circumstances where
it was not possible for them to avoid transacting with a bank and, even
then, they tend to prefer interest-free transactions and interest-free
accounts such as current account (Demand Deposit) rather than Time and
Savings Deposit accounts which bear interest. And among those who do
deposit their savings in time deposit accounts, some tend not to take
the interest for themselves but leave it to the bank to dispose of it
or draw it but give it to poor people as a charity without expecting a
reward for it, hoping thus to escape the chastisement of taking Riba.
Chapra (1985:159) pointed out that: "In practically all Muslim
countries the conventional banks have been unable to penetrate a predo-
minant part of the rural as well as urban population because of a num-
ber of factors, an important one being the lack of faith of the Muslim
masses in interest based banking institutions". For instance, despite
the fact that Egypt was the first Islamic country where modern IBBs
were introduced in 1856 (see 10.3 below), and despite the fact that
many attempts were made to draw a distinction between Riba and inte-
rest, claiming that Islam prohibits only interest on consumption loans
but not interest on productive loans or on bank deposits and loans thus
trying to persuade uneducated people to deposit their savings in the
banks and to take loans from the banks at interest (see 4.5 below), the
majority of the Muslim Egyptian population, as in many other Islamic
countries, has never had dealings with banks. Because of this, capital
formation had been impaired. Tarbush (1981) pointed out that: "Until
the 1970s only 4% of the Egyptians expected to use banks, do so". Howe-
ver, Traute and Nienhaus (1982:251) commenting on the first successful
experiment of Islamic Banking in Egypt (see 3.5 below), wrote:
The basic idea behind the Islamic savings bank experiment was
that the process of capital formation in countries like Egypt
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cannot work adequately not because of a lack of saving motiva-
tion or ability in the population, but because of a lack of
financial institutions which are within reach and trustworthy
to a vast majority of the population, especially, in rural
areas. The non-integration of the majority of the population
into the (interest based) financial system may be indicated by
the fact that 90% of the population of Islamic countries or
even more, are said to have no accounts at all in any of the
financial institutions (while in industrial countries this
situation is rather reverse).
Arabia (No.42 1985) reported that: "Three quarters of a century of
deliberate secularisation have hardly touched more than Turkey's peri-
phery. 90% of Turks are said not to favour using interest based banks".
Parker (1984:17) wrote that: "Stories abound of wealthy Saudis with
occasionally as much as £200 million to their names who consistently
refuse interests on their bank deposits".
The reluctance of these people to deposit their savings with banks
does not mean that these people do not save, on the contrary, they save
substantial parts of their incomes, however small their incomes may be
for social events, emergencies, and the like, such as building a house,
circumcision of children, weddings, Haij (pilgrimage), Eids (religious
feasts), etc.. However, these savings are made in real assets in form
of jewellery, land, real estate etc., or hoarded in the pillows, under
the mattresses or underground. It is true that Islam also prohibits
Iktinaz (hoarding) but the prohibition of Riba (interest) is stronger.
In fact, it is the most severely prohibited thing in Islam after Shirk
(polytheism). It is the only thing that Allah declared war against (see
Koran 2:279). As Traute (1983:79) pointed out: "a precondition, however
for any change of behaviour from hoarding and 'real assets saving' to
financial savings is the creation of financial institutions which would
not violate the religious principles of large segments of the popula-
tion. Only then could the vast majority of the population be integra-
ted into the process of capital formation" .
Muslim economists are strong advocates of the efficacy of finan-
cial development in contributing significantly to the real growth of
developing countries and they contend that only when it runs against
the belief of the majority of the population of a country that it fails
to make a positive contribution to its economic development. They argue
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that the poor performance of IBBs in mobilising savings in Muslim coun-
tries is neither due to structural deficiencies nor to financial rep-
ression of interest rates, though both may exist, but is mainly due to
the very existence of interest (be it small or large, real or nominal)
since the majority of Muslims are insensitive or indifferent to changes
in interest rates because of the Islamic injunctions against it. Howe-
ver, if Islamic Shariah is implemented, interest is abolished and banks
were PLS based as Shariah prescribes, then the Islamic Banks should be
more effective in mobilising the dormant resources that are hoarded.
Muslim economists suggest that if Islamic countries are to develop,
they have to reconcile not only their banking system with Islam but all
their institutions (political, cultural, social and economic) with the
Shariah; for unless this is so, the efficiency of the partially imple -
ented Shariah will be very much limited and/or may even lead to adverse
results for Allah says in /Koran 13:11: Allah will not change the situa-
tion of a people until they change themselves".
Among the earliest proponents of Islamic banking, to name but a
few, are Mawdudi (nd); Uzair (1974); Quereshi (1974); El Naggar (1974);
Muslehuddin (1974); Mannan (1974); Abdou (1976); Afzalur -Rahman (1979);
Siddiqi (1983a, 1983b); and El -Sadr (nd). They all attack the institu-
tion of interest not only from the moral, social and religious point of
views but from the economic point of view as well, and argue that since
Allah has forbidden interest, then there must be something wrong with
it, pointing out that interest is at the root of many economic ills
such as inflation, unemployment, World debt crisis, etc..
2.5 THE RELEVANCE OF THE HYPOTHESES
In order to: (1) assess and test the relevance of the above men-
tioned hypotheses to Muslim and non Muslim countries, 18 countries have
been selected in the following way:
a- 5 Non Muslim Developed Countries (NMDCs): Austria, Canada,
Finland, Japan and Spain
b- 5 Non Muslim Less Developed Countries (NMLDCs): Guatemala,
Guyana, India, Jamaica and Thailand
c- 4 Muslim Countries With Islamic Banks (MCWIBs): Egypt,
Jordan, Pakistan and Sudan.
d- 4 Muslim Countries With No Islamic Banks (MCWN1Bs) before
1985: Algeria, Morocco, Syria and Turkey.
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The selection of countries was based on 3 criteria: (1) The selec-
tion was made so as each group is made up of countries with high, mid-
dle and low per capita incomes within the same category. (2) Countries
in each group were selected from as wide a geographical base as pos-
sible and (3) The availability of data (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 Criteria used for selecting the countries.
Country	 Geographical
	 1984 GNP/c To High Medium Low
position	 in US$ represent GNp/c	 GNp/c GNP/c
Austria	 central Europe	 9140 NMDCS
Canada	 Far West	 13280
Finland	 Northern Eur.
	 10770
Japan	 Far East Asia	 10630
Spain	 Southern Eur.
	 4440 ff
Guatemala Latin America
	 1160 NMLDCs
Guyana	 South America	 590
India	 Asia	 260
Jamaica	 Central America 	 1150
Thailand	 Far East Asia	 860
Egypt
	
Middle East	 720 MCWIBS
Jordan	 II	 1570
Pakistan	 Far East Asia	 380
Sudan	 Sub-Sahara	 360
Algeria	 North Africa	 2410 MCWNIBs
Morocco	 670
Syria	 Middle East
	 1620
Turkey
	 Europe	 1160
Source :The World Bank: World Development Report, 1986
Since there is no precise definition of financial development, fi-
nancial deepening, economic structure or their measurement, proxies in
the form of ratios were used in correlation, regression, tabular and
graphical analyses for individual as well as for groups of countries
for the period 1965-84, using cross section and time series data. The
ratios used are: M2/M1; M2/GDP; QM/M2; Ml/M2; TSD/TLD; BTA/GDP;
BTF/GDP; TSD/GDP; DD/M1; NIR; CCPI and RIR Where:
GDP = Gross Domestic Product; 	 DD = Demand Deposits;
M1 = currency outside banks + DD; QM = Quasi Money;
M2 = M1 + QM;
	
BTA = Banks' Total Assets;
TSD = Time and Savings Deposits;
	 BTF = Banks' Total Finance;
TLD = Total Deposits;
	 NIR = Nominal Interest Rates;
CCPI = Change in Consumer Price Index; RIR = Real interest Rates;
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The averages of these ratios together with the averages of GDP/c
of each of the selected countries and of their groupings were calcula-
ted for the whole period 1965-84 and for its breakdown into two sub-
periods: 1965-74 and 1975-84, and presented in tables 2.2 below.
The percentage point changes of the ratios of the 1975-84 period
over those of the 1965-74 period are presented in table 2.3 and the re-
sults of the correlation and regression analyses are presented in
tables 2.4 and 2.5. The reason for dividing the period 1975-84 into two
sub-divisions is to gauge the improvement made by every group and every
country in the last decade over the previous one.
Testing the Structuralist Hypothesis
The following ratios: M2/GDP, M1/M2, BTA/GDP and TSD/GDP have been
used for the purpose of testing the structuralist hypothesis with the
data of the selected countries. The results obtained are as follows:
1- When regressing GDP/c on M2/GDP and correlating between them
for all the countries (Miles) taken together or for their sub-groups
(NNIDCs, NMIDCs, MCWIBs and MCWNIBs), it was found that for all groups
except for MCWNIBs, there was a significant relationship, this is
because, despite the fact that this latter recorded the highest growth
in terms of GDP/c (265%) compared to other groups, their M2/GDP growth
was the lowest (1.35%) (see Table 2.3). However the regression analysis
for individual countries showed that one country of each group has no
significant relationship. These countries are: Finland among the NMDCs,
Guyana among the NMIDCs, Pakistan among the MCWIBs and Turkey among the
MCWNIBs. Finland, because its M2/GDP remained stable around 42% whereas
its GDP/c grew by more than 224% from an average of US$2668 for the
period 1965-74 to an average of US$8655 for the period 1975-84. Guyana,
because its M2/GDP grew much faster (ie more than 100%) than its GDP/c
which grew by only 47% for the period 1975-84 over the period 1965-74.
In fact Guyana recorded the lowest rate of growth in terms of GDP/c and
the highest rates of growth in terms of M2/GDP, BTA/GDP, BTF/GDP compa-
red to other countries. As for Pakistan and Turkey, their GDP/c grew at
an ARG of 229% and 175% respectively in the decade 1975-84 over the
previous one and their M2/GDP declined by -4% and -2.6% respectively
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(see table 2.3). This is also reflected in their negative correlation
ratios of -4% and -15% respectively (see table 2.4)
2- When regressing and correlating GDP/c and Ml/M2, it was found
that there are significant negative relationships for all the countries
except for Finland, Guyana and Jamaica which recorded non significant
positive relationships and Sudan which recorded a non significant nega-
tive relationship. The relationship is also significantly negative for
all the groups. This means that the higher the income the lower the use
of money and the higher the use of quasi-money. The negative relation-
ships do not mean that the structuralist hypothesis is not valid here.
On the contrary, this does give support to the structuralist hypothesis
in the sense that with the development of financial and economic struc-
ture of the country, people switch from money to quasi-money (from cur-
rency and demand deposits to time and savings deposits) and this is to
be expected. Concerning the countries Finland, Guyana and Jamaica, they
recorded positive, albeit not significant relationship because their
ratios of Ml/M2 for 1975-84 were slightly greater than those of 1965-
74, their rates of growth were 2.7%, 1% and 7.9% respectively.
3- When regressing GDP/c on BTA/GDP and correlating between them
for the groups of countries, significant relationships were found to
exist for every group. However, the correlation and regression analyses
for individual countries revealed that there was no evidence of a
strong relationship for Guyana, Pakistan and Turkey. Guyana because its
BTA/GDP grew by a staggering 180.6% (the highest compared to those of
other countries) in 1975-84 as compared to 1965-74 while its GDP/c grew
by only 47% (the lowest compared to those of other countries). As for
Pakistan and Turkey, the opposite case happened since their BTA/GDP
ratios grew by only 3.7% and 11.2% respectively while their GDP/c grew
by 229.1% and 175.1% respectively for the same period.
4- When regressing GDP/c on TSD/GDP and correlating between them
for the groups of countries it was found that for all groups there was
a significant relationship, however no significant relationship was
found to exist for a number of countries when taken individually. For
instance both Finland and Japan among the NMDCs recorded a non signifi-
49
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cant relationship because, whereas their GDP/c grew by 224% and 283%
respectively for the period 1975-84 over the period 1965-74, their
TSD/GDP ratios grew only by 0.29% and 10.95% respectively. This can
also be seen from the low correlation ratios which were 18% and 34%
respectively (see table 2.4). Guyana and Jamaica among the NMIDCs also
experienced a non significant relationship. Guyana, because its TSD/GDP
grew faster than its GDP/c (103% as against 47%) and Jamaica, because
the opposite case happened since its TSD/GDP grew by only 16.99% compa-
red to the growth of its GDP/c which reached 75.41%. The correlation
ratios for both countries were 30% and 38% respectively. Turkey among
the MCWNIBs also recorded a non significant relationship because its
TSD/GDP did not grew as fast as its GDP/c. Its TSD/GDP grew by only
4.04% for the period 1975-84 over the period 1965-74 whereas its GDp/c
grew by 175%. The very low correlation ratio of 1.4% confirms it.
Testing the Repress ionist and the Islamic hypotheses
Because the Muslim economists hold a diametrically opposed theory
to that of the Financial Repression theorists especially concerning the
relationship between interest rates and financial development, the cor-
relation and regression regression analyses of the following ratios
were carried out in order to test both hypotheses: TSD/GDP on RIR;
BTA/GDP on RIR; TSD/TLD on RIR and TSD/BTA on RIR (see Table 2.5). The
results obtained were as follows:
1- When regressing TSD/GDP on RIR and correlating them, it was
found that, with the exception of Finland which showed a significant
positive relationship all the other countries whether taken individual-
ly or in groups, have either a negative or a non significant positive
relationship. The lowest near significant negative relationships were
those of the Islamic countries like Sudan, Algeria, Morocco and Syria.
In fact Sudan and Morocco have significant negative relationships. This
to some extent give support to the Islamic hypothesis and reject the
repression hypothesis not only as far as the Islamic countries are con-
cerned but also for non Islamic countries. Finland is the only country
where there is a significant positive relationship suggesting that its
people are sensitive to interest rates and since their RIR went down
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from an average of -0.7% in 1965-74 to an average of -2% in 1975-84 at
a highly negative rate of growth of -187% so did its rate of savings
or in fact it merely grew by 0.3% during the same period.
2- When regressing BTA/GDP on RIR and correlating between them,
it was found that for all groups of countries the relationship is a ne-
gative one and that it is more negative in the case of the Islamic
countries than it is in the case of the non Islamic ones. In fact it is
significantly negative in the case of the MCWNIBs (see the correlation
ratios in table 2.5). Concerning individual countries, none of the
countries except Sudan had a significant relationship. They all had
either a very low positive relationship or a negative one. The signifi-
cant relationship for Sudan is not a positive but a negative one, which
suggests that when interest rates go up, BTA/GDP goes down significant-
ly and vice versa. In fact as can be seen from table 2.3 the BTA/GDP
ratio for Sudan grew from 13.7% in 1964-73 to 25% in 1974-83 by an ARG
of 81.9% while its RIR went down from -0.09% to -15.3% by an unbelie-
vable -16900% The next lowest and near significant negative relation-
ships are those of the Islamic countries: -41% for Algeria, -43% for
Morocco, -43% for Syria (see table 2.5).
3- When regressing TSD/TLD on RIR and correlating them, it was
found that none of the groups have a significant relationship, however
for individual countries, significant positive relationship were recor-
ded by Finland and Japan among the NMDCs and by Jamaica among the
NMLDCs. Among the countries which recorded negative relationships bet-
ween TSD/TLD and RIR, the Islamic countries again: Algeria (-43%),
Morocco (-44%), Syria (-47%) and Sudan (-47%), all have the lowest
correlation ratios. In fact the relationship is significantly negative
for Morocco, Syria and Sudan (see Table 2.5).
4- When regressing TSD/BTA on RIR and correlating between them, it
was found that none of the groups has a significant relationship. As
for individual countries, only Guyana and Jamaica among the NM1DCs and
Pakistan among the MCWIBs, recorded significant positive relationships.
Other countries either have non significant positive relationships or
have negative ones. The lowest negative relationships were recorded on-
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ce again by The Islamic countries (-18% for Egypt, -40% for Syria, -54%
for Morocco, and -60% for Sudan). In fact it was significantly negative
for Syria, Morocco and Sudan (see Table 2.5) which give support, to
some extent, once more to the Islamic hypothesis which affirms that
most Muslims, though, may be not all of them, are reluctant to deal in
interest based transactions and that the solution to such a situation
is to offer them the Islamic financial institutions that do not conf-
lict with their belief in Islam and its Sharjah which prohibits Riba
and permits trade (in other words profits) and PIS system.
Extra support for the Islamic hypothesis may also be seen in Table
2.6 and in Figures 2.1-2.10 below, showing the trend of these ratios
for the groups of countries (NMDCs, NMLDCs, MCWIBs, MCWNIBs and ALLCs).
It is quite clear that the ratios: M2/M1, QM/GDP, QM/M2, TSD/GDP,
TSD/BTA and TSEVTLD involving interest, are the lowest for the Islamic
countries (MCWIEs and MCWNIBs) and highest for the non Islamic count-
ries (NMDCs and NMLDCs) and the ratios: Ml/M2, Ml/GDP, DD/BTA and
DD/TLD, not involving interest, show the opposite, thus, confirming the
Muslim economists' claim that the majority of Muslims do not deal with
Interest based banks and when they do, they do so through interest free
instruments such as depositing their savings in current accounts rather
than in interest bearing time and savings accounts.
Table 2.6 Trend of the selected average ratios for the different groups
Ratios NMDCs NMLDCs	 MCWIBs MCWNIBs AILes
Ratios Involving Interest
M2/M1 312.8 267.1 146.6 118.5 215.3
QM/GDP 39.0 20.7 16.6 5.5 24.1
QM/M2 67.0 59.1 31.2 14.4 53.1
TSD/GDP 39.5 20.6 16.4 5.5 24.3
TSD/BTA 55.1 59.7 36.6 15.8 50.0
TSD/TLD 74.2 78.3 51.5 22.8 67.6
Ratios Not Involving Interest
Ml/M2 33.0 41.0 68.8 85.5 46.9
Ml/GDP 18.8 13.4 35.4 32.5 20.9
DD/BTA 19.5 16.2 34.4 54.4 24.1
DD/TLD 25.8 21.7 48.5 77.2 32.4
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, various issues.
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2.6 CONCLUSION
From the review of economics literature, concerning the importance
of savings and intermediation for economic development, it appears that
there is an almost unanimous agreement among economists of all schools
that both savings and intermediation are very important for boosting
economic development. However, there is much disagreement on what makes
people save less, why some of them do not put their savings in finan-
cial institutions, how best to encourage people to save and how to mo-
bilise savings efficiently, thus the different hypotheses (Structura-
list, Repressionist and Islamic) put forward.
The regression and correlation analyses carried out in this
chapter in order to test these hypotheses for the 18 selected Islamic
and non Islamic, Developed and Less Developed countries revealed that
although the Islamic countries have high FIRs in terms of the ratios
not involving interest, they have at the same time very low FIRs
proxied by ratios involving interest. Generally speaking, the available
data give some support and only to some extent to both the Structura-
list and the Islamic hypotheses but no support for the Repressionist
hypothesis was found, not only as far as Islamic countries are concer-
ned but for almost all countries whether being Islamic or not or whe-
ther taken in groups or individually. This confirm the results obtained
by Williamson (1968), Wai (1972) and Gupta (1984) mentioned above.
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CHAPTER THREE
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF BANKING GENERALLY
AND OF ISLAMIC BANKING IN PARTICULAR
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Jacob Burchard (cited by Lopez 1979:1) said: "History is the one
field of study that does not begin at the beginning". Banking, as one
of the most specialized forms of commerce, appeared as did the latter
in conjunction with the civilisations of the past and was nearly always
at the basis of their prosperity, but as Orsingher (1967:1) put it: "It
is impossible with the documents discovered so far, whatever their
kind, to determine when banking operations first took place or to give
a continuous uninterrupted account of their evolution".
Most economists maintain, as Bergier (1979:105) claims that: "Ban-
king was Italian by birth", first because the technical word 'bank' is
derived from the Italian word 'banco' which means a table or a bench on
which Italian money changers and bankers used to display their moneys
and records and conduct their transactions. Second, because they con-
sider that the first banks worthy of the name were those established in
Venice, Florence, Genoa and Lucca in Italy, during the 12th century AD
(see Usher 1943 and De Roover 1954). Thus, banking is often considered
as a modern device or even a modern vice but a glance through the pages
of financial history will dispel the notion of novelty.
Banking, as Homoud (1985) pointed out: "was known in various forms
and guises in a number of cultures which flourished in various parts of
the world before they lapsed into oblivion". The purpose of this chap-
ter is to show that banking was known long before Italy 12th Century AD
and to trace the origin and follow the development of Islamic banking.
3.2 BANKING IN ANCIENT TIMES
3.2.1 Banking in Prehistoric Times
As mentioned above and as Lopez (1979:1) put it: "Nobody knows when
credit was first used as a lubricant of business probably in prehistory
but banks of a sort existed in ancient Mesopotamia, Greece and Rome".
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According to Homer (1963:17), credit probably antedated industry, ban-
king, coinage and even primitive forms of money. He contended: "when we
consider credit in its broadest meaning we can infer something of its
earliest forms. Primitive credit need only have consisted of a loan of
seed to a son or brother or neighbour until harvest time or a loan of
an animal or of a tool or of a food. Such transfers are called gifts if
no repayment is expected, loans if repayment is expected and loans at
interest if the repayment of a certain amount, more than was loaned is
expected. These transactions in kind required no money, no exchange and
no barter". Unfortunately, there is no historical evidence available
about these or other banking operations in these prehistoric times.
3.2.2 Banking in Mesopotamia
Although it is impossible to establish when or where banking opera-
tions first started, it is clear, as Homoud (1985:17) argued that: "the
need for it emerged and developed with the use of money as a means of
exchange at the beginning of organised agriculture, industry and trade".
The first civilisations for which there is available historical evi-
dence on banking operations are the Sumerians and Babylonians who lived
about 34 centuries BC in Mesopotamia. Orsingher (1967:1) reported that:
Historical excavations have uncovered the temple of Uruk and
Chaldea, a relic of the Babylonian Empire, and have shown that
the foundation of the -now known- oldest banking building in
the world took place more than 3,300 years before our era.
From the examination of the -up to now discovered- historical evi-
dence in Mesopotamia it would be inferred that in those days banking
was characterised by being related with sacred temples and that it at-
tained a relatively high degree of progress. The translation of a text
of one of the scripts found there shows that a farmer had borrowed
from the priestess of the temple a quantity of silver to finance his
purchase of sesame and he undertook to pay for the equivalent of this
silver in sesame at the price current at the harvest time to the holder
of the credit document made payable to the bearer (Homoud 1985:17-18).
At least four observations can be made about this document: First,
it shows that the temples used to act as, or play the role of banks,
w4ch may be explained by the fact that people used to have more confi-
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dence in their religious temples and priests than in others, because of
the glory of sanctification of these temples and the belief that these
would render accurate and complete account of deposit and that they are
more secure than any other place since nobody would dare to steal from
the sacred temple. Second, the customer is a producer, in other words
the loan was for production purposes and not for consumption. Third, a
credit document equivalent to a bill of exchange was given by the bor-
rower as a credit evidence not only that but was made payable to bearer
which means that it was transferable. And fourth, there was no interest
involved in the operation since the customer is required to pay only
the equivalent of the silver he borrowed in sesame at the current price
of the harvest time; which may be smaller, equal or greater than its
price at the time of the borrowing but even if it is greater this would
not be interest since interest is the amount paid over and above the
capital lent and from the same kind such as silver on silver or sesame
on sesame but not silver on sesame or sesame on silver (see 4.2 below).
According to Levy (1964:9): "Kings and private individuals were
also among the large scale capitalist bankers at that time". Invest-
ments took the form of loans of money or seed, the rate of interest was
20% for money and 33% for barley and the borrower as well as his family
risked slavery for non payment of debt if he defaulted. The limited
partnership (Commenda) was also a Babylonian invention (ibid:11).
Bank operations by temples and great landowners had become so nume-
rous and so important that the Babylonian King Hammurabi (1728-1686 BC)
thought it was necessary to lay down standard rules of procedures which
deal with nearly all cases arising from the terms of ownership of land,
the employment of agricultural labour, civil obligations, loans, inte-
rest, pledges, guarantees, the presence or absence of evidence, natural
accidents, loss, theft, etc., (Homer 1963:26 and Orsingher 1967:viii)
After the Persian conquest around 539 BC, Mesopotamia lost her in-
dependence. Babylonia was no longer a great capital city, interest rate
reached the level of 40% and became the common prevailing rate. Her old
civilisation had all but vanished and the centre of economic progress
and activity shifted to Greece (Ibid:31).
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3.2.3 Banking in Greece
According to Orsingher (1967:3), the development of banking in
early Greece was hampered by the level of local economic activity, the
severity of local laws and the precarious state of trade and exchange
until the invention of coin money. The question, which arises here, is
who invented coin money and when?. Orsingher (1967:viii) answered that:
"Perhaps the Chinese, but no certainty exists on this point". However,
the official coinage of money, as Einzig (1948:225); Homer (1963:33);
Levy (1964:18-19); and Orsingher (1967:viii-ix) pointed out, is suppo-
sed to have originated in Lydia in the 7th Century BC. The first coins
were attributed to King Cyges (687 BC) of Lydia. They were of electrum
(a mixture of gold and silver). King Croesus of Lydia (560-546 BC) is
credited with providing the first ingots of pure gold when Lydia was
then a leading producer of gold. This must have encouraged the emer-
gence and practice of banking operations in Greece because certain tra-
ders soon began to specialise in the evaluation and exchange of coinage
made from precious metals in various countries (Orsingher 1967:3).
The Greek bankers or Trapezites as they were called -from the Greek
word, Trapeza, a table or a bench on which they used to display moneys
and conduct their transactions- changed money, received deposits, made
loans to individuals and states, issued letters of credit, honoured
cheques and kept complete books, so, "in next to no time the commercial
genius of the Greek rose to the point of speculation. Capital accumula-
ted was only an investment with a view to accumulating more" (Homer
ibid:69). Perhaps under the influence of earlier civilisations, temples
were also used as deposit takers in Greece. The Shrine of Delphi, is
sometimes described as the great banker of the Greek world (ibid:38).
But after the conquest of Alexandria (circa 325 BC), and as Homer
(1963:39) reported: "Athens was no longer in a position to dominate
Mediterranean Commerce. She had lost her empire... During the ensuing
centuries, however, Rome, not Greece dominated the history of the Medi-
terranean world... Athens never regained her position as the great com-
mercial and financial centre. As a consequence of Roman policy, trade
shifted to Rhodes, Antioch, Selencia and especially to Alexandria".
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3.2.4 Banking in Egypt
According to Orsingher (1967:4) "Until the Alexandrian conquest, a
primitive economic system persisted in Egypt, but the Ptolemites intro-
duced coinage into Egypt and the same evolution which has been observed
in Greece took place here also. Indeed, Trapezites are to be found here
as in Greece, but they are, in some sort, official agents; many of them
have Greek names and the earliest of them came from Greece".
During the 1st and 2nd centuries AD, Egypt attained the highest
stages of development in the art of banking and was rich and prosperous
(Homoud 1985:18). But in the third century AD the disorder of the Roman
Empire broke through the barriers of Egypt's economic isolation delibe-
rately caused by a fiat currency that circulated for some time only in
Egypt (Homer 1963:51). Famine, plaque and inflation devastated the land
and banditry became widespread (A. Johnson 1933:vol 11:353).
3.2.5 Banking in Rome
The Romans, as described by Homer (1963:44), were a nation of far-
mers and soldiers. They left manufacture, commerce and banking mainly
to foreigners. Most of the earliest bankers in Rome had Greek names and
were called Trapezites. Orsingher (1967:5-6) reported that: "There were
no banking monopolies during the Roman period, and this liberty allowed
banking operations to develop and flourish". By the first century BC,
Rome was the banking centre of the Republic and of the Empire and pro-
bably of the world at the time. Perhaps bankers became so numerous that
in addition to the name Trapezites, they were later designated by names
like Mensularii, Argentarii, Mummularii, Fenoeratores (Hamer 1963:47).
After 90 BC, banking experienced ups and downs depending on the
political and military conditions of the republic. In time of wars and
disorder, inflation, financial stagnation and bankruptcy prevail and in
times of peace and prosperity, financial stability is restored and ban-
king operations and trade improved. "In the third century AD monetary
inflation on a grand scale accompanied a succession of revolutions and
civil wars" and the chaotic fifty years before Diocletian, 284-305 AD,
were in the opinion of T. Frank (1933:300) "the period when Rome fell.
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There were anarchy and looting. Provincials lost faith in Rome. Indus-
try and trade disintegrated and even the Latin speech decayed".
3.3 BANKING IN THE ISLAMIC EMPIRE FROM THE RISE OF ISLAM
TILL THE 12TH CENTURY
According to Homoud (1985:19): "the period lasting from the fall of
Rome until the dawn of Islam was the darkest, most corrupt and unset-
tled period in the known history of Man.. The dawn of Islam removed
darkness from the face of life and brought an environment of security
and stability to the areas which came under its influence". The rise of
Islam brought about a tremendous change in all economic, political,
social and judicial spheres and brought about a new civilization that
is based on the total and complete submission to Allah and his Shariah.
Wilson (1950:40-53) describing the impact of Islam, wrote:
The sudden eruption of the Arab (Muslim) people in the 7th
Century is something unique in history. In three generations
a collection of scattered tribes, some settled, some nomadic,
living by trade and subsistence farming, had transformed it-
self into a rich and powerful empire dominating the whole of
southern Mediterranean and the Near-East from Afghanistan to
Spain... They had succeeded in weldingtogether peoples of
divers beliefs and languages into a unified society based on
a common religion, a common language and common institutions.
Lieber (1968:230) also contends that "From the seventh century AD
onwards, Muslims succeeded in developing long distance trade and inter-
national commerce on a scale which surpassed anything known before.
This is, perhaps, because Islam is one great religion which affords the
merchant a highly honoured place in society". And, perhaps, that is why
many learned men had, at some stage of their careers, earned a living
as merchants (see Weit 1955). Leiber (ibid) pointed out that: "Among
Muslims, international trade was particularly stimulated by the pilgri-
mage to the holy places of Arabia, in which a great body of men conver-
ged each year from all over the world. Many of these pilgrims fulfilled
their religious obligations and at the same time, marketed their local
products along the route, returning home with foreign goods on which
they hoped to make a handsome profit". And with the development of
trade, comes the development of banking operations though not necessa-
rily. Commenting on De Roover (1954:43) statement which says "There can
be no banking where there are no banks", Udovitch (1979:255) argued:
66
This proposition may hold true for the development of banking
in Medieval Europe but it certainly does not describe the Me-
dieval Islamic world. In the sporadic information on this sub-
ject from Medieval literary or documentary sources, we encoun-
ter bankers and we encounter extensive and ramified banking
activities but we do not encounter banks. That is we cannot
identify any autonomous or semi-autonomous institutions whose
primary concern was dealing in money as specialised if not
exclusive pursuit.
But the historical writings of El-Qalqashandi (1913), El-Djahshi-
yari (1938) and Pellat and Schacht (1965), show that there were indeed
banks called Dawaween El-Djahabidhah. Pellat and Schacht (ibid)
reported that from the end of the 8th century the term Wahbadh
(pl. Djahabidhah) was used in the sense of a financial clerk, expert
in matters of coins, skilled money examiner, treasury receiver,
government cashier, money changer or collector to designate the well
known licensed merchant banker in the time of the Abbasid caliphs. In
913 AD the state established what is called Diwan El-Djahabidhah (pl.
Dawaween El-Djahabidhah) with branches in the main trade cities
conducting almost all modern banking functions albeit without recourse
to interest. In the time of the caliph El-Muqtadir (980-1032 AD) El-
Djahbadh assumed an ever increasing important role and emerged as a
modern banker, who in addition to his functions as administrator of
deposits and a remitter of funds from place to place via the medium of
the Sakk and especially of the Suftajah, was called upon to grant huge
loans to the caliphs, the viziers and other court officials. (see El-
Qalqashandi 1913; El-Djahshiyari 1938 and Pellat and Schacht 1965).
The Chief or Governor of Diwan El-Djahabidhah was required by the
state to prepare a monthly and a yearly accounting statement called
El-Khatmah (the final account or the balance sheet) of all the items of
income and expenditure (See Mettwalli and Shahata 1983:113-17).
Historical sources, also, show that many of the Djahabidhah were
Christians or Jews despite their status as Dhimmis (non Muslims living
in Muslim society). Among the Djahabidhah listed in the sources were:
Ibrahim Ben Yuhanna, Zakariyah Ben Yuhanna, Sulayman Bin Wahb, Ibrahim
Ben Ahmed, Israel Ben Salih and above all two Jewish merchants and ban-
kers: Yusuf Ben Finkhas and Harun Ben Imran of Baghdad who were appoin-
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ted to the office of Djahbadh of the Persian province Ahwaz and later
became Djahabidhat El-Hadhra (the Court bankers) of the caliph El-
Muqtadir and his viziers (see Mez 1937; Goiten 1967, 1973; Udovitch
1970, 1979 and El-Sayed 1984).
El-Diahabidhah used to advance loans to the state secured by the
government tax revenues, which they used to collect. When they collect
the tax revenues, they get their principal and an amount above it which
some historians consider as interest (see Pellat and Schacht 1965:383).
But if we take into consideration the efforts of collecting and admi-
nistering the taxes, we can infer that the amount above the principal
was not interest but a fee for the administration of the taxes because
on one hand, interest is forbidden and fees are allowed in Islam, and
on the other hand, interest depend on the amount and period of loans,
while fees or commissions are allowed to be paid for rendering ser-
vices. Udovitch (1979:267) affirmed that: "whereas it was customary for
merchants and others to keep at least a portion of their money on
deposit with merchant bankers and whereas the merchant banks themselves
kept deposits of various size with several other merchant banks, there
is no evidence whatsoever that any interest or other type of premium
was paid to depositors". This is so because Allah prohibits Riba
(interest) in many verses of the Koran and provides several means such
as Mbsharakah (partnership), Mudharabah (Commanda), Muzaraah (share
cropping), etc., whereby the Riba prohibition could be avoided.
In the early Middle-Ages, the Islamic empire played a great role
in establishing the foundation of an economic golden age of which the
players in the field of trade and banking were Arabs, Persians,
Berbers, Jews, Christians and Armenians. Islamic trade reached from
El-Andalus (Spain) to the sea of China. Pirenne (1939:49) contended:
In consequence of their worldwide trade relations, they (the
Muslims) brought sugar cane from India, cotton to Sicily and
Africa and rice to Sicily and Spain. They learned from the
Chinese how to produce silk and paper and took this knowledge
with them into all parts of their empire.
Lieber (1968:230) also observed that:
The merchants of Italy and other European countries obtained
their first education in the use of sophisticated business
methods from their counterparts on the opposite side of the
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Mediterranean, most of whom were Muslims, although a few were
Jews or Christians. One obvious result is the large number of
words of Eastern origin mainly Aramaic, Arabic or Persian,
which were introduced into the commercial terminology of
medieval Europe. Some examples of the terms (whose European
usage was not necessarily identical with their original
connotation) are douane. arsenal, magazine, traffic, tariff.
risk. fondaco. sensali cialeya, aval and maona.
To quote just a few others words one might mention the very word
cheque, which is originally from the Arabic word Sakk; credit from Oard
risk from Rizk; the French words Acheter from Ishtara (to buy), Le
Magasin from El-Makhzen (warehouse), aval from Hawala and the Spanish
words Almacen from El-Makhzen, Zoko from Souk (market) and many others.
(see Doi 1984:399; Vives 1969:119-20; Terrey 1892 and Steigher 1963).
As Labib (1969:80) pointed out: "Everywhere that Islam entered, it
activated business life, fostered an increasing exchange of goods and
played an important part in the development of credit".
According to Udovitch (1979:263): "The Suftaja (Bill of Exchange)
always and the Hawala (credit guarantee or credit transfer) usually oc-
curred as a written obligation, and were thus the first and most impor-
tant forms of commercial credit papers in the Medieval Near East". That
is so, perhaps because of Allah's order to Muslims in the longest verse
of the Koran 2:282-3 to write down all future obligations. Allah says:
0 you who believe, when you deal with each other in transac-
tions involving future obligations in a period of time, reduce
them to writing. Let a scribe write down faithfully as between
the parties, let not the scribe refuse to write as Allah has
taught him, so let him write. Let himidn incurs the liability
dictate but let him fear his Lord Allah, and diminish aught of
what he owes. If the party liable mentally deficient, or
weak, or unable himself to dictate, let his guardian dictate
faithfully and get two witnesses out of your men and if there
are not two men, then a man and two women such as you choose
for witnesses so that if one of them errs the other can remind
her. The witnesses must not refuse when they are called on for
evidence. Disdain not to reduce to writing your contracts for
future commitments, whether it be small or big: It is juster
in the sight of Allah, more suitable as evidence and more con-
venient to prevent doubt among yourselves but if it be a tran-
saction, which you carry out on the spot among yourselves,
then, there is no blame on you if you reduce it not to writing
but take witnesses whenever you make a commercial contract and
let neither scribe nor witness suffer harm. If you do harm, it
would be wickedness in you. So fear Allah for it is Allah that
teaches you and Allah is well acquainted with all things. If
you are on a journey and cannot find a scribe, a pledge with
possession may serve the purpose and if one of you deposits a
thing on trust with another let the trustee faithfully dis-
charge his trust and let him fear Allah, his Lord. Conceal not
evidence for whoever conceals it, his heart is tainted with
sin and Allah knows all that you do.
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After the 13th Century the Djahbadh lost his control significantly
as a court banker, his function was reduced to that of Sayrafi (money
changer) as a result of the slow but prolonged decline of the Islamic
Empire from about the 12th Century BC, due mainly to the following
internal and external factors:
1	 The vradual but continuous deviations from Islam and
Islamic Shariah especially in the political sphere.
2	 The extravagance and lavish expenditure of the courts.
3	 The lack of organisation and the inflated bureaucracy.
4 The political break down, involving the loss of authority of
the central government in the remote provinces and the
emergence of petty dynasties and quasi-independent governors
resulting in the devradation of the caliphs to the status of
mere puppets of their ministers and military commanders.
5	 The rise and development of different and antagonistic sects,
all claiming to be the real Muslims such as the Suffis, the
Shi'ites, the Ismaelites, the Druzes, etc..
6	 The pro1on7ed warfare with the crusaders, Mongols and
Tartars, which caused much destruction in Iraq and Syria.
7	 The Turco-Persian wars, which dragged on for nearly three
centuries and which impeded the economic recovery of Iraq.
(see Issawi 1966:4 and B. Lewis 1970:102).
3.4 BANKING IN EUROPE FROM THE FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE
TILL THE 12th CENTURY AD
From about 300 AD time of the fall of the Roman Empire till about
1300 AD, Western Europe with the exception of Spain and Italy lived in
dismal and bleak centuries called the 'Dark-Ages'. Spain, because it
was part of the Islamic Empire under the name of El-Andalus which was
known by its great civilisation between the 8th and 15th Centuries AD
and Italy because of its strategic commercial position in the Mediter-
ranean and its regular contact with Muslim, Christian, and Jewish mer-
chants of the Islamic Empire, in fact Sicily and Venice were also part
of the Islamic Empire for some time.
Following the fall of the Roman Empire, barbaric kingdoms prevailed
throughout Western Europe. Commerce became profoundly depressed in Wes-
tern Europe, which was, as Homer (1963:84) put it: "sinking back into a
largely agricultural economy". This led the famous historian Pirenne
(1933:20) to say that in Western Europe: "La terre etait tout et le com-
merce rien" which means that the land (or agriculture) was everything
and the commerce was nothing. This is not to suggest that there was no
trade in Western Europe, but just to say that it was very limited as a
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consequence of political instability, uncertainty, high cost of trans-
portation, heavy taxes and customs duties, piracy, bribery and illite-
racy. Thus, if trade is limited, so must be banking operations.
During these so called 'Dark Ages', as reported by Homer (1963:84):
"the Latin tongue was forgotten, culture vanished and superstition
throve. However, money was used regularly throughout the darkest of the
Dark-Ages but the lack of commerce reduced its circulation". Orsingher
(1967:11) pointed out that: "during all the period which extends from
the fall of the Roman Empire till the end of the 11th Century the ban-
king industry in Western Europe was represented by the money changer.
The age of the crusaders was the starting point for the development of
monetary and credit operations during the 2nd part of the Middle Ages".
The 10th Century was called the century of transition in which the
crusaders managed, on one hand, to weaken the Islamic Empire -which had
already shown weakness after the destructive raids of the Mongols and
Tartars and after the rise of divergent petty dynasties within it- and
on the other, to transfer the know-how from the Islamic civilisation to
Western Europe, especially on how to promote irrigation, handicrafts,
partnerships, trade and banking so that by the end of the llth Century,
political and economic revival in Western Europe generally and in Italy
in particular became general. Thus, as Lopez, (1952:273) described:
Italy at last began to exploit the advantage of her central
position in regard to both continental Europe and the Mediter-
ranean basin. A nation of moderately successful peasants and
farmers who in Roman times were dependent upon Easterners for
their trade and who did not produce enough food for their
overgrown capital, now was on its way to becoming the first
commercial and industrial nation in the world.
Venice, was perhaps the most prosperous town in Italy at that time
where there was no serfdom and where the majority of its population was
engaged in maritime trade especially with the Muslim world in spite of
opposition from the Papacy. Coiners and money changers rose steadily in
power and prestige; and commercial contracts, such as the 'Commenda'
equivalent to the Islamic partnership contract of Mbdharabah which
involved sleeping partnership, became a very popular device in Mediter-
ranean Commerce (see Homer 1963:86-88 and Miskimin 1969:118). This pro-
bably explains the observation of Lieber (1968:230) that:
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The merchants of Italy obtained their first education in the
use of sophisticated business methods from their counterparts
on the opposite side of the Mediterranean most of whom were
Muslims, although a few were Jews or Christians.
This also may explain as Homoud (1985:24) pointed out, the origin
of the concept that the first bank worthy of this nomenclature was that
which was established in Venice in the year 1157 AD, and what became
common knowledge about dating the origin of banking operations back to
the money changers in Lombardia who used to sit behind their wooden
desks, known as banco. Thus, as Lopez (1952:291) remarked: "Italy was
to the Medieval economic process what England was to the modern. Even
as the industrial revolution first transformed economy and society in
some English areas and spread later to the rest of the world, the com-
mercial revolution (trade and banking) first affected a few Italian
cities and then made its way slowly through the rest of Europe".
3.5 BANKING IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD SINCE THE FALL OF THE ISLAMIC EMPIRE
AND THE EMERGENCE OF ISLAMIC BANKING SINCE THE 1940s
From the 11th Century AD, time when the Islamic Empire started dec-
lining till about the mid-20th Century AD the Muslim World underwent
long centuries of prolonged decay and deterioration, known as 'Ursur-El-
Inhitat' or 'The Ages of Decline' just as Western Europe underwent the
'Dark Ages' from the fall of the Roman Empire till the end of the 12th
Century. A deterioration which affected all aspects of life: political,
economic, social and cultural. Many factors helped bring about this de-
terioration (see 3.3 above). The damaging consequences were disastrous.
- The once united caliphate became divided into hundreds of petty
dynasties fighting each other. Despotism, tyranny and injustice became
widespread. This made it easy for the Mongols, the Tartars, the Crusa-
ders and others to invade, dominate and colonise the Muslim world.
- The once just and balanced Islamic society, based on the prin-
ciples of the Sharjah, was transformed into militaristic feudal socie-
ties that were much less conducive to economic and social development.
Bayt El-Mal, which used to care about the poor, the destitute, the old
and the young became the monopoly of the governors, ministers, military
commanders and tax farmers. As a result the general public lost confi-
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dence and withdrew from urban prosperous centres to hills in the coun-
tryside and to deserts to escape oppression, injustice, execution and
confiscation. Ignorance, illiteracy, superstition, mysticism, idolatry,
etc., all became widespread (see Issawi 1966:4).
- Agriculture shrank to a minute fraction of what it had been in
the 10th Century and the population had correspondingly diminished.
Land was granted or taken by officers. Farm techniques remained almost
unchanged. Perhaps until the 1960s most farmers used only wooden
ploughs instead of iron ones. As a result, yields were very low and
both crops and livestock continued to be affected by droughts, pests
and diseases. (see B. Lewis 1970:105, 113 and Issawi 1966:3, 21, 65).
- The strict regulation of craftsmen by the guilds and the subor-
dination of many of them to merchants who supplied them with credit and
raw materials and bought their output, diminished the formers'incentive
to improve and modernise. The flood of European machine-made consumer
goods brought by settlers dealt a severe blow to local handicrafts,
many of which were wiped out in the following decades. One has only to
compare the industrial products of the 18th Century with those made a
few hundred years earlier to realise that the handicrafts had not only
stagnated but had actually retrogressed (Issawi 1966:4, 18 and 46).
- From the llth Century, trade was transferred from the Muslims to
the Europeans who soon became the main carriers and traders in that
sea. The 1498 discovery of the new trade route by the Portuguese Vasco
de Gama, between Europe and India, around the Cape of Good Hope, came
as a crowning catastrophe dealing a mortal blow to the Egyptian route
which remained until then perhaps the only major trade route between
East and West (Issawi 1966:7; and B. Lewis 1970:114).
With the achievement of independence, the nationalisation of foreign
banks and the development of national banking, the overseas colonisation
of the banks disappeared, but it has been replaced, however, by a very
similar 'neo-colonial' banking system. It is true that by nationalising
foreign banks and by establishing new indigenous banks, these banks be-
came national banks looking after the national interests but their ope-
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rating system was the same as the foreign ones in that they continued
to operate and deal in interest which is alien to the belief of the
Muslim population. Thus, arose the idea of establishing 'Islamic banks'
which would not only offer all banking services but which would not
break or violate the religious beliefs of the people.
The idea of creating 'Islamic Banks' or 'Interest-Free Banks' as
they are also called, came as a result of the Islamic revival which can
be traced back to the late 1940s and early 1950s, when some of the co-
lonised Islamic countries became independent. The first attempt to es-
tablish an Islamic Bank was made, as Traute (1983) and R. Wilson (1983)
pointed out, in the late 1950s in a rural area in Pakistan, though this
had no lasting impact. A small experimental Interest-Free Bank was
founded by a small number of pious landowners who were prepared to de-
posit funds without interest rewards. The credit was advanced to other
poorer landowners for agricultural improvements. No interest was char-
ged for the credit, but a small fixed administrative fee was levied to
cover the operating costs of the bank. However, as R. Wilson (1983:75)
put it: "although there was no shortage of borrowers, the depositors
tended to view their payments in the institution as a once and for all
effort, and the institution soon ran short of funds. In addition, the
depositors took a considerable interest in how their deposits were
loaned out and the bank officials enjoyed little autonomy with no new
deposits forthcoming, and problems over recruitment of bank staff, who
were unwilling to give up lucrative and secure careers in city commer-
cial banking for an uncertain venture in the countryside, the institu-
tion soon foundered.. but just as the Pakistan venture was being ended
a new experiment was being tried in Egypt"
On 25/07/1963 a pioneering experiment, the MGISB (Mit-Ghamr Islamic
Savings Bank), started in the county of Mit-Ghamr in the Nile Delta of
Egypt. The main instigator of this Islamic financial institution was Dr
El-Naggar who later became secretary general of the International Asso-
ciation of Islamic Banks (IAIB). The model was the German savings banks
adapted to the rural environment of an Islamic developing country. The
purpose was to mobilise the idle savings of the majority of the Muslim
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Egyptian population without transgressing the laws of the Shariah and
to provide them with Halal returns on their savings as well.
Although Dr El-Naggar, was primarily an academic himself, he mana-
ged the bank and carefully selected the bank's staff from enthusiast
Muslims, who had some banking experience with commercial institutions.
"The staff soon gained the confidence of the conservative county com-
munity who saw they were devout Muslims like themselves, as they wor-
shipped locally with their potential customers. The region's peasants
were suspicious of outsiders and few had ever used commercial banks,
which were seen as alien institutions belonging to the cities, and
mainly to serve westernised Egyptians. These new bankers were viewed
as different.. as they shared the same views and moral values as the
peasants themselves, despite their education" (R. Wilson 1983:76).
The role of this bank, according to El-Naggar (1974:246-47), the
pioneer and manager of this bank, was threefold: first, to act as an
efficient intermediary between the supply and demand of capital, or in
other words between surplus and deficit economic units; second, to act
as an educational centre for economic efficiency, saving education and
banking habit; and third, to set a dynamic factor in mobilising the
idle capital for investment, thus, reducing hoarding and the problems
of capital formation. R. Wilson (1983:76) reported that:
The bank's loans were used for a variety of purposes including
house building and repairs, the purchase of simple machinery
for handicraft industries, such as hand looms for weaving tex-
tiles or... sewing machines. Some loans helped finance the
purchase of farm animals and basic improvement to the irriga-
tion systems as efficient water provision was essential in a
community based on agriculture.
MGISB soon prospered, and within three and a half years, the first
depositors were joined by more than 251,000 and the deposits grew at
unprecedented higher rates than expected (see Table 3.1 and figure 3.1
which compare the growth of its total deposits to that of the Egyptian
Banking System (EBS) as a whole in current and constant prices during
the same period and tables 2.2-2.4 which show the number of depositors,
the size of the average deposit, the number of branches and the kinds
of depositors who were banking with this Islamic bank). It is quite
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clear from the comparative analysis of the little data, that this expe-
riment proved quite successful and the savings mobilisation impressive.
Its success in winning the support of a large number of students, far-
mers and villagers who regarded the bank as their own, is discussed by
Ready (1967); Harvey (1981); Traute (1983) and R. Wilson (1983).
El-Naggar (ibid) commented:
In spite of the short period during which the bank has been in
operation, it has rendered vital services to the economic
development of the local community, especially in the develop-
ment and the establishment of small industries and in provi-
ding new opportunities of work for unemployed workers in Mit-
Ghamr and its 53 affiliated villages".
Table 3.1 Comparative Analysis of the Total Deposits in the EBS and in
the Mit-Ghamr Islamic Savings Bank for the period 1964-1967
Years EBS's TLD
in EL
Index
in %
Growth
in %
MGISB's TLD
in EL
Index
in %
Growth
in%
In Current Prices
1964 378,000,000 100 40,944 100
1965 396,000,000 105 5 191,235 467 367
1966 415,000,000 110 5 879,570 2148 360
1967 445,000,000 118 7 1828,375 4466 108
Averages 6 278
In Constant Prices
1964 364,513,010 100 39,483 100
1965 332,214,760 91 -9 160,432 406 306
1966 319,722,650 88 -4 677,635 1716 322
1967 340,474,360 93 7 1,398,910 3543 106
Averages -2 245
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics and El -Naggar (1974)
Table 3.2 The Number of Depositors
in Nit-Ghamr Islamic
and their Average Deposits
Savings Banks
Years	 No of	 Growth	 Average Deposit 	 Growth
Depositors	 in %	 Per Saver	 in %
1964 17,560 2.33
1965 30,404 73 6.29 170
1966 151,998 400 5.79 -1
1967 251,152 65 7.28 26
Source: El -Naggar (1974:271)
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Table 3.3 Mit-Ghamr Islamic Savings Bank's branches Between 1963-1967
Branch Name Opening Date Branch Name	 Opening Date
1 Mat Ghamr 05-07-1963 6 Zefti 09-02-1966
2 Sharbine 14-08-1965 7 Al Mahallah 24-07-1966
3 Al Mansoura 11-09-1965 8 Misr El-jadidah 23-07-1966
4 Dakerous 09-10-1965 9 Belqaa 01-10-1966
5 Kasr Al Ayni 14-10-1965
Source: El -Naggar (ibid)
Table 3.4 Percentage Share of Savings and Investment Deposits in
Total Deposits of Different Groupings of Savers in MGISB
Savings Deposits	 Investment Deposits 	 Depositors
	
53.5	 38.0	 Students
	
14.0	 12.0	 Workers
	
2.3	 12.8	 Pensioners
	
10.2	 22.0	 Civil Servants
	
5.1	 6.4	 Housewives
	
10.9	 15.9	 Peasants
	
2.0	 2.4	 Merchants
	
2.0	 2.0	 Others
Source: El -Naggar (1974:272)
It is said that this bank was so successful that it would have co-
vered the whole of Egypt by now, if it has not been stopped for politi-
cal reasons outside its control. It came to an end in February 1967
after only three and a half years during which problems of rural indeb-
tedness were reduced in the areas where this bank and its branches were
operating. Borrowers, no longer, had to depend neither on the few local
moneylenders, many of whom charged high interest rates, nor on the non
Islamic banks which consider them as a 'non-bankable class' and which,
they themselves would not deal with, as these banks base their opera-
tions on Riba (interest) which is Haram according to their Islam.
El-Naggar (1978:230-232) reported that:
Paradoxically, yet not surprisingly, it has been its success,
rather than the reverse r which has created problems for thebank. As soon as the social role of the bank began to make it-
self evident in the successful development of the local area,
conflicts started with the local social authorities who saw it
as interfering in their own area of authority and regarded it
as simply reduplicating their own efforts unnecessarily. In
the meantime, because the bank introduced a new concept of
banking more expressive of Islamic belief and practice and
firmly rooted in a popular Muslim base the size of savings and
number of savers was increasing rapidly either by the addition
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of new savers, or by savers who transferred their money from
the commercial banks to the Islamic one. Inevitably this arou-
sed the traditional banks against their new popular based and
progressive competitor... Thus, in furthering such char's:7es,
the functions and role of the bank could, from a narrow view-
point, be regarded as conflicting with existing institutions
such as the social authorities, the commercial banks and some
of the central holding organisations: industrial or commercial
which were mainly under government control, so it was stopped.
Nevertheless, the venture laid the seeds of modern Islamic banking
and pointed the way for subsequent undertakings. Soon afterwards many
Islamic social, developmental and commercial banks started doing busi-
ness following the example of Mit-Ghamr Islamic savings bank with some
improvements. The first of such banks is the Nasser Social Bank estab-
lished in 1971 in Egypt, not as profit oriented institution but as a
social bank to serve the previously 'unbankable' low income group; fol-
lowed by the Islamic International Development Bank (IDB), an Inter-
governmental institution established in 1975 in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia),
with the purpose to foster the economic and social development of its
member countries, and by the Dubai Islamic Bank (DIB) in Dubai (UAE) in
1975, the first major project of Islamic commercial bank, the success
of which led to the establishment of a series of such banks elsewhere.
At present, in addition to the Islamisation of the Iranian, Pakis-
tani and Sudanese banking systems, there are according to Euromoney of
July 1988, about 100 Islamic financial institutions operating worldwide
with total assets of some US$16bn. Most of them were established in
late 1970s and early 1980s in such countries as Egypt, Kuwait, Jordan,
Bahrain, Qatar, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Senegal, Tunis, Turkey, etc., and
most of them have been able to mobilise substantial amounts of deposits,
acquire a notable share in the national market and generate sizable
profits from their first year of operation, in spite of the shortness
of the period, the competition from the interest-based banks and the
problems related to the non-Islamic environments in which they operate.
In fact there are Islamic Banks and Islamic Investment Companies in the
West as well, as in Switzerland, Denmark, Luxembourg, England, etc..
These Islamic banks differ widely in size, the largest bank, KFH,
has a total assets of about US$4bn (see Table 3.5 showing only the top
15 Arab Islamic Financial Institutions; this does not include larger
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Table 3.5 The Top 15 Arab Islamic Financial Institutions (in 1987)
Rank Name and Head Office TLA	 K&R PBT PBT/TLA PBT/K&R K&R/TLA
US$m US$m US$m
1	 KFH (Kuwait) 3,916 159 90.9 2.56 60.57 4.07
22.6 13.2 19.3 2.57 55.57 4.41
2	 FIBE (Egypt) 1,905 98 10.0 0.51 10.26 5.14
-4.5 1.0 3.1 na na 4.86
3	 JIB (Jordan) 599 30 2.5 0.46 8.20 5.08
21.6 0.0 6.5 na na 6.17
4	 DIB (aAE) 470 25 na na na 5.27
13.1 28.2 na na na 4.65
5	 QIB (Qatar) 355 20 3.7 1.23 19.28 5.7246.4 13.8 58.8 1.13 13.40 7.36
6	 DMI (Switzerland) 344 283 8.7 2.59 3.09 82.274.2 0.7 4.2 na na 85.15
7	 AIIB (Bahrain) 233 52 2.3 0.94 4.43 22.32
-7.5 2.0 0.4 0.87 4.37 19.70
8	 BIB	 (Bahrain) 187 19 8.4 4.72 44.21 10.1610.7 0.0 12.0 4.45 42.85 11.24
9	 FIBS (Sudan) 136 30 0.5 0.39 1.65 21.9717.8 0.8 -64.5 1.24 4.66 25.68
10	 MB (England) 107 19 -0.1 -0.06 -0.30 17.5432.6 0.0 -108.3 na na 23.26
11	 TIB (Sudan) 99 10 1.8 2.10 18.75 10.0837.0 8.7 -16.7 na na 12.71
12	 FIBB (Bahrain) 70 39 3.0 5.43 8.51 55.7152.2 11.4 15.8 na na 76.09
13	 IFH (Luxembourg) 45 20 -0.1 -0.11 -0.22 44.44
-2.2 -20.0 99.3 na na 54.35
14	 IBI (Denmark) 44 10 0.0 na na 22.96
11.1 0.0 0.0 na na 25.51
15	 BIIC (Bahrain) 21 13 0.4 na na 62.50
0.0 0.0 433.3 na na 62.50
Source: The Banker, December 1988 P.73
Islamic banks of non Arab countries such as the Islamic Banks of Pakis-
tan and Iran) and the smallest FIBK (Faisal Islamic Bank of Kibris) in
Northern Cyprus had less than US$10m. "Such absolute figures, however,
are", as Nienhaus (1988:90) argued: "not sufficient for an assessment
of the quantitative importance of a bank in its national context.
Internationally small banks can have large market share nationally".
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The primary objective of these Islamic Financial Institutions is
to mobilise dormant resources of devout Muslims who are reluctant to
deal with Interest Based Banks because of Riba. And as pointed out by
Tarbush (1981:6): "they apparently have no problem in achieving this
goal. It is claimed that on its first day of opening to the public the
Kuwait Fiance House (the Islamic Kuwaiti bank) received KD5Om (US$140m)
transferred from deposits of the commercial banks".
The available data, on some of the existing Islamic Banks, reveal
that many of them have even been able to acquire considerable amounts
of assets that they qualify for ranking among the top 100 Arab largest
banks and that they are improving (See table 3.6 showing the position
of some Islamic Banks, in some Arab countries, among the top 100 Arab
Banks. This does not include larger Islamic banks of non Arab countries
such as the Islamic Banks of Pakistan and Iran).
Table 3.6 Position of some Islamic Banks among the top 100 Arab Banks
Year	 KFH	 FIBE	 IBID	 DIB	 JIB	 MFIB
1980
1981
94
68
1982 51 77
1983 42 66
1984 34 47
1985 39 45 74 97 78
1986 36 43 na 87 87 76
1987 28 48 na 93 85 na
Note: See List of abbreviations for Banks' acronyms
Source: Nienhaus (1988:90) and The Banker, various issues.
This shows, as Nienhaus (ibid) remarked that: "these Islamic Banks
have grown to financial institutions of a respectable size within a re-
latively short period of time". Some of them like KFH, FIBE, FIBS, JIB
and MFIB have become among the seven largest banks in their respective
countries and despite a slow down in their rates of growth their market
shares in the mobilisation of deposits and the allocation of funds have
grown considerably (See Tables 3.6; 3.7 and chapters 9-11 below).
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Table 3.7 The Market Shares of some of the Oldest Islamic Banks (in %)
Name Est. 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
DIB 1976 1.30 1.28 1.35 2.03 2.35 3.06 3.27
KFH 1978 5.70 8.21 12.32 17.33 17.13 17.64 18.03
FIBS 1978 6.86 10.87 15.00 13.34 12.68 7.74 7.08
FIBE 1979 1.61 4.43 5.62 6.89 7.06 9.83 7.43
JIB 1979 1.90 3.35 3.90 5.40 6.82 7.72 8.60
BIB 1979 1.03 1.42 2.86 3.45 3.91 6.42 6.68
Source: Nienhaus (1988:94)
3.6 CONCLUSION
Historical evidence on the development of banking, shows that
banking operations have been known long before the 12th Century Italy
which is considered by most economists as the 'birth place of banking'.
Banking has been known to and practiced in earlier civilisations, such
as the Islamic, the Roman, the Greek, the Egyptian and even the Babylo-
nian and the Sumerian. In fact, there is available historical evidence
which dates as early as 34 centuries BC (ie about 5,400 years ago) and
which shows that a very advanced banking system was carried out by the
religious temples which used to take care of the savings of their depo-
sitors and give loans to those who need finance, thus acting as banks.
We also saw how modern banking was developed in Europe and later
transferred to the Muslim World, and how Islamic banking came about to
fill the gap that modern interest-based banks could not fill in the
Muslim World, because of the reluctance of the Muslims to deposit their
savings with interest-based banks, due to their Islamic belief that
interest is Riba and Riba is the most strictly prohibited thing in
Islam after Shirk (polytheism).
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE BASIS OF ISLAMIC BANKING:
THE PROHIBITION OF INTEREST AND THE PERMISSION OF PROFIT
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Islamic banking is said to be based on two principles: a negative
principle: the prohibition of interest; and a positive one: the permis-
sion of profit. The real difference between an Islamic bank and a non-
Islamic bank is that: while the latter deals in interest in most of its
transactions with its customers, the former rejects interest completely
and instead, bases its transactions with its customers on the basis of
profit and PLS system. However, although interest is perhaps no longer
deemed to be synonymous with profit, there are still those who confuse
the two concepts or at least do not see any difference in their econo-
mic impact. In fact, there are even those who, not only confuse inte-
rest with profit, but interest with rent and profit with wages, etc..
The purpose of this chapter is to enquire into the cause and nature
of interest and profit by defining rent, wages, interest and profit; by
critically reviewing and discussing the most important theories of
interest and profit and by introducing 'the Islamic solution', to the
problem, which was until recently, either nt known to, or ignored by
most economists. But it is very important to point out at the outset
that: "the field is an extensive one and bristles with difficulties for
in no other field of economics, perhaps, has so much been written and
with such divergent results" (Divine 1959) .
Concerning the theory of interest, Harberler (1958:195) contended:
The theory of interest has for a long time been a weak spot in
the science of economics and the explanation and determination
of the interest rate still give rise to more disagreement among
economists than any other branch of general economic theory.
And concerning the theory of profit, Maurice Dobb (1937:62) wrote:
The theory of profits is still perhaps the darkest part of the
whole subject of economic distribution and though a voluminous
controversy has been waged on the matter in America... a body
of agreed opinion is still lacking and little has been done
to erect a synthesis from the various partial explanations of
a perplexed and perplexing subject.
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In view of the vastness of the subject, and in view of the limited
space for this chapter, the brief survey of the different theories of
interest and profit and the discussion of their theories are confined
only to the most important and well known ones, bearing in mind, as
Knight (1957:30) pointed out that: "It is of course impossible to take
up even the (most) important theories in all countries and summarise
their views, while any brief treatment by schools or groups would be
misleading rather than helpful". But before critically surveying and
discussing these theories, it is very important to note that by looking
at the historical development of the concepts of interest and profit
one finds out that, until the repeal of the prohibition of interest in
Europe in late Middle-Ages and the emergence of the various and conf-
licting theories to justify it, interest and usury were regarded by al-
most all religious leaders, canonists, philosophers and economists as a
charge over and above loan capital. The two terms were interchangeable.
They were both condemned not only by the monotheistic religions like
Judaism, Christianity and Islam but also by all religious leaders,
great philosophers and all honest men. It was only after the repeal of
the prohibition of interest and the establishment of the so called
'legal rate' that usury received its present meaning of exorbitant
charge for a money loan or a charge that exceeds the 'legal rate'.
As for trade and consequently profit, though regarded with dislike
and suspicion by people like the Indian Brahmins, the ancient Greeks
and Romans, and some Christian scholastics, it was not as much condem-
ned as interest. Though regarded as legitimate, it was considered that
it must be carried out only for the public benefit and must not yield
more than the wages of the labour involved, due allowance being made
for the skill and risk involved (see Tawney 1926:32 and Beddy 1940:11).
4.2 DEFINITIONS
Rent: Rent may be defined as the predetermined market positive
return paid periodically by a lessee to a lessor for the temporary use
of the latter's property which must be a durable good but may not be
money or a perishable consumer good, following a leasing contract. The
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ownership of the property remains with the lessor and the lessee has
only the right of use over it at the risk of the owner except when a
damage is caused by the wilful act of the lessor.
Wages: Wages may be defined as the predetermined positive market
returns paid )2y employers to employees in return for their work follo-
wing an employment contract to do a certain job.
Interest: Interest may be defined as any predetermined return
required hy a lender from a borrower over and above the principal lent,
following a lending contract. The ownership of the principal, once han-
ded over to the borrower, becomes his own and at his own risk. Usually
the lender secures his loan by taking a pledge from the borrower.
Profit: Profit is one of 3 iCTIAS of a sale residaal tollutlim; a
Sale contract: 1) Profit; 2) Loss; and 3) No Profit and no Loss. Any
of these three forms (ie one at any one time) may occur to the owner of
the good sold and/or to the entrepreneur, who instead of getting wages
for his management of the good sold accepts to share the sale residual.
4.3 THE THEORIES OF INTEREST AND THEIR CRITICISMS
"After the repeal of the prohibition of interest, a perfect flood
of writings broke out in which interest was defended with the utmost
vigour, as if the barriers of long restraint had all been torn down in
one day" (Boehm-Bawerk 1890:35). And just as before the repeal, nobody
could, openly, defend the taking of interest, nobody, after the repeal
could dare writing against it, this time not because of fear of punish-
ment but of fear that he might be ridiculed or accused of fanaticism or
reactionary thinking. This remained so until perhaps the mid 20th cen-
tury when interest became a corner stone in the western theories of in-
come distribution and when economists admitted its legitimacy without
questioning its morality. The result was a great number of conflicting
theories. This led Vera and Friederick Lutz (1951:237) to remark that
"the theory of interest is at present in a state of confusion".
Before presenting his own theory of interest in his book The Posi-
tive Theory of Capital to justify interest, Boehm-Bawerk critically
surveyed all the important theories before him in his book Capital and
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Interest. In the following sub-sections, the review and criticism of
these theories and those of Boehm-Bawerk and Keynes will be dealt with.
4.3.1 The Colourless Theories of Interest
Boehm-Bawerk (1890) included in this category along with other
economists the theories of Adam Smith, Ricardo, Torrens and McCulloch.
The title 'colourless' is used because these writers based their ideas
on those of Adam Smith without adding much or enough to make definite
theories of interest and because Adam Smith himself "has not laid down
any distinct theory of interest (though) the germs of almost all the
latter and conflicting theories are to be found with more or less
distinctions in his scattered observations" (ibid 1890:70-71).
Some of these writers, like Sartorious, Lueder and Kraus, who fol-
lowed Adam Smith, copied his vague idea about interest almost literally
particularly his remark that: "if there were no interest the capitalist
would have no inducement to spend his capital productively". Others,
such as Politz and Murhad assumed that interest requires no explanation
and said nothing about it. Others again gave reasons for it that though
peculiar were superficial and trifling that they can scarcely lay claim
to the honourable name of theories (ibid:80-81).
4.3.2 The Productivity Theories
The theories that explain interest by the productivity of capital
include those of J.B. Say, Malthus and Landerdale. Although the concept
of productivity envisaged by these writers is not always clear and is
not the same for each, the fundamental notion of all is that capital
goods are in some sense productive and hence must receive a functional
share in the distribution of income (Conard 1959:28). Although no-one
denies the productivity of capital, since by its assistance more goods
can be produced than otherwise, it should be self-evident that by crea-
ting goods one does not necessarily produce value. In fact, "The very
fact that tomorrow's output can be larger than today's might indeed,
cause the value of that output to be less than today's" (ibid:29).
4.3.3 The Use Theories
Of the writers who hold this theories, Boehm-Bawerk gives special
attention to J.B. Say who first suggested it, Hermann who worked out
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its nature and essence and Menger who gave it the most complete form.
These theories imply that, besides the substance of capital, the use of
capital is an object of independent nature and of independent value.
They argue that to obtain a return for capital it is not enough to sac-
rifice the substance of capital alone but the 'use' of it must also be
sacrificed during the period of production; and since the value of the
product is theoretically equal to the sum of the values of the means of
production spent in making it, and since the substance of capital and
the use of capital, taken together, are equal to the value of the pro-
duct, this product naturally must be greater than the value of the sub-
stance of capital by itself. In other words and as Conard (1959:30) put
it: "he who buys the product of capital must pay both for the substance
of the capital and for the use of it. This latter payment provides the
surplus which is interest".
In criticising these theories Boehm-Bawerk (1890:214) said that:
"There is no independent use of capital such as is postulated by the
use theorists. There can therefore be no independent value of the kind
asserted and the phenomenon of surplus value cannot thus be accounted
for. The assumption is nothing but the product of a fiction which is in
contradiction of actual fact". He argued that all value of all goods
always arise from their use, and that therefore it is meaningless to
try to separate use value form the value of the substance".
4.3.4 The Abstinence Theory
Senior is considered to be the founder of this theory. He distin-
guished between 2 primary instruments of production: labour and natural
agents but these cannot attain complete efficiency if they are not sup-
ported by a third element, 'abstinence', which means: "the conduct of a
person who either abstains from the unproductive use of what he can
command or designedly prefers the production of remote to that of imme-
diate results" (Boehm-Bawerk 1890:272). Thus, according to Senior, the
sacrifice, which lies in the renunciation or the postponement of grati-
fication demands compensation. Among the followers of Senior who hold
this theory, Boehm-Bawerk (ibid) mentioned J.S. Mill, Jevons, Rossi,
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Gamier, Calmness, etc., and concluded that "none of these writers have
added any essential new feature to Senior's abstinence theory".
The ultimate and irrefutable objection to this theory in Boehm-
Bawerk's view is that abstinence simply cannot be regarded as an inde-
pendent factor of production (see Boehm-Bawerk 1890:278).
4.3.5 Labour Theories
Under the title of the labour theories Boehm-Bawerk (1890) grouped
together a number of theories advanced by theorists like Mill, Schaffle
and Wagner, Courcelle Seneil and Rodbertus, who allege that interest is
a payment legitimately earned by the capitalist, through the stored up
labour and/or the labour of saving and accumulation.
As Afzalur-Rahman (1976:25) pointed out: "There is no doubt that
foresight and saving do require some effort but the mere fact that the
performance of labour in a certain set of circumstances is accompanied
by the receipt of income is not by any means a justification for main-
taining that the income is the wage of that labour. In order to advance
such an argument one would have to be able to prove that the income is
actually given in return for the labour and only in order to procure
that labour". Besides, even if we admit that interest is the remunera-
tion of the labour of saving as they claim, why then there is a diffe-
rence in the remuneration of a rich man, who saves say: £10,000 and a
poor man who saves only £500 in a year. They both experienced the
'labour' of saving from consumption and resisted the temptation for the
same period. In fact the poor man with a higher propensity to consume
must have experienced more pain and temptation to consume his savings,
then why should the rich saving 'labourer' get more than the poor one.
4.3.6 The Exploitation Theory
The exploitation theory was pronounced by socialist and communist
writers, such as Sismondi, Proudhon, Rodbertus, Lassalle and Marx, who
expounded the doctrine of Adam Smith and Ricardo that the source of all
value is labour. The essence of this theory is:
All goods that have value are the product of human labour, and
indeed, economically considered as exclusively the product of
human labour. The labourers, however, do not retain the whole
product which they alone have produced, for the capitalists
take advantage of their command over the indispensable means
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of production as secured by them by the institution of private
property, to secure to themselves a part of the labourers'
product. The means of doing so are supplied by the wage cont-
ract in which the labourers are compelled by hunger to sell
their labour power to the capitalists for a part of what they,
the labourers produce, while the remainder of the product
falls as profit into the hands of the capitalists without any
exertion on their part. Interest is thus a portion of the pro-
duct of other people's labour, obtained by exploiting the
necessary conditions of the labourer (Boehm-Bawerk (1890:315).
Thus, according to them rent, interest and profit are illegitimate
plunder from the product of other people's labour and the workers are
defrauded (ie exploited) of the surplus value which they themselves
have produced. This theory, according to Boehm-Bawerk (1890:390) is not
only incorrect but in theoretical value, even takes one of the lowest
places among interest theories. He wrote: "However the fallacies we may
meet among the representatives of some of the other theories I scarcely
think that anywhere else are to be found so great a number of the worst
fallacies: wanton, unproved assumptions, self-contradiction and blind-
ness of fact". He (ibid) demonstrated that labour does not create all
value but besides labour there are other factors such as the demand and
supply of the good and the passage of time on the good which affect its
value and make it fluctuate sometimes below, sometimes above the amount
of labour incorporated in it and contended:
The asserted law that the value of goods is regulated by the
amount of the labour incorporated in them, does not hold at
all, in the case of a very considerable proportion of goods;
in the case of the others, does not hold always; and never
holds exactly. These are the facts of experience with which
the value theorists have to reckon.
4.3.7 The Eclectics
After the repeal of the prohibition of interest and since the 1830s
when the problem of interest had become a common subject of scientific
discussion, it was no longer possible for economists to remain undeci-
ded about it. Boehm-Bawerk (1890:395) reported that:
Economists were obliged to own to an opinion and those who
could not come to a decision of their own became eclectics.
Interest theories were put forward in abundance. Writers who
neither could, nor would, make one for themselves, nor decide
exclusively on one of the already made, would choose from two
or three or more heterogeneous theories the part that suited
them, and weave them into what generally proved a rather bad-
ly connected whole, or without even trying to obtain the ap-
pearance of a whole, they would in the course of their writ-
ings employ sometimes one, sometimes another theory, as sui-
ted best for the purposes they might happen to have in view.
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The least that can be said about such theories is that they are
plagued with hesitation and inconsistency which give rise to all sorts
of contradictions and confusion and thus are no better than the
previous original theories of which, none is free from criticism.
4.3.8 Time Preference Theory
At the end of his book Capital and Interest, where he surveyed and
criticised all earlier known theories, Boehm-Bawerk (1890:428) wrote:
On the foundation thus laid I shall try to find for the vexed
problem a solution which invents nothing and assumes nothing,
but simply and truly attempts to deduce the phenomenon of the
formation of interest from the simplest natural and psycholo-
gical principal of our science.
And in his book Positive Theory of Capital (1891), he expounded
his theory of interest according to which interest arises from the dif-
ference in value between present and future goods claiming that his
theory "does not contain one single feature which is not based on true
empirical principles". He contended:
Present goods are, as a rule, worth more than future goods of
like kind and number. This proportion is the kernel and centre
of the interest theory which I have to present. All the lines
of explanation, by which I hope to elucidate the phenomenon of
interest, run through this fact, and round it, both essential-
ly and superficially, is grouped the whole of the theoretical
work we have to do. Once this fact is established, then the
willingness of persons to pay interest for the loans of funds
becomes obvious.
Although this theory is one of the most accepted ones, it is not
free from criticism. Cassel (1903:61) argued: "this formula of underva-
luation of future goods in relation to present is however ambiguous and
has, in fact, two different meanings even with Boehm-Bawerk himself".
Besides he does not distinguish between the future change in the value
of real goods and that of money. The future value of any real good can-
not be accurately known at present because it is uncertain and depends
on its demand and supply at that future. It may go up as well as down
and it may remain unchanged. As for money, this is not the case because
"if a man hoards his savings in cash he earns no interest though he
saves as much as before" (Keynes 1936:167).
Mawdudi (1984:176), in criticising this theory, argued:
Does human nature really consider the present as more impor-
tant and more valuable than the future?. If this is so why do
the majority of people not consider it wise to exhaust all
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their earnings today, and prefer to save a portion of their
wealth for the future?. Perhaps you will not come across even
1% of people who have abandoned all care for the future and
prefer to spend all their wealth on present pleasures and en-
joyment... You will hardly find a man foolish enough to choose
a better present at the cost of a worse fortune. It is a dif-
ferent matter if a man does so out of ignorance, stupidity or
under the influence of monetary lust, but none would delibe-
rately accept this choice as correct and reasonable.
S. Ahmed (1952:33) also contended that:
In all countries and climes, wherever the men have capacity to
save, they do so in (almost) total disregard of the premium or
otherwise on savings and when men cannot save, have barely
enough to live on, no rate of interest can persuade them to
starve. Here, of course, present goods are of much more value
than future goods. But the men in this situation have no capa-
city to give loan and should as little enter the theories of
interest as they do the money market. Those who can save, as a
rule do sacrifice present comforts to future necessity.
4.3.9 The Loanable Fund Theory
The loanable fund theory of interest, as proclaimed by its suppor-
ters such as Ohlin, Robertson, Hicks, Harberler, etc., regards interest
as essentially a monetary problem. "These theorists are", as Qureshi
(1983:28) pointed out: "less concerned with the cause of the existence
of interest and more with the determination of the rate of interest".
In other words, and as Afzalur -Rahman (1976:46) put it: "they do not
attempt to answer the question why should interest be paid or why inte-
rest is paid?. They have simply ignored this question and have sought
refuge in the theory of value. They say like all other things the price
of capital is determined by the demand and supply of money".
In their effort to define interest, these theorists treat 'money
capital' as equivalent to capital goods, a subtle mistake which, as Abu
Saud (1980:64) put it: "helps them find a warrant for charging interest
on borrowed money. Money per se cannot be considered equivalent to ful-
ly fledged goods mainly because all goods embody a utility which satis-
fies some human economic demand. This innate natural property is arti-
ficial in money, as demand for it -as a means of exchange- is a derived
one imputed to the original need for the exchange of products. If money
ceases to function as such means ie if no exchange of real products ta-
kes place through the mediation of money its raison d'etre disappears".
Besides when exchanging goods, we do not exchange them against the like
goods (in quantity and quality) but against other goods. Thus the ana-
90
logy of the interest with prices of other goods is totally wrong and
does not answer the question why should interest be paid?.
4.3.10 The Liquidity Preference Theory
Keynes' theory is built upon a rejection of the Classical assump-
tion which regards the rate of interest as the factor which brings the
demand for investment and the willingness to save into equilibrium with
one another. In his explanation of the problem of interest, Keynes lays
stress on what he called 'the liquidity preference' and the quantity of
money giving four motives for this liquidity preference, two of which
are insensitive to the rate of interest (the transactions motive and
the precautionary motive) and two of which are interest-elastic (the
speculation motive and the finance motive). Keynes (1936:167-8) argued:
The rate of interest is not the price which brings into equi-
librium the demand for resources to invest with the readiness
to abstain from present consumption. It is the price which
eguilibriates the desire to hold wealth in the form of cash
with the available quantity of cash... The mere definition of
the rate of interest tells us in so many words that the rate
of interest is the reward for parting with liquidity for a
specified period. For the rate of interest is, in itself, no-
thing more than inverse proportion between a sum of money and
what can be obtained for parting with control over the money
in exchange for a debt for a stated period of time.., the
quantity of money is the other factor, which in connection
with liquidity preference, determines the actual rate of inte-
rest in given circumstances... It is obvious that up to a
(certain) point it is worthwhile to sacrifice a certain amount
of interest for the convenience of liquidity. But, given that
the rate of interest is never negative why should anyone pre-
fer to hold his wealth in a form which yields little or no
interest to holding it in a form which yields interest.
Although he did not agree with the classicals on the explanation
of interest, keynes agreed with them in not questioning its necessity
or legitimacy. As Robertson (quoted by Afzalur-Rahman 1976:44) put it:
"they leave interest suspended so to speak in a void, there being inte-
rest because there is interest". On the other hand he (ibid:235) wrote:
The money rate of interest, by setting the pace for all the
other commodity rates of interest holds back investment in the
production of these other commodities without being capable of
stimulating investment for the production of money, which by
hypothesis cannot be produced.
And he also argued on page 184 that:
It seems then that the rate of interest on money plays a pecu-
liar part in setting a limit to the level of employment, since
it sets a standard to which the marginal efficiency of a capi-
tal asset must attain if it is to be newly produced.
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The trade cycles also result, according to Keynes, from the brakes
put on the wheels of the economic machine by the rate of interest. Thus
although Keynes diagnosed interest as the main cause of unemployment
and trade cycles, and considered it as the chief obstacle in the way of
the full utilisation of the productive resources available, he missed
the remedy of abolishing it completely and suggested that "it is to our
best advantage to reduce the rate of interest to that point, relatively
to the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital at which there is
full employment" (p.375). But that point cannot be other than zero.
4.4 THEORIES OF PROFIT
Beddy (1940) critically surveyed the most important and well-known
theories of profits in the west then gave his own theory. Here, I shall
briefly review and criticise these theories. But before that it is very
important to point out that, unlike in the Muslim World where merchants
and traders were honoured and consequently their profits approved, com-
merce and trade were very much despised in the West during the Middle-
Ages and their profits were seen as illegitimate. Beddy reported that:
It was not until the advent of mercantilism, that the position
of the merchants completely changed. Instead of being the des-
pised members of the community they became the chief instru-
ment by which the mercantilist policy could be carried out. On
their ability depended the success of the effort to make as
much profit as possible out of foreigners by exchanging home
produced commodities for the much more highly prized precious
metals, thus, those who engaged in this activity rose from
their lowly social position to one of much higher standing in
which they enjoyed no inconsiderable measure of respect.(p.12)
However, by the mid 18th Century the Physiocrates, led by Quesney,
held that agriculture is the only source of the Produit net and that
other sectors like industry and commerce are sterile since they give no
real wealth surplus. Then came the Classicals starting with Adam Smith,
who on one hand seems to dislike profit-seeking since he described pro-
fit seekers as: "an order of men whose interest is never exactly the
same with that of the public who have generally an interest to deceive
and even oppress the public and who, accordingly have, upon many occa-
sions, both deceived and oppressed it" and on the the other realises at
the same time that: "It is the stock that is employed for the sake of
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profit which puts into motion the greater part of the useful labour of
every society" (see Beddy 1940:15). Since then a number of theories
have been advanced to explain profit, the most important of which are:
4.4.1 The Classical Theories
The Classicals recognised 3 forms of income: rent, wages and pro-
fits. But these forms of rewards were often too difficult to distin-
guish from each other because they sometimes arose in the composite
form of the income of one person. Knight (1951:534) pointed out that:
The Classical writers, recognised at least three elements in
the income of the capitalist entrepreneur: one payment for the
bare use of the capital (equal to interest), a second element
representing payment for the entrepreneur's activities as
manager, and a third connected in a rather vague way with the
carrying of the risks of hazards of the enterprise.
"The chief blemish of these theories", as Beddy (1940:20) remarked:
"lies in the confusion between interest and profit". Although almost
three quarters of a century separated Adam Smith from Mill, yet as
Beddy (1940:36) noticed: "it was only at the very end of this period
that fresh ideas began to emerge on the subject of profits. The classi-
cal economists failed to give a consistent and a clear theory of pro-
fit. Their treatment, as a whole, was superficial and inconsistent. At
times they compare it to interest, others to rent, etc.". From Mill on-
wards economists began to distinguish profit from other forms of income
but many were the theories they advanced to explain it.
4.4.2 Management Earning Theory
This is one of the most accepted theories of profit which continue
to be held by some economists up to the present day. The proponents of
this theory believe that profits represent the reward for the work of
management and superintendence. This theory is held by so many econo-
mists that Beddy (1940:47) said: "it would be a formidable and useless
task to attempt to name them and to set forth their views in any de-
tail". According to this theory, and as Beddy (1940:43) pointed out:
"when the employer pays himself his own wages, he is left with neither
a profit nor a loss on his business". Marshall's leaning towards this
view is clear from his statement that "putting aside the gains of spe-
culation.., it remains true that competition tends to secure, to each
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ordinary employer, earnings of management equal to what his work adds
to the efficiency of production so much and no more". But Hawley (1892)
argued: "why when all managerial functions are delegated do we not say
that those to whom they are delegated receive profits and not wages".
Beddy (ibid:51) contended that: "if as is now quite clear, the
management of the very large enterprises rests in the hands of salaried
individuals who do not share in the net profits remaining after payment
of all salaries and other expenses, there can be no doubt that the pro-
fits of such enterprises are not wages of management. This is the com-
mon sense and generally accepted view of modern economists".
4.4.3 The Business Ability Theory
This theory is associated with Walker (1887) who, like many others,
revolted against the emphasis placed on capital in explaining profits.
He distinguished between the businessman (entrepreneur) and the capita-
list. Excluding from profit the wages for the work of superintending
and directing the business affairs as these could be delegated he found
the explanation and justification for profits in the exceptional abili-
ties of the businessman, to furnish the technical skill and commercial
knowledge to administer the business, to assume its responsibilities
and to provide against contingencies.
Comparing the businessmen who may be called the non-profit class
(who make only a bare living by receiving only wages of superintendence
that are not profits in his view) with the businessmen, in the same
walks of life, who, because of their exceptional abilities and excep-
tional opportunities, make successful varying amounts of profits over
and above their wages of superintendence, he spoke of the 'exceptional
ability' which made men millionaires and the lack of it which caused
long established business concerns of high prestige to collapse through
inefficient management and arrived at the conclusion that: "just as
rent was a reward for the superior productivity of certain soils, so
also profits rewarded the superior personal abilities of certain emplo-
yers or entrepreneurs" (see Beddy 1940:55).
This theory was criticised by Macvane (1887) who pointed to the
failure of Walker to indicate clearly who was the gainless entrepreneur
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and expressed his doubts that price was determined by the least effi-
cient employer. Macvane's soundest objection to Walker's views was that
they represented only a theory of differences in profit (ie he explai-
ned only why one entrepreneur got more than the other but he did not
explain why the other got anything at all). This theory is today, as
Beddy (1940:64) put it: "largely discredited though there still remain
some who seeing the entrepreneur as the guiding spirit in all phases of
business activity, continue to believe that all net gains result from
acts of his, in which his superior skill and ability are displayed".
4.4.4 The Dynamic Theory
This theory is upheld by Clark (1899) and his followers. Assuming
that, all real knowledge of the laws of movement depends upon an ade-
quate knowledge of the laws of rest, Clark started his treatment of the
theory of profit by distinguishing between the static and dynamic eco-
nomies and concluded that profits are exclusively the results of dyna-
mic change. Clark's concept of dynamic theory is different from that of
Schumpeter, which is governed largely by his views of a
which conditions are static but not stationary, that is
the economic system adapts itself to changes in land or
not itself develop from given conditions.
Although this theory received and perhaps continues
and unqualified acceptance, there are many, however who
static state in
to say in which
labour but does
to receive wide
have challenged
both the method and the conclusion of Clark. Beddy (1940:71) reported
that: "Carver wrote of the doubtful utility of so heroic an assumption
as that of the static state and Marshall was not among those who welco-
med so abstract a concept which differed so greatly from that of the
representative firm". Although, Knight (1957:37) admitted that without
changes there would be no profits in the theoretical sense, he argued
that: "it is not dynamic change, nor any change, as such, which causes
profits, but the divergence of actual conditions from those which have
been expected and on the basis of which business arrangements have been
made which brings about a special entrepreneurial income".
Furthermore, as Beddy (1940:77) pointed out: "Clark's conception of
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the entrepreneur is not sufficiently definite... Taussing could not ac-
cept the sharp distinction it draws between wages of management and pro-
fits. Clark's definition was therefore a matter of phraseology and no
clear line could be drawn to show the functions which wages of manage-
ment would remunerate and those which were remunerated by profits. In-
deed Clark's entrepreneur is so shadowy a being that it is difficult to
believe that it is the explanation of profit. His functions are too
vague to leave unsatisfied that they are real".
4.4.5 The Risk Theory
As Beddy (1940:82) pointed out: "It is probable that no theory of
profits has attracted so much attention and given rise to much discus-
sion as the risk theory which ranks today as one of the most widely ac-
cepted views of profit". Many Muslim scholars adhere to this theory in
distinguishing between interest and profit and consequently reject some
Halal sale contracts like Murabahah (mark-up) and Bai' Mua — al (sale at
higher deferred price) as non risky and as similar to interest, which
is Haram (See 5.2 below). But as we will see this theory is tenuous.
This idea of explaining profit in relation to risk was known from
very early times by those who recognised in all business ventures an
element of risk, but who did not believe that risk is the only explana-
tion of the whole profits (see 4.4.1 above). However, the doctrine that
profit is to be explained exclusively in terms of risk has been asso-
ciated with the name of Hawley in the USA and Mangoldt in Germany.
Hawley (1893) regarded risk-taking as the inevitable accompaniment
of dynamic production and the essential function of the entrepreneur.
According to him: "Profit is simply the price paid by society for the
assumption of business risks". Strictly speaking, he regards the entre-
preneur as the only really productive factor, land, labour and capital
being relegated to the position of 'means' of production. The class of
risks rewarded by profits were, in his view, the uninsured business and
industrial risks which are the results of the uncertainty of how the
selling price of unsold product will compare with the cost or how the
cost of unfinished product will compare with its selling price. This
uncertainty would fall on the shoulders of the entrepreneur since, the
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ownership of the product of industry was the distinguishing characte-
ristic of the entrepreneur. He assumes that every businessman's subjec-
tive valuation of a risk is always greater than his actuarial valuation
of the same risk because according to him: "the assumption of risk is
irksome, it gives rise to trouble, anxiety and disutilities of various
kinds and these must be rewarded by a payment over and above the actua-
rial value of the risk". Profit, therefore, consisted of two parts: one
representing compensation for the actuarial or average loss incidental
to the various classes of risks necessarily assumed by the entrepreneur
and the remaining part represented an inducement to suffer the irksome-
ness of being exposed to the risk" (see Beddy 1940:84-85).
However, as Beddy (ibid) criticised this theory, it does not offer
a full explanation of all the gains arising from business activities.
It is evident that the very substantial gains of many monopolistic or
semi-monopolistic business concerns could not be attributed to the
risks which were undertaken, since in many cases the gains arose from
the very fact of not taking any risks at all. When Hawley was conscious
of and recognised that monopolistic profits fell outside his theory, he
placed these gains in a distinct category and regarded distribution as
consisting of rent, wages, interest, profits and monopoly gains.
This theory is defective for at least 4 reasons: First, Hawley was
unable to maintain successfully that these gains were really a distinc-
tive form of economic reward as to justify their inclusion in the theo-
ry of distribution as a fourth independent reward. Secondly, though he
stated that there were four industrial forces: land, labour, capital
and enterprise, he could not say that enterprise alone had two indepen-
dent rewards: profits and monopoly gains. The third objection to this
theory is that, it is well known that greater risk does not necessarily
generate greater profits. Clark (1892) pointed out that "not only do
profits not correspond with risks but often vary inversely as risks".
Fourthly, this theory may also be challenged on the grounds that it is
not always the entrepreneur who assumes risks, especially where entre-
preneurs get wages and where losses are assumed by shareholders.
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4.4.6 The Uncertainty Theory
Knight (1921) criticised risk theorists for confusing risk and un-
certainty. He believed that profit is not the reward of risk which can
be measured and reduced by combinations and insurance but of uncertain-
ty which cannot be measured or insured against. According to him a
businessman must guess future demand and selling prices and pay amounts
based on his guess in advance to his factors of production. This theory
in turn could not escape criticism. Uncertainty is a subjective concept
and the willingness to bear it differs from one person to another. Fur-
thermore it has no direct relationship with the amount of profits rea-
lised. Besides like the risk theory it fails to explain profits that
can be obtained by mark-up sales, where the prices include extra pre-
agreed percentages over costs. Beddy (1940:125) argued that: "the real
importance of uncertainty lies in its influence on supply. So far from
being one of the factors of production it is simply one of the influen-
ces which affect the extent to which those factors will be utilised. In
this respect it somewhat resembles pain which influences the supply of
labour and abstinence which influences the supply of capital. Like them
it is incidental rather than essential... Even if uncertainty bearing
was connected only with business enterprise, we can no more say that
profits are the reward for uncertainty-bearing than we can say that
wages are the reward for pain".
4.4.7 Monopoly Gains Theory
Among those, who hold the view that profits are wholly or in large
part unearned and attribute its origin and size to the existence of ad-
vantageous monopolistic positions in the institutional structure which
are possessed and exploited by a favourite minority and consider them
mainly or wholly due to spoliation, Rodbertus, Lassalle and Marx may be
mentioned. An immediate objection to this theory is that while such
gains may be described as profit, the converse is not the case, since
substantial profits may arise under competitive and not under monopo-
listic conditions. "Even in the same case of complete control by one
person or group of persons of the production of a particular commodity,
there is usually only a partial monopoly, on account of substitute coin-
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modities" (Beddy 1940:148). In fact, in most if not all of today's eco-
nomies, neither monopoly nor competition regulate the economic activity
structure, rather, it is the conditions of imperfect competition.
Thus this theory, like the risk theory which left monopoly gains
out, does not explain or cover all profits and hence does not give a
complete satisfactory explanation of all profits.
4.5.8 The Acquired Advantage Theory
After reviewing and criticising all the previous theories of pro-
fits with a greater detail, Beddy (1940) presented his own theory: 'the
acquired advantages theory'. According to him: "Profits do not arise
from anything but acquired advantages and a study of profits must be a
study of such advantages" (p.265). Hence, he went into a detailed study
of a number of advantages, from which, he believed profits arise. But
before that, he distinguished between two types of advantage by saying:
"though there are so many different kinds of advantage as to make it
virtually impossible to describe them fully, they all fall under two
main headings, natural advantages and those which for want of a more
apt description, may be referred to as acquired advantages (p.254). He
attributed rent to the first which he considered to "arise from natural
ability, natural fertility or more correctly from superiority of natu-
ral resources" (p.267) and profits to the latter which he considered to
"arise from advantages which owe nothing to the bounty of nature".
In his analysis of the latter type of advantages, he argued that:
It is primarily the right to private property which enables
the benefits of economic advantages to be reaped... and with-
out such right, the same endeavours would not be made to se-
cure advantages which had to be shared with the community at
large and on this account, many advantages would not be sought
at all... When the right to private property is enjoyed by all
sections of the community it does not give rise to advantages.
It ensures that those who possess advantages are permitted to
benefit from them and in many cases, the right to private pro-
perty is strengthened so that it becomes a specific right
which is not shared by all, and obviously those advantages
which can be enjoyed by virtue of such rights become the
source of great profits. (p.269).
Among the advantages, he described in detail (between pp.270-340),
the following ones may be mentioned:
1-) The protective duties and other restrictions on imports which
have proved to be of great advantage to those whose products
have been safeguarded from foreign competition;
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2-) The machinery of politics which could be used to further the
interest of "big business" where the ruling classes are the
wealthy classes, and where the latter derive their wealth
from profits which rest upon acquired advantages;
3-) The use of government legislation or patronage to favour
specific individuakl7H or groups who may be qualified in a
particular respect;
4-) The circumstances in which, owing to inequality of
opportunity it is impossible for many even to qualify for the
possession of profitable advantages while others enjoy the
profits that arise from advantages like business secrecy,
location, size, sufficient wealth, machinery, diversifica-
tion, education, monopoly, etc..;
5-) The marketing advantages through the possession of some
exclusive advantages in the purchase of raw materials, in the
methods and processes of manufacture, in accountability to
cheap and efficient labour, in transport, in general organi-
sation, in credit facilities and in anything connected with
business in which advantage is possible;
6-) The unfair advantages which, though are of much more ques-
tionable type, give rise to profits. They arise from methods
of doing business which are ruthless, unscrupulous or decep-
tive or arise form misapplied or distorted power or ability
such as adulteration, deceptive advertising, over-charging,
bribery and corruption of all kinds;
7-) The accidental or fortuitous advantages which are in some
instances the most important element in profits, namely the
reward for good fortune, luck and audacity.
This theory fails, like its predecessors, to answer what the direct
cause of profit is or why profit should be paid to those who receive it.
This theory may be accepted in explaining the causes of differences in
business profits but not in explaining the whole of profits or their
real cause. Hence, it can be said that this theory is open to the same
objections which render the existing theories unacceptable.
4.6 THE ISLAMIC SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF INTEREST AND PROFIT
Before discussing the Islamic solution to the problem of interest
and profit, it is very important to first know about the Islamic atti-
tude towards them from the sources of Islam. But at the outset of this
task it is worth remembering that in case the rtihad of a scholar or a
group of scholars contradicts the Koran or the Sunnah, then this is
considered as void and as non-Islamic whosoever its author(s) may be.
4.6.1 Interest
Like the prohibition of intoxicants, the Koranic prohibition of
interest was gradual. It came in four stages. The first Koranic verse
to be revealed concerning interest is in Koran:30:39:
Whatever you lend at interest, so that it may increase your
net worth at the expense of others, in reality it does not
increase with Allah, but what you give in Zakat (poor due,
charity, etc.) seeking Allah's pleasure, increases manifold.
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Although this verse does not explicitly prohibit Riba, it suggests
that lending at interest is an injustice since it is at the expense of
others (borrowers). It also points out to the paradox that those, who
think that by taking interest on loans, they increase their net worth,
are wrong for in reality they do not. As for paying Zakat, though it
appears as if it decreases the wealth of the individual, it in fact in-
creases it. The Koran does not show us how this could be explained.
The second and third Koranic sets of verses about interest are to
be found in Koran 4:160-162 and Koran 3:120-136. The former set of
verses warn Muslims indirectly not to transgress Allah's laws and not to
take interest as did some of the Jews who took interest despite its pro-
hibition, but to be like the believers among them who believe in all the
revelations from Allah, establish regular prayers, practise regular
Zakat and believe in Allah and in the last day. The latter set of verses
forbids the Muslim to take compound interest and states that the real
prosperity cannot be obtained through the taking of high interest rates
as many would think but on the contrary it can be obtained by spending
freely in charity. Here again the Koran does not tell how this could be
so, and leaves it to the scholars to exert their effort to find out how.
The last set of Koranic verses about Riba is in Koran 2:261-283,
prohibits it categorically with the most severe condemnation by decla-
ring war against those who take it, and clearly defines it as any gain
over and above the principal lent be it small or large. A distinction
is made between interest from loan which is prohibited and sale which
is permitted and a contrast is, once again, made between acts of Infaq
(charity) and acts of Riba suggesting that it is the former rather than
the latter which causes prosperity. Again how this could be achieved is
left to the scholars to ponder about or discover. The longest verse of
the Koran is also among this latter set of verses. It deals with the
rules of writing down the contracts involving future obligations in
order to prevent litigations and conflicts (see 3.4 above).
As for Riba in Sunnah, there are tens of Hadiths about it, some of
those translated by Robson (1975:603-606) are as follows:
101
1- Jabir reported that: "Allah's messenger cursed the one who ac-
cepts Riba, the one who pays it, the one who records its cont-
ract and the witnesses to at, saying that: they are all alike.
2- Abdullah son of Hanzala reported Allah's messenger as saying:
dirham which a man knowingly i6EaVes as interest is more
serious than thirty six acts of fornication".
3- Abu Buraira reported Allah's messenger as saying: "Riba may
take seventy forms, the least important being equal in its
severity to a man committing incest with his own mother".
4- Abu Saeed El-Rhudri reported Allah's messenger as saying: "Do
not barter gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat,
barley for barley, dates for dates and salt for salt except in
equal quantities and with the condition that payment and deli-
very are made on the spot."
5- Abu Saeed El-Rhudri reported that: "One day Bilal brought some
good quality dates to the prophet (PBUH) who asked him: "Where
did you get this from?". Bilal answered: "I had some dates of
inferior quality which I exchanged against these: two measures
against one". The prophet then said: "Ah! the very essence of
Raba, the very essence of Riba. Do not do so, but when you
wish to buy, sell your dates in a separate transaction with
money, then buy what you like with what you get".
From the above mentioned Koranic verses and Badiths all the Muslim
scholars, from the rise of Islam till the present day, distinguish bet-
ween two forms of Riba: Riba El-Nasseea and Riba El-Fadhl. The first is
concerned with interest on money loans and the second emanating from
the barter of some goods if these are of the same kind even if they
differ in quality (see Hadith nos.4 and 5 above). With the exception of
very few Muslims who appeared in the first half of the 20th century and
who -under political and economic pressures or under western educatio-
nal influence- thought that no rapid economic development is possible
without modern banking and no banking is possible to work without inte-
rest, distinguished between interest transactions among individuals and
interest to or from banks, sanctioning the first as the one prohibited
by Islam and declaring the second as permissible, all other Muslim
scholars agree that Riba El-Nasseea is any predetermined increase over
and above the principal of a debt, whether this is between individuals
or institutions. However, there is some disagreement among Muslim scho-
lars concerning Riba El-Fadhl which arises from the barter of commodi-
ties of the same kind (see Hadith nos.4 and 5 above) whether it arises
only from the six commodities mentioned in the hadith or from all com-
modities of the same kind. Because what is of importance to us here is
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the banking interest and this one falls, in my opinion, under Riba El-
Nasseea, I shall limit my discussion only to this latter one.
The problem of interest has received quite a considerable attention
by Muslim scholars this century. First, between 1916 and 1920 when the
idea of establishing an indigenous bank in Egypt was in the air a num-
ber of lectures were given in Nadi Dar El-Ulum to discuss the legiti-
macy of banking interest (Banna 1986:7). Despite the fact that there
was no agreement about the exclusion of banking interest from Riba, the
result, however, was the establishment of the interest based: Banque
Misr in 1920 followed by others. The second occasion was perhaps in the
late 1940s and beginning of the 1950s when some Pakistani Muslim scho-
lars, like Mawdudi, Qureshi, Uzair and M.N. Siddiqi, tried to find an
alternative to interest based banking for the newly established Muslim
country Pakistan. The third occasion was in 1965 during the second co
ference of the Islamic Research Congress in Cairo, in which the, then
present scholars reached the consensus that all forms of interest inc-
luding those from banks -whether they are for consumption or production
purposes- are Riba and hence prohibited. The fourth occasion is connec-
ted with the emergence of the Islamic banks, which started in the 1970s
and has been continuing in the 1980s. Now there seems to be a general
consensus among contemporary Muslim scholars that all forms of prede-
termined interest on loans and deposits are Riba and so are prohibited.
Among those who excluded banking interest on deposits from Riba and
considered it as permissible, Shaltout, Yusuf Ali, Khallaf, Dawalibi,
Sanhuri and El-Fanjari (see Lachine 1983:498 and Banna 1986:35-66) may
be mentioned. They argued that interest from bank on deposits is not
Riba because the bank did not go to the depositors to borrow from them
but it is the depositors who went to the bank and deposited their sa-
vings with it, in other words they deny that deposits constitute a debt
on the bank. They further argued that the interest given to depositors
is not predetermined by the latter, as the lenders do in the case of
Riba, but by the bank and so it represents the profit share of deposi-
tors in the bank's profit and is just like Mudharabah profit.
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The reply to these arguments is that no matter how the deposits came
to reach the bank, they no doubt represent a debt on the bank towards
the depositors (the bank owes these deposits in full to the depositors).
If the bank pays any predetermined return on these deposits, then this
return fall without any doubt under the definition of Riba El-Nasseea,
no matter who decided on the rate of interest. Besides, these returns
do not resemble profits from Mudharabah because a predetermined return
on capital in a Mudharabah makes it not valid and not permissible.
Others like Dawalibi, distinguished between interest on consumption
loans and interest on production loans and argued that Riba is concer-
ned only with the former because in this case there is an exploitation
of the need of the poor who need to be helped rather than oppressed.
As for the interest on productive loans, they saw no objection in char-
ging a so called 'fair and moderate rate'. The answer to this argument
is: first, the Koran and the Sunnah, when referring to Riba, did not
make such difference but affirmed that any addition over and above the
principal of a loan is Riba; second, the historical evidences show that
the Riba that used to be in existence in Arabia, prior to Islam, was
mainly on productive loans (see 3.4 above); third, though exploitation
is more apparent in interest on consumption loans, it is also present
in productive loans not necessarily in detriment of the borrower but
sometimes in detriment of the lender, especially in case where the
borrower realises considerable profits by using the lender's money and
gives only a tiny amount of it to the latter.
Some others, like Sanhuri argued that what Islam prohibits is exces-
sive compound interest and not moderate simple interest. They allow in-
terest because they think it is the only way necessary for mobilising
savings for development. Again Islam is clear when prohibiting interest
that no more than the principal of a loan is allowed. Besides, interest
is neither necessary nor the only way to mobilise savings. Last but not
least, what is a 'fair and moderate' rate of interest?.
As for the majority of Muslim scholars like Mawdudi (nd), S. Ahmed
(1952), Afzalur-Rahman (1976), M.N. Siddiqi (1980), and Qureshi (1983)
who adhere to the strict prohibition of interest on deposits and loans,
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argue that the main reason why Islam abolishes interest is that it is
Dhulm (injustice and exploitation). In the case of consumption loans,
it violates the basic function for which Allah has created wealth which
envisages that the needy be supported by those who have surplus wealth.
In the case of productive loans, predetermined and guaranteed return to
capital is unjust in view of the uncertainty surrounding the business.
A second reason advanced by Muslim scholars as to why all sorts of
interest on loans must be prohibited is that it transfers wealth from
the poor to the rich, increasing thus, inequality by making the rich
richer and the poor poorer. This is against social interest and contra-
ry to the will of Allah who ordains Adl (justice) and Ihsan (benevo-
lence) and forbids Dhulm (injustice and oppression).
A third reason why interest is to be abolished is that it creates
an idle class of people who neither work nor participate in bearing the
risk of losses that might occur to the borrowers. If, instead of len-
ding their surpluses, they had themselves invested them directly, they
would not be certain of getting profits, they even might suffer losses,
so why should they get predetermined returns on their lent capital?.
Another reason for the prohibition of interest is that, perhaps it
is one of the main causes, if not the main cause, of inflation, unemp-
loyment, social injustice, Third World Debt Crisis, etc..
4.6.2 Profit
Concerning profit, however, all Muslim scholars with no exception,
agree that profits and PLS from legal trade of lawful goods, services
and rights (eg shares in companies) are legitimate but they give diffe-
rent explanations as to what causes profits to arise or to what justi-
fies the taking of profit. Some, like S. Ahmed (1952:25) explain profit
as: "the result of initiative, enterprise and efficiency". Others, like
Afzalur-Rahman (1976:90) consider it as: "the uncertain reward for the
labour of trade and for the bearing of risk of loss of the principal".
And others still, consider profits as the result of the productivity of
capital. Since these arguments fall under one or another of the above
criticised theories of profit, they are subject to the same criticisms.
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In my view, if we look at profits in a plain straightforward man-
ner, we find that profits are only one of three outcomes that emanate
from sale and only from sale, for unless there were sale there would be
no profits, no matter how much initiative, organisation, coordination,
management or superintendence were involved and no matter how much risk
and uncertainty may be borne and even no matter how much monopoly or
other advantages the profit seekers might have acquired. It may be true
that good management, organisation, monopoly or advantages like good
location, advertising, use of computers, etc., may help selling more
efficiently thus, indirectly affecting the size of profits, but this is
not necessarily so in all cases. It may also be true that some sales
involve bearing greater risks and uncertainty than others but this does
not necessarily mean that those sales involving greater risk or uncer-
tainty are more profitable than the others. Thus, in my view, profit is
primarily and simply a part of what I call the 'Theory of Sale Residual'
which is concerned not only with profit (the positive return on sales)
but with losses (the negative return) and with the case of making nei-
ther profits nor losses. Perhaps that is why Allah mentioned sale and
not profit in the Koran 2:274 when he said: "They say sale is just like
interest but Allah has permitted sale and prohibited interest", to tell
us that not only profits are permitted but all the outcomes of legal
sales are permitted whether they are profits, losses or no profits and
no losses. As for interest, he mentioned Riba, which is any positive
return on loans to tell us that what is prohibited is not the act of
lending itself but only the return on loans. This theory covers all re-
turns on sales whether these latter are risky or not, certain or uncer-
tain, carried out under monopoly or under competition, etc..
However, Islam does not allow all sorts of sales. It prohibits mo-
nopoly, speculation (storage of goods during periods of abundance to
create shortages that lead to dramatic rises in prices), forward sales
of money and of unripe agricultural products in their fields. It also
prohibits the cut-throat competition and encourages fair business that
is carried out in a spirit of humanitarianism and justice. Islam also
prohibits all sales of harmful and prohibited products like the meat of
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pork and of dead animals, blood, intoxicants, and all sales involving
deception, fraud, chance and other crooked ways. In fact Islam has set
some rules and conditions for the validity of sale contracts. Some of
these conditions apply to the contractants and some others apply to the
commodity. These conditions may be summarised as follows:
1-) Conditions applying to the contractants: the contractant must
be sane, sensible, conscious, honest and under no obligation at the
time of the agreement, otherwise the contract becomes void.
2-) Conditions applying to the commodity: the commodity must not
be lawful, of some beneficial use, belong to the profit-seeker, obtai-
nable, transferable and free from all defects. In case the commodity is
defective in any way the buyer must be told beforehand.
The sale residual may be positive (profit), negative (loss) or
equal to zero (no profit and no loss) depending on the sale price and
on the cost of the commodity. This can be represented in the following
simple equations:	 SR = SP - TC	 (1)
where: SR = Sale Residual; SP = Sale Price; TC = Total Cost
A profit arises only when SR is positive: SR > 0
	 (2)
This happens only when:
A loss occurs when SR is negative:
which implies that the
And no profit and no loss arises when
That is to say when
SP > TC
SR < 0
SP < TC
SR = 0
SP = TC
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Unlike the orthodox theory of income distribution which considers
distribution purely from the functional standpoint by distinguishing
separately the functions of land, labour, capital and enterprise and by
regarding those functions as being rewarded by rent, wages, interest
and profit respectively, the Islamic approach to the distribution of
income is, in my view, a non functional one. The Islamic approach to
the distribution of income is not so much concerned with the factors of
production as it is concerned with the owners of these factors of pro-
duction. It looks at the legal contracts determining the socio-economic
relations between the owners of the factors of production and distribu-
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tes the income according to these contracts. Thus, we can say that the
Islamic approach to the distribution of income is a contractual one.
For example, the entrepreneur receives wages for his work if he
agrees to be employed and to receive wages that have no relation to the
SR of the company he works for. If however, he accepts that his reward
be related to the SR of the company, he receives profits in case SR > 0
and receives nothing in case the SR < 0 or SR = 0, as in Mudharabah. If
on the other hand, he agrees to receive part of his reward from the SR
and the other part with no relation to the SR then he receives part of
his reward in profit and part of it in wages. Likewise if the capital
owner invests his money capital in a company accepting to be rewarded a
share in the SR, he receives profits in case SR > 0, bears a share in
the losses in case of SR < 0 and gets nothing if the SR = 0. However,
if he does not accept to be rewarded in relation to the SR he is not
entitled to any interest but he is entitled to claim back his principal
in full. If the capital provided by the capital owner is not money but
a capital good that can be leased, its owner can either receive rent
for its lease provided that he bears the costs of its repair and damage
or receives profits on it, if it is valued at the time of signing the
contract and committed to be used for a reward that depends on the SR,
or receive nothing for it if he lends it. In this case the borrower
bears the cost of any damage or repair while in his possession.
4.6.3 Profit and Loss Sharing (PIS)
PLS is a financial mechanism taking one of the following forms:
1- Musharakah or Sharikat (partnership) which is divided in the
Islamic Figh (jurisprudence) into Sharikat Al -Amlak (proprietary part-
nerships) and Sharikat Al -Ugud (contractual partnerships)
A- Sharikat Al -Amlak is concerned exclusively with joint owner-
ship of property that may arise from situations like inheritance. It
occurs when two or more persons become partners in the possession of a
property with or without their consent. The one with their consent oc-
curs when they are presented with a property gift and they agree and
accept to own it jointly or when they buy something jointly. The one
without their consent occurs when they inherit a house for example.
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B- Sharikat El-Uqud or contractual partnerships, as their name
indicates occur when two or more persons agree among themselves and
contract to participate in a joint partnership and/or exploitation of
a business and to share its profits and losses. Sharikat El-Uqud can
take the form of one or a combination of the following types: Sharikat
Than. Sharikat Mufawadhah, Sharikat Abdan and Sharikat Woujouh.
a- Sharikat man is a limited partnership contract, whereby two
or more persons provide capital and agree to share profits according to
pre-agreed ratios (not necessarily proportional to their share capital)
and losses according to the share of each in the capital. This partner-
ship is said to be one with limited powers (man). The term man used
in this sense is derived from the reins of a pack animal which serves
to restrain the animal (Udovitch 1970:122). As the responsibility of
the partners is limited to the extent of their joint capital only, this
type of partnership is according to Afzalur-Rahman (1974) valid between
men, women and children (through their guardians) and between Muslims
and non-Muslims. Probably this type of partnership is the base on which
modern joint stock companies were developed.
b- Sharikat Mufawadhah is an unlimited partnership whereby each
partner confers upon his colleague(s) full authority to dispose of their
joint capital in any acceptable manner intended to benefit their asso-
ciation. Each partner is the agent of his partner(s) and can act in all
commercial matters with respect to his own and his colleague's property
without the latter's prior approval. "The liability of the Mufawadhah
partners is", as reported by Udovitch (1970:144), "both joint and seve-
ral, any obligation incurred on behalf of the partnership towards third
parties by one of the associates can be claimed in full from any of the
other parties". This type of partnership requires mutual confidence,
mutual agency and mutual surety. Because of its unlimited liability,
this type of partnership is perhaps more risky than the man.
C- Sharikat Abdan, Sanai or A'amal is a service partnership where-
by two or more persons provide their labour instead of capital and
agree to share their remunerations. This partnership may join not only
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labourers of the same occupation but may join any combination of
labourers who agree to share the costs and proceeds of their work .
d- Sharikat Woujouh is a partnership whereby two or more persons
agree to do business together using their creditworthiness and reputa-
tion to acquire the capital they need on Oard Hassan (interest-free
credit) or on Mudharabah basis (as explained below) and share the resi-
dual profit they may make according to pre-agreed ratios.
2- Mudharabah (Commenda): This is a partnership between a MUdha-
rib (capital owner) and a Dharib (manager) who prefer to share whatever
residual is left from the business they establish with the combination
of their capital and labour. They share any profits on the basis of
pre-agreed ratios. If the SR = 0, both the Mudharib and the Dharib go
unrewarded. Any loss resulting from the exigencies of travel or from an
unsuccessful business venture is born exclusively by the Mudharib. The
Dharib is in no way liable for a loss of this nature, losing only his
expended time and effort (see Udovitch 1970:170).
3- Muzaraah (Share cropping): This is a partnership between a
landowner who provides agricultural land, seeds and equipment and a te-
nant who provides his labour, agreeing to share either the output (in
kind) or the sale proceeds (in money) of the crop, according to a pre-
agreed ratios such as one-half each or one-third and two-thirds respec-
tively, etc.. In the case of an orchard which only need to be watered
and looked after then this contract is called Musaqat. The share of the
tenant in the Muzaraah or Musaqat contract must be at least one-half of
the crop. Qaradawi (1985:287-8) pointed out that: "In all the reports
which have reached us from the time of the prophet (PBUH) and his com-
panions, we find that the cultivator's share was never less than one-
half and in some cases it was more". Hence a Muzaraah contract which
gives less than one-half of the crop to the tenant should be declared
void and the Islamic state should intervene to prevent such exploita-
tion. An example of such an exploitative Muzaraah contract is what was
known in Algeria before 1971 by the name of Rhammassah whereby the cul-
tivator gets the Rhums (one-fifth) only and the landowner gets the
remaining four-fifths of the crop (see Amirech 1987:84).
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4.7 CONCLUSION
Despite the great number of theories that have been advanced in
order to justify and explain interest and profit none is free from
flaws and criticism. Concerning interest none of the existing theories
is valid or acceptable as a justification for a predetermined return on
loans and no theory would succeed in future to justify a certain prede-
termined return from an uncertain income. As for profit, though the
existing theories failed to explain its cause and missed the simple and
direct cause of it: sale there is no question about its justification
because it is a natural part of the exchange that is necessary for any
economy to invest, grow, employ, produce and develop. Profit is only
one of three outcomes of sale: profits, losses, and no profits and no
losses. Profit is justifiable because the profit seeker accepts to bear
losses if they happen to occur while in an interest based contract the
lender requires a predetermined guaranteed return, bearing little or no
risk, he goes even as to secure his loans by requiring from the borro-
wer securities whose values are greater than the loans he grants.
Besides the profit-seeker participates in bearing the consequences
of providing real goods and services needed by the society. An economy
where no interest on loans is allowed may grow and develop and perhaps
to a greater extent than an interest based economy. But an economy
where no sale is allowed, can never go far beyond a subsistence economy
and can hardly grow or develop. Thus one can say that interest is not a
necessary condition for development whereas profit from sale is neces-
sary. Perhaps that is why Allah the all-knowing permitted sale and
prohibited interest. Beddy (1940:2) pointed out that: "it is unques-
tionable that the present day distribution of political power would be
a different basis if the search for profit had not taken place. Nor
would the social structure of today be as it is if there had been no
desire for profit on the parts of individuals. Society would not have
moved away so rapidly from the feudal stage".
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CHAFTER FIVE
TOWARDS AN ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SYSTEM
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The financial system of any economy encompasses financial instru-
ments, financial markets and financial institutions. The primary role
of the financial system is to facilitate the movement of funds from
savers to investors because these are rarely the same economic units.
Moreover, as Kidwell and Peterson (1981:6) pointed out: "The allocation
of funds is necessary for the efficient production of goods and servi-
ces which are vital to the well-being of society. The more efficiently
savings are allocated to the best investment opportunities, the higher
the standard of living achieved in an economy". "The essential features
of any financial system", as described by Revell (1973:3), "consist of
a number of financial interrelationships between the persons and bodies
that make up an economy, and the basic structure of a financial system
has three features: (1) the extent of these interrelationships; (2) the
forms of the financial claims in which the interrelationships are ex-
pressed and (3) the pattern of relationship between persons and bodies
of different kinds between economic units".
Because for the moment there is not a single country applying Islam
in all its aspects, as it should be, and therefore there is no fully
fledged Islamic Financial System (IFS), anywhere in the world, it would
be difficult if not impossible to analyse the financial interrelation-
ships between the persons and bodies that make up an economy that is
non existent. However, it is possible to conceive and compare the fi-
nancial claims, markets and institutions that may exist in an IFS and
their functions vis-a-vis those of an Interest Based Financial System
(IBFS), the subject matter of this chapter. But before doing this it is
very important to point out, at the outset, that an IFS is not a system
that allows Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs) based on PLS to ope-
rate side by side with Interest Based Financial Institutions (IBFIs),
112
nor is it a system that is completely based on the PLS system but in a
non Islamic environment (ie a society that is not ruled according to
the Islamic Shariah in all spheres of life: politically, economically,
socially, culturally, etc.). The true Islamic financial or banking sys-
tem that can be expected to achieve its objectives, and that may be ac-
ceptable to Allah, is the one that is not only based on Islamic Shariah
but is also implemented in an Islamic society that believes in Islam
and practises it with the intention of pleasing Allah. M.S. Khan
(1986:2) pointed out that: "Although the elimination of interest is
certainly a central tenet of the Islamic Economic System, it should be
stressed that it is by no means an adequate description of the system
as a whole or, for that matter even of Islamic Banking".
Nowhere in the Koran or in the Sunnah, the two fundamental and most
important sources of Islam, can one find a detailed description of the
Islamic Financial or Banking system, their necessity, establishment,
structure or operation. All that the Koran and Sunnah have to say in
this matter is that: all financial transactions involving interest,
fraud, deception, gambling, speculation and all other crooked ways of
doing business must be avoided and prohibited and that all other tran-
sactions such as PLS contracts, leasing, trade, and interest-free
credits not involving the transgression of the Shariah, are allowed,
encouraged and considered as Islamic if these are undertaken with the
intention of pleasing Allah. Thus, there is no restriction in Islam on
any Islamic society to organise its financial system the way it thinks
best as long as it does so with the genuine action and intention to
apply and not transgress Allah's Shariah. Therefore the establishment,
the structure, the organisation, and the management of an IFS, are all
a question of rtihad, subject, of course, to the Shariah.
5.2 THE ISLAMIC FINANCIAL CLAIMS
Revell (1973:30) defined a financial claim as "a claim to the pay-
ment of a future sum of money and/or a periodic payment of money" and
commented: "the 'and/or' in this definition implies that either one of
the payments will be sufficient condition but that both may be promi-
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sed". "Financial claims, financial instruments or financial assets as
they are also called provide the economy, as Campbell (1982:3) wrote,
with two services -1) they provide a means by which funds can be trans-
ferred from those who have a surplus to those who have profitable in-
vestments for those funds; -2) they provide the means to transfer risk
from those who seek to undertake investments to those who provide funds
for the investments. Therefore, financial assets are the record of the
claim which facilitates an exchange of funds and a shift of risk".
Describing the characteristics of financial claims in an IBFS,
Revell (1973:30) also notes that: "Typically... a financial claim car-
ries an obligation on the issuer to pay interest periodically and to
redeem the claim at a stated value in one of three ways: -1) on demand;
-2) after the giving of a stated period of notice; or -3) on a defi-
nite date or within a range of dates". In a true IFS, however no finan-
cial claim carries the obligation on the issuer to pay any predeter-
mined interest, but depending on the contract which joins the benefi-
ciary and the issuer of a claim and which determines their relationship
as buyer/seller, as lessor/lessee, as debtor/creditor, or as partners,
a return may or may not be promised to the issuer of the claim.
In case the claim represents a debt on the issuer, then the issuer
(debtor) is obliged to pay back only the principal in full and the cre-
ditor is obliged not to take more than that. If the contract, between
the two parties, is a PLS contract, then the issuer is obliged to pay a
pre-agreed percentage share of the actual profit (Sale Residual) made
by using the fund in question, only in case of realising a profit. The
beneficiary (capital owner), in this case, is obliged to bear a propor-
tional share in any loss if this might occur beyond the control of the
issuer. Thus one can say that the IFS is an equity based system whereas
the IBFS is a debt based one. Consequently no interest based deposits,
bills, bonds, debentures etc., are allowed to exist in an IFS. Instead,
these can either be interest-free or PLS based such as: demand deposits
and Oardh-Hassan which are interest-free or investment deposits, Musha-
rakah Mtdharabah, MCDs and ordinary shares which may or may not be
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rewarded depending on the actual and effective results obtained by
using their funds. There are however, 5 contracts on which a promise of
a predetermined return is allowed in Islam, and which are considered by
some contemporary Muslim economists, as similar to interest, these are:
-1) Ilarah (leasing contract)
-2) Ijarah waqtina' (hire-purchase agreement)
-3) Murabahah (mark up sale)
-4) Bai' Muaijal (sale at a deferred higher price) and
-5) Bai' Bit-Taqseet (sale by instalments)
Arguing perhaps from their strong concern about the implementation
of Shariah and their good intention of not "opening a back door for
dealing on the basis of interest", some Muslim economists, like M.N.
Siddiqi (1983b:137-139), think of the incomes emanating from these con-
tracts or at least from the Mbrabahah and the Bai' Mua — al contracts as
similar to or "bear close proximity to the present interest based
arrangements in effect, though they may be different in formal legal
details". They argue that there is no real risk to the seller in these
contracts and that their economic effects are just like those of
interest. For example M.N. Siddiqi (1983b:139) suggesting the removal
of Bai' Mua — al from the list of permitted methods, says:
I would prefer that Bai' Muaijal is removed from the list of
permissible methods altogether. Even if we concede its permis-
sibility in legal form we have the overriding legal maxim that
anything leading to something prohibited stands prohibited. It
will be advisable to apply this maxim to Bai' Mbaijal in order
to save interest free banking from being sabotaged from within.
These Muslim economists forget that the higher prices agreed upon
in these contracts are not of the same kind as the merchandise sold or
the machine leased and that these enter under the permitted sale and
leasing contracts. Allah says in Koran 2:285: Allah has permitted trade
and prohibited interest. They are suspicious about these contracts and
compare their incomes to interest because they differentiate between
the concepts of profit and interest by the degree of risk involved in
the contracts and not as I argued in the previous chapter in terms of
sales and loans. Income from sale contracts are permitted whether there
is risk involved in the transaction or not, because there is a Sale (an
exchange of a commodity against money) whereas interest is prohibited
because it is on Loan (an exchange of a present amount of money or of a
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commodity against a greater amount of future money or of a commodity of
the same kind) which is injustifiable as we saw above. However, I agree
with those Muslim economists that Islamic Banking and Finance should be
PLS based if it is going to achieve any real change in the economic si-
tuation of the country concerned and that these methods should be used
only as second best substitutes where PLS arrangements are not feasible
but no-one has the right to pronounce Halal things as Haram except
Allah. Nevertheless, if it is proven that the harm coming from them is
greater than their benefits, which I doubt, then the ICB may -under the
Shariah rule which stipulates: "Dar Ul-Mafassid Awla Min -Jalb El -
Manafi" (warding off harm must be prior to gaining benefits) and under
its regulatory and supervisory rights on the financial institutions-
prescribe that these methods must not for example be applied in banking
or that finance through them must not exceed 20% of the total finance
they give, etc., but it cannot declare them as Haram.
Among the financial instruments, money is perhaps the most impor-
tant and most difficult to define. As Kidwell and Peterson (1981:5-6)
pointed out: "it is the key player in the financial system and one of
the most important variables: Too much money leads to inflation and too
little money leads to recession. All of this directly affects financial
institutions and markets and, ultimately, the individual". So, It is a
pre-requisite for establishing a highly developed financial system.
As Revell (1973:33) pointed out: "Much ink has been spilt on contro-
versies over the most useful definition of money". Usually money is
defined as anything used and accepted as a means of making payment for
goods and services and of settling debt obligations. However, economists
generally identify three basic properties of money:
1- Medium of exchange; 2- Unit of account; and 3- a store of value.
Theoretically, as Kidwell and Peterson (1981:10) contended: "money
should possess the three properties.. Unfortunately no single substance
perfectly satisfies our three functions. Furthermore there is no agree-
ment among economists over which property is the most important. Some
economists emphasize the medium of exchange property and define money
as coins and currency in circulation and chequable accounts at finan-
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cial institutions. Still others view money as the group of financial as-
sets most closely related to aggregate levels of economic activity. As
a result of these sharp differences of opinion, a number of definitions
of money are currently used by economists and government officials".
Among the Muslim economists who paid special attention to money and
its role Sadr (1968) and Abu-Saud (1980) criticised the use of money as
a store of value and considered it as a source of many ills. While Sadr
regards Zakat which discourages idle cash balances, and the abolition
of interest which frustrates the desire to earn guaranteed returns by
using such money as sufficient remedies for these ills in the Islamic
system, Abu-Saud does not stop at that and suggests the issuing of a
new kind of money that is subject to a tax other than Zakat to check
hoarding and ensure its continuous circulation and stop all usurious
earnings arising from it. As a practical measure, he suggested the idea
of stamped money suggested earlier by Gessel and briefly tried in the
municipality of Woergel, Switzerland in 1922 (M.N. Siddiqi 1980:218).
Savers in the IFS would have a number of alternative financial
instruments to choose from. Concerning the collection of deposits or
what is called the depository function, the Islamic bank or IFI offers
its customers the choice between a number of different deposit accounts
which are either interest free or PLS based depending on the purpose
and commitment of the depositor and depending also on the security or
risk involved with each of these types of deposits. Deposits may be
classified by ownership, security or form of withdrawal. When classi-
fied by ownership deposits may be private, public or interbank: private
deposits are those belonging to individuals, private companies or other
private institutions; public deposits are those belonging to local and
national governmental institutions; interbank deposits are those that
banks deposit with other banks. When classified by security deposits
may be secured or unsecured: secured if they are deposited as demand
deposits not sharing in the fortune or misfortune of the bank and unse-
cured if they are deposited with the intention of sharing in the pro-
fits and losses of the bank. And when classified by form of withdrawal,
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deposits may be classified as demand or current, savings, or investment
deposits. Perhaps, the best way, to examine the depository function of
the IFI is to look at the purposes for which money is deposited with it.
1- Demand Deposits
The primary purpose of those people who deposit their funds under
this category is the 'liquidity preference' for transaction and contin-
gency motives. They prefer keeping the extra liquidity readily avai-
lable in a convenient form for spending and making payment to others.
The aim of these depositors is not to earn a return on their deposits
but only to keep them safe and readily available for use. The Islamic
banks would not pay any return on these deposits and may charge fees,
if necessary, for running and maintaining these accounts.
2- Saving Deposits
The primary motive of the depositors in the savings accounts is
the 'precautionary motive'. Depositors in this category usually belong
to the middle class. They resort to saving chiefly because of precau-
tion wishing to earn a little income and at the same time have easy
access to their deposits when needed. Under IBFS the IBFIs give inte-
rest on such deposits albeit at lower rate than on time deposits to
encourage saving. However, under the IFS, the IFIs are not allowed to
give interest but are allowed to share with depositors the profits they
realise. Because savings deposits are not subject to a specific term
period and can be withdrawn when needed though not as easily as demand
deposits, the IFI may give choice to the depositor whether he would
like to share with it the profits as well as the loss of using the
funds or not. If he agrees to bear a share in the misfortunes of the
institution then he has the right to get a return on his savings. This
return could be calculated on the minimum saving deposit of each month
or on the average outstanding savings deposit at a sharing rate lower
of course than the sharing rate of investment deposits which are com-
mitted for a certain period and share in the losses of the IFI at par.
3- Investment Deposits
Depositors in this category are more concerned with earning a
return on their surplus savings than with 'transaction' and 'precaution'
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motives. They are mainly wealthy people who can afford to deposit their
surplus funds with the banks for a certain period of time with no real
hardship or problem and who cannot invest their surpluses by themselves
because they lack information about investment opportunities and/or
because they lack the initiative to directly take risk themselves. Thus
the primary motive of these depositors is 'investment' or 'profit'. In
an IBFS, the IBFIs give higher interest rates to these depositors than
they give depositors with savings deposits. However in an IFS, deposi-
tors of this sort are not promised a pre-agreed rate of return but
would share in the profits and losses of the IFI. The IFI will invest
the deposits on the basis of PLS system and the aggregate profit would
be distributed among shareholders and depositors according to the pre-
agreed ratios. In case the IFI incurs a loss, this would be shared bet-
ween shareholders and depositors in proportion of their funds.
4- Mudharabah Certificates of Deposits (MCDs)
The IFIs may also offer negotiable MCDs to their depositors. This
would allow the investors to deposit their surplus funds with the insti-
tution for quite a medium or long term and share with it the profits
and losses on these deposits and also allow them the possibility to
sell their MCDs in the secondary market in case they need liquidity. No
predetermined interest is allowed on these certificates but the holder
has the right to share their profits with the IFI and bear a proportion
of any loss that might occur before these certificates mature. The Mus-
lim saver may also invest in other forms of PLS negotiable securities,
in non-interest bearing stocks like ordinary shares and become share-
holders in the company they invest in or in unit trusts that invest
only in non interest bearing stocks but may not invest in what is known
in the IBFS as preferred stocks, bonds, debentures, options, etc..
Concerning the allocation of finance, the IFIs may use the
following interest free or PLS based methods of finance:
1- Musharakah which means a profit-sharing joint venture designed
for a certain operation within an agreed-upon period of time. The IFI
and the customer contribute capital assets as well as technical and ma-
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nagerial expertise in varying proportions, and they share the realised
profits according to ratios agreed upon in advance. The sharing ratios
are not uniform in all cases. However, it is important to realise that
not only are profits shared but so are losses. If the venture results
in a loss arising from natural or market forces then these will be
shared by the bank and the other party in accordance with their capital
participations. If however, the loss arose from negligence or breach of
contract then the party responsible would be expected to bear the whole
loss or as much as the Islamic court would decide. The relationship
between the IFI and the customer is of partnership rather than that of
creditor and debtor, which governs most transactions in interest based
banks. Where medium or long term operations are undertaken, the IFI may
agree with the customer upon a self-liquidating form of participation
whereby the customer can through marginal repayments, gradually buy out
the IFI's share in order to obtain the full ownership of the project,
the equipment, the land or the property object of the operation. The
success of this method of operation depends on the ability of the IFI
to choose appropriate clients; make realistic feasibility studies of
the projects and follow them up through audit and periodic control
techniques (see Wood 1984, El-Sarraf 1984 and Abdeen & Shook 1984).
2- Mudharabah: which differs from the above described Mlisharakah
contract in that the customer has the freedom to use the funds in the
way he considers best and is not tied to investments in a predetermined
venture. The other difference is that the customer does not need to
have a capital of his own. He participates with his management only and
does not bear any loss that occurs from the normal market forces, ins-
tead he goes unrewarded for the time and expertise he offered.
3- Murabahah: This method of financing is a mark-up sale whereby
a client requests his IFI to buy a certain commodity or asset for him
promising to buy it at a pre-set profit As such, and as Attia (1985:18)
argued: "the passing of title of commodity or goods to Islamic banks
(IFIs) when dealing on the basis of Murabahah, is necessary and this,
of course, is in contradiction to the conventional banking system,
where banks are dealing in money and not in commodities or goods".
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4- Bai' Mua —al: This form of finance is the same as Murabahah
described above, however, the payment is deferred. The payment may be
made either in a lump sum or by instalment depending on the agreement
between the IFI and the customer. According to the majority of the Mus-
lim Jurists, the selling price in case of Bai' Muajjal may be set
higher than the cash price but with the strict proviso that both the
seller and the buyer agree on that fixed price at the time of the sale
contract which must not be raised in case the buyer cannot pay in time.
5- rarah (Leasing): There are two types of lease arrangements
allowed by the Shariah: rarah (simple leasing) and I'arah Wa Iqtina, 
(hire-purchase). In the I'arah form, the IFI purchases a capital asset
and leases it to a customer (the lessee) in return for an agreed upon
regular rent for a long or medium term depending on the need of the
customer, the life of the capital asset, and the agreement between the
IFI and its customer. The IFI would retain the ownership of the asset
but the customer would have the exclusive right to the use of the asset
on payment of the pre-agreed rental payments. At the end of the agree-
ment, the asset reverts to the bank. "The rentals would be sufficient
to amortise not only the capital outlay but also to yield, after taking
into account the 'salvage' value of the asset, an adequate amount of
profit for the bank" (Chapra 1985:167). In the I'arah Wa Iqtina' form,
the customer may agree with his IFI to share the proceeds of the assets
by dividing the proceeds into three parts (not necessarily equal), one
part for the bank as part repayment of the original finance, another
part for the bank as its profit and the third part for the customer as
his profit. After the finance given by the bank is totally repaid, the
asset in question becomes the property of the customer (Hamdi 1981:13).
Alternatively the bank and the customer may agree that a specified rent
must be paid monthly no matter how much profits realised by the custo-
mer and that at the termination of the lease, the customer would keep
the asset in question for a certain price they agree upon at that time.
The risk related with these two forms of finance lies in the fact that
the bank has to buy the asset in question and deliver it to the
121
customer and keep the ownership of the asset during the full period of
lease at its own risk of damage, obsolescence and repair.
It is very important to draw attention here to the fact that
leasing has become very popular in recent years and one of the fastest
growing financing methods of interest based banks. "The reasons for the
fast rate of growth in finance leasing are", as Reed et al. (1980:300)
pointed out: "to be found in the advantages it affords, in certain cir-
cumstances, over buying assets with money borrowed under a conventional
loan". The advantages claimed for finance leasing include the following:
a. Provides financing at a lower cost
b. Gives greater flexibility
c. Requires a lower down payment - provides more financing
d. Requires no capital expenditure authorization or bond issue
e. Releases funds for more profitable investment in other assets
f. Offers a tax advantage".
6- Equity Investment: The IFI may invest in ordinary shares of
successful corporations. Chapra (1985:166) contended: "investment in
the stocks and shares of joint-stock companies, whether public or pri-
vate, should be an attractive avenue for the employment of the bank's
funds. In fact, the stocks of well-established and high-dividend yield-
ing companies, may serve as an alternative for interest-bearing govern-
ment securities and bonds of private companies. With the presence of a
well-organised and properly regulated stock market, the banks may be
able to dispose of such stocks whenever they desire". The owner of the
share is part owner of the assets and earnings of the corporation. A
share has no maturity date, nor does it have any fixed claim on the
assets or earnings. A share is a claim on the assets of the company
after all other creditors have been paid off. Ordinary shares entitles
the holder to some rights such as the rights to name the board of
directors, the right to vote on any major changes in the enterprise
such as dissolution, consolidation, or amendments to the charter or
bylaws. The other basic right is to a dividend, if one is declared.
7- Preferred Stock, like common stock, is an equity or a share in
the earnings and assets of the corporation, but there are several dif-
ferences. The preferred stockholder has priority over the common stock-
holder for dividends. And, in general, in liquidation, preferred stocks
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rank ahead of common stock. On the other hand, the dividend or rather
the interest paid to the preferred stockholder is predetermined whereas
the dividends paid to the common stockholder can rise or fall with the
performance of a company. A preferred stockholder, however has no right
to vote nor any voice in the management of the company. Preferred stock
has seen a good deal of innovation in recent years. In many ways it has
become much more debt-like. The major innovation in the US market has
been floating-rate preferred stock. Preferred shares have also been
combined with other instruments and made convertible into equity or
exchangeable into debt (Walmsley 1988:61). This feature of getting a
predetermined return on preferred stock makes them unacceptable from
the Islamic point of view and so they would not exist in an IFS.
8- Bonds: The classical bond bears a fixed rate of interest and
matures on a date fixed at the time of issue. So from the time of issue
all the cash flows on the bond -except investment income- are known in
advance. This relative certainty has made it an attractive investment
instrument for those who need funds at some future date such as pension
funds or life insurance companies. Another important feature of a bond
is its relative volatility. This is affected by three main factors: the
bond's coupon, the bond's yield and its maturity.
While equities and preferred stock tend to be of a fairly standard
legal form, bonds have been issued in a wide variety of types. One va-
riable is the type of security they offer. Government bonds are unsecu-
red, they are backed only by the government promise to pay. Because
bonds are interest-bearing, they are also not to exist in an IFS, they
would be replaced by the MCDs or other PLS securities whose return is
decided only after the real result of their use is known.
9- Convertible bonds: Convertibles and preferred stocks are, as
Walmsley (ibid) pointed out, the oldest hybrid securities. Preferred is
debt like equity, a convertible is equity like-debt. The holder of a
convertible bond can exchange the security, at his option, for the
common stock of the issuer in accordance with the terms of the bond
indenture. Usually the indenture will say that the bond is convertible
into common stock at a specified price. For example, a US$1,000 bond
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might be convertible into common stock at US$50 per share, that is, it
is worth 20 shares. If the price of the stock went to US$75 the conver-
tible would be worth US$1,500. The actual fixing of the conversion
price is set by the issuer, normally 15 to 20% above the price of the
outstanding shares. As there would be no interest based claims in an
IFS, there would be no convertibles as described.
10- Options: An option for ordinary shares is a right to buy or
sell a certain number of shares at a certain price within a specific
period. There are two sorts of options: call and put options. A call
option is the right to buy shares while a put option is a right to sell
shares. The writer of the option receives a premium from the other par-
ty who does not need to have large amounts of money, at the time of ac-
cepting the option or to tie up large amount of money in the stock with-
out knowing the future direction of the market. By paying the premium,
he gains control over the number of shares under his option and he can,
exercise his option at any time within the time limits of the option if
the prices of the stock in question go up, or not to exercise his
option when the prices of the stock involved go down, thus losing only
the premiums instead of losing on unwanted shares had he bought them.
11- Warrants: A warrant is a kind of option. It gives the holder
the privilege of buying a specified number of shares of the underlying
common stock at a specified exercise price. The purchase can be at any-
time on or before an expiry date. Bonds with warrants resemble conver-
tibles except that the warrant can be traded separately. Another diffe-
rence is that when the warrants are exercised new money is used to sub-
scribe for the shares, and the total capital of the borrower increases.
This is unlike the conversion of a convertible bond which merely shifts
debts capital into equity capital. Until the warrant is exercised the
holder has no rights to vote at a shareholder meetings nor to partici-
pate in dividend distributions. Recently, there has been the introduc-
tion of warrants on fixed interest instruments. Development here have
taken two main forms. First there have been warrants attached to bonds
which allow the investor to buy another bond at some prefixed level.
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These allow the investor to gamble on the possibility of a further dec-
line in interest rates. Second there have been a number of 'naked' war-
rant issues -warrants unaccompanied by other funding. Mostly these have
been issued by investment banks, which can hedge the risks entailed.
From the description above of options and warrants, it becomes
very clear that both options and warrants involve gambling and specula-
tion and injustice which are prohibited by the Islamic Shariah and so
there would be no options or warrants in an IFS, thus reducing the
amount of speculation and fluctuation in the markets.
12- Futures: Futures are standardized agreements to buy or sell a
specific commodity at a specific time and a place in the future, at a
price established through open outcry in a central, regulated market-
place. The two key components of a future contract are that the agree-
ment is standardized and that price is the only variable. Primary uses
of futures are speculation and hedging. Because of the Islamic prohibi-
tion of forward exchange of currencies, and of speculation there would
be no futures in the IFS as practised in the IBFS. However, it is per-
missible under the Shariah to agree to future contracts such as is the
case of Bai' Muaijal which "requires the transfer of the goods to the
possession of the buyer while payment will be due in the future and
would be higher than its cash sale" (Presley 1988a:36) or Bai' El -Salam
which "requires cash payment in consideration for goods that will be
delivered in the future" (ibid). But in these contracts, the deferred
price or the price paid in advance must be agreed upon at the time of
the contract and must not change.
13- Zero coupon: Zero coupon has only one cash flow and that is at
maturity, its reinvestment risk does not arise. This is particularly so
since for all practical purposes a zero coupon bond is fully protected
against early call. Its duration is always longer than that of a con-
ventional bond of comparable maturity. Therefore a zero coupon is much
more volatile. When rates fall, it becomes very attractive investment.
Since it is an interest related claim it would not exist in an IFS.
14- Perpetuals: Perpetuals have no final maturity but also because
they are interest based bonds they have no place in an IFS.
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5.3 THE ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Most economic units, at one time or another fulfil an intermediary
role but what we are interested in here is the specialised bodies whose
main function is that of financial intermediation. Financial Institu-
tions or Financial Intermediaries, as they are also known, are specia-
lised institutions that come between SEUs and DEUs by taking up the
direct claims issued by the latter and issuing secondary or indirect
claims which, in one way or another, are better suited than direct
claims to the needs of the former (see Revell 1973:73).
In the world of interest based financial systems, a great number
of different financial institutions may co-exist specialising in one or
more distinct types of intermediation: (1) denomination intermediation,
(2) risk intermediation, (3) maturity intermediation or (4) liquidity
intermediation. Though distinctly different they all have one function
in common: they all purchase financial claims of one set of charac-
teristics from DEUs and sell financial claims with a different set of
characteristics to SEUs (Kidwell and Peterson 1983:34).
The advantages of intermediation arise almost entirely from eco-
nomies of scale. Other advantages include: (1) Convenience; (2) Profes-
sional management; (3) Diversification; (4) Innovation; (5) Liquidity;
and (6) Income. Without intermediation lenders would have to seek
creditworthy borrowers, and borrowers seek lenders willing to borrow or
lend on mutually acceptable terms for mutually convenient periods of
time. The flow of credit would, clearly be seriously hampered by the
time, inconvenience and cost involved (Struthers and Speight 1986:26).
An advanced financial system may consist of:
1- A Central Bank which would, have the right of note issue, the
right to regulate and supervise commercial banks and other financial
institutions, the right to control and apply monetary policies, and
play the role of the government bank, the custodian of the nation's
reserves, the bankers' bank, etc., (see chapter six below).
2- Commercial Banks which operate the payment mechanism through
cheque current accounts, receive short term deposits from SEUs and make
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short to medium term loans, through their branches, to DEUs. They are
the largest and most important financial intermediaries and the most
regulated financial institutions in any country this is perhaps because
of their vital role in the payment mechanism and their effect on the
monetary system of the country (See chapter six below).
3- Savings Banks which accept interest-bearing deposits of small
accounts. The Post Office Savings Banks (POSBs) are the best example of
these kind of financial institutions. In most countries the POSBs are
government owned and their deposits used by the treasury. They do not
give loans to other economic units. They benefit from the large number
of post office branches which are situated almost everywhere not only
in urban centres but in the rural areas as well. These institutions are
very useful -especially in the LDCs- for the small investors who may
not be welcomed by the commercial banks because of the cost of running
such small accounts. These could well work in an Islamic economy but
investors are not to be given predetermined interest. A question that
arises here is how could they attract the small saver and encourage him
to save?. One solution which I could think of, runs as follows:
The customer may open an account with the POSBs with as little as
the equivalent of say £10.00, with the conditions that this minimum be
kept at all times to assure the continuity of the account, that no more
than say half of the deposits -that is over the minimum- could be with-
drawn at any one time or one day, if the customer is to share in the
profits of the POSBs. In return, the POSBs may invest 50% + 5% of every
monthly outstanding deposit in profitable public companies so as to
get some income to share with the depositors at say 50-50 after the
deduction of the operating costs, keep say 10% for liquidity purposes
and pass the rest to the treasury as Oardh Hassan (interest-free).
4- Mutual Credit Unions are small nonprofit cooperative consumer-
organised institutions owned entirely by their member-customers. Their
liabilities are savings accounts (called share accounts), and their in-
vestments are almost entirely short term instalment consumer loans (see
Kidwell and Peterson 1981:38). These could also exist in an IFS but in
that case, instead of giving consumer loans to its members, the credit
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union buys the consumer good required by the customer and then sell it
to him at a Murabahah or on Bai' Bittaqseet bases.
5- Insurance Companies obtain funds by selling insurance policies
that protect the policy holder against certain risks. There are life
insurance companies and casualty insurance companies. Because they have
a somewhat predictable cash flow, they are able to invest primarily in
higher yielding long term assets. Insurance is considered as the most
effective and economic way of dealing with risk and reducing its effect
by spreading the loss that might cripple an individual or a business
over a large number of policy holders. Otherwise individuals and busi-
nesses would have to set aside some of their capital resources against
possible losses that might occur. As such insurance plays a very impor-
tant economic function and thus, in certain respect, "it is even more
important than banking" (M.N. Siddiqi 1985:11).
There are conflicting views amongst Muslim scholars about the de-
sirability and permissibility of insurance. Those who object to modern
insurance, and especially to the life form of it, argue that there is
no justification for a person to get as much as he gets in case of an
accident nor for losing his premiums in case nothing happen to him as
in the case of casualty insurance and compare this to the act of gamb-
ling. They further argue that modern insurance companies are interest
based and that life insurance pays for something which cannot be valued
or indemnified. As for those who argue for the desirability and the ne-
cessity of insurance, they say that insurance like banking can be run
and organised according Islamically. Secondly, Insurance is a form of
Takafol (mutual solidarity) that Islam encourages and is beneficial to
both the individual and the society. Besides, there is no harm in get-
ting indemnification from the group. Thirdly, there are precedence in
the Islamic tradition and history of compensating accidental killing
by way of paying Divah 'blood money' collected from the relatives and
friends of the killer and paid to the heirs of the deceased. Besides,
The prophet Mohammed (PBUH) also, once said: The Ash'aris are from me
and I am from the Ash'aris, because when they have food shortage, they
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gather all what they got and distribute it among themselves equally.
And finally insurance is fundamentally different from gambling because
as M.N. Siddiqi (1985:27-28) contended:
The evil of gambling lies in the fact that the gambler wilful-
ly seeks out, through betting and wagering, risk which was not
there earlier, or which, even if it did exist, did not perso-
nally concern him. Buying lottery tickets, betting and staking
on horse races, football matches, games of cards or chess are
examples. All possible forms of gambling and its current prac-
tices have one thing in common -the risk of financial loss-
that the gambler courts by betting or wagering could have been
avoided if he wanted to do so. The case of insurance is funda-
mentally different. The occurrence of peril against which and
the effect of which the insured seeks protection does not de-
pend on whether he is insured or not. Most of the normal pur-
suits of life, and normal economic activities are fraught with
risks that cannot be adequately managed by any other method.
Thus, although there is no unanimous opinion about insurance, the
arguments of those who reject insurance outright are in my view weaker.
They confuse gambling (ie running a risk that is avoidable, the risk of
loss with the covetousness to get a bigger gain in games of chance)
with insurance or Takafol which is a means of collectively helping each
other in reducing the effects of unavoidable risks. The risk of finan-
cial loss emanating from the normal businesses of life or of death, is
always there irrespective of whether one arranges for protective insu-
rance or not. It is true that the conventional insurance in its present
form does not conform to Islam, yet this could easily be transformed to
make it acceptable from the Islamic point of view, as is already done
in some countries like Sudan.
Under the Islamic system of Takafol (mutual solidarity or insu-
rance), the policyholders may join by contributing to a commun fund
which is invested for the benefit of the members. Profits out of these
investments are added to the individual accounts according to the con-
tribution made. The losses, if any, are also borne by the members. A
reserve is built up from the profits earned for payment against death
and disability of the members as agreed.
6- Pension Funds obtain their funds from the contributions made
by employers and employees during the employees working years and pro-
vide monthly payment upon retirement. In an Islamic society this must
be the duty of the Islamic government to assure every old person of a
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pension from Bayt El-Mal that would help him lead a decent life and
keep his social position in the society. So the Bayt El-Mal with the
aid of its branches could do the job of pension funds by collecting
funds from employees and employers proportionally to the salaries and
wages paid and provide pension payments upon retirement not only to
those who contributed to the funds but also to those who could not have
contributed because of disability or unemployment.
7- Finance Houses are engaged in the provision of hire purchase
and other forms of instalment credits, unlike the commercial banks they
do not accept savings deposits from consumers. They obtain the majority
of their funds from bank loans, commercial paper sales, and issues of
both long term and short term debt in the capital and money markets in
large quantities and lend those funds in small amounts to individuals
and business enterprises that cannot obtain credit as cheaply or easily
elsewhere (Kidwell and Peterson 1981:318), thus, doing the reverse of
the other financial institutions. As there is no possibility of borro-
wing or lending at interest in an IFS, it would not be possible for fi-
nance companies to raise funds through debt issues. However, they may
raise fund through the issue of PLS certificates which do not promise
any predetermined returns but give right to a share in their profits
if there is any, and reduce the value of the certificate by its share
in the loss that may occur. In allocating their funds they could easily
do so on the PLS basis with business firms. As for individuals they can
either offer them consumer goods on Murabahah, Bai' Muaijal, Bai' Bit -
Taqseet, Iiarah, Iiarah Waqtina' bases.
8- Merchant Banks: The term merchant bank, is applied to such a
wide variety of institutions that it is impossible to define precisely.
The title implies that they are both merchants and banks. The tradi-
tional function of the merchant banks is to accept bills of exchange on
behalf of the drawee. Their own reputations were sound, and bills drawn
on and accepted by them were freely negotiated. Their reputations and
connections also made them the natural agents for issuing bonds for fo-
reign governments and municipalities and debentures and shares for com-
panies wishing to raise money. They engage in wholesale intermediation.
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In fact most of them virtually provide every financial service except
perhaps retail banking, though some are now accepting small deposits
(see Struthers and Speight 1986:69). In an IFS no financial institution
i2H to issue interest bearing claims but the issue of shares and of PLS
instruments is allowed so there would be no objection to merchant banks
which avoid prohibited claims and transactions.
9- Mortgage Finance Companies or building societies as they are
called in the UK, they collect interest bearing deposit from the public
and offer long term mortgage loans at interest to their customers for
house purchase secured by the pledge of real property as collateral. In
the IFS, the mortgage finance companies would collect PLS deposits from
the public and would not offer mortgage loans but may buy the houses in
their names and on their own risk and sell them to their customer on
the basis of Iiarah Waqtina', or Bai' Bittaqseet.
10- Investment and Unit Musts are also called portfolio institu-
tions because they raise money from the public by issuing their own
shares or units and use them to buy securities, mostly shares and
debentures in industrial and commercial public companies. The Islamic
investment and unit trusts can do the same except that they do not deal
in debentures or any other interest bearing instruments. They can
issue shares or PLS units and buy shares and other PLS securities.
In an IFS, the same specialised institutions could exist with the
difference that instead of dealing in interest based claims, the IFIs
deal in profit and PLS based claims. Recently, however, as a result of
deregulation and rapid institutional change in the major financial
systems of the world, the distinction has become blurred and financial
institutions are getting away from specialisation and are becoming more
of diversified businesses rather than specialised ones. Perhaps it
would be better if all financial institutions could be like department
stores, where the customer can find all the financial services he needs
under the same roof. They could all be given the opportunity to offer
all the financial services they can with the condition that they all be
required to operate under the central bank regulation and supervision
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so as to get rid of the discriminatory treatment that exist in the
financial world of today and to let the financial institutions compete
at equal footing and opportunities. They do not need to be called
banks or building societies or savings banks or whatever, they could
simply be called Multi-purpose Financial Institutions (MPFIs) and that
is all. What matters is not the name but the services they offer.
5.4 THE ISLAMIC FINANCIAL MARKETS
Campbell (1982:4) pointed out that: "financial assets can be crea-
ted and exchanged between suppliers and users of funds without ever
utilising an organised financial market. But in a developed economy,
this is more the exception than the norm. Most assets are exchanged
through some kind of financial markets. "A market in its general econo-
mic sense is", as defined by Seldon and Pennance (1965:271): "a group
of buyers and sellers who are in sufficiently close contact for the
transaction between any pair of them to affect the terms on which the
others buy and sell". In other words, a market exist when, as Bannock
et al (1978:297) pointed out: "buyers wishing to exchange money for
goods or services are in contact with sellers wishing to exchange
goods and services for money. Thus a market is defined in terms of the
fundamental forces of supply and demand, and is not necessarily con-
fined to any particular geographical location".
"Financial markets" as pointed out by Revell (1973:49): "play an
important part in the development and evolution of a financial system"
by facilitating the collection of savings and by channeling funds to
investors. Their basic roles, as described by Mettwally (1984:21), are:
(a) to allow savers to participate fully in the fortunes of
business enterprise;
(b) to enable holders of shares and debts to obtain liquidity by
selling their shares and bonds to business enterprises on the
stock market;
(c) to allow business enterprises to raise external finance in
order to expand the economic activities of their enterprise;
(d) to allow business enterprises to separate business and
economic operations from financial activities.
As Revell (1973:50) remarked: "The word market is used somewhat
loosely in discussion of the financial system, and the normal opera-
tions of financial institutions are sometimes brought within the term.
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Thus, one hears talk of the market for deposits with banks or building
societies or for house mortgages. We shall limit ourselves to cases in
which there is an organised apparatus of dealers or brokers acting as
intermediary between buyer and seller... The degree of organisation va-
ries considerably between markets". The distinction between one market
and another depends on the type of financial asset exchanged, whether
it is short or long term, local or foreign, newly issued and sold
directly by the issuer or previously issued and bought through brokers,
sold over the counter or in auction. Thus, financial markets may be
divided into primary and secondary markets or into money markets,
capital markets and foreign exchange market, etc..
The difference between the primary and secondary markets is that
the activity of the former is to conduct the sale/purchase of newly is-
sued securities. It is by this activity that these markets help entre-
preneurs acquire funds from those who have funds but may not have the
time or the ability to use their funds productively. The first issue of
securities by a public company may either be directly placed (direct
placement) by the issuer or sold at a discount and/or for a commission
or fees (underwriting) to an issuing house, a stockbroker or a bank
which brings the firm to the market either by inviting the public to
buy the shares or by placing them in bulk with financial institutions
or stock exchange jobbers, who sell them piecemeal to the public. The
direct placement is cheaper than underwriting for both the issuer and
the investor because the issuer would not have to pay intermediaries to
sell the securities to the investor and the investor would not have to
pay any commission or fees to the intermediary to get the securities.
However, direct placement often is not always feasible. Securities
bought from the primary markets contribute directly to the expansion of
economic activities because the receivers of the funds are the ultimate
producers of goods and services (Zaman 1986:127).
The activity of the secondary markets is the exchange of money for
existing securities. They provide a solution to those investors who may
have bought some securities from the primary markets but needed liqui-
dity at a certain stage. The existence of an active and an efficient
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secondary market provides investors with a high degree of liquidity for
their investments. The secondary market for negotiable securities is
the stock exchange. Unlike in the primary sector, securities bought and
sold in the secondary markets do not participate directly to the econo-
mic activities of, nor do they have a direct impact on, the original
issuers. Both sellers and buyers in the secondary markets are investors
who may gain or loose depending on the situation of the market.
The difference between the money markets and the capital markets
lies in the maturity of the claims traded in them. Money markets for
short term claims and capital markets for long term claims. As for the
foreign exchange market, it differs from the others in being entirely
international and is concerned with the exchange of foreign currencies.
Of recent origin is what is known as the parallel markets. They are
parallel in the sense that they offer to lenders alternative facilities
to those obtainable in the traditional markets. Both borrowers and len-
ders have a wider choice than in the traditional market and the terms
allowed in the parallel markets are more flexible and more adaptable to
changing requirements (Einzig 1966:2). There are at least six parallel
markets, differentiated from each other by the credit instrument traded.
These are the markets in interbank, inter-company, local authority, fi-
nance house, and eurocurrency deposits, and the market in certificates
of deposits. One distinguishing feature of the parallel money markets
is that they do not benefit from the central bank function of lender
of last resort (Walmsley 1988:57-60).
As in an IBFS, The IFS would have all the types of markets through
which Islamic financial claims could be bought and sold, however, their
operations and their financial instruments would differ. Savers in an
Islamic Society, as in any society, also have some degree or another of
liquidity preference, but this does not justify the payment of interest
as we saw in 4.3.10 above. "To the extent that savers can, if necessary
sell securities quickly and at low cost, they will be more willing to
devote a higher portion of their savings to long term instruments than
they would otherwise... And since primary securities in the Islamic
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system are normally tied to particular projects and enterprises, these
are various risks that must enter into the portfolio decisions of the
investor. Therefore, creation of a secondary market will stimulate in-
vestment in such securities by giving investors the option to buy or
sell at any time" (Iqbal and Mirakhor 1987:5). Thus an IFS where inte-
rest bearing claims are prohibited and where direct PLS participation
in business enterprise is encouraged well functioning financial markets
are very important, provided that they comply with Islamic Shariah. In
other words, no interest based instruments are allowed, nor are other
illegal transactions, such as speculation, which make the prices of
shares and other PLS financial assets fluctuate beyond the economic
performance of the enterprises and the forward selling and buying of
gold, silver and currencies, are involved.
5.5 Conclusion
From the above description of the financial instruments, institu-
tions and markets of an advanced IBFS and the discussion of how these
could be adapted or transformed so as to comply with the Shariah and
create an advanced IFS, it became clear that from the structural or
organisational point of view, there would be little or no difference
between an advanced IFS and an advanced IBBS, however, the real diffe-
rence between the two, lies in the financial instruments which are
mostly interest based debts in the IBBS while in the IFS these must be
either mostly PLS based equities or interest-free credits.
The lack of preferred stocks, bonds, options, futures, conver-
tibles, etc., in the IFS would not be an obstacle to its development
because on one hand, the funds that would have been invested under
these instruments would be invested in the instruments available and on
the other hand, this would reduce speculation and fluctuation in the
markets that might be caused by the manipulation of these instruments,
had they been available.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE ISLAMIC BANKING SYSTEM (IBS)
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In every modern society, the banking system is the main and vital
institution that mobilises the society's savings and channels them to
economic and social uses. In an Interest Based Banking System (IBBS),
banks borrow funds at interest from the depositors and extend credits
at interest to creditworthy borrowers, thus acting to induce invest-
ment, increase employment and production, and presumably achieve grea-
ter growth and economic development. In addition to this vital function
banks also provide other important financial services of which the most
important is perhaps the provision of current deposit accounts facili-
ties or what is also called the payment mechanism (a convenient device
to make payments through cheques). Indeed this service is, as Cooper
(1984:49) pointed out: "one of the banking services which must be pro-
vided by an institution in order for it to become a recognised 'bank'
and thus entitled among other things, to use the word bank".
Other services provided by interest based banks include the supply
of foreign exchange, purchase and sale of securities, acceptance and
collection of promissory notes and commercial bills, discounting, safe-
keeping, etc.. Their main goal is to maximise their profits from
interest rate differences and various fees and commissions, subject of
course to a reasonable level of liquidity, safety and soundness.
As Sayers (1967:15) pointed out: "the banking systems of different
countries vary substantially from one another but there has been during
the present century a universal tendency for each nation to develop a
wide networkk of banks centred upon the chief trading centre of the
country with the largest banks themselves established in that centre
and grouped round a quite different institution referred to as the
central bank". The purpose of this chapter is to theoretically compare
and analyse the structure, functions and management of an advanced
Islamic Banking System (IBS) vis-a-vis those of an advanced IBBS.
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6.2 THE ISLAMIC CENTRAL BANK (ICB)
The central bank is a special institution entrusted with the mana-
gement of the money supply and of government finance together with the
supervision and control of banks and other financial institutions. "The
central bank" as Z. Ahmed (nd:1) described: "holds the key position in
the financial system of a country. It is expected to act as a guardian
of the country's monetary and banking system. It is the primary insti-
tution responsible for implementing monetary policy suited to the
achievement of a country's socio-economic objectives". The ICB is no
exception. However, in fulfilling its functions, it would not use or
permit the use of interest or other prohibited financial instruments.
As any other central bank, the ICB would be:
1-) The Bank of Issue and Custodian of the Nation's Reserves;
2-) The Bank of the Government;
3-) The Custodian of the Financial Institutions' Cash Reserves;
4-) The Bankers' Bank and Clearing Bank;
5-) The Lender of Last Resort;
6-) The Supervisor and Controller of Financial Institutions; and
7-) The Controller of Credit and Applicant of Monetary Policy.
6.2.1 The Bank of Issue and Custodian of the Nation's Reserves
The ICB may assume this function with little or no difference to
other central banks. For the general interest of the Ummah (nation) the
ICB should have the sole right of issue of the nation's currency so as
to attain not only uniformity in the state note circulation but effec-
tive elasticity to meet the legitimate currency requirements of busi-
ness and the general public and the effective supervision over a credit
instrument which had for the sake of convenience to be declared legal
tender money (De Kock 1974:22).
6.2.2 The Government Banker, Agent and Adviser
The ICB may also act as the government banker, adviser and agent.
It would manage the banking accounts of government departments, boards,
and enterprises, not only because it is more convenient and economical
but also "because of the intimate connection between public finance and
and monetary affairs. The state is, in every country the largest recei-
ver of revenue and its expenditure has come to play an increasingly im-
portant part in the economic life of the nation" (ibid:36). The turn-
over is huge and "because transfers of this magnitude might be embaras-
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sing to a commercial bank, it is a recognised principle of central ban-
king that the central bank should manage the government's accounts"
(Hanson 1978:52), so as to cushion the commercial banks against the im-
pact of large movements of cash originating in this way. However, the
ICB is not to lend money to the government at interest nor float inte-
rest bearing bonds, it can lend interest free or float PLS securities.
In providing the government with foreign exchange requirements, the ICB
would not deal or allow dealings 'on the forward' market. It would deal
and allow dealings only 'on the spot' market.
In its role as adviser to the government, the ICB should advice the
government with the best ways of achieving economic development, avoi-
ding inflation, establishing proper financial institutions that provide
finance that can finance not only the large sized industries but also
the small and medium enterprises in urban and rural areas.
6.2.3 The Custodian of the Financial Institutions' Cash Reserves
"The concentration of cash reserves in the central bank is", as
De Kock (1974:58) contended: "a source of great strength to the finan-
cial system at any time. Centralised cash reserves can at least, serve
as the basis of a larger and more elastic credit structure than if the
same amounts were scattered among the individual banks. It is obvious
that, when bank reserves are pooled in one institution which is more-
over, charged with the responsibility of safeguarding the national eco-
nomic interests, such reserves can be employed to the fullest extent
possible and in the most effective manner during periods of seasonal
strain and in financial crises or general emergencies". The obligation
imposed on IFIs to keep minimum cash reserves with the ICB gives the
latter a strong means with which it could operate and which, not only
strengthens its financial position, but also gives it some means of
control over the banking and credit situation.
6.2.4 The Bankers' Bank and Clearing Bank
It is more convenient and more advantageous for the financial ins-
titutions to entrust their surplus cash to the central bank just as it
is convenient and advantageous for individuals and companies to entrust
their surpluses to commercial banks and other financial institutions.
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This should be in addition to the minimum reserve requirements that
each financial institution must maintain with the central bank in order
to protect the interests of their depositors and the interests of the
nation. Likewise, the ICB would provide the IFIs with similar banking
facilities and act therefore as the bankers' bank.
6.2.5 The Lender of Last Resort
It is the responsibility of the central bank to protect banks that
have been honestly and competently managed from the consequences of a
sudden and unexpected demand for cash. In other words the central bank
should but rather must act as a lender of last resort to banks so as to
maintain the public confidence in the banking system and prevent its
collapse. To do this effectively it is necessary that the central bank
be permitted either to buy the assets of commercial banks or to make
advances against them (Encyclopedia Britannica 1974:Vo12:708). "In a
more recognisable terms the central bank must, as Sayers (1967:101) put
it: "lend without a stint in times of financial crises". The ICB should
be ready at any time to help any financial institution which might fail
temporarily to match its liabilities so as to give confidence not only
to depositors in current accounts but to investors as well. However in
doing so it must not charge any interest but may either give very short
interest free credits, buy some of the PLS securities held by the bank
concerned at a slightly lower price than their market price or requires
from it, after one or two warnings, to keep with it a larger future re-
serve for a certain time, as a penalty, until this latter settles or
until the ICB decides to waive the penalty.
6.2.6 Supervisor and Controller of Financial Institutions
"Given the importance of banks in modern financial systems and re-
cent experiences in the banking sector, therefore, effective supervi-
sion is clearly, as Gardener (1981:63) put it: "an attractive economic
good. Experience has shown that there are always a few operators who,
given the opportunity, will cross the barriers of prudent banking if
the rewards appear to be high enough. There has to be a higher
authority responsible for ensuring that such banks are kept in line to
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preserve the stability and safety of the entire system. That higher
authority must be the supervisory authorities (the central bank)".
The regulation of financial institutions is necessary and very es-
sential to ensure that banks are not only safe but seen as safe to help
preserve the overall financial stability of the economy and to provide
adequate 'consumer protection' to depositors; control the monetary sys-
tem; and finally, protect financial markets from being inherently un-
competitive (see Gardener and Molyneux 1989:35).
In order to minimise the risks of banks and other financial insti-
tutions' failures due to mismanagement or unscrupulous practices, the
ICB, like the other central banks all over the world, should have regu-
lar contact with the financial institutions by way of examination and
close supervision of their operations and have the power to inspect,
audit, control, advise, guide and impose penalties. Through regular
inspection and contact, the ICB can acquaint itself with the finance
and investment practices of the financial institutions and provide them
with advice and guidance on such matters as staffing, branch expansion,
investment, etc. and issue to them directives on all matters concerning
liquidity, capital adequacy, monetary policy, etc.. It will usually
consult them in all such matters, but if necessary such instructions
can be issued in the form of rules and regulations for their guidance.
6.2.7 Controller of Credit and Applicant of Monetary Policy
In view of its rather special position as the only bank with the
right of issue, the custodian of the nation's reserves and the holder
of the government and all financial institutions balances and reserve
requirements, the ICB should, with the cooperation of the government,
the treasury and the financial institutions be the principal controller
of credit and applicant of the monetary policy in the Islamic state. To
be in position to control credit, it must have an unchallengeable voice
in deciding the volume of credits to be available from time to time.
The ICB, like any other conventional central bank, should, as De
Kock (ibid:143-144) pointed out, aim at being able to assess approxi-
mately the extent to which bank credit is reasonable for a given eco-
nomic situation at any time as compared with the operations of non
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monetary factors since the relation between the two is very important
for the purpose of formulating the correct credit policy. Secondly, it
should aim at being able to determine the particular stage of the busi-
ness cycle at any time, with a view to deciding not only when to act
but what to do, how to do it and how far to go. Thirdly, it should try
to secure the active and continuous cooperation of all the financial
institutions for the more effective execution of its monetary policy...
Fourthly, owing to the much wider sphere of government operations under
modern conditions and the increased economic importance of the public
sector generally, the ICB would need the cooperation and support of the
government, because monetary policy has proved elsewhere to have only
limited scope as an instrument for the maintenance of general economic
stability and growth which has come to be widely accepted as the prin-
cipal objective of national economic policies. It needs to be supple-
mented by, and coordinated with fiscal measures designed to secure
appropriate adjustments in the level of public investment and current
expenditures as well as in the incidence of taxation on private invest-
ment and consumption. In short, it is no longer a question of what mo-
netary policy can achieve by itself but what it can do in conjunction
with fiscal policy. Fifthly, the ICB must always keep watchful eye on
the state of the country's balance of payment and monetary reserves, in
view of their internal and external implications. Finally, in line with
the objective of general economic stability, monetary and fiscal poli-
cies should not only be directed towards the maintenance of stable ex-
change rate, but also to the extent that these obligations can be re-
conciled with each other, towards the minimisation of fluctuations in
business activity and the general price level (ibid).
The principal methods or instruments, which have been devised and
employed, separately or collectively, by conventional central banks for
the control or adjustment of credit include, among others:
(1)The Discount Rate or Bank Rate Policy (BRP);
(2)The Variable Reserve Requirements (VRR);
(3)The Open Market Operations (ONO);
(4)The Credit Rationing Policy (CRP);
(5)The Selective Credit Control (SCC);
(6)The Moral Suasion Policy (MSP)
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The foregoing methods of credit control have come to be employed
in different combinations instead of one at a time, and have varied in
relative importance not only from time to time; but from country to
country depending on the prevailing international or internal condi-
tions and the current trend of monetary policy (De Kock (1974:126-127).
Some of these are in force continuously, others are imposed and with-
drawn at various times; some are mainly imposed to control the size of
the money supply; some are concerned with the allocation of credit bet-
ween different sectors of the economy. Although, the need for such
control is almost universally accepted, they should not be allowed to
impede competition or suppress innovation (CLCB 1978:67).
The choice of policy tools in an IFS would depend greatly on their
compatibility with Islamic Shariah, on the economic situation of the
country and on the policy objectives to be pursued. Five main objec-
tives seems to have gained wide recognition among Muslim economists.
These are: (1) Internal Stability, (2) Distributive justice, (3) Exter-
nal Equilibrium, (4) Allocative Efficiency and (5) Economic Growth.
The Discount Rate or Bank Rate Policy
The Discount Rate or Bank Rate Policy (BRP) represents one of the
oldest instruments of credit control. "The basic approach of using this
policy is", as Hawtrey (1962:273-274) pointed out: "not the level of
rate of interest but the degree of rise or fall in Bank Rate which mat-
ters. It is a change in Bank Rate, rather than continuance either of a
high rate or of a low rate which produces an effect. But the effect
produced may be either strictly limited, a temporary retardation or
modification of whatever movement in progress at the time, or it may be
encouraged. The starting point of a big new movement amplified by the
inherent instability of credit, the vicious circle of expansion or
contraction, whether the effect is to be large or small, depends often
on a psychological response. The rise or fall of Bank Rate is required
to counteract expectations". Uzair (1982:215, 216) commented that: "The
trouble with this approach is that it requires a constant and conti-
nuous manipulation of Bank Rate. This may create problems of instabili-
142
ty in the economic conditions of the country... The question about the
effectiveness of Bank Rate has occupied the attention of experts in
banking. Even in Britain where Bank Rate has been given a high impor-
tance opinion is divided... In certain situations a rise in Bank Rate
may not check the demand for credit but may affect the cost of produc-
tion, thus causing or aggravating 'cost push inflation'".
It is very important to note here, from the beginning, the absence
of this instrument in the IBS because Bank Rate or Discount Rate is the
rate of interest at which non Islamic central banks are prepared to
discount or more accurately rediscount first class bills to the non
Islamic banks in fulfilling their function of lender of last resort;
and because, as we have seen in chapter five above, all interest based
instruments are prohibited in Islam. M.N. Siddiqi (1983b:60) argued
that: "the ICB would continue to perform its conventional functions
even though it would lack the 'Bank Rate' as an instruments of policy",
and suggested the use of two complementary instruments as alternatives.
These, he called 'The Refinance Ratio' and 'The Lending Ratio'. The re-
finance ratio refers to the offer of the ICB to provide additional cash
to the financial institutions to the extent of a certain percentage of
the interest free loans granted by them. Raising or lowering this ratio
will have the effect of expanding or contracting the supply by the
commercial banks of short term credit. Prescribing different ratios in
respect of credit extended to different sectors of the economy can be a
means of channeling credit into desired directions... The Lending Ratio
refers to the percentage of demand deposits which the commercial banks
will be obliged to lend out as Interest Free loans. This instrument too
according to him, can be manipulated to affect the supply of credit.
Uzair (1978) suggested the control of the PLS ratios, between the
depositors and the bank and between the latter and the entrepreneurs as
instruments of monetary policy. Saqr (1978) thinks that these are a
matter between the bank and its customers and that it is not Islamic
for the ICB to intervene and unilaterally change contractually deter-
mined Profit-Sharing Ratios which must not be altered after acceptance
except by mutual consent of the parties to the contracts in question.
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Chapra (1978) also advises against interference in this regard as the
ICB can control credit in other ways. He prefers leaving the determina-
tion of these ratios to the market forces, on the ground of efficiency
and competition. I agree with Saqr and Chapra and I think, the ICB can,
instead, purchase equity securities, it chooses from the equity port-
folio of the bank needing cash, at a discount (say 1 or 2% or more or
less under their market prices) and pays in cash. This latter discount
is not similar to the discount rate used by IBCBs on bills because
bills are interest bearing securities and are not allowed in the IFS
and the purchase and sale of equities and PLS securities is allowed
whether their prices go up or down. Lowering or raising this discount
rate on PLS securities may in some way encourage or hinder the IFIs to
approach the ICB for funds and to expand or contract credit.
Uzair (1982:214-5) also suggested that the ICB should hold 25% or
any other stipulated percentage of the capital stock of all the commer-
cial banks operating in the country. This will, according to him, have
several advantages: "(1) Since the central bank by virtue of its equity
share, will automatically get a part of the profits of the commercial
banks in the form of dividends, the need for interest payments to the
central bank from the commercial bank on the latter's borrowings from
the former will be obviated; (2) It will provide an additional lever to
the central bank in controlling and regulating the activities of the
commercial banks in the overall national interest. The nominees of the
central bank of the boards of directors of the commercial banks regard-
less of whether they are privately-owned or state-owned, will ensure
that the instructions of the central bank are complied with; (3) It
will give the central bank a stake in the success and healthy develop-
ment of the commercial banks. Such a close link between the central
bank and the commercial banks will prove to be all the more important
in fostering a healthy growth of the interest-free banking system as a
whole. If the commercial banks face any problem in the transition pe-
riod because of the new experiment it will be as oncern of
the central bank as that of commercial banks themselves". The danger,
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however, is that such equity participation may lead to the creation of
vested interests which may prevent the ICB from acting judiciously.
Open Market Operations
"In its wider sense, Open Market Operations (OMO) may be held" as
De Kock (1974:179) described: "to cover the purchase or sale by the
central bank in the market of any kind of (financial) paper in which it
deals, whether government securities or bankers' acceptances of foreign
bills". In an Islamic economy, where no interest and no interest bea-
ring securities are allowed, the ICB can also use OMO but by selling
and purchasing ordinary shares and PLS securities of government and of
first class financial, industrial and commercial institutions to con-
trol and stabilise their prices on one hand and to use them as monetary
policy weaponicy weapons in the right time at the other. The ICB shoul
case have an adequate supply of 'ammunition' in form of highly diversi-
fied marketable securities so as not to affect tremendously the prices
of the securities it involves in any one day. "Lack of ammunition as,
Basu (1974:100) pointed out: "obviously stands in the way of the cen-
tral bank's pursuing open market operations to their logical extent".
Basu (ibid) contended that: "The success of open market operations
depends primarily upon first, the existence of broad and well organised
money and capital markets and secondly, on the maintenance by financial
institutions of a relatively stable cash ratio. The absence of a wide
and active market for securities and the maintenance by the commercial
banks of an elastic cash ratio in several countries have caused such
operations to be practically of limited significance".
OMO have two impacts on the financial system. First, the immediate
effect of a purchase or sale of securities is to increase or decrease
the reserve base. However, there is always some questions as to whether
the central bank can buy or sell the amount of securities it desires.
But according to Cargill (1979:288) this is no problem because "the
central bank does not conduct open market operations to make profits
and will simply bid up the price on securities to a high enough level
to purchase the securities from either banks, stockholders or indivi-
duals by simply creating the funds to purchase the securities, by inc-
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reasing the reserve accounts of the banks involved in the transactions.
Likewise the central bank can sell any amount of securities it posses-
ses because it will continue to lower the price until the securities
are purchased. Second the effect of the central bank as a net purchaser
or seller of securities shifts the demand or supply function of securi-
ties in the open market and immediately affects security prices".
This is the normal tendency in the direction of the foregoing as-
symptions but deviation from it cannot be excluded. Firstly because the
quantity of money and the banks' cash reserves do not always increase
or decrease in proportion to the purchase or sale of securities by the
central bank as one or more counter forces might be operating simulta-
neously. Secondly, banks do not always increase or decrease their loans
and investments in proportion to the increase or decrease in their cash
reserves. There are various circumstances of monetary, economic or po-
litical nature which might deter banks from employing increased cash
reserves fully if at all or from contracting credit when their reserves
were reduced. Thirdly, it is not just a case of banks refraining at
times from the full employment of their increased reserves but also one
of a lack of willing or deserving borrowers (De Kock ibid:183-184).
OMO, though a major instruments of monetary control in the hands of
central banks in the more mature and more sophisticated markets, are
not the kind of weapon that can be readily and quickly adapted to LDCs
where money and capital markets are immature or non-existent and where
savings are very small or negotiables securities are lacking. Besides,
even in some well DCs with very sophisticated money and capital markets
the scope of OMO might be limited at times by the simultaneous opera-
tions of various counterforces in respect, not only of the supply of
money and bank credit but also the demand therefrom. The question, as
De Kock (ibid) put it: "is whether and to what extent the central bank
could offset the effects of the counterforces concerned at any time by
suitably adjusting its open market operations, by purchasing or selling
securities in a greater or lesser measure than would otherwise have
been considered necessary. The primary problem of course, would be that
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of gauging accurately the extent and duration of all the actual or po-
tential disturbing factors, and this in turn would depend not only on
the experience and skill of the central bank in this field but also the
degree of complexity of the prevailing economic conditions and trends".
Variable Reserve Requirements (VRR)
The use, by central banks, of the VRR is perhaps the most powerful
tool, a central bank possess, because changes in VRR affect not only
excess reserves but also the deposit money creation multiplier of the
banking system (Binhammer 1968:125). This monetary instrument came to
be adopted by all DCs and LDCs. However, "the range of variation is",
as noticed by De Kock (1974:234-235): "not uniform but differ from one
country to another. In many countries this instrument was employed only
in the form of changes in cash reserve requirements and in some only in
respect of commercial banks, and both these factors tended to limit its
effectiveness as a restrictive measure". The primary purpose of the
is to enable the central bank to exercise some degree of control over
banks especially when these have a volume of reserves far in excess of
legal requirements, which makes the other instruments ineffective. This
is a method of quantitative credit control that affects their reserves
directly as opposed to bank rate or OMO which affect them indirectly.
This instrument of VRR can also be used by the ICB in an Islamic
Economy so long as these reserves are kept with it on interest free or
PLS bases. The ICB may impose a certain minimum cash and liquid reserve
requirements equal to a certain percent of their deposits and designa-
ted non deposit liabilities and change it from time to time. The per-
cent requirements should vary with the kind of financial institution,
the deposits size and the type of deposit or source of funds. However,
this must be taken with great caution because as Horvitz (1969:298)
argued: "the large impact of VRR has some serious adverse side effects.
Many banks may find it difficult to adjust promptly to increased
reserve requirements. The bank that is fully loaned up will find it
necessary to sell sizeable amounts of securities in what are probably
depressed market. this can mean large capital losses and can put many
banks in a severe liquidity bind".
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Three more major criticisms have been levelled against the use of
VRR. It is clumsy; it is discriminatory in its effects; and it is inf-
lexible (Basu 1974:120). Perhaps that is why, as Horvitz (1969:299)
pointed out: "there are few situations in which use of this weapon is
called for. One such circumstances might be during wartime or other
national emergencies which require large government expenditures during
a period of full employment. An increase in reserves requirements could
immobilise the excess reserves that would otherwise be created by defi-
cit spending. The treasury could then borrow the needed funds from the
central bank, thus avoiding the dangers of postwar inflation that could
result from banks and others selling government bonds purchased during
the emergency". There is also a substantial measure of agreement that
the VRR can, as Basu (1974:119) noticed: "be appropriately pressed into
service when a country is experiencing large and sudden movements in
its gold and foreign exchange assets, especially as a result of specu-
lative international capital movements. The effects of large inflows
and outflows of foreign capital, it has been believed, can be counter-
acted more smoothly and effectively by changes in the required reserve
ratio rather than by other monetary measures".
Credit Rationing
Credit rationing is a direct control over the level of bank advan-
ces by requesting them from time to time to observe credit ceilings.
This may be used by the ICB, as an alternative or as a supplement to
other methods of credit controls. It consists of allocation of credit
quotas to the financial institutions, not arbitrarily but in relation
to their capital and reserves or to their proportionate share in the
resources of the central bank to curb excessive inflationary pressures
especially when other methods prove to be inadequate. It should be
discontinued in normal times and to be used only in times of war, real
crises or abnormal conditions, for it is a pernicious form of control,
incompatible with the function of Lender of Last Resort and rigid.
Selective credit controls (SCC)
The directional or selective control on bank advances in the shape
of restrictions of credit to 'low priority' sectors of the economy and
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its diversion to 'high priority' ones is sometimes used to encourage
neglected sectors of the economy like agriculture and industry and to
discourage sectors like trade and personal sector. SCC may take dif-
ferent forms. It may take the form of portfolio ceiling devices which
involve the setting of ceiling on loans to be made for specified purpo-
ses or to certain specific sectors. The ceiling may be specified either
in the form of percentages of loans and advances to be extended to dif-
ferent sectors or they may be stated in terms of the maximum aggregate
amount of loans allocable to the specified sectors. Another type of
portfolio-ceiling device, is the setting of incremental ceiling speci-
fying the maximum increases allowed for loans for various purposes.
Alternatively these may be put in the form of a requirement for
prior approval to be obtained from the central bank for loans to be
extended above specified levels or specified percentages to the diffe-
rent sectors. The central bank may also tie this policies to the dis-
count mechanism by charging preferential rates in rediscounting paper
originating from the sectors earmarked 'high priority' in order to
provide an added incentive for the banks to increase lending to these
favoured activities, and higher rates to 'low priority' areas. A third
way of imposing SCC is to link differential reserve requirements to the
composition of the financial institutions portfolios. Banks whose port-
folios comform to the requirement of certain prescribed percentages of
loans to the 'high priority' areas are allowed to maintain lower cash
or liquidity ratios than the normal ratio, which, of course will conti-
nue to be applied to the other financial institutions which do not meet
the credit requirements. The prescribed percentages and/or the associa-
ted cash or liquidity ratio may be changed as Central Bank's emphasis
shifts from one 'high priority' area to another. These instruments are
to be distinguished from the quantitative instruments in that their
impact is not on the total amount of credit but on the amount that is
put to use in a particular sector of the economy (0.E. Johnson 1974).
There is nothing to prevent the ICB from using this instrument when
necessary, except where interest is involved. The use of SCC in an IFS
would assign a distributive or allocative role to the central bank in
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cases where certain sectors that are vital for the overall national in-
terest do not receive due attention of the IFIs either because they are
more difficult to handle or because they are less lucrative than others
(Uzair 1982:218). The ICB may also use it to curb the IFIs from exten-
sive use of Murabahah, Iiarah or Bai MuaAjal and to encourage them use
PIS methods of finance such as Musharakah, Mudharabah, Muzaraah, etc..
Moral Suasion Policy
Moral Suasion Policy is a qualitative instrument of monetary
policy that consists of persuading the financial institutions that it
is in their interest and in the interest of the nation as whole, that
they should follow the issued instructions and directives. In an IFS
moral suasion would play a significant role. The ICB would try to se-
cure the active and continuous cooperation of all IFIs for the more
effective execution of its monetary policy by developing closer rela-
tionships with them in order to persuade them that all financial insti-
tutions ultimately have a common interest in the maintenance of sound
credit conditions and thereby increase its potential power of moral
suasion over them whenever the occasion demands corrective action since
experience of central banking elsewhere shows that it cannot rely on
its legal powers and weapons at all times (De Kock 1974:143).
6.3 THE ISLAMIC COMMERCIAL BANES
The Islamic commercial banks, in fulfilling their services towards
their customers, are faced with four categories of services as follows:
A-) Services used by IBBs and prohibited by the Islamic Shariah;
B-) Services developed by IFIs to replace the prohibited ones;
C-) Services used by IBBs but doubtful or subject to controversy;
D-) Services used by IBBs but which are Islamically permissible.
A-) The banking services that are provided by the IBBs and which
are unacceptable from the Islamic point of view include:
1. All interest based financial claims;
2. Syndication, management or underwriting them;
3. Forward foreign exchange;
4. Discounting of interest based commercial papers;
5. Finance of interest based documentary credits;
6. factoring (buying of trade debt at discounts).
B-) The banking services that have been somewhat developed by
Muslim economists to comply with Islamic Shariah are concerned with the
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main banking services: collection of deposits and allocation of finance
or in other words with the intermediary function (see 5.2 above).
C-) The banking services provided by IBBs but which are doubtful
or controversial to Muslim scholars are, as reported by Attia (1985):
1. Fees for letters of guarantee: There is no controversy among
Muslim Jurists as to the permissibility of the issuing of letters of
guarantee or to the issuing charges that are not related to the amount
of the letter to cover the expenses to the banks. However, the question
arises as to the fees and commissions related to the amount of the
letter of Guarantee. The legal aspect behind this controversy is not
that the Letter of Guarantee is considered as finance and that these
fees are considered as interest, but the point is that according to
traditional Islamic Jurisprudence, the guarantee is classified under
the non lucrative contracts, and as such it is assumed to be rendered
as 'human service', free of charge.
2. Bonus on current and savings accounts: The predetermined yield
on any deposit or loan is pure interest, and prohibited by Islamic law,
whether it is on fixed term deposits, saving deposits or demand depo-
sits.. meanwhile it is allowed that the debtor, when paying back his
debt, gives the creditor a bonus whether expressed in increasing the
amount of the loan or any other privileges or services and this is even
recommended and expected from a pious debtor, provided that there is no
previous condition or undertaking in this respect. Such a decision, if
repeated and taken the form of a settled custom and is taken into con-
sideration by the depositors when depositing their funds will amount to
a prefixed condition or engagement considered as prohibited interest.
There is even a question of whether the services rendered by banks to
depositors of current accounts are to be considered as a kind of remu-
neration, and thus not allowed.
D-) Finally, the fourth category includes almost all the other
banking services not involving interest. These are, as Attia (1985:4)
pointed out: "in general, permissible under Islamic law, being pure
services for which a fee or commission is allowed".
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6.4 MANAGEMENT OF ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
An efficient management of a financial institution not only impro-
ves the mobilisation of savings but also allocates them to the produc-
tion needs of the society and realises good profits for the sharehol-
ders and depositors without falling in the pitfalls of liquidity or
solvency. Management of IFIs requires that the operations of the IFIs
are carried out Islamically (ie complying with Shariah) and effectively
through the use of management techniques such as: planning, organising,
coordinating, communicating, negotiating, controlling and decision ma-
king so as to attain maximum operating efficiency and profitability.
6.4.1 Planning the activities of an Islamic bank
Planning is perhaps the first very important thing to do in a pro-
cess of good management. It is, as described by Hayes (1980:76): "deci-
ding where we would like to be in the future and what and who may be
involved in our getting there. It involves setting a plan with long and
short range objectives, determining how to allocate resources in rela-
tion to the objectives, setting priorities, and assuring their fulfil-
ment by making available the necessary people, plant and materials".
Hayes (ibid:77) contends that: "planning is more complex than getting
from here to there. It is the basis for cost control, budgetary admi-
nistration, morale and productivity. In effect, any deficiency in these
areas points to a defect in planning."
There is no objection from the Islamic point of view concerning the
methods and techniques of planning so long that, in formulating the
objectives and determining the tools, the management would not be
involved in any prohibited transaction or injustice.
6.4.2 The Structure and Organisation of an Islamic Bank
Organising follows and supports planning. When the objectives have
been agreed upon and the policies determined, organisation must follow
to get things going on smoothly, efficiently and properly. Crosse and
Hempel (1980:36) contended that: "a commercial bank is much more than a
building. It is an organisation that combines human effort and finan-
cial resources to perform the banking function required by the community
it serves, and to earn an adequate return on its owners' investments".
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As Searle (1980:26) pointed out: "the particular organisational
structure which a commercial banking organisation adopts depends upon a
number of factors. Among these are the financial aspects of the decision
opportunities in the market place, competitive considerations, and legal
constraints related to the structure of the commercial banking system
as they apply to that particular banking organisation".
Hayes (ibid:78) says that: "Organising is bringing people together
in a way that most effectively and efficiently will achieve the objec-
tives". It involves the definition of jobs and determination of respon-
sibilities in writing. Far more importantly, however, as Hayes (ibid)
put it: "organising is bringing people with relationships where each
individual can find satisfaction in the job and yet all are united in a
common accomplishment.. The objective is the responsibility of the team
and to bring this about, participation is required". The organisation
of any institution aims at achieving the objectives and policies of
that institution. There is no objection in the Islamic Shariah as to
the organisation of a bank or any other institution.
As Mudawi (1984:3) contends: "there is no prototype organisational
set-up for an Islamic bank. Each Islamic bank should have the organisa-
tional shape and body which suits its environment, the laws of its coun-
try, the type of activity which dominates the economic scene and the
level of advancement it has attained. An Islamic bank could be establi-
shed, subject to regulatory approval, as a private company or a govern-
ment owned institution or it could even be a mixture of both". It may
take the form of a unit, branch or group bank, joint-holding company,
or merge with another bank, etc.. It may also be involved in interna-
tional banking through various organisational units such as representa-
tive offices, agencies, branches, subsidiaries, affiliates, etc..
Whatever form an Islamic bank takes, it has to have certain traditional
organs. These organs may comprise a General Assembly in which the
powers of ownership are vested, and a Board of Directors who are final-
ly responsible to the supreme organisation of its owners. As such the
organisational characteristics of an Islamic bank are:
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Shareholders: The shartholders of any institution are the real
owners of that company. It is they who choose the Board of Directors
and agree or reject the overall policies of the institution. And it is
they who bear the fortunes and misfortunes of the institutions. Crosse
and Hempel (1980:49) pointed out that: "part of a bank's special
character is related to the distribution of its stocks. A bank's stock
may be closely held by a single individual or a relatively small group,
or it can be widely distributed in the community".
Investment Deposits Holders: Unlike in conventional banks where
depositors have a debtor/creditor relationship, receive predetermined
interest returns that have no relation whatsoever with the profits and
losses of the bank and have precedence over shareholders in case of a
liquidation, the holders of investment deposits and PLS certificates in
Islamic banks are like shareholders, share in the fortune and misfor-
tune of the Islamic bank in proportion to their investment deposits and
have no precedence over the shareholders in case of liquidation. In
other words they also have the right of ownership in the bank. The only
difference perhaps is that their deposits have maturities while those
of shareholders have not. Thus, I think depositors of this sort with
investment deposits maturing say after a year or more from the time of
the the annual general meetings of shareholders should have the right
to be represented albeit with less powers than the shareholders, of
course in view of the difference in commitment.
Board of Directors: As Reed et al. (1980:64) pointed out: "Stock-
holders, depositors, and regulatory authorities look to directors for
policy decisions and management ability that will result in the safety
of funds and profitable operations". Depending on the banking act of
the country and on the size of the institution, the Board of Directors
of an Islamic Bank may be determined by the stockholders' general
meeting. Each director may be required to directly own some shares in
the institution he is involved with. The Board of Directors plays the
role of agent towards the shareholders and represents the top echelon
of authority. It should be responsible for the performance of the
institution by selecting competent executive officers, effectively
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supervising the bank's affairs, adopting and following sound policies
and objectives and avoiding self-serving practices (ibid).
Probably the most important functions of the Board of Directors of
an Islamic Bank, are the establishment of its objectives, the determi-
nation of policies and the supervision of the activities. The powers,
duties, responsibilities and liabilities of the Board of Directors are
determined by a combination of statutory law, common law, articles of
association, bylaws and custom, subject of course to Islamic Shariah.
The objectives can and should be set with respect to public relations,
personnel training and development, and community progress and the
development of policies is necessary in planning a course of action.
Religious Supervisory Board: Because for the present time Muslim
bankers have little or no knowledge about the Shariah laws there are
nowadays religious supervisory boards supervising and controlling the
activities of the Islamic banks to make sure that the contracts agreed
upon between the bank and its customers comply with the Shariah.
However, in the future when Muslim bankers would be educated not only
in the conventional banking studies but also in Shariah, this exclusive
feature of religious supervisory boards should disappear.
Different Departments: For an effective and efficient management
of an Islamic bank, it is perhaps very important that the tasks and
responsibilities of the personnel are well defined and coordinated. A
Typical Islamic bank could have an Investment Department, a follow up
Department, A Legal department, A Recruitment and Training Department,
A social Department, etc. (see Presley 1988a:64-5).
6.4.3 Profitability Management
Islamic commercial banks, like other commercial banks, are profit-
maximizing businesses subject of course to the Shariah and other const-
raints. They can increase their profits by investing more of their as-
set portfolio in higher yielding but more risky investments. However
higher bank profits must not be achieved at the expense of bank safety.
Thus, the central problem for bank management is reconciling the conf-
licting bank goals of solvency and liquidity, on one hand, and profita-
155
bility on the other or what is known as the 'banking dilemma' because
the trade-off between profitability and safety is more acute for banks
than for most other businesses (see Kidwell and Peterson 1980:188).
Bank earnings, as Crosse and Hempel (1980:102) pointed out: "are
the foundation upon which rest the two main pillars of banking strength
adequacy of capital and competence of management... Thus, earning power
proved to be the first line of defence against the risks inherent in
banking". In an IBBS, bank earnings, as Crosse and Hempel (ibid) put
it: "provide the return on capital investment in banks. It is for the
sake of this return on his or her investment that the stockholder is
willing to supply the capital that enables a bank to engage in the ris-
ky business of creating credit, and it is by retaining assets generated
by earnings that the major portion of bank capital has been accumula-
ted". Gross income of IBBs is determined by the rate of return on loans
and investments, by the level of various fees and charges imposed for
the performance of services, and by the size and composition of assets.
Although service fees have increased and will probably do so in the fu-
ture, interest on earnings assets, from loans and investments provides
almost 90% of IBB's income (Reed et al. 1980:184).
The profitability of IFIs depends greatly on the realised profits
and losses of their project investments which they finance, the rota-
tion of their financial resources and the termination or completion of
the operations. A large part of an IFI income would be in form of Juala
(fees or commissions) and profits from Murabahah, Bai Muaijal, Bai Bit-
Taqseet, I arah and Iiarah Waqtina l but not from interest. With a good
capable management, IFI would be very much profitable except, perhaps
in times of recession or mismanagement. The existing Islamic banks have
proved this since most if not all of them realised substantial profits
from their first year of business (see chapters 8-11 below) despite the
fact that, like any other corporation, they had substantial amounts of
establishment and overheads costs in their first years of business.
One of the principle byproducts of an analysis of revenue and ex-
pense is a budget that involves forecasting revenues, expenses and the
resulting profits on savings. The IFI should follow this practice and
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look for ways of increasing the earnings of the bank because the ear-
ning of an IFI do not go only to its shareholders but investment depo-
sitors also have their share in them. Unless an Islamic bank makes good
profits, depositors will not approach it because their return depend
directly on the profits realised by it.
6.4.4 Capital Adequacy Management
As Crosse and Hempel (1980:67) contended: "the ultimate strength of
a bank lies in its capital funds. Such is the consensus of writers on
banking and bank supervisors. But the problem of bank capital is not
quite that simple. It is not merely a question of the more capital the
better; rather, it is how much capital for what reasons or purposes".
Reed et al. (1980:158) pointed out that: "the effective management of
capital funds may enhance the profitability of a bank while maintaining
the traditional and necessary function of safety for depositors".
Capital adequacy is so important for banks because banks normally
have a very high degree of financial leverage than do most other busi-
nesses, which means that the majority of their assets (around 90%) are
financed by debt (the funds of the depositors). This state of affairs
demands that capital must be adequate to maintain the confidence of the
depositors who otherwise would be worried over the safety of their de-
posits and would withdraw them in fear that the bank may not be able to
meet its obligations. Capital adequacy is also important for a bank to
meet the regulations drawn by bank supervisors who decide how much ca-
pital is adequate and who have to make sure that the public confidence
is maintained not only as far as a certain bank is concerned but for
the banking system as a whole. Perhaps, that is why, banks are the most
strictly supervised and regulated businesses all over the world. As
Lachab (1987:8) pointed out: "This function of capital depends on its
ability to maintain confidence in the banking system rather than its
ability to pay off bank creditors under crisis situation. After all, no
level of capital is sufficient, except 100 percent to absorb all bank
losses. The emphasis on the capital ratios by the regulatory authori-
ties can also be seen as a mean of controlling bank's rapid growth".
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As in the case of IBBS the ultimate strength of an Islamic bank
lies in its capital funds and so it must maintain the level of capital
adequacy required by the supervisory authorities. But it is very impor-
tant to note here as Reed et al. (1980:172) pointed out that: "although
a ratio may be helpful as a starting point in analysing the capital
adequacy of an individual bank, it should not be considered an end in
itself. A bank does not have adequate capital just because it meets
some statistical average, nor it is beyond criticism just because it
meets some ratio... The inquiry must go beyond the ratio to an examina-
tion of the bank's operations and the risks it assumes in its loan and
investment portfolio". Thus a number of factors such as the liquidity
of assets, the volatility of deposits, the structure of deposits, the
history of earnings, the quality of management, etc., must be taken
into consideration when assessing the adequacy of capital of a bank.
It is perhaps also very important to note that an Islamic bank can
raise its capital only through ordinary shares, retained profits and
reserves. No preferred stock or subordinated capital debt involving in-
terest are allowed in Islam or used by Islamic banks. However, invest-
ment deposits and other PLS instruments should not be considered as
debts when calculating the capital adequacy ratios of Islamic banks but
as part of the cover of debt because their holders are not debtors to-
wards the Islamic banks but, as argued above, partners who have tempo-
ray ownership in the assets of the banks. Investment depositors, like
the shareholders, share in the profits and losses of the bank and in
times of crisis they should help the bank maintain the confidence of
other depositors rather than withdraw their deposits if they are not to
lose, because withdrawing their deposits does not exempt them from the
liabilities of the banks since they have to bear part of the ultimate
loss in case a loss occurs in proportion of their deposits in the total
funds (capital and reserves plus investment deposits) and that, what
makes them different from time depositors in IBBs. Furthermore, the
Islamic bank should not allow investment depositors to withdraw their
deposits before maturity, first because they have a contract to fulfil
and secondly, it is in their own interest. However, current and saving
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account depositors who do not share in the bank's result have the prio-
rity over investment depositors and their deposits must be guaranteed
not only by the capital and reserves of the bank but with investment
deposits as well. This means that the real leverage of Islamic banks is
very low and their capital ratios are very high especially if investment
deposits are considered as part of the capital and not as part of the
debts as in the following formula:
K&R + ID
Capital Ratio -
DD + SD
Where: K&R = Capital and Reserves; ID = Investment Deposits;
DD = Demand Deposits;	 SD = Savings Deposits.
6.4.5 Liquidity and Balance Sheet Management
The problem of liquidity for commercial banks is essentially that
of having available at all times sufficient funds to meet demands for
deposit withdrawals and contingencies. "Throughout the history of ban-
king", as Revell (1975:13) noticed: "there have been many changes in
the sources of liquidity, and these changes have been associated with
the growth and adaptation of money markets and the forms of bank len-
ding... The theory of liquidity has therefore been an operational one..
The theory has thus changed as practice has changed".
(1) The commercial loan theory or the Real Bills Doctrine, as it
was also called is perhaps the oldest theory of solving the liquidity
problem. It states that commercial banks should grant only short-term,
'self-liquidating' loans. There is, of course, no such thing as 'self-
liquidating' loan especially when there is a slump in trade (Revell
1975:13-4). Banks used to adopt this method because there were not many
ways of finding liquidity as are available today. The Islamic banks, in
their present situation where they cannot use the interbank market and
where they have no lender of last resort or a secondary market for
their assets, could use this method but not in its original form
because an Islamic bank does not give commercial loans, it provide
finance on Murabahah which is somewhat a self-liquidating or on PLS
basis where they share in the fortunes and misfortunes of the busines-
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ses financed after they make sure that they are viable or say 'self-
liquidating' to some extent. However, when things improve, they do not
need to stick to this method, they could follow one or more of the
other ways of solving the 'dilemma'.
(2) The shiftability theory emerged in the 1930s as a new theory
replacing the old commercial loan theory. It states that banking liqui-
dity depends upon the ability of the bank to sell or shift its assets
to others at a predictable price. "The doctrine of shiftability is", as
Revell (ibid) argued: "subject to the same fallacy as 'the real bill'
doctrine, that of assuming that liquidity for individual banks and for
the banking system are identical. The fact is that no assets are liquid
when all banks are simultaneously trying to 'shift' them". Individual
Islamic Banks may also use this method when not all banks are doing the
same, if they have a portfolio of negotiable PLS financial instruments
and there is quite a good secondary market for them.
(3) The anticipated income theory emerged in the 1940s as a new
way of assuring liquidity for banks. It expanded the menu of bank loans
from short term loans to longer term loans and non business loans. It
reasons that bank loans are paid off out of the future earnings of the
borrower, from anticipated income and so it focuses on the borrower's
ability to successfully repay a loan in stages over a period of time.
The critical factor in the decision to grant a loan is the borrower's
ability to repay the loan out of his future earnings. (Kidwell and
Peterson 1980:192,193). When Islamic banks offer finance on the basis
of the PLS system which relates their returns to the anticipated income
of the customer, one can say that they use this technique.
(4) Asset Management: Asset Management is the term used to desc-
ribe the allocation of funds among cash, security investment, loans and
other assets so as to achieve the highest rate of return for the level
of risk assumed within the liquidity and regulatory constraints.
According to Reed et al. (1980:96), three different approaches to asset
management have been espoused in attempts to resolve the liquidity-
profitability dilemma. Each differs in its emphasis on the form of the
management process and in the degree to which quantitative analysis is
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employed in evaluating the alternatives available. No one approach can
be considered a panacea for bank management because problems and defi-
ciencies are associated with each. These are:
(a) The Pool-of Fund Approach which is the simplest to administer
and whose basic idea is that all funds should be pooled together and
then allocated to whatever asset investment is appropriate.
(b) The Asset Allocation Approach or Conversion of Funds Approach
which was developed to meet the deficiency of The Pool of-Fund Approach
which failed to distinguish among the different liquidity requirements
of demand deposits, savings deposits, time deposits and capital funds.
Under this method and as Baker (1978) described: "liabilities are cate-
gorised according to their volatility and then allocated to assets that
share the same volatility characteristics. Volatility is assumed to be
a function of deposit size as well as type... Determination of deposit
volatility by category may be made either intuitively or through the
use of statistical inference techniques".
(c)The Management-Science Approach which involves the application
of computer-aided analysis and use sophisticated models and advanced
mathematical techniques such as linear programming to analyse the comp-
lex interrelationships among various components of the balance sheet
and income statement and which can provide powerful aids to management
in the decision making. The models prescribe how a bank's management
should allocate whatever funds are available for investment to provide
adequate profitability while operating within the liquidity constraints
imposed by management (from within) or by regulatory authorities (from
without). The manipulation of these models may be of great assistance
to bank management in realizing increased profitability from bank ope-
rations. The scientific method for the solution of problems involved,
requires a statement of objectives, identification of the relationships
among various elements of the problem, identification of variable ele-
ments that are, and are not under the control of management, an esti-
mate of the way non controlled variables may behave, and identification
of constraints imposed on the behaviour of management (from within or
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without). The method attempts to answers three questions: What is the
problem? What are the alternative solutions? Which alternative is best?
(see Reed et al. 1980:chapter 5).
(5) Liability Management: Prior to the 1960s it was believed that
bank's liquidity comes almost entirely from the asset side of its ba-
lance sheet and that the only other source of liquidity is the central
bank when it is approached as the lender of last resort but because
this latter source was available only in cases of emergency, the banks
used to assume that their liabilities as given and start from there to
allocate them among their assets. The 1960s marked the beginning of a
new era in bank liquidity practices (Kidwell and Peterson 1981:195).
Liability Management has come to be known as the activities invol-
ved in supplementing liquidity needs by actively seeking borrowed funds
when needed. It enables a bank to aggressively expand its lending acti-
vities through increased leverage. The liquidity gained may be used to
smooth out deposit inflows and outflows and reduce their variability.
It may also be used to meet increases in loan demand by the bank's cus-
tomers as long as the expected marginal return of the new loans exceeds
the expected marginal cost of funds (see Reed et al. 1980:25 and
Kidwell and Peterson 1981:196). The Islamic bank when using this method
must of course avoid interest based liabilities.
(6) Balance Sheet Management: Kidwell and Peterson (ibid) repor-
ted that: "Beginning with the rise of liability management in the
1960s, it became apparent that decisions about the composition of a
bank's assets and liabilities were no longer independent. Balance Sheet
Management gives explicit recognition that the decisions about a bank's
asset and liability holdings are highly interrelated and that the en-
tire balance sheet of the bank should be regarded as the portfolio for
which financial planning is undertaken". This type of analysis is ext-
remely complicated, requiring the use of computers and the construction
of financial models of bank operations employing linear programming and
other mathematical techniques that need to be solved simultaneously.
The result should give an optimal solution providing the bank's mana-
gement with actual numbers for how much to invest and in what assets.
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6.4.6 Risk management in Islamic banks:
All business operations involve risk. As Revell (1975:80)
contends: "It is not only insurance companies that have a portfolio of
risk but also all credit institutions and all financial institutions".
In fact as Crosse and Hempel (1980:59) contend: "taking risks can
almost be said to be the business of bank management. A bank that is
run on the principle of avoiding all risks, or as many of them as
possible, will be a stagnant institution and will not adequately serve
the legitimate credit needs of its community. On the other hand, a bank
that takes excessive risks or, what is more likely takes them without
recognising their extent or even their existence will surely run into
difficulties". IFIs are no exception, in fact it is argued that since
Islamic banks would be more involved in direct and indirect businesses,
and not charging predetermined interest but share in the profits and
losses of their customers to whom they give finance, their portfolio of
risk is greater than their counterparts (the IBBs). Here, we shall look
into this claim and see how IFIs could hedge against these risks.
The first most important step in the risk management approach is to
identify all possible risk exposures, so as to be able to evaluate them
and hedge against them. Perhaps one of the most useful and comprehen-
sive classification of the specific types of risks peculiar to the ope-
rations of IBBs is the one given by Revell (1975:82) and produced below:
Types of risks
1. Credit
2. Investment
3. Liquidity
4.Earning
5. Operating
6. Insured
Sources of risks
Default or delay in fulfilment of obligations
Changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates and
assets's prices
Faulty balance sheet structure, changes in assets prices
Changes in interest rates, asset prices and operating
expenses
Operating errors, inefficiency, faulty control procedure
Excess on insurance policies, risks not covered
All of the types of risk mentioned above together with fraud and
fiduciary risks, which are omitted as these can be insured against, may
be present in an IFI, however the sources would be somewhat different.
For instance the IFI will not be subject to risks from changes in inte-
rest rates since they do not deal in interest bearing instruments but
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will be subject instead to risks originating from sharing the losses of
unsuccessful PLS investments.
The most obvious risk in banking, as Crosse and Hempel (1980:60)
remarked is the credit risk -the possibility that loans will not be re-
paid or that investments will deteriorate in quality or go in default
with consequent loss to the bank. Although IFIs do not deal with inte-
rest securities and all their assets with the exception of premises,
plant and equipment are subject to credit risk, nevertheless their risk
exposure would, I believe, be less than IBBs for the following reasons:
(1) The IFI does not give loan advances (credits) except in very limi-
ted circumstances and although these are interest-free they are secured
by pledges. (2) The IFI gives PLS finance or buys goods and then sells
or leases them to its customers. If the finance is in the form of Mura-
bahah (Mark-up sale), Bai Muaijal (Sale at deferred payment), Bai Bit-
Taqseet (sale by instalments), Ii arah (leasing) and rarah Wagtina, 
(hire-purchase), then the finance is guaranteed by the fact that the
ownership of the good involved remains with it until full payment is
received. If, on the other hand the finance is in the form of a PLS
contract as in Musharakah, Mudharabah, Muzaraah and Musaqah projects,
the IFI does not give any of these until it makes sure not only that
the customer is credit-worthy but that the project financed is itself
viable and profitable or 'self-liquidating' and have the right of
follow up and intervention whenever necessary and able to prevent a
loss to the project. This does not say that the IFI will be protected
all along but only to say that the risk of not recovering all or part
of their finance would perhaps be minimal as compared to IBBs' credit
risks, unless the partner it gives finance too turn to be a crook who
fraudulently uses the finance in a different venture without the bank
knowledge or the IFI turns a blind eye on him, which is unlikely.
Perhaps investment and earning risks are the most obvious in Isla-
mic banking and not credit risk, and that is why it is claimed that Is-
lamic banks are more risky than IBBs. This may be true when the bulk of
the Islamic bank's finance is in the form of PLS projects, but if the
bulk of its finance is in the form of a Murabahah, Bai Muajial, Bai'
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Bit-Taqseet, rarah or Iiarah Waqtina' then, the risk would perhaps be
lower. Hedging against the risk of PLS investments could be done
through appropriate diversification, intimate knowledge of the
partners, accurate feasibility studies of the PLS projects and follow
up with intervention when necessary to stop the erosion of the assets'
values. This may prove to be expensive and difficult to implement, but
if followed, may benefit the bank greatly.
As far as the other risks are concerned, The IFIs would be subject
to these risks just as IBBs are, except those emanating from the vola-
tility of interest which is not present in the IFS. To protect itself,
from the liquidity risk for example, the IFI should maintain adequate
liquidity in the form of assets readily convertible into cash at a mi-
nimum risk of loss, manage itself properly and assure itself of its
ability to get needed funds in the market. And to protect or say reduce
the risk of fraud, theft and other risks, the IFI should have adequate
internal and external controls, safeguards, audits and insurance.
6.5 CONCLUSION
The IBS is an equity rather than debt based system and the rela-
tionship between an IFI and its customers is of partnership rather than
of debtor/creditor. It can work without recourse to interest. In other
words, interest in not a necessary component of banking, as it used to
be held. There are a number of instruments, such as Mudharabah, Musha-
rakah Muzaraah, Musaqah, Murabahah, Juala Ijarah, Bai' Muaijal, Bai'
Bit-Taqseet, etc., that can be used to mobilise savings or invest them
without transgressing the Divine law against interest. Not only that
but even monetary policy could be implemented without recourse to inte-
rest. The ICB and the IFIs can design and adopt any variety of banking
and monetary techniques according to the needs of the circumstances and
depending on the level and stage of the development of the IFS as long
as they do not transgress Allah's Shariah. Thus, the absence of inte-
rest does not reduce the scope of banking generally nor of monetary po-
licy in particular. This may prove to be hard to achieve and requires
more manpower and capital than IBBS, but that is where the test lies.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE ISLAMIC BANKING SYSTEM (IBS)
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In every modern society, the banking system is the main and vital
institution that mobilises the society's savings and channels them to
economic and social uses. In an Interest Based Banking System (IBBS),
banks borrow funds at interest from the depositors and extend credits
at interest to creditworthy borrowers, thus acting to induce invest-
ment, increase employment and production, and presumably achieve grea-
ter growth and economic development. In addition to this vital function
banks also provide other important financial services of which the most
important is perhaps the provision of current deposit accounts facili-
ties or what is also called the payment mechanism (a convenient device
to make payments through cheques). Indeed this service is, as Cooper
(1984:49) pointed out: "one of the banking services which must be pro-
vided by an institution in order for it to become a recognised 'bank'
and thus entitled among other things, to use the word bank".
Other services provided by interest based banks include the supply
of foreign exchange, purchase and sale of securities, acceptance and
collection of promissory notes and commercial bills, discounting, safe-
keeping, etc.. Their main goal is to maximise their profits from
interest rate differences and various fees and commissions, subject of
course to a reasonable level of liquidity, safety and soundness.
As Sayers (1967:15) pointed out: "the banking systems of different
countries vary substantially from one another but there has been during
the present century a universal tendency for each nation to develop a
wide networkk of banks centred upon the chief trading centre of the
country with the largest banks themselves established in that centre
and grouped round a quite different institution referred to as the
central bank". The purpose of this chapter is to theoretically compare
and analyse the structure, functions and management of an advanced
Islamic Banking System (IBS) vis-a-vis those of an advanced IBBS.
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6.2 THE ISLAMIC CENTRAL BANK (ICE)
The central bank is a special institution entrusted with the mana-
gement of the money supply and of government finance together with the
supervision and control of banks and other financial institutions. "The
central bank" as Z. Ahmed (nd:1) described: "holds the key position in
the financial system of a country. It is expected to act as a guardian
of the country's monetary and banking system. It is the primary insti-
tution responsible for implementing monetary policy suited to the
achievement of a country's socio-economic objectives". The ICB is no
exception. However, in fulfilling its functions, it would not use or
permit the use of interest or other prohibited financial instruments.
As any other central bank, the ICB would be:
1-) The Bank of Issue and Custodian of the Nation's Reserves;
2-) The Bank of the Government;
3-) The Custodian of the Financial Institutions' Cash Reserves;
4-) The Bankers' Bank and Clearing Bank;
5-) The Lender of Last Resort;
6-) The Supervisor and Controller of Financial Institutions; and
7-) The Controller of Credit and Applicant of Monetary Policy.
6.2.1 The Bank of Issue and Custodian of the Nation's Reserves
The ICB may assume this function with little or no difference to
other central banks. For the general interest of the Ummah (nation) the
ICB should have the sole right of issue of the nation's currency so as
to attain not only uniformity in the state note circulation but effec-
tive elasticity to meet the legitimate currency requirements of busi-
ness and the general public and the effective supervision over a credit
instrument which had for the sake of convenience to be declared legal
tender money (De Kock 1974:22).
6.2.2 The Government Banker, Agent and Adviser
The ICB may also act as the government banker, adviser and agent.
It would manage the banking accounts of government departments, boards,
and enterprises, not only because it is more convenient and economical
but also "because of the intimate connection between public finance and
and monetary affairs. The state is, in every country the largest recei-
ver of revenue and its expenditure has come to play an increasingly im-
portant part in the economic life of the nation" (ibid:36). The turn-
over is huge and "because transfers of this magnitude might be embaras-
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sing to a commercial bank, it is a recognised principle of central ban-
king that the central bank should manage the government's accounts"
(Hanson 1978:52), so as to cushion the commercial banks against the im-
pact of large movements of cash originating in this way. However, the
ICB is not to lend money to the government at interest nor float inte-
rest bearing bonds, it can lend interest free or float PLS securities.
In providing the government with foreign exchange requirements, the ICB
would not deal or allow dealings 'on the forward' market. It would deal
and allow dealings only 'on the spot' market.
In its role as adviser to the government, the ICB should advice the
government with the best ways of achieving economic development, avoi-
ding inflation, establishing proper financial institutions that provide
finance that can finance not only the large sized industries but also
the small and medium enterprises in urban and rural areas.
6.2.3 The Custodian of the Financial Institutions' Cash Reserves
"The concentration of cash reserves in the central bank is", as
De Kock (1974:58) contended: "a source of great strength to the finan-
cial system at any time. Centralised cash reserves can at least, serve
as the basis of a larger and more elastic credit structure than if the
same amounts were scattered among the individual banks. It is obvious
that, when bank reserves are pooled in one institution which is more-
over, charged with the responsibility of safeguarding the national eco-
nomic interests, such reserves can be employed to the fullest extent
possible and in the most effective manner during periods of seasonal
strain and in financial crises or general emergencies". The obligation
imposed on IFIs to keep minimum cash reserves with the ICB gives the
latter a strong means with which it could operate and which, not only
strengthens its financial position, but also gives it some means of
control over the banking and credit situation.
6.2.4 The Bankers' Bank and Clearing Bank
It is more convenient and more advantageous for the financial ins-
titutions to entrust their surplus cash to the central bank just as it
is convenient and advantageous for individuals and companies to entrust
their surpluses to commercial banks and other financial institutions.
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This should be in addition to the minimum reserve requirements that
each financial institution must maintain with the central bank in order
to protect the interests of their depositors and the interests of the
nation. Likewise, the ICB would provide the IFIs with similar banking
facilities and act therefore as the bankers' bank.
6.2.5 The Lender of Last Resort
It is the responsibility of the central bank to protect banks that
have been honestly and competently managed from the consequences of a
sudden and unexpected demand for cash. In other words the central bank
should but rather must act as a lender of last resort to banks so as to
maintain the public confidence in the banking system and prevent its
collapse. To do this effectively it is necessary that the central bank
be permitted either to buy the assets of commercial banks or to make
advances against them (Encyclopedia Britannica 1974:Vo12:708). "In a
more recognisable terms the central bank must, as Sayers (1967:101) put
it: "lend without a stint in times of financial crises". The ICB should
be ready at any time to help any financial institution which might fail
temporarily to match its liabilities so as to give confidence not only
to depositors in current accounts but to investors as well. However in
doing so it must not charge any interest but may either give very short
interest free credits, buy some of the PLS securities held by the bank
concerned at a slightly lower price than their market price or requires
from it, after one or two warnings, to keep with it a larger future re-
serve for a certain time, as a penalty, until this latter settles or
until the ICB decides to waive the penalty.
6.2.6 Supervisor and Controller of Financial Institutions
"Given the importance of banks in modern financial systems and re-
cent experiences in the banking sector, therefore, effective supervi-
sion is clearly, as Gardener (1981:63) put it: "an attractive economic
good. Experience has shown that there are always a few operators who,
given the opportunity, will cross the barriers of prudent banking if
the rewards appear to be high enough. There has to be a higher
authority responsible for ensuring that such banks are kept in line to
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preserve the stability and safety of the entire system. That higher
authority must be the supervisory authorities (the central bank)".
The regulation of financial institutions is necessary and very es-
sential to ensure that banks are not only safe but seen as safe to help
preserve the overall financial stability of the economy and to provide
adequate 'consumer protection' to depositors; control the monetary sys-
tem; and finally, protect financial markets from being inherently un-
competitive (see Gardener and Molyneux 1989:35).
In order to minimise the risks of banks and other financial insti-
tutions' failures due to mismanagement or unscrupulous practices, the
ICB, like the other central banks all over the world, should have regu-
lar contact with the financial institutions by way of examination and
close supervision of their operations and have the power to inspect,
audit, control, advise, guide and impose penalties. Through regular
inspection and contact, the ICB can acquaint itself with the finance
and investment practices of the financial institutions and provide them
with advice and guidance on such matters as staffing, branch expansion,
investment, etc. and issue to them directives on all matters concerning
liquidity, capital adequacy, monetary policy, etc.. It will usually
consult them in all such matters, but if necessary such instructions
can be issued in the form of rules and regulations for their guidance.
6.2.7 Controller of Credit and Applicant of Monetary Policy
In view of its rather special position as the only bank with the
right of issue, the custodian of the nation's reserves and the holder
of the government and all financial institutions balances and reserve
requirements, the ICB should, with the cooperation of the government,
the treasury and the financial institutions be the principal controller
of credit and applicant of the monetary policy in the Islamic state. To
be in position to control credit, it must have an unchallengeable voice
in deciding the volume of credits to be available from time to time.
The ICB, like any other conventional central bank, should, as De
Kock (ibid:143-144) pointed out, aim at being able to assess approxi-
mately the extent to which bank credit is reasonable for a given eco-
nomic situation at any time as compared with the operations of non
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monetary factors since the relation between the two is very important
for the purpose of formulating the correct credit policy. Secondly, it
should aim at being able to determine the particular stage of the busi-
ness cycle at any time, with a view to deciding not only when to act
but what to do, how to do it and how far to go. Thirdly, it should try
to secure the active and continuous cooperation of all the financial
institutions for the more effective execution of its monetary policy...
Fourthly, owing to the much wider sphere of government operations under
modern conditions and the increased economic importance of the public
sector generally, the ICB would need the cooperation and support of the
government, because monetary policy has proved elsewhere to have only
limited scope as an instrument for the maintenance of general economic
stability and growth which has come to be widely accepted as the prin-
cipal objective of national economic policies. It needs to be supple-
mented by, and coordinated with fiscal measures designed to secure
appropriate adjustments in the level of public investment and current
expenditures as well as in the incidence of taxation on private invest-
ment and consumption. In short, it is no longer a question of what mo-
netary policy can achieve by itself but what it can do in conjunction
with fiscal policy. Fifthly, the ICB must always keep watchful eye on
the state of the country's balance of payment and monetary reserves, in
view of their internal and external implications. Finally, in line with
the objective of general economic stability, monetary and fiscal poli-
cies should not only be directed towards the maintenance of stable ex-
change rate, but also to the extent that these obligations can be re-
conciled with each other, towards the minimisation of fluctuations in
business activity and the general price level (ibid).
The principal methods or instruments, which have been devised and
employed, separately or collectively, by conventional central banks for
the control or adjustment of credit include, among others:
(1)The Discount Rate or Bank Rate Policy (BRP);
(2)The Variable Reserve Requirements (VRR);
(3)The Open Market Operations (0M0);
(4)The Credit Rationing Policy (CRP);
(5)The Selective Credit Control (SCC);
(6)The Moral Suasion Policy (ISP)
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The foregoing methods of credit control have come to be employed
in different combinations instead of one at a time, and have varied in
relative importance not only from time to time; but from country to
country depending on the prevailing international or internal condi-
tions and the current trend of monetary policy (De Kock (1974:126-127).
Some of these are in force continuously, others are imposed and with-
drawn at various times; some are mainly imposed to control the size of
the money supply; some are concerned with the allocation of credit bet-
ween different sectors of the economy. Although, the need for such
control is almost universally accepted, they should not be allowed to
impede competition or suppress innovation (CLCB 1978:67).
The choice of policy tools in an IFS would depend greatly on their
compatibility with Islamic Shariah, on the economic situation of the
country and on the policy objectives to be pursued. Five main objec-
tives seems to have gained wide recognition among Muslim economists.
These are: (1) Internal Stability, (2) Distributive justice, (3) Exter-
nal Equilibrium, (4) Allocative Efficiency and (5) Economic Growth.
The Discount Rate or Bank Rate Policy
The Discount Rate or Bank Rate Policy (BRP) represents one of the
oldest instruments of credit control. "The basic approach of using this
policy is", as Hawtrey (1962:273-274) pointed out: "not the level of
rate of interest but the degree of rise or fall in Bank Rate which mat-
ters. It is a change in Bank Rate, rather than continuance either of a
high rate or of a low rate which produces an effect. But the effect
produced may be either strictly limited, a temporary retardation or
modification of whatever movement in progress at the time, or it may be
encouraged. The starting point of a big new movement amplified by the
inherent instability of credit, the vicious circle of expansion or
contraction, whether the effect is to be large or small, depends often
on a psychological response. The rise or fall of Bank Rate is required
to counteract expectations". Uzair (1982:215, 216) commented that: "The
trouble with this approach is that it requires a .
 constant and conti-
nuous manipulation of Bank Rate. This may create problems of instabili-
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ty in the economic conditions of the country... The question about the
effectiveness of Bank Rate has occupied the attention of experts in
banking. Even in Britain where Bank Rate has been given a high impor-
tance opinion is divided... In certain situations a rise in Bank Rate
may not check the demand for credit but may affect the cost of produc-
tion, thus causing or aggravating 'cost push inflation'".
It is very important to note here, from the beginning, the absence
of this instrument in the IBS because Bank Rate or Discount Rate is the
rate of interest at which non Islamic central banks are prepared to
discount or more accurately rediscount first class bills to the non
Islamic banks in fulfilling their function of lender of last resort;
and because, as we have seen in chapter five above, all interest based
instruments are prohibited in Islam. M.N. Siddiqi (1983b:60) argued
that: "the ICB would continue to perform its conventional functions
even though it would lack the 'Bank Rate' as an instruments of policy",
and suggested the use of two complementary instruments as alternatives.
These, he called 'The Refinance Ratio' and 'The Lending Ratio'. The re-
finance ratio refers to the offer of the ICB to provide additional cash
to the financial institutions to the extent of a certain percentage of
the interest free loans granted by them. Raising or lowering this ratio
will have the effect of expanding or contracting the supply by the
commercial banks of short term credit. Prescribing different ratios in
respect of credit extended to different sectors of the economy can be a
means of channeling credit into desired directions... The Lending Ratio
refers to the percentage of demand deposits which the commercial banks
will be obliged to lend out as Interest Free loans. This instrument too
according to him, can be manipulated to affect the supply of credit.
Uzair (1978) suggested the control of the PLS ratios, between the
depositors and the bank and between the latter and the entrepreneurs as
instruments of monetary policy. Saqr (1978) thinks that these are a
matter between the bank and its customers and that it is not Islamic
for the ICB to intervene and unilaterally change contractually deter-
mined Profit-Sharing Ratios which must not be altered after acceptance
except by mutual consent of the parties to the contracts in question.
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Chapra (1978) also advises against interference in this regard as the
ICB can control credit in other ways. He prefers leaving the determina-
tion of these ratios to the market forces, on the ground of efficiency
and competition. I agree with Saqr and Chapra and I think, the ICB can,
instead, purchase equity securities, it chooses from the equity port-
folio of the bank needing cash, at a discount (say 1 or 2% or more or
less under their market prices) and pays in cash. This latter discount
is not similar to the discount rate used by IBCBs on bills because
bills are interest bearing securities and are not allowed in the IFS
and the purchase and sale of equities and PLS securities is allowed
whether their prices go up or down. Lowering or raising this discount
rate on PLS securities may in some way encourage or hinder the Ills to
approach the ICB for funds and to expand or contract credit.
Uzair (1982:214-5) also suggested that the ICB should hold 25% or
any other stipulated percentage of the capital stock of all the commer-
cial banks operating in the country. This will, according to him, have
several advantages: "(1) Since the central bank by virtue of its equity
share, will automatically get a part of the profits of the commercial
banks in the form of dividends, the need for interest payments to the
central bank from the commercial bank on the latter's borrowings from
the former will be obviated; (2) It will provide an additional lever to
the central bank in controlling and regulating the activities of the
commercial banks in the overall national interest. The nominees of the
central bank of the boards of directors of the commercial banks regard-
less of whether they are privately-owned or state-owned, will ensure
that the instructions of the central bank are complied with; (3) It
will give the central bank a stake in the success and healthy develop-
ment of the commercial banks. Such a close link between the central
bank and the commercial banks will prove to be all the more important
in fostering a healthy growth of the interest-free banking system as a
whole. If the commercial banks face any problem in the transition pe-
riod because of the new experiment it will be as oncern of
the central bank as that of commercial banks themselves". The danger,
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however, is that such equity participation may lead to the creation of
vested interests which may prevent the ICB from acting judiciously.
Open Market Operations
"In its wider sense, Open Market Operations (OMO) may be held" as
De Kock (1974:179) described: "to cover the purchase or sale by the
central bank in the market of any kind of (financial) paper in which it
deals, whether government securities or bankers' acceptances of foreign
bills". In an Islamic economy, where no interest and no interest bea-
ring securities are allowed, the ICB can also use OMO but by selling
and purchasing ordinary shares and PLS securities of government and of
first class financial, industrial and commercial institutions to con-
trol and stabilise their prices on one hand and to use them as monetary
policy weaponicy weapons in the right time at the other. The ICB shoul
case have an adequate supply of 'ammunition' in form of highly diversi-
fied marketable securities so as not to affect tremendously the prices
of the securities it involves in any one day. "Lack of ammunition as,
Basu (1974:100) pointed out: "obviously stands in the way of the cen-
tral bank's pursuing open market operations to their logical extent".
Basu (ibid) contended that: "The success of open market operations
depends primarily upon first, the existence of broad and well organised
money and capital markets and secondly, on the maintenance by financial
institutions of a relatively stable cash ratio. The absence of a wide
and active market for securities and the maintenance by the commercial
banks of an elastic cash ratio in several countries have caused such
operations to be practically of limited significance".
OMO have two impacts on the financial system. First, the immediate
effect of a purchase or sale of securities is to increase or decrease
the reserve base. However, there is always some questions as to whether
the central bank can buy or sell the amount of securities it desires.
But according to Cargill (1979:288) this is no problem because "the
central bank does not conduct open market operations to make profits
and will simply bid up the price on securities to a high enough level
to purchase the securities from either banks, stockholders or indivi-
duals by simply creating the funds to purchase the securities, by inc-
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reasing the reserve accounts of the banks involved in the transactions.
Likewise the central bank can sell any amount of securities it posses-
ses because it will continue to lower the price until the securities
are purchased. Second the effect of the central bank as a net purchaser
or seller of securities shifts the demand or supply function of securi-
ties in the open market and immediately affects security prices".
This is the normal tendency in the direction of the foregoing as-
symptions but deviation from it cannot be excluded. Firstly because the
quantity of money and the banks' cash reserves do not always increase
or decrease in proportion to the purchase or sale of securities by the
central bank as one or more counter forces might be operating simmIta-
neously. Secondly, banks do not always increase or decrease their loans
and investments in proportion to the increase or decrease in their cash
reserves. There are various circumstances of monetary, economic or po-
litical nature which might deter banks from employing increased cash
reserves fully if at all or from contracting credit when their reserves
were reduced. Thirdly, it is not just a case of banks refraining at
times from the full employment of their increased reserves but also one
of a lack of willing or deserving borrowers (De Kock ibid:183-184).
OMO, though a major instruments of monetary control in the hands of
central banks in the more mature and more sophisticated markets, are
not the kind of weapon that can be readily and quickly adapted to LDCs
where money and capital markets are immature or non-existent and where
savings are very small or negotiables securities are lacking. Besides,
even in some well DCs with very sophisticated money and capital markets
the scope of OMO might be limited at times by the simultaneous opera-
tions of various counterforces in respect, not only of the supply of
money and bank credit but also the demand therefrom. The question, as
De Kock (ibid) put it: "is whether and to what extent the central bank
could offset the effects of the counterforces concerned at any time by
suitably adjusting its open market operations, by purchasing or selling
securities in a greater or lesser measure than would otherwise have
been considered necessary. The primary problem of course, would be that
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of gauging accurately the extent and duration of all the actual or po-
tential disturbing factors, and this in turn would depend not only on
the experience and skill of the central bank in this field but also the
degree of complexity of the prevailing economic conditions and trends".
Variable Reserve Requirements (VTR)
The use, by central banks, of the VRR is perhaps the most powerful
tool, a central bank possess, because changes in VRR affect not only
excess reserves but also the deposit money creation multiplier of the
banking system (Binhammer 1968:125). This monetary instrument came to
be adopted by all DCs and LDCs. However, "the range of variation is",
as noticed by De Kock (1974:234-235): "not uniform but differ from one
country to another. In many countries this instrument was employed only
in the form of changes in cash reserve requirements and in some only in
respect of commercial banks, and both these factors tended to limit its
effectiveness as a restrictive measure". The primary purpose of the VRR
is to enable the central bank to exercise some degree of control over
banks especially when these have a volume of reserves far in excess of
legal requirements, which makes the other instruments ineffective. This
is a method of quantitative credit control that affects their reserves
directly as opposed to bank rate or OMO which affect them indirectly.
This instrument of VRR can also be used by the ICB in an Islamic
Economy so long as these reserves are kept with it on interest free or
PLS bases. The ICB may impose a certain minimum cash and liquid reserve
requirements equal to a certain percent of their deposits and designa-
ted non deposit liabilities and change it from time to time. The per-
cent requirements should vary with the kind of financial institution,
the deposits size and the type of deposit or source of funds. However,
this must be taken with great caution because as Horvitz (1969:298)
argued: "the large impact of 1/PR has some serious adverse side effects.
Many banks may find it difficult to adjust promptly to increased
reserve requirements. The bank that is fully loaned up will find it
necessary to sell sizeable amounts of securities in what are probably
depressed market. this can mean large capital losses and can put many
banks in a severe liquidity bind".
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Three more major criticisms have been levelled against the use of
VRR. It is clumsy; it is discriminatory in its effects; and it is inf-
lexible (Basu 1974:120). Perhaps that is why, as Horvitz (1969:299)
pointed out: "there are few situations in which use of this weapon is
called for. One such circumstances might be during wartime or other
national emergencies which require large government expenditures during
a period of full employment. An increase in reserves requirements could
immobilise the excess reserves that would otherwise be created by defi-
cit spending. The treasury could then borrow the needed funds from the
central bank, thus avoiding the dangers of postwar inflation that could
result from banks and others selling government bonds purchased during
the emergency". There is also a substantial measure of agreement that
the VRR can, as Basu (1974:119) noticed: "be appropriately pressed into
service when a country is experiencing large and sudden movements in
its gold and foreign exchange assets, especially as a result of specu-
lative international capital movements. The effects of large inflows
and outflows of foreign capital, it has been believed, can be counter-
acted more smoothly and effectively by changes in the required reserve
ratio rather than by other monetary measures".
Credit Rationing
Credit rationing is a direct control over the level of bank advan-
ces by requesting them from time to time to observe credit ceilings.
This may be used by the ICB, as an alternative or as a supplement to
other methods of credit controls. It consists of allocation of credit
quotas to the financial institutions, not arbitrarily but in relation
to their capital and reserves or to their proportionate share in the
resources of the central bank to curb excessive inflationary pressures
especially when other methods prove to be inadequate. It should be
discontinued in normal times and to be used only in times of war, real
crises or abnormal conditions, for it is a pernicious form of control,
incompatible with the function of Lender of Last Resort and rigid.
Selective credit controls (SCC)
The directional or selective control on bank advances •in the shape
of restrictions of credit to 'low priority' sectors of the economy and
148
its diversion to 'high priority' ones is sometimes used to encourage
neglected sectors of the economy like agriculture and industry and to
discourage sectors like trade and personal sector. SCC may take dif-
ferent forms. It may take the form of portfolio ceiling devices which
involve the setting of ceiling on loans to be made for specified purpo-
ses or to certain specific sectors. The ceiling may be specified either
in the form of percentages of loans and advances to be extended to dif-
ferent sectors or they may be stated in terms of the maximum aggregate
amount of loans allocable to the specified sectors. Another type of
portfolio-ceiling device, is the setting of incremental ceiling speci-
fying the maximum increases allowed for loans for various purposes.
Alternatively these may be put in the form of a requirement for
prior approval to be obtained from the central bank for loans to be
extended above specified levels or specified percentages to the diffe-
rent sectors. The central bank may also tie this policies to the dis-
count mechanism by charging preferential rates in rediscounting paper
originating from the sectors earmarked 'high priority' in order to
provide an added incentive for the banks to increase lending to these
favoured activities, and higher rates to 'low priority' areas. A third
way of imposing SCC is to link differential reserve requirements to the
composition of the financial institutions portfolios. Banks whose port-
folios comform to the requirement of certain prescribed percentages of
loans to the 'high priority' areas are allowed to maintain lower cash
or liquidity ratios than the normal ratio, which, of course will conti-
nue to be applied to the other financial institutions which do not meet
the credit requirements. The prescribed percentages and/or the associa-
ted cash or liquidity ratio may be changed as Central Bank's emphasis
shifts from one 'high priority' area to another. These instruments are
to be distinguished from the quantitative instruments in that their
impact is not on the total amount of credit but on the amount that is
put to use in a particular sector of the economy (0.E. Johnson 1974).
There is nothing to prevent the ICB from using this instrument when
necessary, except where interest is involved. The use of SCC in an IFS
would assign a distributive or allocative role to the central bank in
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cases where certain sectors that are vital for the overall national in-
terest do not receive due attention of the IFIs either because they are
more difficult to handle or because they are less lucrative than others
(Uzair 1982:218). The ICB may also use it to curb the IFIs from exten-
sive use of Murabahah, rarah or Bai Muajjal and to encourage them use
PLS methods of finance such as Musharakah, Mudharabah, Muzaraah, etc..
Moral Suasion Policy
Moral Suasion Policy is a qualitative instrument of monetary
policy that consists of persuading the financial institutions that it
is in their interest and in the interest of the nation as whole, that
they should follow the issued instructions and directives. In an IFS
moral suasion would play a significant role. The ICB would try to se-
cure the active and continuous cooperation of all IFIs for the more
effective execution of its monetary policy by developing closer rela-
tionships with them in order to persuade them that all financial insti-
tutions ultimately have a common interest in the maintenance of sound
credit conditions and thereby increase its potential power of moral
suasion over them whenever the occasion demands corrective action since
experience of central banking elsewhere shows that it cannot rely on
its legal powers and weapons at all times (De Kock 1974:143).
6.3 THE ISLAMIC COMMERCIAL BANES
The Islamic commercial banks, in fulfilling their services towards
their customers, are faced with four categories of services as follows:
A-) Services used by IBBs and prohibited by the Islamic Shariah;
B-) Services developed by IFIs to replace the prohibited ones;
C-) Services used by IBBs but doubtful or subject to controversy;
D-) Services used by IBBs but which are Islamically permissible.
A-) The banking services that are provided by the IBBs and which
are unacceptable from the Islamic point of view include:
1. All interest based financial claims;
2. Syndication, management or underwriting them;
3. Forward foreign exchange;
4. Discounting of interest based commercial papers;
5. Finance of interest based documentary credits;
6. factoring (buying of trade debt at discounts).
B-) The banking services that have been somewhat developed by
Muslim economists to comply with Islamic Shariah are concerned with the
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main banking services: collection of deposits and allocation of finance
or in other words with the intermediary function (see 5.2 above).
C-) The banking services provided by IBBs but which are doubtful
or controversial to Muslim scholars are, as reported by Attia (1985):
1. Fees for letters of guarantee: There is no controversy among
Muslim Jurists as to the permissibility of the issuing of letters of
guarantee or to the issuing charges that are not related to the amount
of the letter to cover the expenses to the banks. However, the question
arises as to the fees and commissions related to the amount of the
letter of Guarantee. The legal aspect behind this controversy is not
that the Letter of Guarantee is considered as finance and that these
fees are considered as interest, but the point is that according to
traditional Islamic Jurisprudence, the guarantee is classified under
the non lucrative contracts, and as such it is assumed to be rendered
as 'human service', free of charge.
2. Bonus on current and savings accounts: The predetermined yield
on any deposit or loan is pure interest, and prohibited by Islamic law,
whether it is on fixed term deposits, saving deposits or demand depo-
sits.. meanwhile it is allowed that the debtor, when paying back his
debt, gives the creditor a bonus whether expressed in increasing the
amount of the loan or any other privileges or services and this is even
recommended and expected from a pious debtor, provided that there is no
previous condition or undertaking in this respect. Such a decision, if
repeated and taken the form of a settled custom and is taken into con-
sideration by the depositors when depositing their funds will amount to
a prefixed condition or engagement considered as prohibited interest.
There is even a question of whether the services rendered by banks to
depositors of current accounts are to be considered as a kind of remu-
neration, and thus not allowed.
D-) Finally, the fourth category includes almost all the other
banking services not involving interest. These are, as Attia (1985:4)
pointed out: "in general, permissible under Islamic law, being pure
services for which a fee or commission is allowed".
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6.4 MANAGEMENT OF ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
An efficient management of a financial institution not only impro-
ves the mobilisation of savings but also allocates them to the produc-
tion needs of the society and realises good profits for the sharehol-
ders and depositors without falling in the pitfalls of liquidity or
solvency. Management of IFIs requires that the operations of the IFIs
are carried out Islamically (ie complying with Shariah) and effectively
through the use of management techniques such as: planning, organising,
coordinating, communicating, negotiating, controlling and decision ma-
king so as to attain maximum operating efficiency and profitability.
6.4.1 Planning the activities of an Islamic bank
Planning is perhaps the first very important thing to do in a pro-
cess of good management. It is, as described by Hayes (1980:76): "deci-
ding where we would like to be in the future and what and who may be
involved in our getting there. It involves setting a plan with long and
short range objectives, determining how to allocate resources in rela-
tion to the objectives, setting priorities, and assuring their fulfil-
ment by making available the necessary people, plant and materials".
Hayes (ibid:77) contends that: "planning is more complex than getting
from here to there. It is the basis for cost control, budgetary admi-
nistration, morale and productivity. In effect, any deficiency in these
areas points to a defect in planning."
There is no objection from the Islamic point of view concerning the
methods and techniques of planning so long that, in formulating the
objectives and determining the tools, the management would not be
involved in any prohibited transaction or injustice.
6.4.2 The Structure and Organisation of an Islamic Bank
Organising follows and supports planning. When the objectives have
been agreed upon and the policies determined, organisation must follow
to get things going on smoothly, efficiently and properly. Crosse and
Hempel (1980:36) contended that: "a commercial bank is much more than a
building. It is an organisation that combines human effort and finan-
cial resources to perform the banking function required by the community
it serves, and to earn an adequate return on its owners' investments".
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As Searle (1980:26) pointed out: "the particular organisational
structure which a commercial banking organisation adopts depends upon a
number of factors. Among these are the financial aspects of the decision
opportunities in the market place, competitive considerations, and legal
constraints related to the structure of the commercial banking system
as they apply to that particular banking organisation".
Hayes (ibid:78) says that: "Organising is bringing people together
in a way that most effectively and efficiently will achieve the objec-
tives". It involves the definition of jobs and determination of respon-
sibilities in writing. Far more importantly, however, as Hayes (ibid)
put it: "organising is bringing people with relationships where each
individual can find satisfaction in the job and yet all are united in a
common accomplishment.. The objective is the responsibility of the team
and to bring this about, participation is required". The organisation
of any institution aims at achieving the objectives and policies of
that institution. There is no objection in the Islamic Shariah as to
the organisation of a bank or any other institution.
As Mudawi (1984:3) contends: "there is no prototype organisational
set-up for an Islamic bank. Each Islamic bank should have the organisa-
tional shape and body which suits its environment, the laws of its coun-
try, the type of activity which dominates the economic scene and the
level of advancement it has attained. An Islamic bank could be establi-
shed, subject to regulatory approval, as a private company or a govern-
ment owned institution or it could even be a mixture of both". It may
take the form of a unit, branch or group bank, joint-holding company,
or merge with another bank, etc.. It may also be involved in interna-
tional banking through various organisational units such as representa-
tive offices, agencies, branches, subsidiaries, affiliates, etc..
Whatever form an Islamic bank takes, it has to have certain traditional
organs. These organs may comprise a General Assembly in which the
powers of ownership are vested, and a Board of Directors who are final-
ly responsible to the supreme organisation of its owners. As such the
organisational characteristics of an Islamic bank are:
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Shareholders: The shareholders of any institution are the real
owners of that company. It is they who choose the Board of Directors
and agree or reject the overall policies of the institution. And it is
they who bear the fortunes and misfortunes of the institutions. Crosse
and Hempel (1980:49) pointed out that: "part of a bank's special
character is related to the distribution of its stocks. A bank's stock
may be closely held by a single individual or a relatively small group,
or it can be widely distributed in the community".
Investment Deposits Holders: Unlike in conventional banks where
depositors have a debtor/creditor relationship, receive predetermined
interest returns that have no relation whatsoever with the profits and
losses of the bank and have precedence over shareholders in case of a
liquidation, the holders of investment deposits and PLS certificates in
Islamic banks are like shareholders, share in the fortune and misfor-
tune of the Islamic bank in proportion to their investment deposits and
have no precedence over the shareholders in case of liquidation. In
other words they also have the right of ownership in the bank. The only
difference perhaps is that their deposits have maturities while those
of shareholders have not. Thus, I think depositors of this sort with
investment deposits maturing say after a year or more from the time of
the the annual general meetings of shareholders should have the right
to be represented albeit with less powers than the shareholders, of
course in view of the difference in commitment.
Board of Directors: As Reed et al. (1980:64) pointed out: "Stock-
holders, depositors, and regulatory authorities look to directors for
policy decisions and management ability that will result in the safety
of funds and profitable operations". Depending on the banking act of
the country and on the size of the institution, the Board of Directors
of an Islamic Bank may be determined by the stockholders' general
meeting. Each director may be required to directly own some shares in
the institution he is involved with. The Board of Directors plays the
role of agent towards the shareholders and represents the top echelon
of authority. It should be responsible for the performance of the
institution by selecting competent executive officers, effectively
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supervising the bank's affairs, adopting and following sound policies
and objectives and avoiding self-serving practices (ibid).
Probably the most important functions of the Board of Directors of
an Islamic Bank, are the establishment of its objectives, the determi-
nation of policies and the supervision of the activities. The powers,
duties, responsibilities and liabilities of the Board of Directors are
determined by a combination of statutory law, common law, articles of
association, bylaws and custom, subject of course to Islamic Shariah.
The objectives can and should be set with respect to public relations,
personnel training and development, and community progress and the
development of policies is necessary in planning a course of action.
Religious Supervisory Board: Because for the present time Muslim
bankers have little or no knowledge about the Shariah laws there are
nowadays religious supervisory boards supervising and controlling the
activities of the Islamic banks to make sure that the contracts agreed
upon between the bank and its customers comply with the Shariah.
However, in the future when Muslim bankers would be educated not only
in the conventional banking studies but also in Shariah, this exclusive
feature of religious supervisory boards should disappear.
Different Departments: For an effective and efficient management
of an Islamic bank, it is perhaps very important that the tasks and
responsibilities of the personnel are well defined and coordinated. A
Typical Islamic bank could have an Investment Department, a follow up
Department, A Legal department, A Recruitment and Training Department,
A social Department, etc. (see Presley 1988a:64-5).
6.4.3 Profitability Management
Islamic commercial banks, like other commercial banks, are profit-
maximizing businesses subject of course to the Shariah and other const-
raints. They can increase their profits by investing more of their as-
set portfolio in higher yielding but more risky investments. However
higher bank profits must not be achieved at the expense of bank safety.
Thus, the central problem for bank management is reconciling the conf-
licting bank goals of solvency and liquidity, on one hand, and profita-
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bility on the other or what is known as the 'banking dilemma' because
the trade-off between profitability and safety is more acute for banks
than for most other businesses (see Kidwell and Peterson 1980:188).
Bank earnings, as Crosse and Hempel (1980:102) pointed out: "are
the foundation upon which rest the two main pillars of banking strength
adequacy of capital and competence of management... Thus, earning power
proved to be the first line of defence against the risks inherent in
banking". In an IBBS, bank earnings, as Crosse and Hempel (ibid) put
it: "provide the return on capital investment in banks. It is for the
sake of this return on his or her investment that the stockholder is
willing to supply the capital that enables a bank to engage in the ris-
ky business of creating credit, and it is by retaining assets generated
by earnings that the major portion of bank capital has been accumula-
ted". Gross income of IBBs is determined by the rate of return on loans
and investments, by the level of various fees and charges imposed for
the performance of services, and by the size and composition of assets.
Although service fees have increased and will probably do so in the fu-
ture, interest on earnings assets, from loans and investments provides
almost 90% of IBB's income (Reed et al. 1980:184).
The profitability of IFIs depends greatly on the realised profits
and losses of their project investments which they finance, the rota-
tion of their financial resources and the termination or completion of
the operations. A large part of an IFI income would be in form of Juala
(fees or commissions) and profits from Murabahah, Bai Muajjal, Bai Bit-
Taqseet, Ijarah and Ijarah Waqtina' but not from interest. With a good
capable management, IFI would be very much profitable except, perhaps
in times of recession or mismanagement. The existing Islamic banks have
proved this since most if not all of them realised substantial profits
from their first year of business (see chapters 8-11 below) despite the
fact that, like any other corporation, they had substantial amounts of
establishment and overheads costs in their first years of business.
One of the principle byproducts of an analysis of revenue and ex-
pense is a budget that involves forecasting revenues, expenses and the
resulting profits on savings. The IFI should follow this practice and
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look for ways of increasing the earnings of the bank because the ear-
ning of an IFI do not go only to its shareholders but investment depo-
sitors also have their share in them. Unless an Islamic bank makes good
profits, depositors will not approach it because their return depend
directly on the profits realised by it.
6.4.4 Capital Adequacy Management
As Crosse and Hempel (1980:67) contended: "the ultimate strength of
a bank lies in its capital funds. Such is the consensus of writers on
banking and bank supervisors. But the problem of bank capital is not
quite that simple. It is not merely a question of the more capital the
better; rather, it is how much capital for what reasons or purposes".
Reed et al. (1980:158) pointed out that: "the effective management of
capital funds may enhance the profitability of a bank while maintaining
the traditional and necessary function of safety for depositors".
Capital adequacy is so important for banks because banks normally
have a very high degree of financial leverage than do most other busi-
nesses, which means that the majority of their assets (around 90%) are
financed by debt (the funds of the depositors). This state of affairs
demands that capital must be adequate to maintain the confidence of the
depositors who otherwise would be worried over the safety of their de-
posits and would withdraw them in fear that the bank may not be able to
meet its obligations. Capital adequacy is also important for a bank to
meet the regulations drawn by bank supervisors who decide how much ca-
pital is adequate and who have to make sure that the public confidence
is maintained not only as far as a certain bank is concerned but for
the banking system as a whole. Perhaps, that is why, banks are the most
strictly supervised and regulated businesses all over the world. As
Lachab (1987:8) pointed out: "This function of capital depends on its
ability to maintain confidence in the banking system rather than its
ability to pay off bank creditors under crisis situation. After all, no
level of capital is sufficient, except 100 percent to absorb all bank
losses. The emphasis on the capital ratios by the regulatory authori-
ties can also be seen as a mean of controlling bank's rapid growth".
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As in the case of IBBS the ultimate strength of an Islamic bank
lies in its capital funds and so it must maintain the level of capital
adequacy required by the supervisory authorities. But it is very impor-
tant to note here as Reed et al. (1980:172) pointed out that: "although
a ratio may be helpful as a starting point in analysing the capital
adequacy of an individual bank, it should not be considered an end in
itself. A bank does not have adequate capital just because it meets
some statistical average, nor it is beyond criticism just because it
meets some ratio... The inquiry must go beyond the ratio to an examina-
tion of the bank's operations and the risks it assumes in its loan and
investment portfolio". Thus a number of factors such as the liquidity
of assets, the volatility of deposits, the structure of deposits, the
history of earnings, the quality of management, etc., must be taken
into consideration when assessing the adequacy of capital of a bank.
It is perhaps also very important to note that an Islamic bank can
raise its capital only through ordinary shares, retained profits and
reserves. No preferred stock or subordinated capital debt involving in-
terest are allowed in Islam or used by Islamic banks. However, invest-
ment deposits and other PLS instruments should not be considered as
debts when calculating the capital adequacy ratios of Islamic banks but
as part of the cover of debt because their holders are not debtors to-
wards the Islamic banks but, as argued above, partners who have tempo-
ray ownership in the assets of the banks. Investment depositors, like
the shareholders, share in the profits and losses of the bank and in
times of crisis they should help the bank maintain the confidence of
other depositors rather than withdraw their deposits if they are not to
lose, because withdrawing their deposits does not exempt them from the
liabilities of the banks since they have to bear part of the ultimate
loss in case a loss occurs in proportion of their deposits in the total
funds (capital and reserves plus investment deposits) and that, what
makes them different from time depositors in IBBs. Furthermore, the
Islamic bank should not allow investment depositors to withdraw their
deposits before maturity, first because they have a contract to fulfil
and secondly, it is in their own interest. However, current and saving
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account depositors who do not share in the bank's result have the prio-
rity over investment depositors and their deposits must be guaranteed
not only by the capital and reserves of the bank but with investment
deposits as well. This means that the real leverage of Islamic banks is
very low and their capital ratios are very high especially if investment
deposits are considered as part of the capital and not as part of the
debts as in the following formula:
K&R + ID
Capital Ratio -
DD + SD
Where: K&R = Capital and Reserves; ID = Investment Deposits;
DD = Demand Deposits;
	 SD = Savings Deposits.
6.4.5 Liquidity and Balance Sheet Management
The problem of liquidity for commercial banks is essentially that
of having available at all times sufficient funds to meet demands for
deposit withdrawals and contingencies. "Throughout the history of ban-
king", as Revell (1975:13) noticed: "there hame been maru dnan!;es in
the sources of liquidity, and these changes have been associated with
the growth and adaptation of money markets and the forms of bank len-
ding... The theory of liquidity has therefore been an operational one..
The theory has thus changed as practice has changed".
(1) The commercial loan theory or the Real Bills Doctrine, as it
was also called is perhaps the oldest theory of solving the liquidity
problem. It states that commercial banks should grant only short-term,
'self-liquidating' loans. There is, of course, no such thing as 'self-
liquidating' loan especially when there is a slump in trade (Revell
1975:13-4). Banks used to adopt this method because there were not many
ways of finding liquidity as are available today. The Islamic banks, in
their present situation where they cannot use the interbank market and
where they have no lender of last resort or a secondary market for
their assets, could use this method but not in its original form
because an Islamic bank does not give commercial loans, it provide
finance on Murabahah which is somewhat a self-liquidating or on PLS
basis where they share in the fortunes and misfortunes of the busines-
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ses financed after they make sure that they are viable or say 'self-
liquidating' to some extent. However, when things improve, they do not
need to stick to this method, they could follow one or more of the
other ways of solving the 'dilemma'.
(2) The shiftability theory emerged in the 1930s as a new theory
replacing the old commercial loan theory. It states that banking liqui-
dity depends upon the ability of the bank to sell or shift its assets
to others at a predictable price. "The doctrine of shiftability is", as
Revell (ibid) argued: "subject to the same fallacy as 'the real bill'
doctrine, that of assuming that liquidity for individual banks and for
the banking system are identical. The fact is that no assets are liquid
when all banks are simultaneously trying to 'shift' them". Individual
Islamic Banks may also use this method when not all banks are doing the
same, if they have a portfolio of negotiable PLS financial instruments
and there is quite a good secondary market for them.
(3) The anticipated income theory emerged in the 1940s as a new
way of assuring liquidity for banks. It expanded the menu of bank loans
from short term loans to longer term loans and non business loans. It
reasons that bank loans are paid off out of the future earnings of the
borrower, from anticipated income and so it focuses on the borrower's
ability to successfully repay a loan in stages over a period of time.
The critical factor in the decision to grant a loan is the borrower's
ability to repay the loan out of his future earnings. (Kidwell and
Peterson 1980:192,193). When Islamic banks offer finance on the basis
of the PLS system which relates their returns to the anticipated income
of the customer, one can say that they use this technique.
(4) Asset Management: Asset Management is the term used to desc-
ribe the allocation of funds among cash, security investment, loans and
other assets so as to achieve the highest rate of return for the level
of risk assumed within the liquidity and regulatory constraints.
According to Reed et al. (1980:96), three different approaches to asset
management have been espoused in attempts to resolve the liquidity-
profitability dilemma. Each differs in its emphasis on the form of the
management process and in the degree to which quantitative analysis is
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employed in evaluating the alternatives available. No one approach can
be considered a panacea for bank management because problems and defi-
ciencies are associated with each. These are:
(a) The Pool-of Fund Approach which is the simplest to administer
and whose basic idea is that all funds should be pooled together and
then allocated to whatever asset investment is appropriate.
(b) The Asset Allocation Approach or Conversion of Funds Approach
which was developed to meet the deficiency of The Pool of-Fund Approach
which failed to distinguish among the different liquidity requirements
of demand deposits, savings deposits, time deposits and capital funds.
Under this method and as Baker (1978) described: "liabilities are cate-
gorised according to their volatility and then allocated to assets that
share the same volatility characteristics. Volatility is assumed to be
a function of deposit size as well as type... Determination of deposit
volatility by category may be made either intuitively or through the
use of statistical inference techniques".
(c)The Management-Science Approach which involves the application
of computer-aided analysis and use sophisticated models and advanced
mathematical techniques such as linear programming to analyse the comp-
lex interrelationships among various components of the balance sheet
and income statement and which can provide powerful aids to management
in the decision making. The models prescribe how a bank's management
should allocate whatever funds are available for investment to provide
adequate profitability while operating within the liquidity constraints
imposed by management (from within) or by regulatory authorities (from
without). The manipulation of these models may be of great assistance
to bank management in realizing increased profitability from bank ope-
rations. The scientific method for the solution of problems involved,
requires a statement of objectives, identification of the relationships
among various elements of the problem, identification of variable ele-
ments that are, and are not under the control of management, an esti-
mate of the way non controlled variables may behave, and identification
of constraints imposed on the behaviour of management (from within or
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without). The method attempts to answers three questions: What is the
problem? What are the alternative solutions? Which alternative is best?
(see Reed et al. 1980:chapter 5).
(5) Liability Management: Prior to the 1960s it was believed that
bank's liquidity comes almost entirely from the asset side of its ba-
lance sheet and that the only other source of liquidity is the central
bank when it is approached as the lender of last resort but because
this latter source was available only in cases of emergency, the banks
used to assume that their liabilities as given and start from there to
allocate them among their assets. The 1960s marked the beginning of a
new era in bank liquidity practices (Kidwell and Peterson 1981:195).
Liability Management has come to be known as the activities invol-
ved in supplementing liquidity needs by actively seeking borrowed funds
when needed. It enables a bank to aggressively expand its lending acti-
vities through increased leverage. The liquidity gained may be used to
smooth out deposit inflows and outflows and reduce their variability.
It may also be used to meet increases in loan demand by the bank's cus-
tomers as long as the expected marginal return of the new loans exceeds
the expected marginal cost of funds (see Reed et al. 1980:25 and
Kidwell and Peterson 1981:196). The Islamic bank when using this method
must of course avoid interest based liabilities.
(6) Balance Sheet Management: Kidwell and Peterson (ibid) repor-
ted that: "Beginning with the rise of liability management in the
1960s, it became apparent that decisions about the composition of a
bank's assets and liabilities were no longer independent. Balance Sheet
Management gives explicit recognition that the decisions about a bank's
asset and liability holdings are highly interrelated and that the en-
tire balance sheet of the bank should be regarded as the portfolio for
which financial planning is undertaken". This type of analysis is ext-
reuely complicated, requiring the use of computers and the construction
of financial models of bank operations employing linear programming and
other mathematical techniques that need to be solved simultaneously.
The result should give an optimal solution providing the bank's mana-
gement with actual numbers for how much to invest and in what assets.
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6.4.6 Risk management in Islamic banks:
All business operations involve risk. As Revell (1975:80)
contends: "It is not only insurance companies that have a portfolio of
risk but also all credit institutions and all financial institutions".
In fact as Crosse and Hempel (1980:59) contend: "taking risks can
almost be said to be the business of bank management. A bank that is
run on the principle of avoiding all risks, or as many of them as
possible, will be a stagnant institution and will not adequately serve
the legitimate credit needs of its community. On the other hand, a bank
that takes excessive risks or, what is more likely takes them without
recognising their extent or even their existence will surely run into
difficulties". IFIs are no exception, in fact it is argued that since
Islamic banks would be more involved in direct and indirect businesses,
and not charging predetermined interest but share in the profits and
losses of their customers to whom they give finance, their portfolio of
risk is greater than their counterparts (the IBBs). Here, we shall look
into this claim and see how IFIs could hedge against these risks.
The first most important step in the risk management approach is to
identify all possible risk exposures, so as to be able to evaluate them
and hedge against them. Perhaps one of the most useful and comprehen-
sive classification of the specific types of risks peculiar to the ope-
rations of IBBs is the one given by Revell (1975:82) and produced below:
Types of risks
1.Credit
2.Investment
3.Liquidity
4.Earning
5.Operating
6.Insured
Sources of risks
Default or delay in fulfilment of obligations
Changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates and
assets's prices
Faulty balance sheet structure, changes in assets prices
Changes in interest rates, asset prices and operating
expenses
Operating errors, inefficiency, faulty control procedure
Excess on insurance policies, risks not covered
All of the types of risk mentioned above together with fraud and
fiduciary risks, which are omitted as these can be insured against, may
be present in an IFI, however the sources would be somewhat different.
For instance the IFI will not be subject to risks from changes in inte-
rest rates since they do not deal in interest bearing instruments but
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will be subject instead to risks originating from sharing the losses of
unsuccessful PLS investments.
The most obvious risk in banking, as Crosse and Hempel (1980:60)
remarked is the credit risk -the possibility that loans will not be re-
paid or that investments will deteriorate in quality or go in default
with consequent loss to the bank. Although IFIs do not deal with inte-
rest securities and all their assets with the exception of premises,
plant and equipment are subject to credit risk, nevertheless their risk
exposure would, I believe, be less than IBBs for the following reasons:
(1) The IFI does not give loan advances (credits) except in very limi-
ted circumstances and although these are interest-free they are secured
by pledges. (2) The IFI gives PLS finance or buys goods and then sells
or leases them to its customers. If the finance is in the form of Mura-
bahah (Mark-up sale), Bai Muaijal (Sale at deferred payment), Bai Bit-
Taqseet (sale by instalments), Farah (leasing) and rarah Waqtina' 
(hire-purchase), then the finance is guaranteed by the fact that the
ownership of the good involved remains with it until full payment is
received. If, on the other hand the finance is in the form of a PLS
contract as in Musharakah, Mudharabah, Muzaraah and Musaqah projects,
the IFI does not give any of these until it makes sure not only that
the customer is credit-worthy but that the project financed is itself
viable and profitable or 'self-liquidating' and have the right of
follow up and intervention whenever necessary and able to prevent a
loss to the project. This does not say that the IFI will be protected
all along but only to say that the risk of not recovering all or part
of their finance would perhaps be minimal as compared to IBBs' credit
risks, unless the partner it gives finance too turn to be a crook who
fraudulently uses the finance in a different venture without the bank
knowledge or the IFI turns a blind eye on him, which is unlikely.
Perhaps investment and earning risks are the most obvious in Isla-
mic banking and not credit risk, and that is why it is claimed that Is-
lamic banks are more risky than IBBs. This may be true when the bulk of
the Islamic bank's finance is in the form of PLS projects, but if the
bulk of its finance is in the form of a Murabahah, Bai Muajjal, Bai' 
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Bit-Taaseet, I'arah or I'arah Waqtina' then, the risk would perhaps be
lower. Hedging against the risk of PLS investments could be done
through appropriate diversification, intimate knowledge of the
partners, accurate feasibility studies of the PLS projects and follow
up with intervention when necessary to stop the erosion of the assets'
values. This may prove to be expensive and difficult to implement, but
if followed, may benefit the bank greatly.
As far as the other risks are concerned, The IFIs would be subject
to these risks just as IBBs are, except those emanating from the vola-
tility of interest which is not present in the IFS. To protect itself,
from the liquidity risk for example, the IFI should maintain adequate
liquidity in the form of assets readily convertible into cash at a mi-
nimum risk of loss, manage itself properly and assure itself of its
ability to get needed funds in the market. And to protect or say reduce
the risk of fraud, theft and other risks, the IFI should have adequate
internal and external controls, safeguards, audits and insurance.
6.5 CONCLUSION
The IBS is an equity rather than debt based system and the rela-
tionship between an IFI and its customers is of partnership rather than
of debtor/creditor. It can work without recourse to interest. In other
words, interest in not a necessary component of banking, as it used to
be held. There are a number of instruments, such as Mudharabah, Musha -
rakah Muzaraah, Musaciah. Murabahah, Juala, Ijaratt, Bair WmAiaL, Bair
Bit-Taqseet, etc., that can be used to mobilise savings or invest them
without transgressing the Divine law against interest. Not only that
but even monetary policy could be implemented without recourse to inte-
rest. The ICB and the IFIs can design and adopt any variety of banking
and monetary techniques according to the needs of the circumstances and
depending on the level and stage of the development of the IFS as long
as they do not transgress Allah's Shariah. Thus, the absence of inte-
rest does not reduce the scope of banking generally nor of monetary po-
licy in particular. This may prove to be hard to achieve and requires
more manpower and capital than IBBS, but that is where the test lies.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF INTEREST AND PIS BASED FINANCE
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Most assuredly the changeover, from an Interest Based Financial
System to an Islamic one, based on PLS system of finance would have far
reaching socio-economic implications on the different social and econo-
mic aspects of the society. However the switchover is not easy and can-
not come overnight or in a very short time. To be successfully applied,
it must be implemented gradually in an Islamic society that applies Is-
lamic Shariah in all its aspects and where the people must be willing
to apply it because nothing succeeds if it forced on the people or the
people do not know much about it, because, as Presley (1988b:8) put it:
"It may be counter-productive in trying to proceed too quickly in the
evolution of Islamic banking without thinking through the practical
implications of the theory and the need to re-educating the Islamic
population in the ideal conduct of their economic and social life".
Thus, for the Islamic system to be successfully implemented, the people
should know about it and should prefer it over other systems. In other
words, a change of hearts is necessary. This is confirmed by Allah when
He said: "Allah will not change the condition of a people until they
change what is in their souls" (Koran 13:11). This change does not come
suddenly but requires education, persuasion, conviction and reminding.
There are several criteria for judging the appropriateness of a
financial system, or its implications, but for the purpose of this ana-
lysis five have been singled out as especially important. These are:
(1) Mobilisation of Savings; (2) Promotion of Entrepreneurship, Invest-
ment and Employment; (3) Financial Stability; (4) Social Justice; and
(5) LDCs' Debt Problem. Although, it is not possible to say very much,
at this stage about the implications that the introduction of the PLS
system would have on these economic aspects, as these various issues
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will clearly require further research and concerted efforts at both the
theoretical and empirical levels and as there is no complete and mature
IFS that applies PLS system extensively anywhere in the world, to use
its data for empirically testing and comparing the hypotheses presented
in this chapter, it is still possible to draw certain policy implica-
tions from this study that relate to the practice of the PLS system in
contrast to the interest based system, the purpose of this chapter.
7.2 MOBILISATION OF SAVINGS
As Iqbal and Mirakhor (1987:5) reported: "Concerns have been ex-
pressed that the adoption of an Islamic Financial system may lead to a
reduction of savings and a retardation of financial intermediation and
development". Pryor (1985), for example, is one %Ito is c§Aaite sjAnticzI
about the feasibility of such a system. "The few studies that `nave con-
sidered the question have tended to compare the effects on savings of a
fixed and certain rate of return with those of an uncertain rate of re-
turn, implicitly assuming the same mean rate of return with greater va-
riability. The result, obviously shows a reduction in saving. The conc-
lusion, however, is far from obvious when both risk and return are al-
lowed to vary... Other studies have shown that under reasonable assump-
tions, in the face of uncertainty, households will increase their sa-
ving as a precaution (see for example Leland 1968). Theoretical analy-
sis has not, therefore, provided a clear cut testable hypothesis in
this regard, and it becomes an empirical question whether saving will
increase or decrease in an Islamic system" (Iqbal and Mirakhor, ibid).
It can however be reasonably expected, as Hahn (1970:24) remarked that:
"a rational planner may make more provision for the future when the
future becomes more uncertain". In a recent theoretical study in which
variations in riskiness, as well as in the rate of return are taken
into account, Ul -Hague and Mirakhor (1986b) concluded that: "there is
no strong theoretical reason to believe that on balance savings will
decline as a result of introducing an Islamic economic system" .
A number of theories have been advocated to explain the relation-
ship between savings and other variables and a number of variables have
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been promulgated as affecting the volume of personal savings, viz., the
rate of saving as a function of income, income distribution, rate of
interest, the presence of financial institutions which provide for sa-
vings, the existence of incentive and opportunities for social advance-
ment, etc. (see Wai 1972 and Beheiry 1980).
As seen in chapter two above, there are three different, but not
mutually exclusive, ways of achieving this objective (mobilisation of
savings). One of these ways is the fiscal approach whereby the govern-
ment uses taxation to acquire savings and then channel them to invest-
ment; the second way is to rely on financial institutions of one sort
or another, which issue their own liabilities to the public to transfer
resources for investment and the third way is to channel savings direc-
tly from surplus economic units to deficit economic units by having the
latter issue medium and long term instruments, such as bonds, shares,
and debentures to savers. The first one is never popular, it is clumsy,
costly, and sometimes involves bureaucracy, corruption, disputes, etc..
The second one is the most popular and easy to implement, however, the
way, the financial systems operate, differs from one country to another
and affect the behaviour of economic units of the economy especially
the personal sector which contributes the most to the success of the
system. The third way, "usually requires", as Khatkhate and Riechel
(1980:494) pointed out: "both underwriting to facilitate the original
issue and the emergence of a market for secondary trading to enhance
the liquidity of these longer term instruments to make them more at-
tractive to savers". It is the last two ways that are most important
in the development of financial systems.
Prior to the recent re-emergence of Islamic economics, the possible
impact of the interest rates on the volume of saving mobilisation for-
med one of the most controversial issues between the Classical econo-
mists and the Keynesians. The classical theory considered saving as a
function of the rate of interest. Since interest is paid to the saver
for abstaining from consumption, saving should increase with a rise in
the interest rate and decrease with a fall in the interest rate. On the
other hand interest is a cost of investment, therefore, investment is a
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negative function of interest. The equilibrium rate of interest is de-
picted by the intersection of the saving and investment functions. It
is always assumed that both saving and investment are sufficiently
interest-elastic to permit adjustment toward a new equilibrium, should
the rate of interest change. Therefore the interest rate has, according
to them, a positive and direct effect on the volume of savings.
The Keynesian school, on the other hand, advocated the idea that
the volume of savings is chiefly determined by the income level from
which the savings originated and not by the level of interest, thus, a
direct impact of the interest rate on the overall savings volume was
rejected; moreover, it was accepted that interest produced a certatm
indirect but negative effect through its impact on investment and hence
on income (See Keynes 1936; Panhuyzen 1975; Kahf 1982 and Gupta 1984).
Wai (1972), however, argued that the reality cannot be explained by
a single theory because people behave differently under different cir-
cumstances. In his attempt to incorporate all relevant variables in
past theories, he contended that: "the decision to save by each unit in
an economy is influenced by the Ability, the Willingness and the Oppor-
tunity to do so. Thus each unit's savings may be regarded as a function
of three factors. For the economy as a whole it would be the sum of the
individual units' savings less whatever duplication occurs and whatever
reductions would take place between ex-ante and ex-post savings due to
changes in total income a la Keynes or to other sociological factors".
Thus, we have:
	 S = o(A,W,O)	 (1)
where: S = Savings, A = Ability, W = Willingness and 0 = Opportunity.
Each of these economic independent variables is a function of
economic and non economic variables. Ability (A), for example, depends
on income (Y), structure of population or dependency (N) and wealth (K).
A = a(Y,N,K)	 (2)
Willingness (W), depends on inducement through interest rates (i);
the stage of life of the individual (L) and on cultural factor (C).
W = B(i,L,C,..)
	 (3)
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Finally the Opportunity (0) principle is related to the question
of financial intermediation (F) available to the saving unit or possi-
bility of using self finance (Ir), thus:
0 = k(F,Ir,..)	 (4)
o, a, B, k are functional notations.
If the functions and the changes in savings in these variables
could be specified, then the changes in savings could be determined
during future plans. The ex-post savings of the household sector as a
whole may be limited by any of the three factors A, W, or 0 and any one
can be the constraining factor.
Concerning the effect of interest on savings, many empirical stu-
dies have shown that savings is not positively correlated to interest
rates in all times and across countries (see Williamson 1968; Wai 1972;
Panhuyzen 1983; Gupta 1984 and chapter two above). Panhuyzen (1983:15),
for instance, concluded his empirical study on the measuring of the in-
terest elasticity of the overall Belgian savings volume between 1952
and 1969 by stating that:
It strikes one immediately that all interest elasticities take
a negative value. This does not fit with the opinion of those
who argue that the interest rate is an incentive to saving and
that this incentive grows stronger as the interest rate is
raised. It appears now that a rise in the interest rate causes
on the contrary, a certain shrinking of the overall savings
volume and vice-versa. This may seem odd at first sight; on
closer examination, however, this negative interest elasticity
is far from being illogical.
Similar results were also found in my empirical study in chapter
two above which regressed and correlated the real rates of interest
with the volume of savings in 18 Muslim and non Muslim, Developed and
Less Developed Countries. "Theoretically this means that the classical
vision on this subject is rejected by applying the macromodel as well
as by utilising the regression analysis... From a practical viewpoint
the foregoing implies that an interest policy is not an efficient means
of manipulating the saving behaviour of the population" (ibid:25).
However even if savings were interest sensitive in some countries, this
does not necessarily mean that this is a universal law that works at
all times in all countries. In fact as the comparative empirical study,
in chapter 2 above, shows, the relationship between interest and sa-
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vings is less powerful in some countries than in others but still it is
even less powerful in Islamic countries. Thus, the elimination of inte-
rest from the financial and banking system of an Islamic country and
its replacement by the Islamically legitimate PLS system of finance
would not adversely affect the saving of the economy. On the contrary
it may increase it because it would attract the savings of those people
who were reluctant to deposit their savings with banks because of the
existence of interest. This can be seen from the performance of some of
the Islamic banks, which are operating in many parts of the world (see
chapters 8-11 below). This is not to suggest that PLS system is a bet-
ter system to mobilise savings anywhere. What it suggests is that PLS
system is perhaps more appropriate in societies where interest is loo-
ked upon as an evil not to be touched. As for its effect in increasing
or decreasing the level of saving in an economy, this may be no diffe-
rent from interest as the level of savings depends on a number of other
factors as we saw above.
7.3 ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INVESTMENT AND EMPLOYMENT
The promotion of entrepreneurship is another desideratum that the
LDCs generally and Islamic countries particularly must strive to pro-
vide if they are to achieve any real progress. The IBBs, being interes-
ted merely with securing the principal of their loans together with
interest, militate against indigenous entrepreneurs, and particularly
new ones (Khatkhate and Riechel 1980:507), who have no collateral to
secure the finance they need even though they may be very enthusiastic,
keen, clever, expert, and hardworker. Criticising the role of IBBs in
this respect, M.N. Siddiqi (1983b:88) wrote:
The entrepreneur's obligation to repay the borrowed capital as
well as a predetermined rate of interest to the bank severely
constrains his willingness to take risk. No project can be
taken up unless the expected profits are sufficiently high to
cover the risk of loss, assure a return equal to the rate of
interest, plus yield a surplus to the entrepreneur himself at
least equal to his alternative earnings on the labour market.
In LDCs where finance is interest based, "entrepreneurs are", as
Khatkhate and Riechel (1980:507) put it: "impelled to choose only those
investment projects that can yield a certain, albeit moderate return, a
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return that would not fall below what is considered to be a 'critical
income level'. A further problem facing the new and small entrepreneurs
in LDCs is that their cost of funds is usually very high, since for a
bank the cost of administering a loan to them is generally considerably
higher on average than it is for loans to larger, well established com-
panies". Besides, in order that an entrepeneur succeed to get finance
from an IBFI, he must show his ability to pay back the finance together
with its interest and provide a collateral that covers and guarantees
the repayment of the credit in case he would not succeed in his enter-
prise. Moreover, as Khatkhate and Riechel (ibid:507) put it "the diffi-
culties of the local entrepreneurs tend to multiply since they do not
have easy access to necessary knowledge, information and expertise".
The introduction of the PLS system will not automatically elimi-
nates these difficulties but reduces them to a greater extent if app-
lied properly. A major advantage attributed to PLS system, if applied,
is that the finance given under this system may not depend solely on
the financial ability of the person to whom finance would be given; but
to a great extent, it depends on the feasibility of the project to be
financed. This opens the door widely to talented individuals who may
not be able to provide the collateral required by the IBBs.
Salama (1984:9) arguing from his experience in FIBS contended that:
"PLS system is particularly important in developing countries, it makes
possible extension of finance to artisans and handicrafts, supplying
them with machines that suit their talents, as well as machines that
are adapted to local conditions level of technology and using raw mate-
rials available in those countries. If such finance is widely extended
to those classes this will promote and modernise handicraft industries
and if labour intensive industries are encouraged and established by
those banks, such methods may break the vicious circle of poverty pre-
vailing in many developing countries".
Salama (1984:1-2) further argued that unlike interest based finan-
ce, the PLS does not discriminate against projects that yield returns
lower than the prevailing interest rates. Where interest rate exists,
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it acts as a lower bench-mark beyond which no investor takes a decision
to invest (ie if the expected rate of return is below interest rate he
will not go into the venture). In a world free of interest rate, in-
vestment decisions will depend on economic factors and the rate of
return will be the true allocator of funds. The cost of capital will
therefore be reduced. Interest-free finance may also reduce risks faced
by the investor. In case of loss, for example the investor will share
the loss with the supplier of capital; this contrasts to the interest
based finance where he has to pay the principal plus the interest".
Besides, as the return to the IFIs giving the PLS based finance,
depends directly on the returns to the entrepreneurs, it is in their
interest to offer as much information, technical assistance and help to
the latters if they are not to loose on their investments. Thus one
could say that the PLS system has an opposite impact to interest on the
promotion of investment, employment and entrepreneurship.
Concerning investment and employment no one can deny that interest
stands in the way of the fuller utilisation of available resources thus
limiting investment and creating unemployment. S. Ahmed (1975:13) ar-
gued that: "Before an entrepreneur engages himself in an act of produc-
tion he calculates costs of production and probable return that he can
expect. If the cost of production is higher than the probable return,
he will abstain. If the probable return is higher than the cost of pro-
duction, he will go ahead and invest. Now interest enters into the cal-
culation of the entrepreneur at both these crucial points. It increases
the cost of production on the one hand and decreases the probable
return on the other". And he (ibid:32) commented that: "This is both
'scientific truism and plain common sense that the rate of interest is
inversely related to the level of investment. The higher the rate of
interest, the lower the level of investment; and the lower the rate of
interest, the higher the level of investment".
Although Keynes (1936) observed that, the rate of interest on money
Plays a peculiar part in setting a limit to the level of investment and
employment, since it sets a standard to which marginal efficiency of a
capital asset must attain if it is to be newly produced and he was con-
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vinced, as he put it that: "It is to our best advantage to reduce the
rate of interest to that point at which there is full employment" which
cannot be other than zero, he did not call for its abolition but justi-
fied it in terms of liquidity preference (see 4.2.10 above) and sugges-
ted instead, to fill the gap of unemployed physical resources occasio-
ned by the impact of interest, with the help of investment in the pub-
lic sector, meaning that whomsoever the entrepreneur leaves as unemplo-
yed can thus be employed by the State. The result was: not only full
employment was never achieved but higher inflation became the issue.
The reason, as S. Ahmed (1975:36-7) argued: "is that as soon as we
proceed artificially to create jobs and go some distance in doing it,
the price level starts rising because of the built-in push given by in-
terest and keeps on rising, eroding the value of wages. If wages are
also raised to match the rise in prices, prices spurt still further and
a wage-price spiral gets under way which threatens our monetary struc-
ture. When this happens, we immediately raise the rate of interest to
cool down the economy in the private sector which of course results in
further unemployment". Thus, as S. Ahmed (ibid:16) put it: "interest
then, is inversely related with investment, and so long as interest
dominates an economy, unemployment must persist".
Here comes the idea of the trade-off between inflation and unemp-
loyment introduced by A.H. Phillips in 1958 and known as 'The Phillips
Curve' which, as Treynor (1975:21) pointed out: "attempts to reduce to
numbers the intuitively appealing idea that the inflation rate depends
loosely on the level of unemployment. It expresses this kind of trade-
off: "if we are willing to tolerate high rates of price inflation we
can enjoy low levels of unemployment; if we are willing to tolerate
high levels of unemployment we can enjoy low rates of price inflation".
There is a great number of economists who criticised the Phillips curve
and asserted that there is no historical evidence of a stable relation-
ship between unemployment and inflation or that if such a relationship
ever existed, it exists no more. They cite the current stagflation, a
very high level of inflation coupled with rising unemployment, as evi-
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dence. For instance Al-Naqib and Moosa (1984:107) concluded that:
"contrary to the widely held views, in the long run higher unemployment
was found to be associated with higher inflation and lower unemployment
with lower inflation. There is no trade-off between unemployment and
inflation; in fact they have a high positive correlation. This means
that an attempt to reduce inflation by increasing unemployment (through
raising interest rates) is likely to increase inflationary pressures
later on in the cycle. Thus to abort recoveries in the hope of easing
inflationary pressures is counter-productive. This long term approach
purposely disregard changes in the inflation rate within a cycle on
which past research tended to focus".
In a pure IFS, where PLS is practiced and where there is no inte-
rest on finance, investments are worthwhile up to the level where their
marginal rates of return are not equal to a certain rate of interest
but up to the point where they are equal to zero. This allows a maxi-
misation of investment and employment, far much greater than the - .inte-
rest based system allows. This does not mean that full employment would
be achieved under the PLS system at all times but the level of unemp-
loyment would be very much lower than under the interest based system
and under the same conditions, because there are, of course a number of
other factors which affect the level of employment such as the availa-
bility of capital for investment, the wage-price flexibility, etc..
7.4 FINANCIAL STABILITY
Financial stability is one of the most important, if not the most
important, objective of any financial system. "Stability in the value of
money should", according to Chapra (1983:30), "be accorded high priority
in the Islamic frame of reference because of the unequivocal stress of
Islam on honesty and fairness in all human dealings and because of the
negative impact of inflation on socio-economic justice in general wel-
fare". Chapra (ibid:31) further argued that while inflation is in conf-
lict with Islamic values, prolonged recession and unemployment are also
unacceptable because they bring misery to certain sectors of the popu-
lation and also act counter to the goal of broad-based economic well-
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being. Recession also tends to increase uncertainty and discourages in-
vestors from undertaking risk associated with projects that earn a re-
turn over many years. Hence in the interest of achieving overall objec-
tives of Islam, it would be necessary for the Islamic state to adopt
all available measures to minimise economic fluctuations and to stabi-
lise the value of money and the economy.
A positive correlation between the levels of interest rates and
prices has been pointed out many times by many economists. Thomas Tooke
(1844:76-78) was probably the first to notice this positive correlation
followed perhaps by A.H. Gibson who published a series of articles,
mostly in the Banker's Magazine between January 1923 and November 1926
emphasising the extraordinary close correlation over a period of more
than a hundred years between the rate of interest, as measured by the
yield of consols, and the level of prices, as measured by the wholesale
price index number. Keynes (1930:198) named this empirical regularity
the 'Gibson Paradox' since it seemed to contradict the prediction of
the classical monetary theory. Although many papers have been written
on the topic (see for example Meiselman 1963; Cagan and Gandolfi 1965;
Friedman 1968; Yohe and Karnosky 1969 and W. Gibson 1970), no single
explanation of the relationship between inflation and interest commands
wide acceptance. As proof of this statement, it is sufficient to note,
as Sergent (1973:385-386) put it: "that the name, that Keynes gave to
that relationship, 'the Gibson Paradox', has stuck".
Whether or not this positive correlation can be called a 'paradox',
numerous explanations of it have been advanced. Wicksell (1899:78,167)
and Keynes (1930:198-208) suggested that increases in the demand for
loans raise interest rates and result in an increased money supply and
level of prices and conversely for decreases in the demand for loans.
Fisher (1930) suggested that the positive correlation may simply
be an 'accidental' result of this fundamental hypothesis that nominal
interest rates reflect expected inflation combined with imperfect fore-
sight concerning inflation and the upward and downward movement of pri-
ces historically. This explanation has been found inadequate by some,
because the estimated distributed lag of inflation rates to explain in-
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terest rates seems too long when estimated with data over long periods
of time (see Cagan 1965; Macaulay 1938 and Sargent 1973).
Sargent (1973:444) argued that: "our empirical results imply that,
to explain the 'Gibson Paradox', it is not adequate to hypothesize a
one-way influence directed from inflation to interest rate (which most
economists follow) or for that matter, from interest to inflation. Ins-
tead, with the context of bivariate models, interest and inflation ap-
pear to influence one another. One implication of this finding is that
Irving Fisher's explanation of the 'Gibson Paradox' which posits a uni-
directional influence flowing from inflation to interest is inadequate.
Instead, to explain the 'paradox', it is necessary to view interest and
inflation as being mutually determined."
Despite this disagreement about the so called 'Gibson Paradox' and
despite the fact that economists have, as Horwich (1966:16) noticed,
never satisfactorily integrated their theories of interest as a produc-
tion cost, as a return to the claimants of capital, or as a variable in
monetary policy; and also despite the fact that there is no agreement
among economists as to why interest should be paid viz, for produc-
tivity of capital, use of capital, risk of capital, time preference,
liquidity preference, etc. (see chapter four above), the majority of
economists, when writing about inflation and interest rates, write as
if inflation is the cause and interest is the effect and rarely the
other way round. Not only that but the monetarists among them suggest
that to curb inflation, it is necessary to raise interest rates, and
teach that high interest rates are anti-inflationary, when it cannot
necessarily be true. For it may be true that raising interest rates in
an IBFS where economic units are interest-sensitive may curb inflation
in the short run when it curbs the demand for credit on one hand and
encourage savings on the other, but on the long run it will definitely
result in the opposite because raising interest rates raises the cost
of borrowing not only to the personal sector and the governmental sec-
tor but also to the private productive business sector. This would lead
to higher cost of production which in turn lead to one of three possi-
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bilities: (1) canceling new production whose rate of return is lower
than the new interest rate, or (2) reducing the existing output to the
level where the marginal product is not lower than the marginal rate of
interest. These, both lead to lower supply of goods in the future than
otherwise which may lead in turn to inflation, or (3) raising prices if
possible to compensate for the higher costs incurred.
Hoston (1982:1-4) argued that: "it is irrational to seek lower pri-
ces by policies which raise costs. It is inefficient to use 'blunt
instruments' such as quantitative controls over money when selective
credit controls are so much more 'cost effective', for interest is a
cost, and when cost go up, so do prices, unless indirectly the higher
interest costs result in the fall of other costs". Panico (1985:143)
also demonstrated this latter view when he argued that:
Variations of interest can affect distribution and prices in
two ways. First (
 since interest payments on short term lending
to firms are directly introduced into the cost of production
of commodities, the variation in interest causes an immediate
variation in the same direction in this cost. If for instance,
we suppose an increase in interest, an increase in the cost of
production and an immediate transfer of profits from indust-
rialists to bankers will result. Industrial producers may then
try, if circumstances allow them to pass their higher costs on
in higher prices. In this case workers will then suffer a loss
in their purchasing power. In the presence of real wage resis-
tence, however, this may generate a demand for higher money
wages and consequent inflation process. Second, if the varia-
tion in interest is considered to be permanent, a change in
the same direction in the long term interest rate can come
about together with a change in the same direction in r and p.
As a consequence, workers will have to suffer a loss in their
purchasing power, unless they are able to resist it by deman-
ding higher money wages. Once again, an inflationary process
may set in. It is impossible to say a priori how and where
this process will end. The specific economic, social and poli-
tical conditions prevailing at the time will determine whether
workers will accept a lower real income, whether a monetary
policy leading to lower interest rates will be started or whe-
ther for other reasons not touched upon here, the Social pro-
duct increases and makes the demand of different social groups
compatible. Yet as long as these demands are not compatible
with the existing Social product, adjustment process, most
probably in the form of price variations, will go on.
Kaldor (1980:315 and 1982:56-63) also claimed on more than one
occasion, that interest costs on working capital enter the cost of
production of commodities and that: "there is evidence for believing
that interest costs are passed on in higher prices in much the same way
as wage costs" (Kaldor 1982:63). This implies that, ceteris paribus
higher interest rates lead to higher prices, and vice-versa.
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Another major source of instability in the present-day economies,
is, as M.A. Khan (1983:240) pointed out: "speculation on the stock ex-
change which provides a happy rendez-vous to the jobbers and brokers.
Almost all the major monetary crises of the capitalist world can be
traced to the activities of speculators and financiers. In each case,
credit was expanded to abnormal limits to finance speculative activity,
until a 'spelling spree' broke the spell and the resulting crisis rui-
ned millions". The collapse of Soug El-Manakh the unofficial stock mar-
ket of Kuwait in 1982 (see chapter 10 below) and the worldwide stock
markets crashes of 1929 and 1987 are examples of this speculation.
The question that arises here is what would happen in an Islamic
society where interest and speculation are prohibited and where finance
is made on the basis of profits and PLS system as explained earlier?.
M.N. Siddiqi (1983b:127) argued that: "the Islamic PLS system has the
unique advantage of not being prone to inflation. This characteristic,
according to him, follows from the way money capital is supplied for
business". It is evident from the model of IFS discussed in chapter 5
above that there are a number of ways to advance finance to DEUs in an
Islamic economy. If most of the finance given by the IFIs is on PLS
basis (ie Musharakah, Mudharabah, Muzaraah, Musagat) then inflation
would be minimal in view of the fact that no consumer finance could be
given under these methods, in other words the bulk of the finance would
be productive creating more supply of output that may lead to lower
prices if not offset by the demand that would also be created by the
high level of employment. If on the other hand the bulk of the IFIs'
finance is in the form of Murabahah, Bai Bit-Tagseet, Bai Muaijal, 
II arah and II arah Wagtina', then it depends whether the goods financed
were for productive or consumer purposes. But even in the latter case,
there would be little or no credit money creation than under IBFS since
the IFIs do not advance loans to customers but provide them with goods.
Add to this the other factors which should limit the demand in the Is-
lamic economy such as the moderation called for by Islam, the prohibi-
tion of Ihtikar (speculation), Israaf (indulgence), Tabtheer (extrava-
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gance), sculptures, ornaments for men, golden or silver utensils, etc..
which would act in an IFS, as built in stabilisers.
Oardh Hassan, however, is very restricted in an IFS, because the
IFIs are not allowed to get any return on such credits. This means, as
M.A. Khan (1982:239) noticed that: "the possibility of extending credit
for speculative purposes will be considerably reduced. This is in cont-
rast with modern (interest based) banking where credit is extended for
speculative purposes as well. As a matter of fact, most of the specula-
tive activity in stock markets is carried out with borrowed funds".
Besides, as M.N. Siddiqi (1983b:127) argued: "In a fractional reserve
system supply of investible funds by banks involves creation of new
money (credit money). This applies to the profit-sharing system also,
but the creation of new money in the profit-sharing system is effecti-
vely linked with genuine possibilities of creating additional value. It
may not be so in the interest-based system where creditworthiness of
the borrower is more important than the prospective productivity of the
project". And both these two measures make the level of inflation lower
in the IFS than it would have been under IBFS.
7.5 SOCIAL JUSTICE
"Perhaps the most pernicious consequence of interest based finance
is the creation of a debt ridden economy wherein the entire entrepre-
neur class, the government and the bulk of consumers find themselves
heavily in debt to the financiers, this has important economic, social,
psychological and political consequences" (M.N. Siddiqi 1983b:69). Thus
one could say that this method of finance is unjust and results in mal-
distribution of income and wealth in the society since under this sys-
tem and as, Taylor and Evans (1987) pointed out: "if interest rates are
high and a loan recipient makes a loss, then the full amount of the in-
terest would still have to be repaid. Similarly, if interest rates are
low, is it just for the recipient of the loan to make disproportionate-
ly high returns whilst savers are inadequately rewarded?".
PLS system, on the other hand, and as Salama (1984:4) pointed out:
"ensures a fair distribution of profits especially when high profits
180
are achieved. In case of interest based system there is no built in me-
chanism whereby such profits are distributed but in case of profit sha-
ring system profits will be distributed to a large number of sharehol-
ders and investment account holders". M.N. Siddiqi (1983b:126-127) con-
tended that: "Whereas the system based on interest is unjust for it
guarantees a definite positive return to the financier whereas, the
value productivity of investment is uncertain. It transfers additional
wealth to owners of capital even when no additional wealth has been
created through the employment of their capital in productive enter-
prise. The system results in a constant transfer of existing wealth
from loss incurring entrepreneurs to wealth owners, which makes the
distribution of wealth inequitable with the passage of time. By cont-
rast, profit-sharing ensures justice both at the micro and macro level.
When the returns to productive employment of capital are high, the en-
trepreneurs, the banks as intermediaries and the savers all get good
returns as agreed out of the new wealth created. When the returns are
low each one still receives a share. In the case of a loss the entre-
preneur goes unrewarded but does not lose his own assets as happens in
the interest-based system. The banks get back what remains of the capi-
tal supplied. A policy of pooling of deposits and diversification of
investment can ensure that the banks do not sustain a loss on the tota-
lity of their investments and hence the depositors do not get negative
returns, except in the case of deep recession".
7.6 THE LDCs' DEBT PROBLEM
Perhaps, the worst socio-economic implications of interest may be
seen quite clearly from what is called 'The International Debt Crisis'
or 'The Debt Time Bomb'. Since the beginning of the 1980s there has been
a growing concern about the magnitude of the debt burden of LDCs. There
are more than 35 countries which are either in the process of reschedu-
ling or have recently rescheduled their debts involving over a thousand
banks in North America, Europe, and Japan. In the five years 1976-1981
total LDCs' debt grew by 20% a year. It was US$251 bn in 1976, but the
part owed to banks grew by 25% a year, and the short term part grew
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fastest of all by 29% a year. In the early 1980s the combination of ro-
cketing interest rates and bunching of maturities has put a number of
countries into a position of very high obligations. They can pay them
from net foreign earnings or by drawing down reserves. But LDCs' reser-
ves had fallen rapidly and in trade they have had net deficits, not net
earnings. The only way they can meet their debt obligation is by borro-
wing more. Total foreign indebtedness of the developing countries rea-
ched some US$630bn in 1981. It consisted of US$490bn of medium or long
term debt, and US$140bn of short term debt. Of these sums, about half
was owed to commercial banks. According to the World bank's statistics
the debtor nations owed an estimated US$1019bn at the end of 1987.
Although many factors are said to have contributed significantly
to the problem of The International Debt Crisis, the single most impor-
tant factor in precipitating the crisis seems to be the level of inte-
rest rates on the dollar (see Errunza and Ghalbouni 1986:231).
Pietro Manes (1982) explored the interrelation between internatio-
nal indebtedness, interest rates and inflation and arrived at the conc-
lusion that high indebtedness is a by-product of interest rates higher
than the gross return on capital employed, and inflation is one of the
two alternatives to which this condition must necessarily lead, the
other being a worldwide deflationary crisis of the 1929 type.
In order to relate his analysis specifically to the subject of
international indebtedness, he defined Dn as the average amount of the
foreign indebtedness of a given country in the year n, i n as the
average interest rate applied to the debt D. Then the amount of
interest, I, paid by the debtor country in the year n is:
In = Dnn
	 (1)
He argued that during the same year n, the country, besides paying
interest on the outstanding indebtedness will repay some of the capital
and presumably will also have to borrow new sums from abroad. Defining
Rn as the reimbursement of old debts effected during the year and C n as
the new gross borrowing during the year n, then the net new borrowing,
182
or the net indebtedness increase, in the year n, is the difference:
Cn-Rn=Bn
	(2)
In order to simplify the analysis, he assumed that new borrowing
and repayment of old debts are spread evenly throughout the year:
Dn=Dn-1+Bn	(3)
By combining the equations (1) and (3), he got the following set
of equations describing the flow of interest payments from the debtor
to creditor in successive years:
I0=Do.io (4)
Ii=(Do+Bi)il (5)
I2=(D0+B1+B2)i2 (6)
• • •
In=(D0+B1+B2+...+Bn)in (7)
Answering the question: where do these money flows come from? he
said: "They should come out of the income produced by the use of the
borrowed sums. They should be part of the gross profit resulting from
the investment of the borrowed capital, including any reinvested pro-
fits and any related losses". In other words he is suggesting that the
natural and just way to deal with international indebtedness is the Is-
lamic way based on PLS system, though he did not pronounce it clearly.
Calling Gn: the average amount of the cumulative investment in the
year n (resulting from the employment, over the years, of the borrowed
sums which constitute the indebtedness Dn
 plus any accumulated reinves-
ted profits or losses); and rn : the average gross rate of return on the
said investment (ie after deduction of all expenses, but before the
payment of interest) the total gross return Yn
 obtained from the
investment in the year n will be:
Yn=Gn* rn	(8)
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Assuming that all borrowed sums and all net profits are forthwith
invested, the relationship between Gn valued at cost and Dn would be:
vlz,v)
Gn=Dn+Zpn	(9)
nz.
where: Pn = nn is the net profit or, if negative, the net loss
obtained in the year n from the investment made from the borrowed sums.
For the debtor country to be able to pay interest on its indebtedness,
we must obviously have:
P =Y -I > 0n n n-
Hence, taking into account (1), (4) and (9)
Dn
na
Dn+2.Pn
"As long as this condition is met", as Manes (ibid:111) contended,
"everything is all right. The debtor country can not only pay interest
on its indebtedness and repay the capital, but can also obtain a net
profit which can be reinvested together, with the new net borrowings.
But if the gross return on investments made from borrowing is smaller
than the required interest payments, then the debtor is in trouble, and
so is the creditor who sees his credit in jeopardy".
The interest payment to be made by the debtor may be larger than
the return he obtains on borrowed capital and this is not merely a
theoretical proposition but it is something which can actually be ob-
served quite often in reality. When this happens, interest payments
either cannot be made, or, if they are made, they are no longer paid
entirely out of profits, but partly out of fresh indebtedness. In this
case, only a part of the net new borrowing can be invested, since a
part of it must be used to pay interest on old debts and even perhaps
to repay capital. calling required borrowing L n, the sum which must be
borrowed in order to enable the debtor to service the old debts; and
Bn, the part of the net new borrowing available for investment in the
year n, we get:
( 10)
r >
n-
in
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and it is obviously
and hence, generally
Bn =Bn-Ln
Ln=-Pn
--
Bn=Bn+Pn
This equation (14) tells us that, when the net profit, P n is
positive, the yearly sum available for investment is equal to the net
new borrowing plus the net profit. When the net profit is negative, (ie
there is a loss), the yearly sum available for investment is equal to
the net new borrowing minus the loss; and the loss, once it has
appeared, tends to increase rapidly, because, while interest has to be
paid on the entire amount of the net borrowing, only a part of this can
now be invested and yield a return.
In mathematical terms, if i' n is the rate of interest to be paid
on the new net borrowing Bn, the gross rate of return r' n, which must
be obtained on the new net investment B n in order not to have an
additional loss, must be:
Bn 
r' >(15)n- n --Bn
This means that r' n must be so much higher than i' n, the higher
Bn
the ratio ---- .
	 Thus , unless the profitability of investment is
Bn
quickly restored to positive levels, indebtedness becomes a self-
feeding process, which after a certain point cannot be reversed, but
gains speed, like an avalanche, at a compound rate, since a large and
growing part of the net new borrowing is practically nothing else but
the capitalisation of interest payments which otherwise could not have
been made (ibid). Two corollaries follow:
a-) the outcome of this process must be inflation, for if the
banking system creates spendable money assets through loans which are
used to service older debts, it is clear that this buying power
against which there are no real assets and there is no production of
goods and services, must lead to higher prices.
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b-) while the banking system remains solvent, it cannot be hoped
to overcome inflation through high interest rates because high interest
rates are the very factor which feeds higher indebtedness and hence the
creation, in the form of increasing volume of bank liabilities, of pu-
rely monetary buying power (see Manes 1982:100-114).
The conventional assumption that the LDC debts can be managed by
good housekeeping practices supervised by the IMF has been questioned
by Lever (1984), Clausen (1985), Chakravarty (1986) and others. Chakra-
varty (ibid) argued: "the debts are too large to be serviced... It is
neither in the interest of the debtors nor in the interest of the len-
ders that the loans be serviced at the present level. Debtor countries
would suffer because, even under generous terms of rescheduling, neces-
sary trade surpluses could not be generated without massive sacrifice.
The manufacturing nations in Europe would lose in output and employ-
ment". Lever (1984:34) argued that: "to pay the debts back, the borro-
wing countries would have to run trade surpluses against the lending
countries on a scale which would cause problems in the west". Even if
one supposes as Chakravarty (1986:5) did, that "severe restraints on
internal consumption were applied and exports encouraged, an optimistic
outcome would be a reduction in imports by half and an increase of
exports by 50%... Austerity measures of this kind would entail massive
upheaval. Productive capacity would be destroyed, the poor would suffer
untold miseries and the middle class would be alienated. The debts
would still remain unpaid after years of deflationary policies".
More than 15 economic summits have been organised between 1980-88,
spending millions of pounds and dollars, in order to solve the problem
of the world financial system, and The International Debt Crisis, but
the crisis continues and goes from bad to worse. This is because they
could not agree on a radical solution to the problem. All they did is
suggesting ineffective and even counter-productive weapons such as res-
cheduling the debts (extending debt maturities which is usually made at
even higher interest rates) making thus the problem even worse by accu-
mulating the debts for later times. The consequence would be as Clausen
(1985) put it: "debt repudiation which, can occur because of either
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'incapability' or 'unwillingness'. The former corresponds to insolvency
and the latter might occur through political difficulties in asking for
domestic sacrifices beyond a certain point entailed in debt servicing".
According to World Bank statistics, no country involved in rescheduling
its debts has significantly reduced its debt ratios since 1982.
In fact debt rescheduling has merely postponed the crisis, it is a
short term solution to a long term problem. A strategy of this kind,
even if it eases the problem in the short run, it makes the problem
even worse in the future (the long run) and unless interest rates are
completely removed on existing debts, new finance based on PLS system
is extended and the exchange rates stabilised, the problem will not be
solved. On the contrary the problem will worsen even further with ad-
verse consequences not only on the borrowers (the LDCs) but on the len-
ders (the DCs) as well. As Erbe (1983:205) argued: "there would be a
growing medium-term danger of banks collapsing on account of the inc-
reasing concentration of poor risks on a decreasing number of institu-
tions. And in view of the considerable ramifications in the internatio-
nal banking system the chances of larger scale bankruptcies not leading
to chain reactions are very slim. Secondly, many debtor nations are
faced by growing political instability. Stagnation or falling real
income levels have weakened the position of many governments. What is
more, the drying-up, of the flow of capital, forces many governments to
resort to socially painful and thus politically risky measures to put
the current account and public finance situation back on its feet. This
twofold pressure of endogenous and exogenous factors on the government,
restricts the latter's room for manoeuvre. There is an increasing ten-
dency to blame the foreign creditors and the IMF for the economic cri-
sis". Chakravarty (1986) suggests: "The sooner these realities are fa-
ced and some mechanism is found to write off much of the loans now out-
standing, the less the probability of a major financial crisis trigge-
red off by default".
Muslim economists believe that, had the LDCs' debt been in form of
PLS finance, the problem would not have reached this state of affairs.
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First, because Islamic banks do not give interest based loans but be-
fore agreeing to finance a project in any country they make sure that
the project is viable and profitable for both the country involved and
the banks themselves and provide it not only with the finance but will
all necessary expertise, technical assistance and follow-up that should
prevent the diversion of the finance from being used in other purposes
and watch over the project to make sure that it goes as planned. If the
project turns out to be successful, both parties benefits and if turns
out to be a failure, then the loss is shared between the banks and the
country involved in proportion to the participation of each in the
capital of the project. Thus, no heavy burdens on any of them. This is,
according to Presley (1988a:61): "undoubtedly one of the main strengths
of an Islamic Banking System in which the risk is born by the investor
and the financier. It is therefore in the financier own interest to pay
particular attention to the viability of the project in which the
financial support is vested".
7.6 CONCLUSION
It appears from the above theoretical discussion that, though PLS
system, may not prove to be a panacea to all the economic problems of
today, it would perhaps, if implemented properly in an Islamic society,
offer better solutions than interest or at least, if it does not solve
any of these problems, it would not contribute in worsening them, as
interest does. Thus one could conclude that the TES system of finance
is perhaps better, juster and more conducive to greater growth,
development and prosperity than interest based system. Consequently,
Islam is not an obstacle to, but a promoter of, economic growth and
development, prosperity and social justice.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
PERFORMANCE OF THE ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK (IDB)
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The IDB is an International Islamic Development Bank set up in
Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) in 1975 as a development, investment and welfare
oriented international financial institution based on the Islamic prin-
ciples of Shariah. It is one of the oldest Islamic banks.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the performance of the
IDB's financial operations during the first ten years of its existence.
But before doing this, it is, perhaps, very important to first give an
overview on the economies of its member countries.
8.2 THE ECONOMIES OF THE IDBillEMBER COUNTRIES: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
The 43 membership of the IDB include a wide range of countries ran-
ging from the richest in the world, the UAE with the highest per capita
income in the world (US$23,770) to the poorest in the world, Chad, with
the lowest per capita income in the world (US$80) in 1982. However all
of them are considered as LDCs for the reasons advanced below. Because
of their different economic potentials, any generalisation cannot fully
reflect the diverse economic conditions in individual countries, there-
fore, even though not satisfactory, it is perhaps more appropriate to
divide them into three groups: high, middle and low per capita income
countries, to use the World Bank classifications.
1. The first group with per capita income of more than us$5,000
includes the highest per capita income country in the world, the UAE
with US$23,770 in 1982, followed by Qatar with US$21,880; Kuwait with
US$19,870; Saudi Arabia with US$16,000; Bahrain with US$9,280; Libya
with US$8,150 and Oman with US$6,090 for the same year (see Table 8.1).
All of these countries are members of OPEC and so their high inco-
mes are the result of the last decade high oil prices and production,
which provided them with substantial amounts of income and foreign ex-
change. But nowadays with the sharp drop in oil demand and prices, cau-
sed by: 1) the recession in the DCs; 2) the competition from the non
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OPEC oil producers, whose share in the oil market has grown impressive-
ly in recent years; 3) the development of alternative energy resources;
4) energy efficiency and 5) energy conservation, these countries have
started experiencing and suffering balance of payments deficits and
other related problems (see Tables 8.1 and 8.2).
Table 8.1 IDB High Income Member Countries: Basic Economic Indicators
UAE Qatar Kuwait S.Arabia Bahrain Libya Oman
Area in sq km (000) 84 11 18 2,150 0.67 1,760 212
Population (m)	 (1983) 1.21 0.28 1.67 10.48 0.40 3.35 1.13
Density (person per km24 14 25 93 5 645 2 5
ARG of the pop.
	 (%) 15.5 5.4 6.3 4.8 1.1 4.1 4.3
Life Expectancy (years) 71 71 71 56 68 57 52
GNP/c (US$000)
	 (1982) 23.8 21.9 19.9 16.0 9.3 8.5 6.1
ARG of GNP (1960-80)
	 (%) -0.7 na 2.2 9.8 na 4.1 5.8
BOP c/a in US$bn (1980) 23.02 na 15.30 41.40 0.39 8.21 0.94
BOP c/a in USSbn (1984) na na 5.57 -18.43 -0.011 -1.80 0.15
Sources: IDB 9th Annual Report (1984)
The World Bank, World Development Report, (1984)
IMF, International Financial Statistics, Yearbook 1985
Arabia, oct. 1984
Table 8.2 External Trade position of Oil Exporting IDB Member Countries
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
C/a balance in US$ bn 29.3 15.7 53.1 103.9 58.4 -5.9 -15.5 -6.6
C/a balance in % 25.9 13.6 29.8 39.0 22.3 -2.9 -9.4 -3.8
Terms of trade change -1.6 -10.1 24.8 13.5 2.3 -8.1 -1.4 -2.6
Source: IDB 10th annual report.
Oil exports constitute more than 80% of the total GDP and more than
90% of total exports of these countries and so any fluctuation, in pro-
duction or prices, directly affects their GDPs and their BOPs. Thus,
high per capita incomes in these countries are not the result of real
economic and industrial development. Production of oil in these count-
ries is tied more to external than internal factors related to the
course of economic and social development of these countries. According
to Attigua (1984:136): "World demand of Arab oil is what is known as
'residual demand', meaning that it meets fluctuations in the level of
world demand for energy in general and for oil in particular. Therefore
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a drop in world demand implies a bigger drop in demand for Arab oil,
and a rise in demand implies greater pressure on their oil production".
So, despite the high incomes and the substantial foreign exchange
and reserves enjoyed by these countries during the last decade, these
countries are still classified as LDCs because of their dependence on
one product (oil) and because of lack of domestic technology, lack of
diversified industry and lack of capital formation. Other features of
these countries include a high rate of illiteracy, lack of skilled
labour, and little real investment since most of their petrodollars are
placed in the banks of the West especially in the USA and Switzerland.
These countries can also be qualified as consumer orientated rather
than producer orientated societies. Apart from oil, very little is pro-
duced in economic terms by these countries and the rates of inflation
in these countries are also very high. Saudi Arabia for example had an
annual average rate of inflation of 22% for the period 1970-80. Such
high rates of inflation have serious repercussions on the development
in these countries. El Agraa (1985:77) pointed out that:
Countries like Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar and the UAE
depend heavily on oil revenues. These revenues cannot be gua-
ranteed indefinitely, they last as long as the oil lasts. Once
oil is exhausted, these countries will have to depend on the
returns from investing their financial resources, which will
be no more than a small percentage of the present flows. Of
course, these countries have made attempts to construct hu7e
plants (especially for petrochemicals, steel, chemical ferti-
lisers and cement) with prohibitive running costs to produce
goods and products for which they are not suited... Such
attempts are doomed to failure since their running costs are
sustainable only for as long as the oil revenues last.
The implication of the sharp decline in oil prices on the econo-
mies of these oil exporting countries has affected all their economic
aspects and sectors. These were exhibited by the cuts in subsidies, in
budget expenditures, in investments, in imports of capital goods, etc.,
worsening, thus, the world recession which, combined with the DCs rest-
rictive monetary policies and protectionism, has had a profound adverse
affect on the rates of growth of these and other LDCs and this revealed
haw fragile were the development patterns of these oil exporters.
The spectacular collapse of Kuwait's Souq El -Manakh stock market
in 1982, which left in circulation post dated cheques totalling more
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than US$90bn, and the Iran-Iraq war have affected the Gulf countries
adversely even further, both economically and politically.
2. The Second group of the IDB member countries (ie the middle
income countries) with per capita incomes ranging from US$4,000 for
Gabon and US$580 for Indonesia (see Table 8.3), comprises some of the
OPEC members like Gabon, Algeria, Iraq and Indonesia and some other
energy exporters like Malaysia, Syria, Tunisia, Cameroon and Egypt, but
because all of these countries are more populous than the Middle-East
oil exporters, their per capita incomes are lower than those of the
Gulf countries and so are their life expectancy and annual average rate
of population growth. Such countries, are classified by most economists
as 'high absorbers' countries since they tend, as indicated by Hamid
(1983:41): "to expand imports as their export revenues rise. They have
shown substantial current account surpluses only during the oil shock
years of 1974, 1979 and 1980. Otherwise the surpluses have been small,
and in 1978 and 1981 the accounts were in deficit" (see Table 8.3).
Table 8.3 IDB Middle Income Member Countries: Basic Economic Indicators
Area
	
Population	 Life	 GNP/c
(000)	 (m) density ARG	 Exp.	 US$
sq. km
 1982 Persons	 %	 Years	 1982
GDP	 Average	 BOP c/a
ARG Inflation	 in US$m
1970-80 1970-80 	 1980 1983
Gabon 268 0.7 4 1.1 49 4,000 4.4 19.5 392 75
Algeria 2,382 20.5 9 3.1 57 2,350 9.8 13.9 249 -86
Iraq 435 14.7 34 3.5 59 2,100 na na na na
Malaysia 330 14.9 45 2.5 67 1,860 7.7 7.2 -285 -3,379
Jordan 98 3.6 37 2.5 64 1,690 9.3 83 13
Jordan 33 24 6 2 35 57 43
Kuwait 84 1 1 5 9 85 15
Libya 100 - - - - 100 -
Malaysia 36 44 3 12 5 80 20
Morocco 44 28 10 1 17 72 28
Niger 81 17 1 - 1 46 2.5
Indonesia 1,905 160.3 84 2.3 53 580 7.7 19.9 2864 -6338
Sources: IMF World Development Report, 1984
IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1985
IDB Annual Report 1984
Jordan, Turkey, Morocco and Djibouti are oil importers. They expe-
rienced current account deficits during the oil shock years and sur-
pluses in other years. Jordan and Morocco are mainly phosphate expor-
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ters, Turkey and Djibouti are rather agricultural exporters. The conti-
nuing recession in the industrialised world severely constrained these
countries' growth. The drop, in industrial countries' demand, resulted
in declining both prices and volumes of these countries' primary ex-
ports. As these countries relied heavily on foreign debt for the last
20 years to finance their ambitious development plans, their outstan-
ding debts and debt services have grown substantially (see Table 8.4).
Table 8.4	 IDB Middle Income Countries Member Public External Debt
Outstanding debt in US$m
1970	 1978	 1982
Debt service as % of exports
1970	 1978	 1982
Gabon na na na na na na
Algeria 937 13,168 12,897 3.2 20.9 24.6
Iraq 274 na na 2.2 na na
Malaysia 390 2,671 7,671 3.5 8.8 5.1
Jordan 118 840 1,686 3.6 4.0 6.1
Syria 232 2,091 2,616 10.8 15.1 14.2
Tunisia 545 2,359 3,472 17.5 12.3 15.1
Turkey 1,854 6,188 15,933 16.3 11.0 19.6
Cameroon 131 1,167 1,912 3.1 7.7 15.6
Morocco 711 5,139 9,030 7.7 18.7 36.8
Djibouti na na na na na na
Egypt 1,644 9,879 15,468 28.7 22.2 20.2
Indonesia 2,443 13,089 18,421 6.9 13.0 8.3
Source: IMF World Development Reports, 1980 and 1984
Besides, the restrictive monetary policies, pursued by a number of
industrial countries to control inflation, maintained interest rates at
high levels, thus greatly increasing developing countries' service pay-
ments on floating rate debt generally. The combination of the reces-
sion, restrictive monetary policies, the drop in the export of these
countries, the increasing debt and debt services resulted in a severe
reduction in the growth rates of these countries' economies. Many of
these countries resolved to imports' restrictions in order to contain
their BOP deficits, thus, worsening the world economy and causing more
economic and social problems both within and without their economies.
Although exact statistics are hard to obtain, lower growth rates in
these countries has undoubtedly resulted in increasing unemployment and
underemployment, and in delaying economic development.
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During the 1970s these countries registered relatively high rates
of growth (see Table 8.3) but since 1980 their rates of growth declined
substantially for the reasons mentioned above. Now unless these count-
ries co-operate with each other and with other countries to reduce the
effects of the recession by encouraging trade among themselves and with
other countries and by advancing aid and technical assistance to each
other with little or no charge at all, their conditions will only wor-
sen. The primary task of the IDB is to play the role of the coordinator
and the intermediary between these countries.
3. The third group of the IDB member countries consist of the
least developed countries, not only as compared to other IDB members
but as they are classified by the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD. Of
the remaining 23 IDB low income countries, 16 are from Sub-Saharan
Africa, the poorest region in the world. The other 7 countries are
among the poorest in Asia either because of their large populatiohlikLe
Bangladesh and Pakistan or because of little resources, as in the case
of the two Yemens or because of the war as in the case of Afghanistan,
Palestine and Lebanon. So all of these countries are among the least
developed countries of the world and the most exposed to the changes of
the world economy. These countries are characterised by low per capita
incomes, short life expectancy, very low or negative rates of growth,
high rates of illiteracy, deficit BOPs (see Table 8.5), increasing debt
burdens, high rates of unemployment, high infant mortality rates, etc..
Since 1980 the recession in the industrial countries combined with
restrictive monetary policies pursued on their part to control infla-
tion has had a profoundly adverse effect on the rates of growth of many
LDCs (see World Bank 1984:32). The Sub-Saharan African countries have
been particularly vulnerable to the impact of the recession combined
with the current drought which played a role in the decrease of crop
production thus intensifying food shortage and causing the problem of
famine and refugees which have, recently, grown dramatically.
Other factors which hamper economic growth and development in these
countries to mention just a few, include scarcity of educated people,
the dominance of land extensive agricultural systems, extreme ethnic
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diversity with consequent political fragility, climatic and geographi-
cal factors hostile to development, administrative constraints on mobi-
lising and managing resources for development given the widespread
weakness of planning, decision making and management capacities, over-
valued exchange rates, etc.. Moreover, basic infrastructure is, in some
areas, almost nonexistent: roads, rails, ports, communications, etc..
Table 8.5 IDB Low Per Capita Income Countries Members: Basic Indicators
Area	 Population	 Life	 GNP/c GDP
(000)
	 (m) density ARG Exp.
	 US$	 ARG
sq. km
 1982 Persons % Years 1982 1970-80
Average	 BOP c/a
Inflation
	 US$000
1970-80 1980	 1983
Yemen AR 195 6.3 32 3.0 44 500 8.5 15.0 -685.2 -559.0
Senegal 196 6.3 32 2.7 44 490 2.9 1.9 -442.1 -199.5
Mauritania 1,031 1.8 2 2.3 45 470 2.0 8.7 -134.3 -308.9
Yemen PDR 333 2.2 6 2.2 46 460 na na -159.2 na
Sudan 2,506 20.4 8 3.2 47 440 0.6 15.2 -320.2 -219.7
Sierra Leone 72 3.7 52 2.0 38 390 2.0 12.2 -182.7 -169.8
Pakistan 804 89.7 112 3.0 50 380 5.0 12.7 -924 14
Maldives 0.3 0.2 533 3.1 52 373 na na na na
Gambia 11 0.7 60 3.0 36 360 2.5 9.7 -75.08 -49.7
Comoros 2 0.4 210 2.9 48 340 0.9 11.7 na na
Benin 113 3.7 33 2.7 48 310 1.3 9.6 na na
Guinea 246 5.4 22 2.0 38 310 0.8 3.3 na na
Niger 1,267 5.8 5 3.3 45 310 -1.4 12.1 -27.9 -75.5
Lebanon 10 2.7 265 0.5 65 na na na -1,919 -2,715
Palestine na na na na na na na na na na
Somalia 638 5.2 8 2.8 39 290 -0.5 12.6 -136.2 -149.9
Uganda 241 14.5 60 2.7 47 230 -1.5 47.4 -83.1 7.1
Burkina Faso 274 6.5 24 2.0 44 210 3.4 na -48.7 -155.2
Mali 1,240 7.5 6 2.7 45 180 1.3 9.8 -124.5 -102.7
Guinea Bissau	 36 0.9 24 1.6 38 170 -1.7 7.1 na na
Afghanistan 648 17.2 27 2.5 36 160 na na na na
Bangladesh 144 94.7 657 2.6 48 140 4.1 14.9 -757.0 -78.9
Chad 1,284 4.8 4 2.0 44 80 -2.6 7.8 8.6 37.9
Sources: IMF World Development Report, 1984
IDB annual reports, various issues
IMF International Financial Statistics, various issues
Finally, because the tropical climate of the Sub-Saharan African
countries is especially hospitable to bacterial, parasitic and epidemic
diseases such as malaria, cholera and the like, human energy and pro-
ductivity are adversely affected. The problem of such countries cannot
be solved by emergency food relief which take place from time to time
when things get really worse but can only be solved, if these countries
are helped with interest-free loans, grants, capital goods, PLS joint-
ventures, technical assistance and the like. For the present little is
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done in this respect, in fact, as reported by the IDB 9th report 1404H:
"official development assistance has been diminishing. According to the
OECD estimates the total of such resources received by the LDCs in 1983
was US$33.5bn, some US$200m less than in 1982 and the total net capital
inflows including short-term bank lending, has been on a downward trend
ever since 1981 from US$132bn in 1981 to US$112bn in 1982 to US$101bn
in 1983. Therefore, the evidence emphasises the current reality that
external financial inflows desperately needed by the developing count-
ries for their growth and development are being severely diminished".
As mentioned above, no real economic recovery will last long in the
DCs as well as in the LDCs, in fact the world economic situation will
only deteriorate further unless more co-operation, more investment and
more co-ordination are undertaken between the North and the South and
between the countries of the South themselves, to use the 'Brandt Com-
mission' names for developed and developing countries. The 1.1:111
however, is to foster the well-being of its member countries, and to
try to achieve a harmonious and balanced development, giving due regard
and priority to the needs of the least developed member countries,
through mutual financial and economic co-operation.
8.3 PERFORMANCE OF THE ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK (IDB)
8.3.1 Establishment, Purpose and Operations of the IDB
The Islamic Development Bank (IDB) was established in 1975 as a
development, investment and welfare oriented international financial
institution, based on the Islamic principles of the Shariah. It opened,
officially, on the 20th October 1975 and so is considered to be one of
the oldest and pioneering banks in promoting and implementing Islamic
banking and Islamic economics. According to A.M. Ali (1979:336): "The
bank has been set up in recognition of the need for fostering the well-
being of the peoples of the participating countries and for achieving a
harmonious and balanced development of these countries. It is based on
the conviction that such development can be best advanced through mu-
tual, financial and economic co-operation among the states, which are
members of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). It is designed
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to promote and strengthen co-operation among its members in the econo-
mic, social and other fields of activity.., and seeks to mobilise fi-
nancial and other resources both from within and outside its member
countries and is expected to promote domestic savings and investment
and a greater flow of development funds into member countries".
The bank's principal office is located in Jeddah in Saudi Arabia
and is authorised to open agencies or branch offices elsewhere. At
present it has not yet opened any branch or office neither in Saudi
Arabia nor elsewhere, but it has maintained a close relationship with
National Development Financing Institutions (NDFIs) in member countries
and with Islamic commercial banks in different countries.
IDB's functions and powers include, among others:
	
1	 Participation in equity capital of productive projects
2 Investment in economic and social infrastructure projects by
way of participation or other financial arrangement (conform
with Islamic Shariah of course);
	
3	 Provision of interest free loans to the private and public
sectors for the financing of productive projects;
4 Establishment and operating special funds for specific purpo-
ses, such as, a fund for assistance to Muslim communities in
non-member countries and trust funds;
	
5	 Accepting deposits and raising funds Islamically;
	
6	 Assisting in the promotion of foreign trade, especially in
capital goods, among member countries;
	
7	 Suitable investment of funds not needed in its operations;
	
8	 Provision of technical assistance to member countries;
	
9	 Extension of training facilities for personnel engaged in de-
velopment activities in member countries;
	
10	 Undertaking research for enabling the economic, financial and
banking activities in Muslim countries to conform to Shariah;
11 Co-operation, subject to agreement, in such a manner as the
bank may deem appropriate, with all bodies, institutions and
organisations having similar purposes, in pursuance of inter-
national economic co-operation;
	
12	 Any other activities which may advance its purpose;
8.3.2 Membership and Capital
The IDB authorised capital is ID2000m divided into 200,000 shares,
having a per value of ID 10,000 each, and may be increased by the board
of governors at such and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem
advisable by a vote of 2/3 of the total number of governors, represen-
ting not less than 3/4 of the total voting powers of the members. The
unit of account of the bank is known as the Islamic Dinar (ID), the va-
lue of which is equivalent to 1 SDR (Special Drawing Right). The mini-
mum number of shares to be subscribed by a member is 250 shares with a
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per value of ID10,000 each, (ie ID2.5m). The bank's financial year is
the lunar Hi . ra year which is 11 days shorter than the Gregorian year.
29 countries signed the agreement before the end of October 1974,
thus, qualifying as founding members. Their total subscription amounted
to ID755m, the largest share of which ID200m, contributed by Saudi Ara-
bia, followed by that of Libya, ID125m. By the end of 1985, membership
had increased to 43 countries with total subscription of ID1,952.07m.
The major 5 participants in the 1985 capital are Saudi Arabia, Libya,
Kuwait, UAE and Turkey (see Tables 8.6 and 8.7). The basic condition
for membership is that the prospective member country should be a mem-
ber of the OIC and be willing to accept such terms and conditions as
may be decided upon by the board of governors (see Mannan 1984:454)
Table 8.6 Initial	 Subscription	 to the	 Authorised	 Capital
of IDB by the Founding Members (in ID million and %)
Country Amount of subscription Share
Afghanistan 2.5 0.33
Algeria 25.0 3.31
Bahrain 5.0 0.66
Bangladesh 10.0 1.32
Chad 2.5 0.33
Egypt 25.0 3.31
Guinea . 2.5 0.33
Indonesia 25.0 3.31
Jordan 4.0 0.53
Kuwait 100.0 13.24
Lebanon 2.5 0.33
Libya . 125.0 16.56
Malaysia 16.0 2.12
Mali 2.5 0.33
Mauritania 2.5 0.33
Morocco 5.0 0.66
Niger 2.5 0.33
Oman 5.0 0.66
Pakistan 25.0 3.31
Qatar 25.0 3.31
Saudi Arabia 200.0 26.49
Senegal 2.5 0.33
Somalia 2.5 0.33
Sudan 10.0 1.32
Syria . 2.5 0.33
Tunisia 2.5 0.33
Turkey 10.0 1.32
UAE 110.0 14.57
Yemen (Northern) 2.5 0.33
755.0 100.00
Source: IDB 10th annual report.
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Table 8.7	 Member Countries Subscriptions as on 29.12.1405H
(in million Islamic Dinars)
Member	 country Initial Increase	 Total
1 Afghanistan 2.5 2.5 0.13
2 Algeria 25.0 38.1 63.1 3.23
3 Bahrain 5.0 2.0 7.0 0.36
4 Bangladesh 10.0 15.0 25.0 1.28
5 Benin 2.5 2.5 0.13
6 Burkina Faso 2.5 3.8 6.3 0.32
7 Cameroon 2.5 3.8 6.3 0.32
8 Chad 2.5 2.5 0.13
9 Comoro Islands 2.5 2.5 0.13
10 Djibouti 2.5 2.5 0.13
11 Egypt 25.0 25.0 1.28
12 Gabon 3.0 4.5 7.5 0.38
13 Gambia 2.5 2.5 0.13
14 Guinea 2.5 3.8 6.3 0.32
15 Guinea Bissau 2.5 3.8 6.3 0.32
16 Indonesia 25.0 28.1 63.1 3.23
17 Iraq 10.0 15.2 25.2 1.29
18 Jordan 4.0 6.1 10.1 0.52
19 Kuwait 100.0 152.2 252.2 12.92
20 Lebanon 2.5 2.5 0.13
21 Libyan 125.0 190.3 315.3 16.15
22 Malaysia 16.0 24.4 40.4 2.07
23 Maldives 2.5 2.5 0.13
24 Mali 2.5 2.5 0.13
25 Mauritania 2.5 2.5 0.13
26 Morocco 5.0 7.6 12.6 0.65
27 Niger 2.5 3.8 6.3 0.32
28 Oman 5.0 2.0 7.0 0.36
29 Pakistan 25.0 38.1 63.1 3.23
30 Palestine 2.5 2.5 5.0 0.26
31 Qatar 25.0 25.0 50.0 2.56
32 Saudi Arabia 200.0 306.4 506.4 25.94
33 Senegal 2.5 3.8 6.3 0.32
34 Sierra Leone 2.5 2.5 0.13
35 Somalia 2.5 2.5 0.13
36 Sudan 10.0 15.2 25.2 1.29
37 Syria 2.5 2.5 0.13
38 Tunisia 2.5 2.5 5.0 0.26
39 Turkey 10.0 150.0 160.0 8.20
40 Uganda 2.5 3.8 6.3 0.32
41 United Arab Emirates 110.0 84.7 194.7 9.97
42 Northern Yemen 2.5 3.8 6.3 0.32
43 Southern Yemen 2.5 3.8 6.3 0.32
TOTAL 798.0 1,154.0 1,952.0 100.00
Source: IDB 10th annual report.
IDB financial resources consist of the following:
Ordinary Capital Resources
1	 the capital subscribed
2	 deposits placed with the bank
3 amounts received in repayment of loans, from the sale of
its equity holdings and as income from investment re-
lated to its ordinary operations
4 any other funds raised or received by the bank, or
placed at its disposal for specified purposes other than
special funds resources and trust funds resources.
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Special Fund Resources
1	 funds contributed by members for inclusion in any
special fund;
2	 funds allocated by the bank to any special fund form
net income arising out of its ordinary operations;
3	 funds repaid in respect of financing from the resources
of special funds
4	 income derived from operations financed by a special fund;
5	 any other resources received by, or placed at the dis-
posal of any special fund.
Trust Fund Resources
1	 resources received by the bank to be administered in
accordance with the terms of the trust;
2	 funds received in respect of operations financed by
trust funds; and
3	 income derived from operations financed by trust funds.
The operations of the Bank are separated according to these desi-
gnations. Its resources are not fungible, and separate financial state-
ments for each type of operations are mandated.
8.3.3 The IDB Balance Sheets
Because the only financial reports made available to me were those
between 1400-1405H, the Balance Sheet discussion is limited to those 6
years only (see Table 8.8). Three striking observations attract the at-
tention from the first glance at these balance sheets: First, the cash
to assets ratio is very high (ranging between 54% and 35.5%) and having
the highest share in total assets compared with other items of the BS.
This means that the bank is too liquid and needs to invest and allocate
such funds for the economic development of its members which need such
funds. Second, the total of ordinary operations finance to total assets
is relatively very low (less than 20%) though these are supposed to be
the main functions of the bank and Third, more than 80% of the bank
operations are financed from capital and reserves which means that
little use is made of external sources of funds. This requires that the
bank should develop the ways and means to attract such funds. This also
requires that the surplus oil exporting countries should deposit some
of their petrodollars in interest-free deposits or on PLS basis with
the bank, so that the bank will have enough funds to finance more pro-
jects especially in the least developed counties to help them develop
and overcome the difficulties of capital scarcity.
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Another observation is that, although Foreign Trade Finance (FTF)
was not intended to be the main function of the bank at the time of the
establishment of the bank, it is the most practised by the bank. For
instance, FTF/TLA ratio ranged between 27.4% in 1980 and 42.7% in 1985
coming second after liquid assets to total asset ratio. This means that
most of the bank finance is in the form of FTF. The reason for this
may be that FTF is the most easy short term investment, the most profi-
table and the least risky for the bank to undertake as compared to or-
dinary finance which includes loans and technical assistance that are
in the form of interest-free loans or even in the form of grants that
are not repayable, equity investment, leasing and profit sharing, all
of which need substantial amounts of time and efforts to undertake.
During the period 1400-1405H the IDB's TLA Increased from ID973.2m
in 1400 to ID2109.6m in 1405 at an annual ARG of 16.9%, thus, more than
doubled in the last 6 years. Among the ordinary operations, equity in-
vestments was the most important with an average share of about 46% of
total ordinary operation finance followed by loans and technical assis-
tance with an average share of 35.3% and leasing with a share of 18.3%.
The share of profit sharing is very negligible (0.6% only) (see Tables
8.8, 8.9 and 8.10).
The IDB introduced the investment deposit scheme in September 1980
in order to provide both acceptable opportunities to investors and to
mobilise financial resources for the Bank. During the period 1400-1405H
these deposits registered 83.2% growth rate, the 2nd highest annual ARG
after profit which registered an annual ARG of 91.2%. The level of de-
posits at the end of 1405H decreased by 56% compared to that of 1403H.
The Bank did not give any reason for this, but in my opinion the drop
is due to the fact that most if not all of these deposits were those of
other Islamic banks which were too liquid in previous years in view of
being newly established, not yet involved in real investment or in view
of operating in highly liquid financial environments like the case of
Kuwait Finance House which had to limit and restrict accepting deposit
in 1403H. But now that the Gulf banking boom years are over, especially
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Table 8.8 The IDS Balance Sheets for the Years 1400-1405H (in ID million and in	 )
1400 1401 . 1402 1403 1404 1405
Amount	 % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount	 % Amount %
Cash 523.7 53.8 395.6 35.5 619.3 45.0 874.1 51.6 780.2 41.5 771.1 36.6
FTF 267.4 27.4 468.4 42.0 430.5 31.3 434.1 25.6 660.7 35.1 901.6 42.7
Ordinary O perations 136.0 14.0 197.9 17.8 269.9 19.7 325.8 19.3 388.9 20.7 395.2 18.7
Sundry Debit Accounts 23.0 2.5 30.5 2.7 33.1 2.4 36.6 2.1 28.3 1.5 18.5 0.9
Fixed Assets 22.4 2.3 22.0 2.0 21.6 1.6 23.4 1.4 23.4 1.2 23.2 1.1
Total Assets	 . 973.2 100.0 1114.4 100 1374.4 100.0 1694.0 100.0 1881.6 100.0 2109.6 100.0
Ca p ital 760.4 78.2 775.0 69.6 932.4 67.8 1082.6 64.0 1275.0 67.8 1428.2 67.7
Reserves 107.2 11.0 156.7 14.0 208.3 15.2 269.2 15.9 316.5 16.9 333.7 15.8
Profit or Loss 10.2 1.0 14.7 1.3 16.9 1.2 2.4 0.1 8.4 0.4 28.6 1.4
Dep osits 13.0 1.3 53.7 4.8 62.6 4.6 , 155.4 9.2 77..1 4.Z 67.f I.2
Special Assistance 79.7 8.2 111.6 10.0 144.9 10.5 171.3 10.1 194.6 10.3 203.4 9.1
Sundry Credit Account 2.6 O.& 2.8 0.3 9.3 0.7 13.1 0.7 9.8 0.5 47.8 2.3
Total Liabilities 973.2 100.0 1114.4	 100.0 1374.4	 100.0 1694.0	 100.0 1881.6 100.0 2109.6 100.0
Source: IDB, various Annual Re ports, 1400-1405
Table 8.9	 The Breakdown of IDB Ordinary Finance,(in million ID and 	 1400-1405H)
1400	 1401	 1402	 1403	 1406	 1405	 Averages
Amount %	 Amount %	 Amount %	 Amount	 %	 Amount	 %	 Amount	 %	 Amount
Tech. Assist. 38.7 28.5	 58.8 29.7	 81.5 30.2 117.0 35.9 140.1 37.0 165.2 41.8 100.9 35.3
Equit y	81.6 60.0 110.0 55.6 130.4 48.3 152.4 46.8 169.9 43.7 144.5 36.3 131.3 45.9
Leasing	 12.6	 9.3	 27.0 13.6	 56.9 21.1	 56.4 17.3	 74.9 19.3	 86.1 21.8	 52.3 18.3
Profit Sharing 3.1	 2.3	 2.1	 1.1	 1.0	 0.4	 -	 0.4	 0.1	 1.6	 0.6
Total	 136.0 100.0 197.9 100.0 269.8 100.0 325.8 100.0 388.9 100.0 395.2 100.0 285.6 100.0
Source: IDB various Annual Reports
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after the Soull El -Manakh financial market collapse, the drop in housing
prices in which KFH was involved, the sharp drop in oil prices, and the
general trend of the drop in TLA of banks not only in the Islamic ones,
but in most banks even at the international level, these banks had to
withdraw some of their deposits with the IDB to meet contingencies.
Table 8.10 Growth Rates of the Most Important Items of the IDB
Balance Sheets between 1400-1405H (in Percentages)
1401 1402 1403 1404 1405
Averages1400 1401 1402 1403 1404
Cash funds -24.5 56.5 41.1 -10.7 -1.2 12.2
Foreign trade
financing 75.2 -8.1 0.8 52.2 36.5 31.3
Project financing and
technical assistance 45.5 36.3 20.8 19.4 1.6 24.7
Capital and reserves 7.4 22.4 18.5 11.1 10.1 15.1
Special assistance
account 39.7 29.8 18.2 13.6 4.5 21.2
Deposits 313.6 16.6 148.4 -50.3 -12.2 83.2
Profits 43.7 15.0 -85.5 242.3 240.5 91.2
Total assets 14.5 23.3 23.3 11.1 12.1 16.9
Source: Table 8.8 above
In the year 1403H, the Bank conducted studies relating to the es-
timates of its resource needs up to the year 1415H. The studies indica-
ted that a resource gap aggregating approximately ID11bn was projected
over the years 1409H to 1415H, if the Bank was to provide for a modest
growth in its operations allowing for inflation and taking into account
the needs of its least developed member countries. Thus the need to im-
prove the Investment Deposit Scheme to make it responsive to the needs
of the Bank and prospective investors and the need to develop new PLS
financial instruments which could help the Bank fill the gap and carry
out its activities with little or no problem.
Unlike other international development banks whose task of resource
mobilisation is somewhat easier as they can borrow funds from capital
markets on the basis of interest through issuing bonds, certificates of
deposit and term loans, the task before the IDB is much more difficult.
Firstly, because as an Islamic bank whose operations must conform to
Shariah, it cannot borrow funds from capital markets on the basis of
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interest which is prohibited in Islam. Secondly, because the Islamic
Financial System is still in its infancy, Islamic capital markets and
Islamic financial instruments conform to Shariah are yet to be develo-
ped. Nevertheless the IDB, in addition to its planning to improve the
Investment Deposit Scheme, is paying particular attention to the deve-
lopment and issuance of the following:
1	 short-term investment certificates, the receipt of which
are to be used in the Foreign Trade Finance (FTF);
2	 long-term investment certificates, the receipt of which
are to be used in leasing operations of the IDB.
3	 closed-end mutual funds, the receipts of which are to be
used in the Bank's eguity investments.
4	 general type certificates, the receipt of which are to
be utilised in 'a basket' of various modes of investment.
The IDB is also considering and following with great interest the
experience of Jordan Islamic Bank (JIB) in issuing Mudharabah Certifi-
cates of Deposit (MCDs). The holder of these certificates would not be
assured a predetermined return on the capital he has provided but would
receive an agreed percentage of the net profits of the project if there
is any profit and bear his share of any loss that might occur. Besides,
the IDB is also considering co-operation with other Islamic banks to
mobilise more resources through the initiation of various institutional
arrangements such as the formation of a consortium of Islamic banks,
investment companies and secondary markets.
The Special Assistance Account, which represents about 10% of IDB's
TA and which increased from ID79.7m in 1400H to ID203.4m in 1405H, at
an annual MG of 21.2% (see Tables 8.8 and 8.10), is still insufficient
to meet the need of the member countries and Muslim communities that
are affected by natural disasters, as in the case of the Sub-Saharan
member countries which are affected by long droughts and by diseases.
Although the amount of funds in this account has more than doubled bet-
ween 1400 and 1405H, more funds are needed from the rich member count-
ries to ease the problems of the least developed countries. Funds for
this account can also be raised during the Haij (pilgrimage) season in
Mekkah (Saudi Arabia) where more than 2 million people from all over
the world gather every year and who could donate on average at least
US$25 each, which means the collection of about US$50m a year. Funds
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for this purpose can also be raised through collection of Zakat from
the places that are of no need to places where these are most needed.
During the period 1400-1405H the IDB made quite substantial amounts
of profits ranging from ID2.4m to ID28.6m, growing at an annual ARG of
91.2%, albeit the sharp drop in profit from ID16.9m in 1402H to ID2.4m
in 1403H representing 85.5% decrease due in part to the decline in the
value of the bank equity investment and in part to the creation of
ID1Om provision for any further decrease.
As for the Foreign Trade Financing (FTF), investment loans and
technical assistance, I think it is better to look at them in greater
detail in the next section because their appearance in the BS does not
give much information on the number of operations financed, neither the
effective amounts spent on them, all it gives is the outstanding debt
of member countries at the end of each year in the form of FTF, loans
or technical assistance, however, the outstanding FTF at the end of
each year increased with an annual ARG of 31.3% from ID267.4m in 1400H
to ID901.6m in 1405H, thus, more than tripled. And project financing
and technical assistance which include loans, shares in companies,
leasing, technical assistance, etc., also increased by 24.7% during the
same period from ID136m in 1400 to ID395.2m in 1405H, thus recording
almost threefold increase during the 6 years under review.
8.4 THE IDB FINANCE OPERATIONS
As mentioned earlier, the IDB finance operations consist of:
1	 Ordinary operations which include project financing and
technical assistance;
2	 foreign trade operations; and
3	 special assistance operations.
Table 8.11 summarises the IDB total financing operations since es-
tablishment in 1396H till the end of 1405H. During this period, the IDB
financed 575 operations amounting to ID4,873m (US$5,360m) in its first
10 years of activity. On average the IDB financed about 58 operations
per year amounting to ID487m (US$536m) or to ID8.5m (US$9.3m) each. The
annual number of operations grew from 2 in 1396H to 97 in 1405H and
their corresponding amounts increased from ID13.45m to ID1,005.22m at
an annual ARG of 134% (see Tables 8.11 and 8.12).
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Of the IDB total 575 operations, during the 10 years, 268 opera-
tions, amounting to ID1,335.54m (US$1,469m) and representing 27.4% of
the total, were in the form of ordinary operations which included 204
project financing operations amounting to ID1,302.28m (US$1,432.52m)
representing 26.7% of the total and growing from 2 operations in 1396H
amounting to ID13.45m to 35 operations in 1405H amounting to ID266.48m
at an ARG of 85% and 64 technical assistance amounting to ID33.26m
(US$36.6m) and representing 0.71% of the total and growing from 3
operations in 1397 amounting to ID0.84m (US$0.93m) to 13 operations in
1405 amounting to ID6.63m (US$7.29m) at an annual ARG of 48%.
250 operations of the total 575, amounting to ID3,379.31m
(US$3,717.24m) and representing 69.3% of the total, were in the form of
FTF. FTF grew from 5 operations amounting to ID43.61m (US$47.97m) in
1397H to a peak 47 operations amounting ID714.31m (US$785.74m) in 1404H
and dropping to 38 operations amounting ID668.21m (US$735.03m) in 1405.
The annual ARG of FTF for the period was 52% (see Tables 8.11 and 8.12)
Table 8.12 Growth Rates of IDB Total Finance Operations (1396-1405H)
(in Percentages)
Years Project
Financing
Technical
Assistance FTF
Special
Assistance Total
1396 - - - - -
1397 635 - - - 966
1398 -30 -2 192 - 38
1399 30 67 106 - 80
1400 43 147 34 1092 39
1401 -18 102 5 -37 -1
1402 43 -35 -3 74 7
1403 19 35 34 -15 29
1404 14 -51 49 698 46
1405 31 124 -6 2 2
Averages 85 48 52 227 134
Source: Table 8.11.
The remaining 57 operations, amounting ID158.15m (US$173.97m) and
representing 3.3% of the total, were in the form of special assistance
operations and financed from the special assistance account. They inc-
reased from ID0.71m (US$0.78m) in 1399H for 1 operation to ID63.90m
(US$70.29m) in 1405H for 11 operations growing at an ARG of 227%.
207
8.4.1 IDB Ordinary Operations
Table 8.13 gives more detail about the IDB's ordinary operations
which include project financing and technical assistance. Project fi-
nancing which represents 98% of the bank total ordinary finance inc-
ludes: 1) interest-free loans for constructional projects of infra-
structural nature such as roads, dams, communications, etc., 2) equity
participation in the capital of agricultural and industrial companies,
3) leasing of machinery and other equipment; 4) MUrabahah and instal-
ment sale; and 5) profit sharing.
The remaining 2%, of the total, is in the form of technical assis-
tance to enable member countries execute the necessary social, economic
and financial feasibility studies to prepare projects for financing by
the financial institutions. The table shows the number of operations of
each of these forms of financing, their amounts, the percentage of each
in the total, their yearly percentage changes and their averages.
A- Loan Financing
During the first 10 years of activity, the IDB approved 85 loan
projects amounting to ID492.97m (US$543.27m) in 36 member countries and
representing 37% of the total ordinary finance. The loans given by the
Bank were interest-free, however, the IDB collected service fees, which
are controversial, to cover its relevant administrative expenses.
The approved loan projects increased from 1 in 139611 amounting to
ID6m to 15 in 1405H amounting to ID98.62m at an average of 8.5 projects
per year amounting to ID49.30m or to ID5.80m each and growing at an ARG
of 11.2% per annum, the highest among those of the other forms of pro-
ject financing. In 139711 it recorded a peak rate of growth of 824%
when it jumped from 1 loan amounting to ID6m in 1396 to 11 loans amoun-
ting to ID55.41m in 1397, and a lowest rate of -54% in the following
year 1398H when it approved only 5 projects amounting to ID25.46m The
fluctuation depends of course on the number of applications for loans
every year and on the feasibility of the projects.
Most of these loans were given to the least developed member coun-
tries for socio-economic infrastructural projects that help bringing
about better growth and development, but because of the inadequate phy-
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sical, administrative and social infrastructure, the magnitude of in-
vestment needed for development in the least developed member countries
will remain for many years to come at a level far beyond the saving ca-
pacity of these countries and the IDB financial resources.
Table 8.13 The Evolution of the IDB Ordinary Operation (1396-1405H)
(in ID million and in %)
Loans Equity Leasing Inst. PLS Total pro3. Tech. Grand
Sale	 finance	 Ass. Total
1396	 No. 1 1 - -	 - 2 - 2
Amount 6.00 7.45 -
-	 - 13.45 - 13.45
% 45 55 -
-
100 - 100
Growth - - - _	 _=
- - -
1397	 No. 22 8 1
-	 - 20 3 23
Amount 55.41 38.32 5.22 -	 - 98.95 0.84 99.70
% 56 38 5 -	 - 99 1 100
Growth 824 414 -
-	 - 636 - 641
1398	 No. 5 5 1 -	 1 12 3 15
Amount 25.46 29.36 10.00 -	 4.27 69.09 0.82 69.91
% 36 42 14 -	 6 99 1 100
Growth -54 -23 92
-	 - -30 -2 -30
1399
	 No. 6 8 2
-	 - 16 5 21
Amount 33.74 39.79 16.25 -	 - 89.78 1.37 91.14
% 37 44 18
-	 - 98 2 100
Growth 33 36 63
-	 - 30 67 30
1400
	 No. 9 10 5
-	 - 24 3 27
Amount 52.68 39.04 36.47 -	 - 128.19 3.38 131.57
% 40 30 28 -	 - 97 3 100
Growth 56 -2 124 -	 - 43 147 44
1401
	 No. 6 10 3 -	 - 19 10 29
Amount 28.12 45.98 30.69 -	 - 104.79 6.83 111.62
% 25 41 27 -	 - 94 6 100
Growth -46 18 -16 -	 - -18 102 -15
1402	 No. 9 8 8 -	 - 25 8 33
Amount 48.03 28.70 75.53 -	 - 150.26 4.44 154.70
% 31 19 48 -	 - 97 3 100
Growth 71 -38 140 -	 - 43 -35 39
1403	 No. 11 5 10 -	 1 26 12 38
Amount 73.45 15.61 86.43 -	 3.06 178.55 5.99 184.54
% 40 8 47 -	 2 97 3 100
Growth 53 -46 18 -	 - 19 35 19
1404	 No. 12 1 12 -	 - 25 7 32
Amount 71.46 6.00 125.27 -	 -	 202.73 2.96 205.70
% 35 3 61 -	 - 99 1 100
Growth -3 -62 45 -	 - 14 -51 11
1405	 No. 15 4 9 7	 - 35 13 48
Amount 98.62 9.87 92.10 65. 90	 - 266.49 6.63 273.12
% 36 4 34 24	 - 98 2 100
Growth 38 65 -26 -	 - 31 124 33
Total	 No. 85 60 50 7	 2 204 64 264
Amount 492.97 260.13 475.96 65.90	 7.33 1302.29 33.25 1335.54
% 37 19 36 5	 1 98 2 100
Average No. 8.5 6 5 0.7	 0.2 20.4 6.4 26.4
Amount 49.30 26.01 47.60 6.53	 0.73 130.23 3.33 133.55
112 40 49 85 48 86
Source: IDB Annual Reports, Various issues.
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Mannan (1984:485) argued that: "It has to be acknowledged that in
real terms project lending even with high service charge cannot be con-
sidered to be a profitable operation for the bank if the present infla-
tion rate is added to the normal monetary rate of discount", and so he
suggested that the IDB has to divert its resources to explore other
avenues of investment opportunities either in the form of equity parti-
cipation or in the form of expanded foreign trade financing operations
or similar lines of investment. But if we take into consideration that
the IDB as a development bank should not be a profit seeker (ie profit-
maximiser) and that loans for financing infrastructural projects are
the most needed especially in the least developed countries to alle-
viate or remove the bottlenecks and to ease the difficulties accounting
for most if not all other economic activities, one has to disagree with
Dr. Mannan. This is not to suggest that the Bank should give all its
finance in the form of interest-free loans, but a diversification in
its forms of financing is best for both the bank and its customers.
B- Equity Participation
Since 1396H, the year of establishment until 1405H the 10th year
of activity, the IDB participated in 60 equity operations amounting to
ID260.13m, representing 19% of the total ordinary finance and varying
from 1 equity participation in 1396H amounting to ID7.45m to 10 in 1401
amounting to ID45.98m and to 1 only in 1404 amounting to ID6m and then
to 4 in 1405 amounting to ID9.87m. On average the IDB participated
annually in 6 equity operations amounting to ID26m.
Though equity financing had been expanding till 140111, it has suf-
fered a decline since 1402H. The relative decline in equity financing
is, according to IDB 10th Annual Report, primarily attributed to poor
financial performance of some of the IDB's equity projects due to the
general world economic recession, delayed implementation, cost overrun,
marketing, currency depreciation and management. Consequently the pro-
fitability of some of these projects has been adversely affected and
considerable losses have been incurred in others.
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Furthermore as rightly pointed out by Mannan (1984:460): "The
guidelines of equity participation presuppose the existence of adequate
and sound physical and social infrastructure and administrative machi-
nery capable of formulating and implementing policies in all sectors of
the economy. Unfortunately this presupposition is not the reality in
many developing countries not to speak of the least developed member
countries of the Bank". All these factors have without doubt contribu-
ted to the limitation of the bank equity participation and to the dec-
line in the value of its investments, in the rate of return and divi-
dend of some companies in which it has equity participation. But as a
safeguard for the future, the Bank has formulated new equity guidelines
which among others, include:
(a) selective approach in choosing suitable equity projects;
(b) more rigorous marketing study;
(c) involvement of the Bank at the early stage;
(d) stricter financial evaluation;
(e) proper follow up and post evaluation.
The IDB's equity financing includes direct participation in pro-
jects and the granting of mixed line of equity and leasing to National
Development Financial Institutions (NDFIs) in order to extend assistan-
ce to small and medium industrial projects; particularly in the private
sector. The NDFIs act as agencies of the Bank for the purpose of iden-
tifying, appraising and implementation of the local projects which are
suitable for this type of financing by the Bank. In this manner it can
participate even in smaller size projects which it cannot otherwise do
but the lack of suitable and profitable projects remains the obstacle.
C- Leasing
Leasing is the second most important mode of finance used by the
IDB after loan projects in terms of its share in the total ordinary fi-
nance (36%) and its annual ARG was 49% (see Table 8.13). Total lease
financing approved by the Bank from the commencement of its operations
till the end of 1405H amounted to ID475.96m for 50 operations, that is
5 operations per year on average, each amounting to ID9.52m increasing
from 1 operation amounting to ID5.22m in 1397H to 12 operations in 1404
amounting to ID125.27m and decreasing to 9 operations in 140511 amoun-
ting to ID92.10m recording an annual MG of 49%. Its share in the total
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amount of ordinary finance grew from 5% in 1397H to 61% in 1404H and
declined to 34% in 1405H because of the introduction in 1405H of the
new type of finance 'the instalment sale' to supplement leasing and
which accounted for 24% of the total ordinary finance in 1405H.
The IDB introduced leasing operations in 1397H in order to assist
its members in the procurement of necessary equipment and machinery for
the production of various intermediate and capital goods in its member
countries. Lease financing has also been used for the acquisition of
ocean-going vessels towards building up necessary transportation faci-
lities thereby augmenting foreign trade activities. Most of the leasing
operations approved were applied for, by the middle income member
countries (see IDB's Annual Reports 1400-1405H).
This type of finance is in my view more beneficial to the recipient
than loans, since the latter needs not to buy very expensive machinery,
vessels or equipment that it cannot afford to buy or even if it can, it
would cost it too much to maintain, repair and keep in case some diffi-
culties arise. Besides, even if the beneficiary can afford to buy the
machinery or whatever, it may need it only for some time which may be
less than its life span. Thus, getting it through leasing would save
substantial amounts of capital that can be used to procure other things
needed for development. This is also beneficial to the Bank under the
condition of diversification whereby a large number of leasing opera-
tions is necessary so that if one operation goes wrong other operations
would offset it and compensate for the loss that may arise. The Bank
would receive regular inflows of incomes from its leasing operations to
improve its cash flow and carry out other operations.
D- Instalment Sale
The IDB introduced this type of finance in 1405H to supplement
leasing which, according to the IDB 10th Annual Report, has some cons-
traints relating to the Bank's ownership of the leased assets and which
did not provide it with the necessary flexibility to finance fixed
assets for its members. For example, the asset in question may not be
eligible for leasing either because it is not separately identifiable
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or because of its short useful life span. Besides, the legal or tax
regulations of the prospective lessee may not make leasing an attrac-
tive or even a feasible proposition. Moreover, many prospective lessees
(mainly in the private sector) fail to get a commercial bank guarantee
in case of leasing because they do not hold ownership of the assets
leased. As a result of this limitation in the leasing mode, IDB intro-
duced the mode of instalment sale whereby the ownership of the asset is
immediately transferred to the buyer, while the sale price (which is
higher than the original price) is payable by instalments. Though this
means that IDB cannot repossess the asset if the buyer defaults in any
instalment, it also means that the Bank does not have to worry about
the risks associated with the ownership of the asset. Nevertheless the
asset may be offered as a counter guarantee to any financial institu-
tion which would, in turn, provide a guarantee for IDB instalments.
7 instalment sales were approved in 1405H for 6 member countries.
They amounted to ID65.90m, representing over 24% share in the 1405H
total ordinary finance. This type of finance is, perhaps, going to be
the most important one in the future.
E- Profit Sharing
Profit sharing is the most fundamental principle of Islamic ban-
king finance, but because it requires a great deal of involvement from
the Bank in evaluating, appraising, implementing, managing, supervising
and following up the projects financed by this method more than any
other type of financing and because the total area of the IDB member
countries covers more than 24m sq. km , the IDB found that it is diffi-
cult to expand it due to the above mentioned and other various concep-
tual and operational problems. As such, the Bank approved only 2 profit
sharing operations during the first 10 years amounting to ID7.33m and
representing only 0.55% of the total ordinary finance. The first opera-
tion was approved in 1398H for Badr Housing Complex project in the UAE
with Dubai Islamic Bank (DIB) and amounted to ID4.27m and the second
was approved in 1403H for Marakesh awqaf project in Morocco involving
an amount of ID3.06m.
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F- Technical Assistance
In addition to the above mentioned forms of project financing which
constitute about 98% of the IDB total ordinary finance, the IDB also
provided technical assistance to its member countries either in the
form of loans or grants (not exceeding ID150,000) or a combination of
both, primarily for feasibility studies, preliminary and detailed de-
signs and consultancy services, as well as procurement of research and
training equipment during the execution phase of a project. Technical
assistance activities of the Bank are important since they relate to
the identification and development of viable projects and to allocation
of scarce resources to the most appropriate areas.
70 technical assistance operations were approved by the Bank up to
the end of the year 1405H, involving an amount of ID34.15m in 29 coun-
tries. This included 6 operations involving ID0.917m which were later
cancelled, thus the effective technical assistance operations approved
by the Bank during the period under review were 64 operations amounting
to ID33.25m that is about 6.5 operations per year on average amounting
to ID3.66m or ID0.57m each and growing with an annual ARG of 48% from 3
operations amounting to ID0.84m in 1397H to 13 operations amounting to
ID6.63m in 1405H (see table 8.13).
G- Sectoral Allocation
Of the total ordinary operations financed, 37% were allocated to
industry, amounting to ID490.21m, 20% to transport and communications
corresponding to ID263.78m, 17% to agriculture involving an amount of
ID230.52m, 14% to utilities corresponding to an amount of ID187.14m, 9%
to social services involving ID121.13m and 3% to other sectors amoun-
ting to 142. 76m (see Table 8.14).
The annual allocation to the industrial sector fluctuated between
55% in 1396H and 24% in 1405H taking the lead over all other sectors
except in 1397 and 1403 when it was overtaken by the transport and com-
munication sector and in 1405 when it was overtaken by the agricultural
sector. But in general it is the sector number one in terms of finance
allocations followed by the sector of transport and communication which
include the financing of building roads, railways and oil pipelines.
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The share of the transport and communication sector in the total ordi-
nary finance fluctuated from year to year between 45% in 1397H and 3%
in 1405H. The fluctuation of course depends on the number of projects
applied for, the viability of the projects submitted and the condition
and terms of each project.
Table 8.14 Sectoral Allocation of IDB Total Ordinary Finance
(in ID million and in Percentages)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1396 Amount - 7.45 - 6.00 - - 13.45
% - 55 - 45 - - 100
1397 Amount 11.12 28.74 44.27 - 5.38 10.19 99.70
% 11 29 45 - 5 10 100
1398 Amount 13.00 37.96 - 9.65 - 9.30 69.91
% 19 54 - 14 - 13 100
1399 Amount 9.45 42.75 24.42 9.48 5.04 - 91.14
% 10 47 27 10 6 - 100
1400 Amount 15.49 57.18 22.72 17.56 10.23 8.39 131.57
% 12 43 18 13 8 6 100
1401 Amount 24.10 60.08 22.32 5.12 - - 111.62
% 22 54 20 5 - - 100
1402 Amount 23.26 65.51 34.12 25.10 5.00 1.71 154.70
% 15 43 22 16 3 1 100
1403 Amount 6.06 45.20 74.22 21.18 27.53 10.35 184.54
% 3 25 40 11 15 6 100
1404 Amount 28.79 79.42 34.43 21.20 41.37 0.49 205.70
% 14 39 17 10 20 0.2 100
1405 Amount 99.25 65.92 7.28 71.75 26.58 2.33 273.11
% 36 24 3 26 10 0.9 100
Total Amount 230.52 490.21 263.78 187.14 121.13 42.76 1335.54
% 17 37 20 14 9 3 100
Source: IDB Annual Reports, various issues.
Notes : (1) Agriculture and Agro -industry;
(3) Transport and Communications;
(5) Science;
(7) Total.
(2) Industry and Mining;
(4) Utilities;
(6) Others;
The agricultural sector comes in the 3rd place with an average
share of 17% of the total ordinary operations financed fluctuating from
11% in 1396 to 3% in 1403 and to 36 % in 1405H, followed by the sector
of utilities which includes financing dams for producing electricity
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and generators for electric power necessary for the development of
other sectors of the members' economies. This sector accounted for 14%
of the total ordinary finance for the 10 year period and its annual
share varied from 45% in 1396 to 5% in 1401 and to 26% in 1405H.
The social services sector includes the financing of hospitals,
schools and the like, things that are very much needed especially in
the least developed member countries where diseases, malnutrition and
illiteracy are very widespread. This sector accounted for a share of
9% in the total ordinary finance of the period growing steadily from 5%
in 1397 to 20% in 1404 then declining to 10% in 1405H.
8.4.2 IDB Foreign Trade Financing Operations
As noted by the IDB 9th Annual Report for the year 1404H and by
Nienhaus (1983:5), the general level of trade among Islamic countries
is rather low and foreign trade of IDB member countries has the same
general characteristics as the trade of developing countries as a whole.
Among these characteristics is the domination by primary goods, comple-
mented by a relatively smaller proportion of manufactured goods in
their total exports. At the same time, there is a relatively high share
of consumer and manufactured goods in their total imports and a high
dependence on the markets of the industrial countries.
Available data on the foreign trade of 23 of IDB member countries
whose share in the total of all IDB member countries for the year 1401H
accounted for more than 75% in both export and import, reveal that the
share of fuel and other primary goods was more than 90% of their total
export, while the share of manufactured goods formed more than 65% of
their total imports (see IDB 9th annual report 1984:40 and table 8.15).
Table 8.15 shows the structure of foreign trade of the 23 IDB
member countries mentioned above and shows also that complementarity of
the economies of these countries for co-operation and trade improvement
is at too low a level to allow for rapid expansion in the flow of trade
among them. However, the IDB, in addition to its ordinary project fi-
nancing operations, started financing foreign trade operations for its
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Table 8.15 Foreign Trade Structure of Some IDB Member Countries (in %)
EXPORTS
Fuels,
Minerals
& metals
1
Other	 Textiles Machinery
Primary	 and	 Transport
Commod. Clothing Equipment
2	 3	 4
Other
Manuf.
Goods
5
All
Primary
Commod.
1+2
All
Manuf.
Goods
3+4+5
Algeria 99 1 - - - 100 -
Bangladesh - 32 56 1 11 32 68
Burkina Faso - 85 2 6 7 85 15
Cameroon 33 64 1 - 2 97 3
Egypt 69 23 7 - 1 92 8
Indonesia 83 13 1 1 2 96 4
Jordan 33 24 6 2 35 57 43
Kuwait 84 1 1 5 9 85 15
Libya 100 - - - - 100 -
Malaysia 36 44 3 12 5 80 20
Morocco 44 28 10 1 17 72 28
Niger 81 17 1 - 1 98 2
Oman 94 1 - 4 1 95 5
Pakistan 7 40 41 1 11 47 53
Saudi Arabia 99 - - - 1 99 1
Senegal 52 29 4 4 11 81 19
Somalia 5 94 - - 1 99 1
Sudan 5 94 1 - - 99 1
Syria 74 18 4 1 3 92 8
Tunisia 57 10 15 2 16 67 33
Turkey 7 56 19 4 14 63 37
Yemen AR - 49 6 25 20 55 45
Yemen PDR 75 25 - - - 100 -
IMPORTS
Foods
1
Fish
2
Other	 Machinery
Primary	 Transport
Commod.	 Equipment
3	 4
Other
Manuf.
Goods
5
All
Primary
Commod.
1+2+3
All
Manuf.
Goods
4+5
Algeria 21 2 5 38 34 28 72
Bangladesh 20 8 11 21 40 39 61
Burkina Faso 25 16 3 24 32 44 56
Cameroon 9 12 2 34 43 23 77
Egypt 34 3 6 28 29 43 57
Indonesia 11 13 6 36 34 30 70
Jordan 17 17 3 33 30 37 63
Kuwait 14 1 2 41 42 17 83
Libya 18 1 2 38 41 21 79
Malaysia 13 17 5 37 28 35 65
Morocco 23 27 9 19 22 59 41
Niger 23 15 4 26 32 42 58
Oman 13 13 2 39 33 28 72
Pakistan 14 28 8 23 27 50 50
Saudi Arabia 14 1 2 40 43 17 83
Senegal 28 30 1 18 23 59 41
Somalia 33 1 4 35 27 38 62
Sudan 19 19 3 22 37 41 59
Syria 14 25 4 23 34 43 57
Tunisia 14 21 8 27 30 43 57
Turkey 3 44 6 22 25 53 47
Yemen AR 28 7 1 28 36 46 54
Yemen PDR 17 47 1 23 12 65 35
Source: The World Bank: World Development Report, 1984
Note : - stands for less than 0.5 per cent
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members in 1397H to provide its member countries with facilities for
obtaining essential commodities for their development programme and to
assist them procuring the necessary new materials and capital goods
needed by domestic industries. This facility serves for the bank as a
short-term placement operation in conformity with Shariah. The diffe-
rence between the purchase and the resale prices constitutes a source
of income for the bank.
Because of the small size of the manufacturing sectors in these
countries; their demand for manufactured goods is met primarily by
imports from the industrial countries. Likewise their supply of fuel
and raw materials depends mostly on the demand of the industrial coun-
tries for these goods and so the prospects of their economies depend
too much on the changes that happen in the developed world.
This is clear from the effects of the recent world recession which
affected the trade of LDCs in different magnitudes, with a particular
adverse impact being made on the trade of the IDB member countries. The
IDB 9th Annual Report (1984:42) states that: "Total world trade decli-
ned by 10% during the period 1980-1983 (1400-1403H). The estimated dec-
line in the exports of developing countries and member countries was
15% and 33% respectively. Exports of oil and non oil member countries
declined by the same percentage. The impact of this recession on the
total imports of developing countries started in 1982, total imports
were 12% less in 1983 than in 1981. The decline in the imports of non-
oil member countries started in 1983, their total imports in that year
were 23% less than in the preceding year" (see Table 8.16 which com-
pares IDB member countries' total trade to that of the world and of the
LDCs from 1978-1984). The share of IDB member countries in world trade
declined steadily from 15% in 1980 to 14.5% in 1981, 12.2% in 1982,
11.2% in 1983 and 10.3% in 1984. The situation must be even worse after
1985 when the price of oil fell from US$29 to about US$15 a barrel.
In conclusion the foreign trade of the LDCs generally and of the
IDB member countries in particular is highly dependent on the supply
and demand conditions in the markets of the industrial world which has
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been adopting many restrictive measures and trade barriers against the
flow of goods from the LDCs into their markets. Now unless the develo-
ping world in general including IDB member countries try to overcome
the problems of the recession and of the restrictive measures adopted
against them, by improving South-South trade and by starting effective
co-operation among themselves in any grouping and on regional bases in
all fields and especially in the field of trade, the problems of these
countries will only worsen in the future if the existing circumstances
continue to prevail. It is true, as Nienhaus (1983:5) argued that: "a
policy of nothing but trade liberalisation cannot speed up the trade
volumes within a short period of time as long as most exports of Isla-
mic countries consist of agricultural products and raw materials while
the complementary capacities in manufacturing industries are very limi-
ted or completely missing in the Muslim world". But something has to be
done and so the necessity of co-operation and integration in all fields
and especially in the field of industrialisation which should have the
priority in the development policies of these countries so as to diver-
sify their economies and be able to increase volumes of trade among
themselves, thus at least, partially substituting trade with industrial
countries and resisting the recession. In this respect, the IDB started
FTF activities in 1397H in order to promote such co-operation and help
its member countries import developmental commodities preferably from
member countries, thereby encouraging the flow of trade between them.
During the period 1397-140511 the IDB approved 250 FTF operations
amounting to ID3,379.1m (US$3,790.49) for 29 of its members, with an
average size of US$14.77m each (see Table 8.17). The number of opera-
tions increased from 5 operations in 1397H to 47 operations in 140411,
then dropped to 38 operations in 1405H recording thus, an annual ARG of
41% and their corresponding amounts increased from US$50.52m in 139711
to US$748.22m in 1404H, then decreased to US$659.4m in 1405H recording
thus, an annual ARG of 49%.
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Table 8.17 IDB Foreign Trade Financing Operations (1395-1404H)
Number of
Beneficiary
Year	 Countries
Number of	 Amounts Approved
Operations	 in IDm	 in US$m
% Change
	 % Change
of the Number of the US$
of Operations
	
Amounts
1397 4 5 43.61 50.52 - -
1398 9 14 127.44 155.82 180 208
1399 13 25 262.46 338.09 79 117
1400 19 33 352.86 459.99 32 36
1401 15 32 370.34 456.44 -3 -1
1402 12 29 379.68 424.70 -9 -7
1403 11 27 460.40 497.50 -7 17
1404 16 47 714.31 748.22 74 50
1405 13 38 668.21 659.40 -19 -12
Total 29 250 3,379.31 3,790.49 ARG=41 ARG=49
Source: IDB, Annual Reports, various issues.
The IDB' FTF represents about 70% of its total finance which means
that nearly three quarters of its finance was in the form of FTF. This
may perhaps be explained by the following: (1) FTF is the easiest form
of finance to carry out, compared to the other forms adopted by the
bank such as project financing since it does not require extensive
evaluations of the operation as the other forms do. All it requires is
the signing of agreements with the buyer and seller countries on the
quantities and prices of the commodities to be financed and carrying on
of the operation; (2) It is perhaps the most profitable form of finance
with or after leasing operations for the bank, as compared to project
financing, profit sharing or even equity participation because before
financing a foreign trade operation the bank agrees with the buyer
country on a mark up price which would, more or less assure, the bank
of a return on its financing; (3) This mark up price is allowed in
Islam since it is a profit out of trade Murabahah and not interest on
loans. (4) Perhaps FTF is also the preferred form of finance to the
beneficiary country, which, after receiving the commodity it need, is
free from the bank supervision and following up in contrast to profit
sharing for example, where the bank has the right to follow, supervise
and even decide on where and how finance should be used; and (5) FTF
also involves less staff and requires less time to carry out compared
to other forms of finance adopted by the IDB.
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Out of the 250 operations approved by the bank, 241 operations
amounting to ID3,374.12m (US$3,785.18m) were effectively carried out
during the period 1397 to 1405H. Of these operations 212 operations
amounting to ID2,682.74m (US$3,103.67m) were between member countries
representing 80% of the total amount. This means that the IDB is pro-
moting trade among member countries which are all included in what is
called the 'South' thus, promoting South-South trade.
As can be seen from table 8.18, the commodities financed by the
bank include: crude oil, refined petroleum products, different types of
fertilisers, materials of construction, phosphates, vegetable oil, jute
products, cotton and other intermediate industrial goods; the most im-
portant commodity being crude oil, intermediate industrial goods and
refined petroleum products representing altogether about 80% of the
total FTF during the period under review.
Table 8.18 Breakdown of IDB FTF Operations by Commodity (in US$ and %)
Product Total since 1397
Crude oil 1,856.62 48.5
Refined petroleum products 411.30 11.1
Intermediate industrial goods 617.17 19.9
Fertilisers 114.93 3.4
Capital goods 10.40 -
Cement/construction materials 137.23 4.4
Bicycles 1.76 -
Jute and jute products 106.18 2.4
Cotton 72.30 2.0
Vegetable oil 281.50 5.4
Ammonia 24.00 0.7
Rock phosphate 28.34 0.8
Ore 19.00 0.6
Sun flower (seed) 15.00 0.5
Clinker 19.00 0.6
Others 21.76 0.7
Total 3,790.49 100.0
Source:	 IDB, Annual Reports, various issues.
Crude oil and petroleum products represent about 60% of the total
FTF, this is because oil and petroleum products are the commodities
that are the most available in some of the member countries and at the
same time are the most demanded by the other member countries which do
not have them. These commodities contribute the most of the intermember
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trade financed by the bank. This very high percentage share of oil and
petroleum products in the IDB total foreign trade operations should
decline with time in favour of other commodities if the bank is to pro-
mote the least developed countries' commodity trade, to help them ex-
port more, thus gaining more foreign exchange which may improve their
balance of payments and ease their foreign debts and therefore helping
them getting better rates of growth.
8.4.3 Special Assistance Operations
According to Resolution No. BG/14/99 of the Board of Governors of
the IDB adopted at its Third Annual Meeting in 1399H, the financing of
operations out of the special assistance account can be made for:
1	 Training and research aimed at assisting and guiding member
countries to re-orient their economic, financial and banking
activities in conformity with Islamic Shariah through an
institute set up in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia);
2 The provision of relief in the form of necessary goods and
services to member countries and Islamic communities affected
by natural disasters;
3	 The provision of financial assistance to member countries for
the promotion and furtherance of Islamic causes.
According to the IDB 8th Annual Report: "The special assistance ac-
count is funded from the net proceeds derived from its deposits with
financial institutions operating in the international financial markets
through allocations made by the Board of Executive Directors". No
other source of finance is mentioned which means that the resources of
this fund are very much limited and not sufficient to cope with the
need of the least developed IDB member countries which represent more
than a third of the total member populations and which are very much
affected by drought, malnutrition, diseases etc., in Sub-Saharan Africa
and by floods and other social and economic handicaps as in Bangladesh.
Therefore, the need for raising the sources of funds of the special
assistance account through the collection of donations, Zakat, or any
other lawful means, is necessary.
From 1400H, the date of commencement of this form of finance, to
1405H, the bank financed 57 special assistance operations amounting to
ID158.16m (US$163.68m) for the benefit of various member countries and
Muslim communities in non member countries (29 in member countries and
28 Muslim communities in non member countries). In other words, the IDB
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financed on average 9.5 operations per year, amounting to ID2.77m
(US$2.87m) each. These operations include contribution to finance a
feasibility study for earthquake early warning systems in Algeria,
grants for construction of schools for Muslim communities in Vietnam,
Kampochea, Eritheria, Yemen AR, South Africa, Sri Lanka, India, Zambia,
Philippines, etc.. These operations also include assistance to drought
and flood affected areas, like Sub-Saharan Africa and Bangladesh,
grants for building hospitals and for constructing nursing schools,
clinics, mosques and orphanages for Muslim communities both in member
and non-member countries where these are most needed.
The Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI) has already been
set up and is expanding and strengthening its organisational structure
and continuing its research and training activities but no information
is given by the Bank in its annual reports on how this is financed, or
by how much or whether this is financed out of the special assistance
account or is self-financed. At present, IRTI is composed of 3 divi-
sions: (1) Research, (2) Training and (3) Administration and Finance.
The research division of IRTI carries out various internal and external
research activities, focusing on Islamic economics, Islamic jurispru-
dence and economic co-operation among IDB member countries. The trai-
ning division provides training facilities in Islamic economics and
banking to its staff with the co-operation of other financial institu-
tions and to personnel engaged in development activities in Shariah
observing institutions. The . raining includes seminars and courses in
economic, legal and administrative spheres and financial analysis. Fur-
thermore, the IDB also accords special attention to the building up of
its library to enable it to perform its role in the collection of in-
formation and statistical data related to economics, finance, business,
development, banks, etc.. By the end of 1404H and according to the IDB
9th Annual Report, the library acquired the following:
1 about 2,000 reports and studies on member countries;
2 10,224 books and reference materials in Arabic, English
and French languages;
3 798 journals and magazines in the three languages;
4 1,950 publications released by international agencies.
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Table 8.19 The IDB Distribution of Sacrificial Meat (1403-1405)
1403
Country/operation	 No.	 %
1404
No.
1405
%	 No.
Total
%	 No. %
Bangladesh	 -	 - 44,111 24 66,891 22 111,002 20
Palestine	 -	 - 42,429 23 40,960 13 83,389 15
Af7hanistan	 23,243	 39 25,478 14 30,667 10 79,388 14
Djibouti	 15,830	 27 10,000 5 17,000 6 42,830 8
Sudan	 15,771	 26 - - - - 15,771 3
Chad	 -	 - 5,335 3 7,080 2 12,415 2
Yemen AR	 -	 - 16,100 9 - - 16,100 3
Mauritania	 -	 - - - 6,780 2 6,780 1
Mali	 -	 - - - 5,190 2 5,190 1
Burkina Faso	 -	 - - - 5,890 2 5,890 1
Saudi Arabia	 5,000	 8 42,742 22 126,808 41 174,305 32
Total	 59,844	 100 186,195 100 307,266 100 553,305 100
% Change	 - 211% 65%
Source:	 IDB 10th Annual Report for 1405H
The bank has also prepared a study for a microfilm and microfiche
system to copy all relevant documents and reports and is striving to
obtain from the competent authorities of member countries, reports,
statistical information and studies on the economic development, so
that it will have a better picture on the needs of each member country
and be able to assess their priorities.
Since 1403H, the IDB has also been actively involved in arranging
and distributing the sacrificial meat which the pilgrims offer every
year during the pilgrimage season and of which a great proportion of
the hundreds of thousands of sheep slaughtered at Mina (Saudi Arabia)
every year, used to be wasted creating problems of health, pollution
and disposal of carcasses. Table 8.19 shows how the IDB has managed in
the 3 years (1403-1405H) to distribute more than half a million sheep
to the poor and needy refugees of Africa, Bangladesh, Palestine and
Afghanistan, thus helping to solve and ease the problems of famine and
hunger of these people on one hand and the problems of sacrificial meat
on the other. The bank's role lies in the recruitment of the required
number of slaughterers, veterinarians and other staff and arranging the
distribution of the sacrificial meat. It utilised the services of a
number of butchers and veterinaries together with the voluntary partici-
pation of its own staff and of boy scouts for carrying out the mission.
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The estimated cost, according to the IDB 10th Annual Report, on
executing the programme was US$7.36m of which the pilgrims contribution
was US$6.41m and the balance of US$0.95m was contributed by IDB.Saudi
Gazette (27/6/1989) reported that the IDB utilised more than 350,000
heads in 1406H, more than 478,000 in 1407 and more than 473,000 in 1408
and is planning to utilise about 500,000 heads in 1409H, thus making
use of more than 2,350,000 heads in 7 years.
8.5 CONCLUSION
However impressive may be the performance of the IDB in view of
some, it seems to me that its task is still far from complete, and
though its operations, run into millions of dollars, they are still not
sufficient to cause any significant change in the economic situation of
its 43 members all of which are less developed countries and most of
them are among the world's least developed countries. This is not to
suggest that the bank is not doing well but only that during its short
existence, it has created an impact less than expected from a bank ope-
rating at the International level and serving 43 member countries. This
may be due to its limited financial resources which need to be raised,
or to the lack of experience in the kind of operations it implements in
diverse socio-economic settings or to the shortness of its life time.
Presley (1988a:51) pointed out that: "ten years is not a long time in
the life of an international institution in dealing with development
finance. This is really a short period for the institution to make its
mark, more so where, as in the case of the IDB, it has no precedent to
follow and no analogous institution from which to learn". Nevertheless,
as Mannan (1984:469) put it: "The IDB represents a significant mile-
stone towards achieving the goals of Islamic economics in member count-
ries and towards achieving economic development conform to Shariah".
In spite of operating in an environment where there are still no capi-
tal or money markets dealing in Islamically acceptable financial
instruments, it managed not only to carry out its operations without
recourse to interest which is prohibited by Shariah but mobilised quite
substantial deposits and made quite good profits.
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In order to make its mark in contributing to the the welfare and
development of its member countries, the IDB should give priority to
'multinational projects' which benefit several member countries at the
same time, such as telecommunication, transport links, joint production
and/or distribution of electric power, irrigation, etc., A special pre-
ference should also be accorded to the least developed member countries.
Technical assistance in the field of management, project identification,
preparation and evaluation may be provided freely to these countries,
if circumstances permit. To do this the bank needs to mobilise more fi-
nancial resources for all its different funds. Now the IDB has well es-
tablished its facilities like the IRTI and computer, and acquired more
information on its member countries economies and their needs and more
experience, it Should be able to underta-ke more iinancial operations on
a profit sharing basis than it has done up to now. Furthermore, the IDB
is also expected as Mannan (1984:405) suggests: "To assume the entre-
preneurial role in due course of time in trade and industry particu-
larly in countries where necessary infrastructure facilities are la-
cking. The bank's involvement in joint ventures may not be based merely
on equity participation and consequent profit sharing, but also on the
basis of assumptions of controlling interest in the venture. It goes
without saying that this type of venture is to be undertaken on the
basis of comparative cost advantage and/or proper market research".
This would also help increase the so-called 'absorptive capacity'
of its member countries and develop the lacking industries. The IDB
should last but not least establish subsidiary companies that can
specialise in carrying out the diversified forms of finance in the
different sectors of its member countries. This would enable the bank
to raise its financial resources on one hand and finance more projects
on the other. It also eases the task of the bank and probably makes it
more efficient, though this may be very costly in its first phase.
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CHAPTER NINE
PERFORMANCE OF KUWAIT FINANCE HOUSE (KFH)
9.1 INTRODUCTION
KFH is the second oldest surviving Islamic commercial bank to be
established in the world after Dubai Islamic Bank (DIB). It has just
completed 10 years of activity. Nevertheless, its success and the suc-
cess of DIB to mobilise substantial deposits and to make good profits
in their first few years encouraged other Muslim businessmen to open
Islamic banks in their respective countries, thus giving them the green
light that Islamic banking is a workable and feasible formula to do
banking at least in the Muslim World. This led to a greater confidence
that led in turn to the establishment of other Islamic banks elsewhere
such as JIB (Jordan Islamic Bank), FIBE (Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt),
FIBS (Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan), BIB (Bahrain Islamic Bank), etc..
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the performance of KFH
to that of the oldest and largest commercial interest based bank in
Kuwait, the National Bank of Kuwait (NBK), to Other Commercial Banks
(OCB that is the KBS excluding KFH and NBK) and to the Kuwaiti Banking
System (EBS) as a whole for the period 1978-87. But before doing this,
it is perhaps very important to give an overview on the Kuwaiti economy
and the Kuwaiti Banking System, where these banks operate.
9.2 THE KUWAITI ECONOMY: AN OVERVIEW
Kuwait is a tiny country in the Gulf with only 17,818 sq. km
 and a
population of about 1.8m in 1987 of which only 36.8% are Kuwaitis and
the remaining 63.2% are foreigners. Kuwait is bounded on the West and
the North by Iraq, on the East by the Gulf and on the South by Saudi
Arabia. It is mainly a desert except for Al-Jahrah Oasis and a few
fertile patches in the South Eastern and Coastal areas.
Before 1946, Kuwait's traditional activities were mainly trading,
pearling, seafaring and fishing. As for the emergence of its modern eco-
nomy, this goes back to 1946 when, the first oil shipment was exported.
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Since then, as Khouja and Sadler (1979:25) reported: "the country's
growth has largely mirrored the smooth and swift exploitation of its
vast oil reserves. Within a span of no more than 15 years its popula-
tion came to enjoy living standards normally considered the prerogative
of the most developed among the industrialised countries".
The pattern of growth, Kuwait has experienced since 1946, the
development of its infrastructure, institutions and the welfare system
that has evolved are unparalleled. But the problem is that most if not
all of these developments depended and still depend on oil which con-
tributes more than 95% to its foreign exchange earnings, 90% to the
government revenue and about 60% to its GDP.
According to OPEC Bulletin (September 1982), the estimates of
Kuwait's oil reserves in the 1980s varied between 65,000m and 81,000m
barrels, sufficient to allow for production to continue at the present
rate for the next 100 years. Though its oil revenues are huge and its
population relatively small, Kuwait is nevertheless acutely aware of
its heavy reliance on a single resource with the risk that when oil
runs out or is replaced by a cheaper source of energy, there will be no
alternative to fall back on. For this reason the economic and political
planners of Kuwait concentrate on several main issues. The first is how
to diversify the economy away from depending on one resource (oil) and
to make plans for further improvement in the standard of living. The
other main issue is how to strike a political equilibrium internally
and regionally. In 1976, a reserve fund was set up to take care of
future generations. "After a large initial funding by the government
this fund is now fed with an annual 10% of the state's oil revenues,
and there is a statutory requirement that its assets cannot be touched
for 25 years" (Boudjellal 1982:93). By 1986, about KD14.3bn (US$51bn)
were held in this fund (see NBK annual report 1988:11).
The need to diversify sources of income and develop new productive
activity is self-evident for Kuwait which depends on a single exhausti-
ble resource because apart from oil, there is scarcely any other usable
natural resource in Kuwait, at least none that is known. There are no
other minerals than oil, and even the large expanses of sand, being
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very solid, are not economically exploitable. The soil is very poor and
fresh water is almost non-existent, thus, the possibilities of agricul-
tural development are severely limited. Only about 3% of the land is at
all arable and owing to the scarcity of water, deficiencies of soil and
lack of manpower trained in agricultural skills, barely 1% of the land
area is under actual cultivation (Encyclopedia Britannica 1974:549).
Together with fishing, agriculture contributes only 0.2% to the GDP of
the country. Fish are plentiful in the Gulf and fishing is probably
going to assume more importance in the future of the economy and to
play a significant role in its diversification.
For a desert country like Kuwait, where there had been an ever pre-
sent need for water it was only natural to give top priority to solving
this acute problem. In earlier days people depended on a few artesian
wells, or rainwater collected from the roofs of houses and on irregular
supply from Shatt-El-Arab by boat. The supplied water was very expen-
sive and often contaminated. With the rapid growth of population which
increased almost twenty fold over a period of about 40 years from an
estimated 90,000 people in 1946 to approximately 1.8m by 1985 due main-
ly to the influx of expatriate workers from other countries, who came,
after the discovery of oil, to work in the construction of the coun-
try's infrastructure, the government of Kuwait built the first sea-
water distillation plant in 1953 with a designed capacity of almost a
million gallons per day of potable water from the sea. According to
Khouja and Sadler (1979:29): "the supply of water has continued to en-
joy the highest priority in all government plans. The growth of this
activity is truly phenomenal, production increased from about 250m gal-
lons in 1957 to 2.2bn in 1964 and 6.6bn by 1970. Kuwait's production of
desalinated water is the highest in the world reaching in 1978 a capa-
city of 102m gallons a day".
The expansion of electric facilities has also been remarkable due
mainly to the introduction of desalination plants which paved the way
for the development of the country's power sector. The power generating
capacity of the country increased phenomenally from 2.5m watts in the
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early 1950s to 150m watts in 1962, to over 500m watts in 1967 and a
staggering production of 12,016m watts in 1982 (see Khouja and Sadler
1979:29 and Encyclopedia Britannica Yearbook 1985:720).
Since 1946, the Kuwaiti government has been assuming a paternal at-
titude towards its population and has been responsible for the creation
of the welfare state system. Its aim, as Boudjellal (1982:86) pointed
out: "has been to give its citizens all they require in basic needs via
a comprehensive and entirely free social security system, while provi-
ding the financial liquidity and the opportunities for more substantial
acquisition of wealth". Today, as described by Encyclopedia Britannica
(1974:549): "there has been a comprehensive scheme of social welfare
covering most of the misfortunes that might befall Kuwaiti citizens.
For the needy there is financial assistance, for the handicapped there
are loans to start a profitable business, for the invalid and deformed
there are treatment and training, for the adult illiterates there is
education and for those of limited income there is comfortable housing.
General education in Kuwait is entirely free and includes not only tui-
tion but also school meals, books, uniforms, transportation and medi-
cal attention". All these services are financed almost exclusively from
government oil revenues rather than from the usual sources of taxation.
But recently and with the sharp drop in oil prices from US$30 a barrel
in the 1970s to around US$15 a barrel in the 1980s, these services are
very much likely to be hard hit or most probably cut unless the govern-
ment starts collecting taxes, borrows or the price of oil improves. In
fact, as the NBK (1988:11) reported: "the council of ministers approved
in September 1987 legislation enabling the government to launch a pub-
lic debt program to the tune of KD1,400 million in a move aimed at
providing partial funding to the budget deficit as much as introducing
more flexibility in the money market and financial system".
Reflecting the deterioration in the world oil market conditions,
Kuwait's GDP registered negative growth rates in 1981 and 1982 of -9.5%
and -11% respectively, and although it recovered by 7% in 1983, it
went down again by -6.3% in 1984, -7.9% in 1985 and -15.6% in 1986 (see
Table 9.1 showing the development of Kuwait GDP between 1980 and 1986).
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It is clear from the Table that almost all the sectors of the economy
have been adversely affected because of the oil crisis.
Arabia (June 1984) reported that the fall in government resources
has been followed by a cut in the budget and with the retreat of in-
vestment allocations in budgets, various methods have been developed to
reduce foreign labour. Many sectors have already stopped importing new
foreign labour and have initiated a comprehensive review of their fo-
reign labour policies. Decisions made to control expenditure included:
- Elimination of state subsidies on basic commodities
-
Reconsideration of free services, especially for foreigners.
- Reduction of loans to Third World countries.
Add to this the financial crisis that hit the Kuwaiti financial sec-
tor in 1982 after the collapse of Soug El -Manakh, the unofficial stock
exchange, which according to Stoneman (1986:102): "behaved in a bizarre
fashion by European standards. New issues were oversubscribed 100 times
as vast sums of capital pursued relatively few securities. Security was
largely a question of names and not of prospects... The government was
unable to unravel the knot when the Manakh fell in a welter of US$94bn
of complex transactions largely backed by postdated cheques, the Manakh
crisis sent shock waves through the financial community. In 1984 the
profits of the commercial banks fell for the first time in ten years".
During the period under review, and as Lascelles (1985:45) noti-
ced: "the destabilising exogenous factors of the Iraq-Iran war and the
international recession continued to exert themselves on the local
scene, building up a negative psychology and a moode of hesitancy in
the business circles, and to create an atmosphere of gloom that brought
about a slump in share prices and property values and has undermined
confidence in Kuwait's investment community".
It is against this background of political and economic circumstan-
ces that the performance of the Kuwait Finance House (KFH), the Islamic
Bank in Kuwait, should be judged in comparison to the NBK, OCB and KBS.
9.3 THE KUWAITI BANKING SYSTEM
Prior to 1952 year of the establishment of the first Kuwaiti com-
mercial bank, the National Bank of Kuwait (NBK), there was no bank in
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Kuwait except a branch of the British Bank of the Middle East which was
opened in 1941 and which was replaced in 1971 by the Bank of Kuwait and
the Middle East. However, according to Sabbagh (1981:57): "Kuwait's
present banking system traces its origin to the early 1800s when the
Kuwaiti sailors sailed to the sea-ports of India and East Africa, hand-
ling much of the Gulf region's trade estimated then at around US$4.5m
per year... It was these merchant families which provided the social,
economic and political leadership and which founded the first Kuwaiti
Bank in 1952, the National Bank of Kuwait".
The NBK was established in 1952 with a capital of KD982,500. After
ten years, its paid up capital was raised to KD1.96m then kept rising
to reach together with reserves KD234.78m in 1987. It has more than 50
branches within Kuwait and overseas. It is the largest bank in Kuwait
with total assets exceeding KD2,935m in 1987 and ranks 10th among the
top 100 Arab banks (see The Banker, December 1987:65)
Two more Kuwaiti banks were established in 1960, about a year
before the independence, these are the Commercial Bank of Kuwait and
the Gulf Bank. But the Kuwait monetary system did not become fully
independent until the Currency Board was established and the Kuwaiti
Dinar (KD) was put into circulation on the 1st April 1961, replacing
the Indian Rupee that was the circulating currency throughout the Gulf
area. The Currency Board was replaced in 1968 by the Central Bank of
Kuwait (CBK). Now KBS is made-up of eight banks: the National Bank of
Kuwait (1952), the Commercial Bank of Kuwait (1960), the Gulf Bank
(1960), El -Ahli Bank (1967), Bank of Kuwait and the Middle East (1971),
Kuwait Real Estate Bank (1972), Burgan Bank (1975), and Kuwait Finance
House (the Islamic Bank established in 1977). The KBS is heavily over-
banked with more than 200 branches in 1987.
Unlike the other Gulf states where foreign banks are allowed to
operate, the expansion of the banking system in Kuwait has come about
through local initiative due mainly to the private sector's entrepre-
neurial ability and traditional interest in the field of finance being
greatly enhanced by the substantial wealth acquired through government
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policy. This included banning the operation of foreign banks on its
soil and concentrating on developing large and powerful national finan-
cial institutions which will handle the placing and investment of its
own enormous funds abroad and will be able to stand by themselves as a
major force in the international market. The result has been the emer-
gence of the present financial system which is considered by far the
largest and most developed in the region and which has, according to
Khouja and Sadler (1979:164), the potential to evolve into one of the
world's most important financial centres. Although these banks are all
independent commercial banks, the government has acquired a significant
stake in the banking industry through its recent operations to prop up
the stock market. This interest ranges from as little as 31 in the IVEK
to as much as 60% in Burgan Bank (see Lascelles 1985:41).
As in other Gulf countries, the KBS has had a remarkable expansion
record since 1970 both in terms of assets and deposits as a result of
the oil boom in the 1970s, but with the sharp drop in oil prices in the
1980s, the repercussion of the Gulf war and the collapse of Souq El -
Manakh, "the Kuwaiti banking has lost its fizz" (J. Wilson, 1984:105).
As can be seen from Table 9.2 below, which shows the consolidated
balance sheets of the KBS between 1972 and 1985, the banking sector re-
corded a substantial and unprecedented fall in total assets. The over-
all decline was almost entirely the result of a fall in total deposits.
Notice for example the rates of growth of total assets, they used to be
more than 20% every year and in 1976 and 1977 they even reached the
rate of more than 41% while after 1982 they dropped to 9.3%, -4.2% and
-7.9% for the years 1983, 1984 and 1985 respectively. The same trend
can be seen for other items of the balance sheets such as total depo-
sits, claims on the private sector, foreign assets, etc..
The question, however, remains: will the situation change for the
better or will it worsen?. Experts and financial executives believe
that the return of confidence in Kuwait is going to be a very long slow
process and notably will only start with the ending of the Iran-Iraq
war and the improvement of oil prices.
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9.4 PERFORMANCE OF KFH AS COMPARED TO NBK, OCB AND KBS
9.4.1 Establishment, Objectives and Operation of KFH
KFH was established on 23rd March 1977, as an Islamic institution
for banking and investment. It began its operations on 31st August 1978
thus it has just completed 10 years old. Now it is the largest Islamic
financial institution among Arab banks. It is a Kuwaiti shareholding
company founded by the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs, the
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Justice holding together
between them 49% of the institution's shares and the remainder 51% was
left to the general public. The objectives of KFH, as described by
article 5 of the Memorandum of Agreement, are:
	
1	 To conduct all banking operations and services, whether for
its own account or third parties, without practicing usury.
	
2	 To carry out direct investment, or purchase finance projects
or activities owned by others, on non usurious basis.
3 May co-operate with other organisations which engage in acti-
vities similar to its own, or which may assist it to achieve
its own objectives. The company may further participate in
such organisations, or associate with them in one way or an-
other through agency or procuration or integration and may
join any consortium recognised by law or by custom, covering
holding, subsidiary or associated companies and corporations.
With respect to its banking services and operations, KFH may,
according to article 6 of its Memorandum of Agreement:
1 Receive various types of cash deposits, either for safe
custody or for conditional or unconditional reinvestment,
provided that this shall be on non-usurious basis.
	
2	 Purchase and sell gold bullion, acquire foreign exchange and
sell or purchase drafts in such exchange.
3 Provide short term financing against collateral in the form
of commercial papers and at an agreed commercial yield not
involving Riba.
	
4	 Open letters of credit and provide banking credit facilities.
with or without security.
	
5	 Issue guarantees in favour of third parties.
6 Collect the value of drafts, promissory notes, chegues, bills
of exchange and all other instruments against commission for
the account of permanent customers and other parties.
	
7	 Receive subscription payments related to establishment of new
shareholding companies or capital increases.
8 Purchase and sell shares, certificates of investment and
similar financial papers either for its own account or for
the account of other parties (on non usurious basis).
	
9	 Safe-keep all kinds of currencies, precious metals, jewellery,
documents and packages, and rent safes for private use.
	
10	 Act as depository agent, accept agencies and appoint agents.
Concerning its depository function, the KFH offers 3 kinds of
deposit accounts with 5 choices in the following way:
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(a) Current Accounts
The client can deposit or withdraw any amount he wishes from his
account at any time. The credit balance is a demand or call deposit and
the client is neither entitled to any profit nor is he liable to bear
any loss. These deposits are guaranteed and KFH commits itself to pay
in full the credit balance of such accounts on demand. The depositor is
supplied with a cheque book, cash book and cheque deposit book. A state-
ment of the account is sent to him quarterly, unless otherwise there
are special arrangements in this respect. Recently KFH issued cheque
card and visa credit cards for its customers.
(b) Savings Accounts
Two possibilities are open to the clients: saving accounts with or
without authority for investment. The former shares in the profits and
losses of the bank but the latter not. In case a saving account without
the authorisation for investment is opened, the current account provi-
sion of neither getting profit nor bearing losses applies except that
depositors are furnished with a savings account book only. As for the
saving accounts with authorisation for investment, the return (profit
or loss) is calculated on the lowest monthly balance. The profit is
paid and the loss deducted periodically as determined by the adminis-
tration. The client may deposit and withdraw any amount he wishes in or
from his account. He is supplied with a saving account book, showing
the account's movements and balances after his initial deposit which
should not be less than one Kuwaiti Dinar.
(c) Investment Accounts
Two possibilities are again open here to the clients: fixed time
investment deposit, the minimum period of which, is one year renewable
at the depositor' wish on the due date and open time investment deposit
the minimum period of which is one year renewable automatically for the
same period unless the client notifies KFH to the contrary in writing
at least 3 months before the due date. The client in both cases is sup-
plied with a certificate of deposit in the name of the beneficiary of
deposited amounts after depositing a minimum of KD1000. The depositor
or the beneficiary or whoever has the right to withdraw, cannot with-
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draw any part of the deposit before the due dates. The investment of
the deposit is carried out on the basis of absolute Mudharabah and KFH
has a free hand to invest in the way seen proper for realising the mu-
tual advantages. The return (profit/loss) on the deposit will be paid
or deducted periodically as determined by the administration of KFH.
In general, it may carry out all banking operations and services
as well as other operations permissible by law, regulations and statu-
tes observed by banks, on condition that such operations shall not be
usurious. Thus, one can say that KFH is not a finance house that deals
in consumer credit as its name may suggest, but is more than an ordi-
nary bank, an investment company or a building society. We can safely
qualify it as an Islamic Multipurpose Financial Institution.
9.4.2 Performance in Terms of Capital and Reserves (K&R)
The initial authorised capital of KFH was fixed at KD1Om (US$36m)
divided in 10m shares of 1KD each to be paid in cash and subscribed as
follows: 49% for the government (20% for the Ministry of Finance, 20%
for the Ministry of Justice and 9% for the Ministry of Awqaf and
Islamic affairs) and 51% for the general public.
According to article 9 of the Articles of Association, the shares
of KFH shall be nominal and shall not be owned by non-Kuwaitis. KFH
authorised capital was raised up to KD15m (US$54m) in 1982, to KD18.75m
(US$67.5m) in 1983 and to 1020.65m (US$75m) in 1986. As for the paid up
capital and reserves (K&R), see Tables 9.3 which compares the growth of
KFH's K&R to those of the NBK, OCB and KBS in current and constant
prices for the period 1978-87 and for a clearer picture see figure 9.1
exhibiting the relative development of the K&R of KFH as compared to
those of the NBK, OCB and KBS in the form of indices in current and
constant prices, taking 1980 as a base year.
It is quite clear from Table 9.3 that, although KFH started from a
very small base, its K&R in current prices increased from KD2.81m in
1978 to KD42.6Im in 1987, recording a rise of more than 15 fold at an
annual ARG of about 49%, while for the same period the NBK, the largest
and oldest bank in Kuwait recorded less than 4 fold rise from KD62.75m
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to KD234.78m, increasing at an annual ARG of growth of 16.2%. The K&R
of the OCB and '<BS increased by less than 5 fold each from KD152.84m to
KD721.71m and from KD218.40m to KD999.10m with an annual ARG of 19.3%
and 18.9% respectively during the same period. When allowing for infla-
tion by deflating the current prices by the corresponding CPI, it was
found that while the annual ARG of KFH's K&R was more than 40%, that of
NBK was 11.4% and those of OCB and RES were 14.4% and 14% respectively.
From its first year of business KFH managed to get a market share
of 1.3% in the KES's aggregate K&R. This increased to reach 6.2% in
1982 but dropped to 4.2% in 1984 and 1985 then improved to 4.3% in 1986
and 1987, but on average KFH's share recorded a positive annual ARG of
24.3%. At the same time the NBK share dropped from 28.7% in 1978 to
23.4% in 1981, then kept fluctuating between 24 and 23% for the rest of
the period, thus recording an annual negative ARG of -2.2%. As for the
market share of OCB, this fluctuated between 70 and 74.5% during the
same period recording an annual ARG of 0.3% (see Table 9.4).
Table 9.4 The Market Share of KFH, NBK and OCB in KBS's K&R (in %)
Years
KFH
Share
	 Growth
NBK
Share	 Growth
OCB
Share	 Growth
EBS
Total
1978 1.3 - 28.7 - 70.0 - 100
1979 1.2 -7.7 26.0 -9.4 72.8 4.0 100
1980 1.5 25.0 24.0 -7.7 74.5 2.3 100
1981 4.4 193.3 23.4 -2.5 72.2 -3.1 100
1982 6.2 40.9 23.7 1.3 70.1 -2.9 100
1983 5.3 -14.5 24.5 3.4 70.2 0.1 100
1984 4.2 -20.8 22.7 -7.3 73.1 4.1 100
1985 4.2 0.0 23.8 4.8 72.0 -1.5 100
1986 4.3 2.4 24.3 2.1 71.4 -0.1 100
1987 4.3 0.0 23.5 -3.2 72.2 1.1 100
24.3 -2.1 0.4
Source: Table 9.3
As table 9.5 shows, KFH average capital ratio for the period 1978-
87, is lower than those of the NBK, OCB and EBS. It was 5.1%, when mea-
sured by K&R/TLA, compared to 6.8% for NBK, 8.2% for OCB and 7.5% for
KBS and 5.4% when measured by K&R/TLD, compared to 7.3% for NBK, 9% for
OCB and 8.1% for KBS. This may be explained by the fact that KFH's TLA
grew faster than its K&R because of the deposits which kept coming in
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at an even greater rate despite that KFH does not promise any guaran-
teed return on deposits (see Table 9.6 comparing the average rates of
growth of the K&R, TLA, TLD and TLF for KFH, NBK, OCB and EBS).
Table 9.5 Capital Ratios of KFH, NBK, OCB and KBS 1978-87
Ratio Bank 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 Aver.
K&R/TLA KFH 10.9 4.3 3.1 5.2 6.3 4.4 4.1 4.5 4.4 4.0 5.1
NBK 7.9 7.1 5.9 4.9 5.9 6.2 7.1 7.8 7.5 8.0 6.8
OCB 6.2 6.0 6.1 5.6 6.5 7.1 9.9 11.2 12.0 11.4 8.2
KBS 6.7 6.3 6.0 5.4 6.3 6.6 8.6 9.6 9.9 9.9 7.5
K&R/TLD KFH 12.2 4.5 3.2 5.4 6.7 4.6 4.3 4.7 4.6 4.2 5.4
NBK 8.6 7.6 6.2 5.2 6.3 6.6 7.6 8.4 8.2 8.7 7.3
OCB 6.6 6.4 6.5 5.9 6.9 7.7 11.0 12.6 13.6 12.9 9.0
EBS 7.1 6.7 6.3 5.7 6.7 7.1 9.4 10.6 10.9 10.7 8.1
Sources: Tables 9.3 and 9.7
Table 9.6 Comparison of the ARG of the K&R, TLA, TLD and TLF
of KFH, NBK, OCB and KBS (in percentages)
KFH	 NBK	 OCB	 KBS
K&R	 48.9	 16.2	 19.3	 18.9
TLA	 61.8	 16.6	 12.3	 14.6
TLD	 64.2	 16.7	 11.5	 14.2
TLF	 100.4	 17.1	 12.6	 15.9
Sources: Tables: 9.3, 9.7, 9.9 and 9.11
9.4.3 Performance in Terms of Total Assets (PTA)
In order to better judge the performance of KFH versus those of
NBK, OCB and KBS in terms of TLA, TLD and TLF, it is very essential at
the outset to take into consideration that:
1	 With the exception of KFH, the whole of the Kuwaiti banking
system (KBS) is based on interest.
2 The NBK is the oldest and largest bank in Kuwait established
in 1952. It has 37 years of experience whereas KFH is the
last Kuwaiti bank to be established in 1977; it has just
completed 10 years.
3 The Kuwaiti banking system is made up of eight commercial
banks with more than 200 branches of which the NBK has 58
branches and KFH has only 15 in 1987.
4 The NBK has overseas branches in London, New York and Singa-
pore which give it the advantage of dealing more conveniently
in foreign assets and liabilities over KFH which does not
have branches overseas.
5 Unlike other banks, KFH does not guarantee the investment
deposits and in case of loss, deductions are made from the
original deposits of the depositors. KFH only guarantees the
demand deposits which do not share in the profits of the bank.
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Taking into consideration the above mentioned facts, KFH may be
said to have performed quite well compared to NBK, OCB and KBS despite
the interest based hostile environment in which it operates. Table 9.7
compares its performance in terms of TLA in current and constant prices
with those of the NBK, OCB and KBS for the period 1978-87. Its TLA rose
more than 40 fold from KD25.87m in 1978 to KD1057.50m in 1987 at an ARG
of 61.8%. At the same time The NBK's TLA rose by less than 4 fold from
KD794.82m in 1978 to KD2935.33m at an ARG of only 16.6%. As for OCB,
their TLA grew a little bit more than 2.5 times from KD2457.81m in 1978
to KD6316.77m in 1987 at an ARG of 12.3%. The TLA of KBS recorded just
a little more than 3 fold increase during the period, increasing from
KD3278.5m in 1978 to KD10309.6m in 1987 at an ARG of 14.6%. Allowing
for inflation by deflating the TLA of the banks by the corresponding
CPI, it was found that the TLA of KFH in constant prices rose more than
22 times from KD29.60m in 1978 to KD836.63m in 1987 at a real annual
ARG of 54%, whereas the TLA of NBK recorded only about 2.5 fold during
the same period increasing from KD909.41m in 1978 to KD2322.25m in 1987
at an annual ARG of 11.6%. The TLA of OCB and KBS managed only to
record an annual ARG of 6.4% and 9.7% respectively (see Table 9.7).
Relatively speaking, from these tables and from Figure 9.2 which
shows the indices of KFH, NBK, OCB and KBS's TL A for the period 1978-87
taking 1980 as a base year, it is quite clear that the Islamic KFH
performed much better than not only the average bank in Kuwait but also
better than the oldest and largest bank of the country, the NBK.
The effects of the 1982 Souq E1-Manakh collapse, the sharp decline
in oil prices in 1983 and thereafter, the world recession and the Gulf
war can clearly be seen in the slow and even negative rates of growth
in the TLA of not only KFH but also of NBK, OCB and KBS as a whole.
This can be seen across Table 9.7 and Figure 9.2 as well. In fact the
world recession of the 1980s has affected not only Kuwaiti banks but
banks all over the world. The total assets of most if not all the banks
across countries have experienced meagre if not negative rates of
growth (see The Banker surveys of the top 500 banks for 1983-1987).
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Table 9.8 The Market Share of NBK and OCB in KBS's TLA (in %)KFH,
KFH	 NBK	 OCB	 KES
Years	 Share	 Growth	 Share	 Growth	 Share	 Growth	 Total
1978	 0.8	 -	 24.2	 -	 75.0	 -	 100
1979	 1.8	 125	 22.9	 -5	 75.4	 1	 100
1980	 3.0	 67	 24.3	 6	 72.7	 -4	 100
1981	 4.6	 53	 25.7	 6	 69.7	 -4	 100
1982	 6.2	 35	 25.4	 -1	 68.4	 -2	 100
1983	 8.0	 29	 26.5	 4	 65.5	 -4	 100
1984	 8.8	 10	 27.7	 5	 63.5	 -3	 100
1985	 9.1	 3	 29.3	 6	 61.6	 -3	 100
1986	 9.5	 4	 31.9	 9	 58.7	 -5	 100
1987	 10.3	 8	 28.5	 -11	 61.3	 4	 100
37	 2	 -2
KFH's market share in the KBS's TLA increased from 0.8% in 1978 to
9.3% in 1987 at an annual ARG of 37% and NBK's share dropped from
24.2% in 1978 to 22.9% in 1979, improved to reach 31.9% in 1986 and
then dropped again to 28.5% in 1987 at an annual ARG of 2%. However,
OCB's market share declined from 75% in 1978 to 58.7% in 1986 and then
improved to 61.3% in 1987 at a annual ARG of -2% (see Table 9.8).
The growth of the NBK share in the KBS total assets may be due to
the diverse services that it introduced recently such as the Watani
Express Service of more than 50 automated teller machines which provi-
des more than 100,000 cardholders with unparalleled convenience of 24
hours service express cash capability, current account balances, mini-
statements covering the last 12 entries and request for cheque books
and full account statements. The other banks have just started to fol-
low suit. KFH has also just started in 1986 to offer such services at
its head-office. The growth of NBK's TLA may also be explained by its
involvement in international banking for the last eight years. As for
the high growth of KFH's share in KBS's TLA, this can partly be explai-
ned by the high profits it managed to realise from its first year of
operation and the high share of the depositors in these profits since
it shares its profits with its depositors and, perhaps by the fact that
a large section of the Muslim Kuwaiti population would like to observe
the rules of the Islamic Shariah by depositing their savings with an
Islamic bank rather than with an interest based bank.
Source: Table 9.7 above
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9.4.4 Performance in Terms of Total Deposits (TLD).
Because the NBK does not give a separate entry for its TLD in its
balance sheets and adds other liabilities including contingencies to
its deposits, I was obliged to do the same for KFH, OCB and KBS to get
a comparable set of figures, thus total liabilities are used instead of
total deposits in the tabular and graphical analysis though under the
name of Total Deposits (TLD). From the 1st day of opening to the gene-
ral public on 31st August 1978 until the end of the year on 31st Decem-
ber 1978, KFH managed to collect more than KD23m (US$82.8m) of deposits
in just four months. The KFH first annual report (1978:11) states that:
The accounts that have abundantly been registered with a steadily inc-
reasing number have surpassed all predictions based on the trend of de-
posits of the other banks which have.., come into being in Kuwait".
One year later the TLD of KFH more than tripled and by the 7th year
(1984) it recorded more than a 35 fold increase. Though in 1985 it dec-
lined by a negative rate of growth (-5.3%) over the previous year. this
drop did not last long, in fact it was reversed the year after by a po-
sitive rate of growth of 7.2% followed by an even stronger rate: 23.2%
the following year. Table 9.9 below compares the TLD of KFH to those of
NBK, OCB and EBS in current and constant prices for the period 1978-87.
KFH managed in less than 10 years of business to record a staggering 44
fold increase in its TLD which rose from KD23.06m in 1978 to KD1014.89m
in 1987 at an annual ARG of 64.2%, while the NBK managed to increase
its TLD by 3.7 times only, from KD732.07m in 1978 to KD2700.55m in 1987
at an annual ARG of only 16.7%. OCB's TLD rose from KD2304.97m in 1978
to KD6082.14m in 1983, fell to KD4824.30m in 1985 and then rose again
to KD5595.06m in 1987, thus increasing at an annual ARG of 11.5% for
the current prices and 6.8% for the constant prices. The KBS's TLD re-
corded just a little bit more than a 3 fold increase in nominal terms
and just above 2 fold in real terms. Its TLD in current prices increa-
sed from KD3060.1m in 1978 to reach KD9329.8m in 1982 then decreased to
KD7980.9m in 1985 and then improved to reach KD9310.5m in 1987. The ARG
of KBS' TLD for the period 1978-87 was 14.2% for the current prices and
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9.4% for the constant prices (see Tables 9.9). A clear comparative pic-
ture can be seen from Figure 9.3 which shows the relative development
of current and constant prices TLD indices of KFH, OCB and KES.
The decline in deposits in 1985 was not limited to KFH alone but
was general to other banks as well, mainly because of loss of confi-
dence in the banking system caused by the 1982 collapse of Souq El-
Manakh, the Gulf war and its consequences which have spread the fear of
insecurity especially after the attempt in 1984 to kill the Emir and
the bombing of the airport, pipelines, etc., in 1985 and 1986, and by
the general recession which has hit almost all countries. The decrease
in KFH deposits in 1985 may also be due to the decision of the bank not
to distribute any profits to depositors or shareholders in 1984 because
the real value of its assets dropped drastically as a consequence of
the sharp drop in its investments in real estate. Thus, may be some of
the depositors withdrew their deposits. Another reason is that in 1983,
KFH decided to stop accepting new deposits for some times in view of
the limited demand for investment in the Gulf countries generally and
in Kuwait in particular. "The astonishing thing", as put by Boudjellal
(1982:117): "is the determination of the public to bank with KFH which
has surpassed all expectations" despite that KFH does not guarantee any
return on the investment deposits and in fact it shares its losses as
well as its profits with its depositors so that in the case of the bank
making a loss, it deducts from the original investment deposits their
corresponding shares in the loss.
KFH market share in the aggregate TLD of KBS has kept growing imp-
ressively from 0.8% in 1978 to about 11% in just 10 years of business
despite as mentioned earlier, the circumstances surrounding the bank,
the small number of branches, the little experience, the shortness of
the period, the competition from the other older and larger banks, etc..
Its share has risen by more than 13.6 times in just 10 years growing at
an annual ARG of 38%. The NBK share has also kept rising steadily from
23.9% in 1978 to 32.7% in 1986, however it dropped back to 29% in 1987.
The annual ARG of the NBK market share was 2% whereas the OCB share in
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the deposit declined dramatically from 75.3% in 1978 to 57.3% in 1986
and improved in 1987 to 60%, at an ARG of -2% annually.
Now if the NBK share has kept growing though at a slow but steady
rate because of the diverse services it provides and because of its
involvement in international banking, the question that arises here is:
why is that the deposits in KFH have grown extraordinarily well beyond
expectations despite the PLS system that it applies to investments de-
posits which represent the bulk of KFH total deposits?. The main reason
behind this may be, as the KFH annual report for 1979:9 put it: "the
desire of Kuwaiti Muslims to practice their banking and investment for-
malities through Islamic banks", that observe Islamic Shariah by basing
their banking operations on PLS system rather than on interest which is
prohibited in Islam.
Table 9.10 The Market Share of KFH, NBK and OCB in the KBS's TLD
KFH
Share	 Growth
NBK
Share
	 Growth
OCB
Share	 Growth
KBS
Total
1978 0.8 - 23.9 - 75.3 - 100
1979 1.8 125 22.7 -5 75.5 0 100
1980 3.1 72 24.3 7 72.6 -4 100
1981 4.6 48 25.8 6 69.6 -4 100
1982 6.2 35 25.5 -1 68.3 -2 100
1983 8.2 32 26.6 4 65.2 -5 100
1984 9.3 13 28.2 6 62.6 -4 100
1985 9.6 4 29.9 6 60.5 -3 100
1986 10.0 4 32.7 9 57.3 -5 100
1987 10.9 9 29.0 -11 60.1 5 100
38 2 -2
Source: Table 9.9 above
9.4.5 Performance in Terms of Total Finance (T1F)
KFH's TLF in current prices recorded more than 75 fold increase in
just 7 years from KD9.69m in 1979 to KD734.64m in 1984 and although its
total finance dropped in 1985 by 3.8% against that of 1984, it soon
recovered to reach KD842.95m in 1987 thus, recording an 87 fold rise in
just 10 years increasing at a staggering annual ARG of more than 100%.
NBK recorded about 4 fold increase in the same period from KD409.75m in
1978 to KD1607.73m in 1987 at an annual ARG of 17.1%. At the same time
the OCB did not achieve more than 3 fold increase for the same period
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going from KD1139.96m in 1978 to KD3146.22m in 1987 at an annual ARG of
only 12.5%. As for the KBS, it recorded just about 4 fold increase from
KD1559.4m in 1978 to KD5596.90m in 1987 at an ARG of 15.9% per annum.
In real terms the KFH managed to achieve a 66 fold increase for its TLF
from KD11.09m in 1978 to KD666.89m in 1987, rising at an ARG of 90.1%
annually compared to less than 3 fold increase for each of the NBK, OCB
and the KBS at annual ARG of 12.7%, 7.9% and 11% respectively (see
Table 9.11). The difference in performance can clearly be seen from the
comparison of the indices of each of the TLF of KFH, NBK, OCB and KBS
taking 1980 as a base year (see Figure 9.4).
Unlike other banks KFH does not grant loans at interest but instead
it invests in real estate, buildings, plots of land through direct pur-
chase and sale. It is also involved in commercial investments which in-
volves direct buying and selling of cars, furniture, food, etc., on
Murabahah, Bai l Muaijal, rarah rarah Waqtina' bases. It, also offers
consultancy services to customers who are interested in investing their
funds according to the Sharjah.
Because of the lack of demand on funds for project financing in
Kuwait and the excess liquidity, KFH stopped, for some time accepting
new deposits in August 1983 because as an Islamic bank it cannot use
overnight funds and its minimum time period for utilisation of funds is
one month though they are working on a 14-day investment performance
and that is why the bulk of its finance is direct investment, Murabahah
and Iiarah. KFH runs supermarkets, car showrooms and real estate compa-
nies. It takes part in export and import trade flows, as a Kuwaiti ban-
ker said: "on the incoming side it is a commercial bank but on the out-
going side it is an investment holding company" (Rashid 1984:172).
Because investment in real estate was perhaps the most profitable
investment before 1982, KFH made the mistake of investing the bulk of
its funds in this sector, but after the Souq El -Manakh crisis, prices
of houses fell by 35% in 1983; share prices in real estate companies by
40% and this affected the value of its investment portfolio dangerously
253
•-• 0, 0 N 0 Cr, r- LO
N-030•-•CONNNN101
V, %,
cr N CO N CD a)'00
01 0- Os 03 -1- 0, 0 .0 c0
• •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
• LO N c10 '-IC CO N
0 CO cr	 01 N c 0 a)
• k0 co 0 03 NJ CO Cr) CO C-
.-.	 N N	 N CV CV
I CO 111 03 cr CO •-•
• •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
N	 •zr CO if) •-•
c.) C\I CNJ	 c\J
• C\J 0 r- N •cr	 cr
‘.0 co 0 N .0 '0 'O N 03
•-• N-4 4 I 4-4 4-4	 N-1
NI 0 1.1)	 •-• 1.1) co CsJ 0 ct
•ct	 N 111 NO-
a) c " '0 Lf1 CV a) a,
'0-00- h. •-• 0/ Cr) Cr
ci 1.0 -0 0)0'Cr- )--•	 •-•
I CO .0	 •-•	 N CO cr
' • " • " • 'N cr c0 c-4 CO 0, Ul VD 0
0 0 Os
(Y-. U) CO r, 111 .4- .4- .13
cr. o3 0,
	
0, N s.0 •-n 	 11) ct 00 CV
	
1/40 CO a.	CO 0 in cr
	•- n C.1	 cr	 r-
a.) 0, 0 •-• NJ CO cr r•-•
N N co oo a) a) a) CO 03 03
0- 0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-Cr. , , CN Cr, 0, 0, 0,
254
.0
4-)
cr,	 co o kr)
•	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
Ls) 	 o	 o	 co
0, I 0	 03 03 0	 0 Os
r••• r••• 0 Cr in in	 rs• •••n1
o3
co
CO CV CV NJ N •-)	 •n-•
cf)
a) 0-0 Cr, 0 a) 0- 0- Cr) 0- N- CO 0	 a) r-	 C\J •cr
ca
X
(1)	 (1.)
cr3 73
U) r, 0 N O r-, c0 a) 0, 0
	 NJ
a) 0 N CO cr LII Lr) L11 .0
cu
C
•-/
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 CO 0 N. CO lf) 00 cr
.4- Cr) N. 0	 co u) c-0 N	 r--	 N	 LC) Ln N
cu
C • 0, Os	 1".• Cr) Ul ,13 •-• O N Cr)	 CT) r••••
N ch. CO LI") LI1 U)	 N 0, •-• 0 .0 0 N
•-• 0cr NJ r-- 00 •-•I N- CV .0 NJ '00- •-•	 •-•
•-•• NJ N CO ct cr LI) Ul	 LI) ••-• N N	 CO CO .rt	 cr
)=C
13
.c
4-,
3
I	 C\I 1/40	 •.o	 •ct• 01 03 c0
•	 •	 •	 '	 •	 '	 •	 "
111 I ch fs,	 N. Cr, N •-• s c4
•	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
cr0OcrNr,0003 NJ Lf) N N Lf) .0 .0 •-• •-• 00
CO	 N	 I N	 •-• •-•	 I	 I	 I	 I
X
cc) aJ
C.) 73
0 C
NJ CO 0 c-4 •-• N CO a) r- •••n
'00)0 N L11 ct tfl	 L11
.....	 %-1 N-4
N NJ NJ N. CO CO szt 0 NJ
4-) 0, cr 0' N	 •-•	 In	 N
•	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
0-0-- C1	 0 czt Ul L11 1.11 N
-o
1.13
a)
CO NJ ct N r, 0 0 •-• 0, C-
•-• 111 Q) NJ r-, r-- 0, 0-0)
•••n •-••-•NININNNJNO1
U
CO
C-)
-C
4-,
I r, 0 NJ 1.0	 r•- Lt1 "0'
0 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
0:1 Q.1 03	 N	 •-•I	 Lf) ‘0(D N	 01
7
>C
]C Cr, -00 V3 CO Cr, N r-• 03 CO
c0 -0 1nI 1.11 r•-• 0 CO If) 0- 000 •-• CO
I- Z C csi Ni
•-•
)1)
.c
4-)
L11 VI 111 •-• 03 CO CO 0 ID CO
r's cr •-4C0r...inin00r.•
•	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
Cr• 	 •-• 03 N	 0 CO r-•
0 N 0- ch	 r-- Cr, CO 00
ct	 '00- 0 CO CO Tr LI") V)
>-
•
.0
3
Li3 I II) c0 CO CO 0, cr 03 CI
I' CO N 0-0 Cr) N,
.4-	 .4-	 v-4
In I-I 4-4
X
cu
La. -0 s 0 CO	 r- a) CO	 s
0 C -1- 0	 N 0) CO ••-• LI)
C-) 1-1 N CO cr 1.11 LO LO
4-)
CO 0, 0 0, c-• N 0,	 N 03
cr 00- 03 0 CO •-• ct. c0
s-•	 N cr ci cr cr
cy, 0, CO 0- •-•	 t \ I 0 c0 0-
0 0Q. 0.(1)
CC CC
n3 n3
D
C C
C C
O I,- .0 CO N. 0 N CO	 c0 .0 < <
•	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
.0	 •-•	 Cr, 0, 0) Y	 NC
CCP CO I-- a) ct 0- .0 0 .0 0 CD u- CO
•-• NI CO L11 LI) LO	 .13 C.
ns
Z Z
v)
0) Cr, 	N CT) cr 111	 r-
r- S	 03 a) a) a) a) a) a) a)
0- 0- 0- Cr• 0, Cr, 0, 0- 0, C), 0(f)
600
550
500
450
400
350
If)
lU
300
Z 250
150
100
SO
19/8	 19/9	 1980	 1981	 1982	 1983	 1984	 198S	 19116	 1987
KFH	
EA]
N8K
OCB
KB5
450
400
3S0
bsk,	300
250
200
tJ
j 150
100
SO
Figure 9.4 Performance of KFH, NBK, OCB & KBS in Terms of TLF
In Current Prices
YEARS
In Constant Prices
KFH
MIK	 r±]
OCB
KB5
19/0	 19/9	 1980	 1981	 1982	 1983
	
1984	 1985	 1986	 1911/
'YEARS
255
to the point that it did not declare or distribute any profits in 1984
neither to shareholders nor to depositors. This led KFH to change its
investment policies in 1985 towards more diversification in order to
avert pitfalls. KFH market share in KBS total finance rose from 0.6% in
1978 to 14.6% in 1984, and although it slightly went down to 14% in
1985, it soon recovered and was able to get more than 15% of the aggre-
gate finance of the KBS, growing at an ARG of 67% annually, compared to
that of the NBK which fluctuated between 24.8% and 29% growing at an
annual ARG of only 1% during the period of study. As for the market
share of OCB in KBS total finance, this declined from 73.1% in 1978 to
56.2% in 1987 at a negative ARG of -3 annually (see table 9.12).
Table 9.12 The market Share of KFH, NBK and OCB in the KBS's TLF
EFH	 NBK	 OCB	 KBS
Share	 Growth Share Growth Share	 Growth Total
1978 0.6 - 26.3 - 73.1 - 100
1979 3.0 400 24.9 -5 72.2 -1 100
1980 5.1 70 25.9 4 69.0 -4 100
1981 8.4 65 27.2 5 64.4 -7 100
1982 10.4 24 24.8 -9 64.9 1 100
1983 14.0 35 29.0 17 57.0 -12 100
1984 14.6 4 27.7 -5 57.7 1 100
1985 14.0 -4 28.3 2 57.7 0 100
1986 14.7 5 29.2 3 56.1 -3 100
1987 15.1 3 28.7 -2 56.2 0 100
67 1 -3
Source: Table 9.11 above
KFH does not engage in short term interbank operations, and its
foreign exchange dealings are all on the spot market only, because for-
ward exchange is not allowed in Islam for currencies. Although it can-
not provide overdrafts or similar facilities that would be construed as
pure 'money lending' its programme does allow for the possibility of
Oardh Hassan or charitable interest-free credits (Rizq, 1980:34). The
total of such loans granted between 1980 and 1987 amount to 10973,699
and covered 692 beneficiaries (see KFH Annual Report 1987:21).
Because there is no other information on the sectoral distribution
of the KFH, NBK or KBS finance except for the year 1985, table 9.13
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shows the sectoral distribution of the TLF of KFH, NBK and KBS for 1985
only. It is clear that KFH was greatly involved in real estate invest-
ment (56.9%). The table also shows that only about 3% of the KBS total
finance goes to industry which is very limited and that no credit is
allocated for agriculture which is almost non-existent. This indicates
the lack of demand of credit by these sectors because Kuwait is neither
an industrial nor an agricultural country as we saw above. Most of KBS
TLF goes to personal use which contributes to inflation but to which
KFH does not contribute in view of the fact that personal credit is not
profitable for an Islamic bank that does not involve in interest tran-
sactions, as for interest free credit, these are given only for emer-
gency cases and are very limited. What is needed for KFH to diversify
its investment portfolio is to involve itself in internNticsnai tz:nkim;
if it is to achieve any success in diversifying its finance outlets.
Table	 9.13	 Comparative Analysis of KFH, NBK and KBS Portfolio
Investment:	 Sectoral	 Distribution	 for	 1985
KFH NBK KBS
Trade 33.8 30.2 22.8
Real estate 56.9 13.8 18.0
Construction 6.7 13.2 16.3
Personal
- 22.7 27.6
Finance 1.8 9.9 8.7
Industry
- 4.0 3.0
Others 0.8 6.2 3.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source:	 KFH Annual Report,
NBK Annual Report,
1985
1985
9.4.6 Performance in Terms of Other Proxies
Table 9.14 below shows that KFH performed better than NBK, OCB and
KBS in terms of intermediation as measured by both ratios: TLF/TLD and
TLF/TLA. While on average KFH managed to use more than 80% of its depo-
sits in financing the economy the other banks only managed to use less
than 55.5% of their deposits. The exceptional case of KFH in recording
higher intermediation than other banks may be explained by the fact
that as an Islamic bank having the right to invest its funds directly
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and not necessarily through third parties, it did not wait for finance
application but instead invested most of its finance funds on its own
risk, by buying and selling buildings, land, cars, construction mate-
rials and by creating co-operatives that sell clothes, food, etc..
Perhaps, that is the reason why its liquidity is lower than that of the
NBK (see table 9.14). Thus, we can say that KFH is more involved in di-
rect investment than in finance. It is a bank if we look at its liabi-
lities but an investment company if we look at its assets.
Because there is no available data on the aggregate profits, the
number of branches, the number of staff and on the detailed liquidity
of the KBS and thus of OCB, the profitability, liquidity and efficiency
comparative analysis in table 9.14, is made only between KFH and NBK.
Concerning profitability as measured by return on equity and return on
total assets for the period 1978-87, the average return on equity for
KFH is 19.28% during the period 1978-87 looks better than that of NBK
(13.22%) and so its average return on assets (0.96%) better than that
of NBK (0.88%), however as the table also shows the profits of the NBK
were steadier than those of the KFH which fluctuated considerably from
year to year. The striking thing is that, from its first year 1978, or
more accurately in just four months, KFH succeeded in realising a pro-
fit that is relatively speaking better than that of the NBK which was
at the time twenty six years old, the oldest and largest bank in Kuwait
with more than 30 branches all over Kuwait. The other thing is that,
after the first year (1978) and up to 1982, KFH realised phenomenal
profits. Its return on equity ratio for each of these years was about
30% or more. It.even reached 45.85% in 1980 while the return on equity
ratio for NBK fluctuated between 13.62% and 16.61% for the same years.
During this same period, KFH return on total assets ratios were greater
than 1.28% while those of NBK were less than 1% despite the fact that,
in view of its size, the NBK should be the most profitable bank in
Kuwait because it enjoys economies of scale that smaller banks like KFH
do not. However, after the 1982 collapse of Souci El -Manakh, which af-
fected badly the economy and especially the real estate sector in which
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KFH was very much involved, the KFH profitability dropped sharply so
that in 1984 it did not declare or distribute any profit neither to its
depositors nor to its shareholders. In the following years (1985-1987),
KFH recovered. It made a modest profit in 1985, thereafter it improved
its profits by diversifying its portfolio, which means that the failure
of KFH to realise good profits after 1982 is not due to the Islamic
technique of doing banking, but rather was the result of lack of diver-
sification and thus, is the result of mismanagement.
Because neither KFH nor the NBK give information about their opera-
ting costs or on the number of their staff in their annual reports, the
efficiency comparative analysis is measured only by the ratios: total
assets, total deposits and total finance to the number of branches (see
table 9.14). As can be seen from the table, it is quite clear that KFH
is more efficient in terms of TLA/NOB, TLD/NOB and TLF/NOB since its
average ratios for the period 1978-87, are 60.9%, 57.9% and 49.9% com-
pared to those of the NBK which were 44.7%, 41.8% and 23.1%.
In addition to its banking and investment activities, the KFH, as
an Islamic Bank not only interested in maximising profits, undertook
the social responsibility of collecting and distributing Zakat (poor
due) and Sadaqat (charity). The total funds collected between 1979 and
1987 amounted to KD2,873,513 (more than US$10m) and total funds distri-
buted locally and abroad, amount to KD2,811,830 (about US$10m) and co-
vered 2896 beneficiaries (see KFH Annual Report for 1987:21). KFH also
organised seminars and conferences on Islamic economics and Islamic
banking and by way of various press and television interviews, aiming
at raising the public awareness of Islamic economics that prohibits
interest, gambling and hoarding and allows profits, PLS and investment.
9.5 CONCLUSION
Taking into consideration the environment in which it operates,
the shortness of the period since it started operating, the small num-
ber of its branches, the little experience in Islamic banking, KFH
managed to perform better than the oldest and largest bank in Kuwait,
the NBK and the OCB and KBS taken as a whole in terms of K&R, TLA, TLD,
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TLF, intermediation, efficiency and profitability. This indicates again
that interest is not necessary to do banking and that banking can be
carried out without it. This also indicates that when Islam prohibited
interest it did not prohibit profit sharing which has proved once again
that it may be beneficial not only to the bank but also to its deposi-
tors and other customers if the bank was well managed, thus Islam is
not an obstacle to economic development.
KFH only failed in making good profit in 1984 because it did not
have a good diversification of its investment portfolio and because it
created a provision of KD28.5m (US$85.5m). It was very much involved in
real estate (more than 50% of its finance funds) which deteriorated
very rapidly after the 1982 Souci El-Manakh crash, which caused a rapid
fall in the property market because people wished to sell their
properties to meet their obligations, thus flooding the property market
and brought prices sharply down (Arabia November 1985:58). But general-
ly and relatively speaking KFH performed better than the rest of the
other banks in Kuwait during the period 1978-1987 proving that banking
can be carried out without recourse to interest which is prohibited by
Islam and offering its services to the devout Muslims who used not to
use banks for investing their savings.
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CHAPTER TEN
PERFORMANCE OF FAISAL ISLAMIC BANK OF EGYPT (FIBE)
10.1 INTRODUCTION
Although Egypt may be qualified as 'the cradle of Islamic Banking'
because it was the first country to experience successful Islamic ban-
king in the 1960s (see chapter 3 above), FIBE is the first joint ven-
ture Islamic commercial bank to be established in Egyp in Egypt in 1978
cordance with the principles of Islamic Shariah and under the legisla-
tion covering the investment of Arab and foreign capital. It is, thus,
one of the oldest existing Islamic Banks in the world.
The present chapter attempts to gauge and analyse the performance
of FIBE as compared to those of the oldest and largest bank in Egypt,
the NBE (National Bank of Egypt), the OCB (Other Commercial Banks: that
is the EBS excluding FIBE and NBE) and to the EBS (Egyptian commercial
Banking System) as a whole but before doing this, it is perhaps, very
important to give an overview on the Egyptian economy and on the deve-
lopment of its banking system.
10.2 THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY: AN OVERVIEW
Egypt is a developing country, with 1m sq Km and a population of
about 50m in 1987. Its income per capita is very low (US$820 in 1984).
In comparison to other Arab Middle Eastern countries, Egypt is one of
the poorest Arab countries. Birks and Sinclair (1982:35) noted that:
"The Arab region is generally thought of as wealthy, being the reci-
pient of a large income from oil. In reality, oil wealth is confined to
a small minority of states and peoples. Most of the region's population
are poor". They cited Egypt among the poorest Arab countries though it
has recently started exporting some oil. Its economy exhibits a number
of poverty features such as low per capita income, low rates of saving
and investment, high propensity to consume, maldistribution of incomes,
limited satisfaction of basic needs, high rates of inflation, falling
standards of living and rising level of unemployment.
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Egypt is the most populous country of the Arab World and the second
of the African countries after Nigeria. Peasant farmers make up over
50% of the population living in rural areas (about 58% in the 1970s and
more than 80% in the 1960s), but less than 4% of Egyptian land is sui-
table for farming and about 96% of its total area is desert (Encyclo-
pedia Britannica 1974). The lack of forests, permanent meadows or pas-
tures, throws a heavy burden on the available arable land which totals
less than 7m acres. This limited area, which sustains on average almost
7 persons per acre, is however highly fertile, and is cropped more than
once a year, although still mainly ploughed and harvested by archaic
means. Traditionally Egyptian farmers had to await the arrival of the
annual flood of the Nile river to plant their crops. During the 20th
century, however, an extensive system of dams, reservoirs and canals
has been built to control and use the waters of the Nile more effecti-
vely. For instance, the Aswan High Dam helped providing enough power
and water to irrigate an additional 2m acres of Egypt's farm land and
to convert part of the former desert into fertile land.
Before 1975, agriculture was the most important sector of the Egyp-
tian economy, contributing more than 30% of its GDP and more than 60%
of its exports. Cotton is the most important cash crop grown throughout
the Nile valley and the Delta and occupies about a fifth of the arable
land. Other principal crops are: maize, rice, millet, broad beans,
wheat and onions. Despite a considerable output, cereal production in
Egypt falls short of total consumption and a substantial proportion of
foreign exchange is spent annually on the import of cereals and milling
products (see Birks and Sinclair 1982, Marlowe 1966 and El-Zohry 1978).
After 1975, agriculture's share in GDP and in exports declined subs-
tantially to less than 15% of the exports and less than 20% of the GDP
in the 1980s (see tables 10.1 and 10.2). This is attributable mainly to
the 1974 'open door' policy which diverted investments into other sec-
tors such as industry and services and to the discovery of some oil
reserves and also to upswings in the domestic consumption.
According to El-Zohry (1978:1): "the process of industrialisation
began after the 1930s world depression when the prices of cotton, the
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main Egyptian crop, fell more sharply than most other commodities.
Attempting to break its dependency on agriculture through rapid indus-
trialisation, Egypt developed many industries. Textile manufacturing
and food processing are traditionally the most important industries,
but newer industries such as the manufacturing of steel, chemicals and
automobiles, though still not sufficient, are expanding quite rapidly".
The largest section of Egypt's manufacturing industry in the late
1960s was represented by spinning and weaving. This was followed in the
1970s by food processing, engineering industries, chemicals and buil-
ding materials, other manufactured products included cotton yarn, tex-
tiles, edible oils, refined sugar, cheese, bleached rice, cigarettes,
vehicles, tyres and pneumatic tubes, paper, soap, commercial fertili-
sers and glass products. Aswan High Dam contributes greatly in the de-
velopment of more industries, which are expanding especially after the
1974 'open door policy' which encouraged foreign investments in Egypt,
by providing enormous amounts of electricity for industrial use. Now
the industrial sector is contributing about 40% of the GDP. This inclu-
des petroleum, electricity and construction. During the last decade the
industrial sector succeeded in achieving a continuous increase of out-
put, exports, domestic sales as well as a growth in the volume of the
labour force engaged therein. The GDP generated by this sector accor-
ding to Ministry of Finance's figures, has recorded an annual growth
ranging between 7.5% and 17.8% especially the petroleum sector which in
1976 realised for the first time a surplus in its balance of payment as
against a deficit of LE92m in 1974 and which, since then, has become
the leading sector in the economy ranking first among the basic sources
of foreign exchange contributing about 66% to the total value of
Egyptian exports and about 17% to the GDP (see tables 10.1 and 10.2).
10.3 THE EGYPTIAN BANKING SYSTEM (FRS)
The origin of the interest based Egyptian Banking System may be
traced back not only to 1898 when the National Bank of Egypt (NBE), the
oldest surviving bank, was established but long before that. According
to Abdou (1976:156), attempts to establish banks in Egypt, started in
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1830 when the then ruler of Egypt, Mohammed Ali Pasha, tried with the
help of some foreigners to open the first bank in Egypt. The attempt
did not succeed because Mohammed Ali did not pay up the capital he
promised. Another unsuccessful attempt was made by an Armenian called
El-Kessinyan in 1848 when he demanded and obtained form El-Khediwi
Abbas, son of Mohammed Ali, the right to manage the treasury resources
at his own risk and in return, pay 10% interest back to the Treasury.
El-Kessinyan could not succeed in making profit and could not even pay
back the resources of the Treasury and was thus jailed. Then during the
rule of Saeed and Ismael, a great number of foreign banks started
operating in Egypt for two main reasons. First, during the period 1863-
79 Egypt depended almost completely on foreign debts because of Saeed's
involvement in the high cost digging of the Suez Canal and because of
the extravagance of Ismael's spending on fine arts. Second, the demand
on Egyptian cotton increased manifold because of the American Civil War
(1861-65) which reduced American supply to Europe.
Some of these foreign banks came to Egypt mainly to manage closely
their claims on the Egyptian government and the others mainly to secure
cotton supplies at cheaper prices to Europe. The former disappeared
with the redemption of foreign debts in 1876 and the creation of the
debt funds. Some of these banks, to mention only a few are, Greenfield
Bank, Egyptian Austria Bank, Goldsmith Bank, Egyptian French Bank,
Rothschild's Bank, etc.. As for the foreign banks which came to Egypt
to finance and secure the export of cotton to European industry and to
promote European trade to Egypt, the British banks were the first to
arrive in Cairo and Alexandria, followed by the French, the Italians,
the Japanese, the Greeks, the Belgians and the Germans. The First Bank
was established in 1856 by an Armenian in London, with a paid up capi-
tal of £250,000 fully subscribed in London and with its general office
in Alexandria and a branch in Cairo. It was called Bank Misr (this has
nothing to do with the 1920 purely Egyptian Bank, Banque Misr). Its
purpose was to secure the supply of cotton to the British textile mar-
ket and to promote British trade to Egypt, but it was involved in gi-
ving a large loan to El-Khediwi Abbas. Faced by buying the largely
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available treasury bonds at 30% interest rate, this bank was bankrupt
in 1911 because of the 1907 banking crisis (ibid:161). For other banks
see table 10.3 below and for further details see Abdou (1976:181-91).
Table 10.3
	 Foreign Banks in Egypt before 1900 AD
Name of Bank	 Date of Operation in Egypt Headquarters
Bank Misr (old) 1856 London (Britain)
The Anglo-Egyptian Bank 1864 London (Britain)
Ottoman Bank 1866 Istanbul (Turkey)
Yukuhuma Bank 1870 Tokyo (Japan)
Credit Lyonnais 1874 Paris (France)
Bank Roma 1880 Rome (Italy)
Discount and Savings Bank 1887 Cairo (Egypt)
Athens Bank 1895 Athens (Greece)
National Bank of Egypt 1898 Cairo (Egypt)
Source: Abdou (1976)
In the early years of the 20th century, the continually rising
prices of cotton and the relative political stability in Egypt in view
of the Anglo-French agreement in 1904, induced tens of other foreign
banks to come to Egypt and so a large amount of foreign capital flooded
the country causing hyper-inflation, financial crisis and a collapse of
the economy in 1907. The NBE, established in 1898 as a joint stock com-
pany with half of its capital of Elm, subscribed in London by one indi-
vidual (Sir Ernest Cassel) and the other half by two British companies
residing in Egypt, could do nothing to save the situation because al-
though it had the privilege to issue bank notes, make advances to the
government, discount bills and receive deposits, in other words acting
as a Central bank and as a commercial bank at the same time, it did not
play the role of lender of last resort and of supervision. This was be-
cause foreign banks with strong links with their parent banks outside
Egypt, did not feel the need for it, nor did they want to be closely
scrutinised. Each bank used to discount its bills and borrow from its
principal headquarters or from foreign money markets especially London
and each bank was protecting its independence and its operational sec-
recy. Besides, each bank used the language of its country and did not
publish reports on its operations in Egypt, except the Discount and
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Savings Bank, which was in the form of an Egyptian joint stock company.
Hansen and Marzouk (1965:214) reported that: "statistics of the balance
sheets of commercial banks were little known before 1946 in Egypt".
As most of these banks had foreign control or ownership, they were
not interested in the economic or financial development of the country.
On the contrary, they were rather concerned in expatriating the maximum
profits possible and in securing the interests of their respective
countries especially at a time when there was no control over them and
no restriction on the movement of funds between Egypt and their head-
offices. As Hansen and Marzouk (1965:215) noted: "until 1947, Egypt was
almost a country without monetary policies of its own. Movements of
funds between London and Cairo were free, and this enabled the commer-
cial banks, since most of them were branches of foreign banks, to rely
on their head-offices abroad for funds to finance the cotton crop. They
were engaged mainly in financing those expatriates and borrowers whose
collateral and reputation were very well known to them and who were en-
gaged in the large scale export of cotton". Eshag and Kamal (1967:97),
describing their failure to serve the Egyptian community wrote:
At the turn of the century, some three-quarters of a million
farmers representing over 80% of Egypt's landowners were small
in the sense that their lands consisted of lots of less than 5
feddans (5.20 acres). Most if not all of these farmers had no
access to credit on normal credit terms from the country's...
commercial banks (which) were mainly concerned with financing
the principal export crop cotton by advancing short-term loans
to big landlords, merchants and exporters but they were unwil-
ling to undertake small credit transactions with the mass of
small cultivators. Some of the funds advanced by the banks
were passed down to small cotton growers but the interest
charged by the intermediaries was invariably much higher than
the statutory maximum of 9 per cent charged by the banks.
At that time the majority of the Egyptians were also not interested
in depositing their savings with these banks. Many reasons may be gi-
ven, of which, perhaps the most important, is the problem of interest
which is not allowed in Islam. Second, they were very poor and lived in
rural areas with little to save or no contact with the banks which were
concentrated in the big cities (Cairo and Alexandria). Third, the lack
of confidence in bankers who came with the French and the British
colonisation and fourth, gold and silver were the most respected forms
of money while paper money was more of a joke than a reality.
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Seeing the 1907 economic and financial crisis caused to the country
by foreign banks, the famous Egyptian economic leader Mohammed Talaat
Harb started thinking about the establishment of a pure Egyptian bank
to look after the interests of the country and to help the small depo-
sitor and borrower. In 1908 he presented the idea to the first national
congress which came up with a communique urging the Egyptian population
to support the establishment of a pure Egyptian bank which: "would save
the Egyptian economy from bankruptcy and the Egyptian wealth from the
hands of foreign banks and their usurious transactions". In 1911 Talaat
Harb published a book entitled: The Economic Solution to Egypt and the
Pro'ect of an Egyptian Bank. In 1920, he succeeded in establishing the
first purely Egyptian bank, Banque Misr. The subscription to its ini-
tial capital of LE80,000 was encouraged by newspapers, magazines and
schools. For instance, each schoolboy was required to subscribe to at
least one share of the bank (see Abdou 1976:76). In addition to tradi-
tional banking the bank was authorised by its statutes to participate
in the establishment of national industrial ventures.
Being a purely Egyptian bank and claiming to be established on the
basis of the Shariah, though not really, "the initiative was crowned
with success and made possible the promotion of a number of important
industries, especially in the field of textiles" (Tadros 1980:163);
many of which still form an important part of Egypt's industrial base.
At present Banque Misr is the second largest bank after the NBE and is
competing for the first place by opening branches that work according
to Islamic Shariah alongside its interest-based banking and by offering
various savings schemes similar to those offered by the NBE.
Until the revolution of 1952, the banking system was mainly in
foreign hands. The commercial banking system was divided into 3 main
sections: the partially and increasingly Egyptianised NBE, the purely
Egyptian Banque Misr and the rest, branches of foreign banks or banks
registered in Egypt but owned mainly by foreigners. In late 1952 the
second purely Egyptian bank, Banque du Caire was established with an
initial capital of LE500,000. Its activity was primarily concerned un-
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til recently with the services sector in accordance with banking spe-
cialisation, but it has expanded its operations in the last few years
and is the third largest bank in the country. In 1957 year of the
Egyptianisation of the banking system, El-Gamhuria Bank was established
to take over the offices of the Ottoman Bank and Bank of Alexandria was
established to take over the local branches of Barclays Bank DC&O.
The NBE's de facto position of central bank remained till 1951 when
the Egyptian law No.571 of 1951 changed it into de jure position. The
bank remained a private company and although not called upon to with-
draw from commercial banking activity, was required not to deal with
small accounts. On the 1st of January 1961, it was divided into two se-
parate banks, one for carrying out central banking functions proper un-
der the name of the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) and the other for con-
ducting ordinary commercial banking operations to retain the name of
the National Bank of Egypt (see A. Ali 1958:55 and Tadros 1980:153).
Owing to the predominance of foreign banks in Egypt and following
the military aggression on the country in 1956 which led to the confis-
ation of British and French banks operating in Egypt, another impor-
tant step was taken in the late 1950s. Mackie (1981:131) reported that:
In the late 1950s, Egypt withdrew from the world. Foreign con-
tacts with the West were cut in an effort to redress the ba-
lance which until the 1952 revolution, had been in favour of
the foreigners. Egyptianisation eventually became nationalisa-
tion and the banking sector was one of the first to feel the
wind of change. The small private banks were all absorbed in
the four biggest: the NBE, which until the creation of the
Central Bank in 1961 performed its functions, Banque du Caire,
Bank of Alexandria and Banque Misr.
This situation of closed door policies and of highly concentrated
socialist strategy of development remained until 1974, date of procla-
ming the 'open door policy'. During this period the banking system was
unsuccessful to attract sufficient savings for the economic development
of the country, despite the various savings schemes devised by the NBE,
Banque Misr Banque du Caire and Bank of Alexandria to attract savings.
For instance the NBE, in addition to ordinary demand, savings and time
deposits, devised 3 types of saving certificates in order to suit dif-
ferent categories of savers and to attract the maximum possible volume
of savings and time deposits. First it introduced in January 1965 sa-
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vings certificates with a progressively appreciating value, known as
group A certificates. Originally these bonds were issued in denomina-
tions ranging between LE5 and LE500 to be redeemed at 165% tax free of
their nominal value provided they were held for 10 years until matu-
rity. With the gradual raising of interest rates, the redeemable value
of such certificates at maturity had risen to 240% in 1979, 325% in
1981 and 365% in 1985. However, reimbursement is permitted after an
initial period of six months or more in accordance with a graduated
scale so that the surrender value rises gradually to yield the maximum
if held for 10 years. The second type of savings certificates known as
group B or current income bonds were also introduced in 1965 and issued
in denominations varying from LE10 to LE5000. The returns payable every
six months, originally 5%, has been raised gradually in the last few
years in accordance with the rise of interest rates to reach 13.25% if
the certificates are held until maturity. Reimbursement is also permit-
ted after six months subject to discount and the third type, known as
group C or lottery certificates introduced on the 4th of February 1968
are supposed to be non interest-bearing certificates but the holder is
entitled to take part in five monthly drawings in each of which the
first prize, originally amounts to LE10,000 was raised to LE15,000 in
1981, the second LE2,000 raised to LE5,000, while the remaining prizes
range between LE1000 and LE10.
As Table 10.4 shows, the poor performance of interest based banks
in the period 1953-73 to attract deposits can be seen from the very low
average rate of TSD/GNP which was 7.2% growing from 4.5% in 1953 to
only 9.1% in 1973 at an annual ARG of 4.5%, and by the low average per
capita savings of LE5.07 which grew from only LE1.96 to LE9.29 at an
annual ARG of 9%. The Banking habit, as measured by DD/M1, is also very
low. In fact the average DD/M1 ratio for the period was only 35.6%
growing at less than 1% annually and so is the average TSD/TLD which
stood at 39% growing from 20% in 1953 to 44% in 1973 at an annual ARG
of less than 3%. This means that the average DD/TLD ratio was more than
60% which indicates that even among those who dealt with banks in those
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days preferred interest free demand deposits over interest based depo-
sits to avert the sin of taking interest which is prohibited by Islam.
Table 10.4 Contribution of the EBS in the Promotion of Savings,
Banking Habits and GDP (1953-73)
YEAR	 TSD/GNP MG TSD/c
LE
MG DD/M1 MG TSD/TLD MG BTA/GDP MG
1953 4.5 - 1.96 - 30.8 - 29 - na -
1954 4.8 6.7 2.17 10.7 34.7 12.7 29 0.0 na -
1955 4.8 0.0 2.26 4.1 36.5 5.2 30 3.4 21.5 -
1956 4.6 -4.2 2.21 -2.2 34.0 -6.8 28 -6.7 22.4 4.2
1957 4.4 -4.3 2.20 -0.5 38.7 13.8 26 -7.1 23.2 3.6
1958 5.4 22.7 2.76 25.4 38.7 0.0 31 19.2 24.1 3.2
1959 6.1 13.0 3.33 20.7 42.0 8.5 34 9.7 26.8 11.2
1960 5.7 -6.6 3.05 -8.4 40.7 -3.1 32 -5.9 28.6 6.7
1961 5.9 3.5 3.24 6.2 43.5 6.9 30 -6.3 34.4 20.3
1962 8.9 50.8 4.95 52.8 37.7 -13.3 45 50.0 36.0 4.7
1963 0.3 15.7 6.19 25.0 33.1 -12.2 50 11.1 38.5 6.9
1964 9.5 -7.8 6.25 1.0 32.0 -3.3 47 -6.0 42.0 9.1
1965 9.0 -5.3 6.70 7.2 30.3 -5.3 50 6.4 39.7 -5.5
1966 7.6 -15.6 6.00 -10.4 34.2 12.9 44 -12.0 37.8 -4.8
1967 8.1 6.6 6.47 7.8 34.7 1.5 43 -2.3 42.2 11.6
1968 8.9 9.9 7.04 8.8 35.3 1.7 47 9.3 44.1 4.5
1969 9.5 6.7 7.78 10.5 33.5 -5.1 50 6.4 44.6 1.1
1970 9.2 -3.1 8.10 4.1 32.9 -1.8 41 -18.0 44.8 0.4
1971 7.7 -16.3 6.98 -13.8 33.9 3.0 45 9.8 40.7 -9.2
1972 7.8 1.3 7.63 9.3 36.1 6.5 43 -4.4 40.8 0.2
1973 9.1 16.7 9.29 21.8 35.3 -2.2 44 2.3 45.0 10.3
Aver. 7.2 4.5 5.07 9.0 35.6 1.0 39 2.9 37.6 4.4
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
However, after 1974 'open door policy' and the establishment of
Islamic banks such as Nasser Social Bank (NSB), Faisal Islamic Bank of
Egypt (FIBE), International Islamic Bank for Investment and Development
(IBID) and the opening of the Islamic branches that deals in conformity
with Shariah by Banque Misr the 2nd largest bank in Egypt and by the
Bank of Commerce and Development (BCD) and others, things have changed
dramatically. For instance, as shown in Table 10.5 the average TSD/GDP
ratio has increased by about five and a half times in 14 years from
13.5% in 1974 to 74% in 1988 growing at an annual ARG of 13.4% while it
took 21 years to only double in the previous period. The average per
capita saving also increased substantially in the period 1974-88 as
compared to the 1953-73 period. While it was only LE5.07 in 1953-73
period growing at only 9% from LE1.96 in 1953 to LE9.29 in 1973 and
recording less than five fold increase, it became LE204.6 for 1974-88
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period growing at 32.7% from LE13.70 in 1974 to LE676.5 in 1988
recording more than forty nine fold increase in just 14 years.
Table 10.5 Contribution of the EBS in the Promotion of Savings,
Banking Habit and GDP (1974-1984)
YEAR TSD/GNP MG
	 TSD/c MG TSD/TLD MG DD/M1 MG BTA/GDP MG
%	 %	 LE
1974 13.5 13.7 47.4 36.8 - 59.6
1975 10.8 -20.0 15.2 10.9 44.5 -6.1 37.9 3.0 63.3 6.2
1976 12.3	 13.9 21.7 42.8 49.2 10.6 37.9 0.0 62.4 -1.4
1977 14.1	 14.6 29.9 37.8 49.2 0.0 40.6 7.1 64.3 3.0
1978 16.9	 19.9 41.7 39.5 54.8 11.1 38.5 -5.2 66.5 3.1
1979 19.7	 16.6 60.8 45.8 59.5 8.6 39.0 1.3 61.5 -6.6
1980 23.2	 17.8 84.9 39.6 58.9 -1.0 37.0 -5.1 79.7 28.8
1981 34.1	 47.0 136.2 60.4 67.2 14.1 37.7 1.9 88.7 11.3
1982 40.6	 19.1 184.5 35.5 70.2 4.5 36.6 -8.9 100.2 13.0
1983 44.2	 8.9 237.0 28.5 74.1 5.6 34.7 -5.2 103.0 2.8
1984 48.9	 10.6 286.9 21.1 74.8 0.9 36.6 5.5 108.0 4.9
1985 46.7	 -4.5 329.4 14.8 74.0 -1.1 38.1 4.1 103.3 -4.4
1986 55.3	 18.4 425.9 29.3 77.5 4.7 38.4 0.8 120.7 16.8
1987 60.5	 2.4 525.0 23.3 78.1 0.8 40.9 6.5 130.9 8.5
1988 74.0	 22.3 676.5 28.9 80.3 2.8 41.0 0.2 146.9 12.2
Aver. 34.3	 13.4 204.6 32.7 64.0 4.0 38.1 4.3 90.6 7.0
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, various issues.
The TSD/TLD ratio also registered a remarkable increase from under
50% in 1974 to more than 80% in 1988 growing at an annual ARC of 4%,
thus indicating a switch from demand deposits to time and savings depo-
sits to which Islamic banks have contributed very much by attracting
the idle savings of the reluctant Muslims who do not want to take inte-
rest. However, the banking habit as measured by DD/M1 did not improve
much in comparison to the previous period. The average DD/M1 ratio has
only gone up by 2.5% to 38.1% in 1974-88 as compared to 35.6% in 1953-
73 period which means that people still prefer to use cash rather than
cheques. This may be explained first by the fact that in Egypt, cheques
are not always accepted as a means of payment and creditors require
cash payments rather than payment by cheques which needs a guarantee
that sufficient money is available in the debtor's bank to cover his
debt. Secondly, it takes time to cash a cheque while cash can be used
immediately which explains the creditors' refusal to accept payment by
cheques except when they do not need cash immediately and when they
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trust the debtor and know him personally. The improvement in Egypt's
financial development in the last 14 years over the previous 21 years
can also be gauged by the ratio BTA/GDP which many economists use as a
proxy for the FIR (financial interrelationship ratio) which was less
than 50% before 1974 and which exceeded the 100% level by 1982 and
stood at 146.9% in 1988 raising the average ratio from 37.6% for the
period 1953-73 to 90% for the period 1974-88.
In the last few years, Egypt have witnessed a number of changes
and related problems and the authorities are now unable to end the
country's economic brinkmanship. Foreign debt is now around $60m, the
balance of payment deficit is $554m, inflation is between 30-40%, and
foreign exchange reserves are at record lows. With 54m population inc-
reasing by 1m every seven months, unemployment is at 20-22% and 2m un-
employed graduates are waiting up to five years for government guaran-
teed jobs (see Laurie 1989:147). The crackdown on what is called 'Isla-
mic Investment companies' added another blow to the confidence of depo-
sitors and investors alike in a shaky economy.
As McDougall (1988:36) reported: "Charging or receiving interest
(RilmO runs against fundamental Muslim beliefs. So for religious or
less orthodox reasons investors voted with their feet. In the early
1980s savers began to switch their money into a fast growing sector of
unregulated Islamic Investment houses. As the funds flowed into some 50
of these they got returns as high as 24%". Naturally as M. French
(1987:81) put it: "Egyptian depositors have flocked to the new compa-
nies at the expense of the nationalised banks. The investment companies
have been particularly successful in attracting US dollars remittances
from the 2.5 million Egyptians working in the Gulf... By the time the
government realised the enormity of their growth, it was too late to
stop them... Egyptian officials and economists launched a concerted
attack on the investment companies (in 1986). Central bank governor All
Nagm swore to 'destroy' them as being responsible for many people ha-
ving withdrawn their money from public sector banks".
With confidence now severely dented, not only has the foreign ex-
change shortage become critical because the money of the Egyptians wor-
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king abroad is staying out of Egypt but also the clampdown on the in-
vestment companies has also contributed to liquidity problems in the
Egyptian pounds. The fall was triggered by a host of rumours that had
further shaken the rocky business confidence. The rumours were aggrava-
ted by reports that four Egyptian banks, including Faisal Islamic Bank
of Egypt (FIBE) and Islamic International Bank for Investment and
Development (IBID), were having serious liquidity problems. The govern-
ment stepped in to dissolve the latter's board and run it with a cent-
ral bank committee admitting that the problem is not financial but ad-
ministrative and FIBE caught the backlash of the Islamic investment
companies crisis and the rumours set off a run on the bank. Although
things are now calmer and confidence has returned; FIBE has a long way
to go to reverse the deficit (Laurie 1989:147-9). It is against this
background that the performance of FIBE should be gauged.
10.4 PERFORMANCE OF FIBE AS COMPARED TO NBE, OCB AND EBS
10.4.1 Establishment, Objectives and Operations of FIBE
FIBE opened its door to the general public in July 1979 with the
objective to perform all banking and financing in industrial, economic,
development and urbanisation projects either locally or abroad in
accordance with its statutes and the operations that it can undertake,
may be summarised in the following:
	
1	 To open current accounts, issue cheques and grant credit;
	
2	 Receive deposits and invest them Islamically;
	
3	 To keep trusts and receive personal and real securities;
4 To receive title documents, company shares, bills of exchange
and other commercial documents for safekeeping and collection
on behalf of their owners
	
5	 To collect and pay cheques and payment orders.
	
6	 To handle storage operations.
	
7	 To issue shares for the account of institutions and companies
and help them in subscription operations at the time of incor-
poration or increasing their capital and to act as a trustee;
8 To represent banks and institutions which exercise similar
objects and participate in any way with other companies, ins-
titutions or banks performing similar activities in accomp-
lishing its objectives in Egypt and abroad. It may also found
such companies or institutions;
9 To perform all business operations and transactions as may be
necessary to accomplish its objectives provided these shall
not involve in any Riba or other prohibited activities;
10 To handle commercial, industrial agricultural or other opera-
tions either directly or through companies which it can
create or participate therein;
	
11	 To rent, buy and sell lands or erect buildings and properties.
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12	 To handle foreign exchange operations and any other banking
operations not conflicting with Shariah.
13 To accept grants and donations from individuals and organisa-
tions (for the purpose of spending them in aspects conducive
to the attainment of its objects and social services) and
aids, provided the acceptance thereof shall be by a decision
from the board of directors;
14 To offer advice on financial and economic matters based on
its Islamic experience to official authorities in the Islamic
and other countries which may seek such advice.
From the above mentioned operations that FIBE can perform, one can
qualify FIBE as a Multi-purpose Financial Institution rather than just
a bank because according to the list of operations it may handle, it is
more than an ordinary bank, a building society or a merchant bank. In
addition to the CBE supervision over its operations, a religious super-
visory board is also formed within the bank to observe its conformance
with the principles of the Islamic Shariah.
10.4.2 Performance of FIBE, NBE, OCB and EBS in terms of MR
FIBE's initial capital, as fixed by article 5 of law No.48/77, was
US$8m divided into 80,000 shares of US$100 each, 50% of which for Egyp-
tians payable in dollars or in any convertible currency and the remai-
ning 49% for Saudi subscription or any non-Egyptian Muslim, payable in
US dollars. But in view of a staggering and unexpected oversubscription
that reached US$20m in the first 4 months, the authorised capital had
to be raised from the initial US$8m to US$30m, but still subscription
to the Islamic bank's capital kept growing to reach US$36m in the fol-
lowing 5 months of the same first year and consequently authorised ca-
pital was raised for the second time in the same first year to US$40m,
in other words to five times the initial suggested capital. On 17/3/83,
that is to say, after just 4 years of activity, FIBE's authorised capi-
tal was raised again to US$50m and lastly on 31/1/1984, the general
meeting of shareholders agreed to raise the bank's authorised capital
to US$500m to cope on one hand with the increasingly high demand on the
subscription in the bank's capital and on the other hand to cope also
with the staggering increase of deposits so as to maintain its capital
ratio in accordance with the Egyptian banking regulations.
As shown in Table 10.6 the K&R of FIBE in current prices registered
more than sixteen and a half fold increase during its first 9 years of
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operations between 1979 and 1987 increasing from LE9.21m in 1979 to LE
153.17m in 1987 at an annual ARC of 50% compared to that of NBE which
increased by only 13% from LE61.14m in 1979 to LE180m in 1987 and those
of OCB and EBS which increased by 20% each during the same period. Al-
lowing for inflation by deflating the current prices by the CPI of the
period, FIBE's K&R grew at an annual ARG of 28% while that of the NBE
declined by 2% and those of OCB and EBS grew at only 3% each. The com-
parison can better be seen from each of FIBE, NBE, OCB and EBS indices
of current and constant prices K&Rs, taking 1980 as a base year (see
table 10.6 and Figure 10.1).
Table 10.7 shows the share of each of FIBE, NBE and OCB in the
total K&R of EBS. From the first year of its existence FIBE counted for
more than 3% in the EBS aggregate K&R. By 1986 it reached a share of
12.9% but in 1987 its share dropped to 12.1% due mainly to the low rate
of growth of its capital and reserves in that year, which was only 1%
compared to previous years. Nevertheless, even reaching the level of
12% in the total EBS capital and reserves in this very short time (ie 9
years only) is staggering if we take into consideration the number of
44 commercial banks working in Egypt, up to June 1987, most of them are
more than 10 years old and some of them are more than 25 years old.
FIBE's share grew at an annual ARG of 26.6% compared to to that of NBE
and OCB which declined by 4.5% and 0.25% respectively despite the
establishment of new banks and the raising of the paid up capital of
the reserves some others during this period.
Table 10.7 The Shares of FIBE, NBE and OCB in the K&R of EBS (in %)
Year FIBE % Change NBE % Change OCB % Change EBS
1979 3.1 - 20.7 - 76.2 - 100
1980 5.8 87 19.6 -5 74.6 -2 100
1981 9.2 59 20.6 5 70.1 -6 100
1982 5.7 -38 18.8 -9 75.5 8 100
1983 6.0 5 17.1 -9 76.9 2 100
1984 8.2 37 15.7 -8 76.1 -1 100
1985 7.0 -15 14.8 -6 78.2 3 100
1986 12.9 84 14.3 -3 72.8 -7 100
1987 12.1 -6 14.2 -1 73.6 1 100
ARG 26.6 -4.5 -0.25
Source: Table 10.6
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Looking at the above analysis of the FIBE's performance in terms of
K&R one might ask a couple of questions. Why is it that FIBE's capital
was oversubscribed even before the bank started operating or showing
any sign of success? and why is it that people are so interested in a
bank that was going to operate in a highly competitive environment,
competing with banks which give about 13% as a guaranteed return to
depositors while FIBE does not promise any guaranteed return but promi-
ses to share not only its profits but its losses as well with the depo-
sitors? How such a bank can attract depositors to do business in the
first place, let alone make profits? and how can the oversubscription
to a bank that was not sure to make a profit be explained.
The answers to these questions can be summarised in the following:
First, and perhaps the most important reason of the oversubscription to
FIBE's capital is that many Muslims were prepared to invest in somewhat
risky but lawful business rather than in unlawful but highly profitable
business in other words their religious incentive is greater than their
profit incentive. Secondly, some subscribers might have thought that
since the depositors in the Islamic bank are going to share any loss
that might occur with the shareholders, there is a lesser burden on the
latter in case of a loss in an Islamic bank than in a non-Islamic one
where the whole loss is charged in whole to the shareholders. Thirdly,
some shareholders knew that many, if not most, of the Egyptian Muslims
are reluctant to deposit their savings with banks that give interest
for religious observance and so these would most probably deposit their
savings with the new Islamic bank which gives them a share in the rea-
lised profit rather than a predetermined return and so they had no fear
that the bank would not be able to mobilise deposits. Fourthly, some
shareholders were sure that the bank with a good management can not
only attract substantial amounts of deposits but make substantial pro-
fits as well by diversification and other financial techniques, espe-
cially when they knew that other Islamic banks established before FIBE,
such as Dubai Islamic Bank (DIB) and Kuwait Finance House (KFH) which
made very good profits from their first year.
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10.4.3 The Performance of FIBE, NBE, OCB and EBS in terms of TLA
FIBE's TLA in current prices went up from LE27.12m in its first
year of business in 1979 to LE3130.82m in 1986 then slightly declined
in 1987 to LE2991.04m, growing at an annual ARG of 110% and recording
more than 110 fold increase in just 9 years, while that of NBE, the
oldest and largest bank of the country recorded less than 4 fold rise
and grew at an annual ARG of 19% during the same period from LE2824.60m
in 1979 to LE10820m in 1987 and those of OCB and EBS grew at 29% and
26% from LE4951.28m to LE32088.96m and from LE7803.00m to LE45000m res-
pectively which means that FIBE performed better than the NBE, OCB
taken together and the EBS as a whole in terms of TLA despite the fact
that, as Johns (1987:22) reported: "In terms of assets the scene is
still dominated by the big four public sector banks -National Bank of
Egypt, Banque du Caire, Banque Misr and Bank of Alexandria- which cur-
rently share as much as three quarters of the market and handle most of
the business of the public sector entities".
After allowing for inflation by deflating the current prices by the
CPI of the period, it was found that while FIBE's TLA grew at an annual
ARG of 80% from LE32.71m in 1979 to LE1044.36m in 1987, NBE's TLA grew
at an annual ARG of only 2% from LE3407.24m in 1979 to LE3777.93m in
1987 and those of the NBE, OCB and EBS grew only by 10% and 8% respec-
tively from LE5972.59m and LE9412.50m in 1979 to LE11204.25m and
LE16026.54m in 1987 respectively (see table 10.8).
Taking 1980 as a base year, the TLA indices of FIBE in current
prices grew from 20% in 1979 to 2167% in 1987, while those of NBE, OCB
and the EBS grew only from more than 50% to less than 380%. The indices
of FIBE's TLA in constant prices grew from 24% in 1979 to 757% in 1987
while that of NBE grew from 112% to 124% only. OCB and EBS indices
grew from 65% to 123% and from 76% to 130% respectively (see table 10.8
and Figure 10.2). The comparison between the performance of FIBE and
those of NBE and OCB can also be seen from Table 10.9 which shows the
development of their market shares in the TLA of the EBS as a whole. In
its first 6 years FIBE managed to get more than 9% share in the EBS's
TLA growing from 0.4% in 1979 to 9.1% in 1985 but due to a reduction in
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its liquidity in form of balances with other banks and in its sundry
accounts in 1986 and 1987, its market share dropped to 7.7% and 6.7%
respectively. Perhaps that is why there were rumours that it is beco-
ming illiquid which led to the replacement of its governor in 1986 and
a run on its deposits after the government clampdown on the Islamic In-
vestment companies.
Table 10.9 The Shares of FIBE, NBE and OCB in the TLA of EBS (in %)
FIBE % Change NBE % Change OCB % Change EBS
1979 0.4 - 36.2 - 63.5 - 100
1980 1.1 175 24.7 -32 74.2 17 100
1981 2.7 146 22.0 -11 75.4 2 100
1982 4.1 52 19.7 -10 76.2 1 100
1983 5.0 22 20.7 5 74.3 -3 100
1984 8.5 70 21.3 3 70.2 -6 100
1985 9.1 7 25.4 19 65.6 -7 100
1986 7.7 -15 24.5 -4 67.8 3 100
1987 6.7 -13 24.0 -2 71.3 5 100
56 -4 2
Source: Table 10.8
This performance of FIBE in terms of TLA is phenomenal considering
the short time (9 years only) in which it had realised it, and conside-
ring the small number of branches (10 branches only) and the difficul-
ties and obstacles it faced. After only 3 years of business (1979-81),
FIBE managed to get the 7th rank among the 44 commercial banks in Egypt
and is now competing for higher ranking in the next few years if no
more problems happened. The Egyptian authorities have already been
trying to slow down its remarkable performance by delaying the permis-
sion of opening more than 13 ready branches for more than 5 years now,
perhaps with the view to stop it from taking over the first four ranks
held by the four largest and public banks. Not only that, but after its
first 3 years of business (1979-81) FIBE has also managed to get the
69th rank in 1981, the 48th in 1984, the 45th in 1985 and the 43rd in
1986 among the Arab top 100 banks which means that FIBE did not only
perform very well as compared to the Egyptian banks, but as compared to
banks in the Arab world as well (see The Banker, July issues).
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10.4.4	 Performance of FIBE, NBE, OCB and EBS in terms of TZD
The analysis of FIBE's performance in terms of TLD as compared to
those of the NBE, OCB and EBS can be seen in Tables 10.10-10.12 and in
Figures 10.3. For instance as Table 10.10 indicates, the volume of de-
posits mobilised by FIBE registered over a 144 fold increase in just 9
years of business, increasing from LE16.54m in 1979 to LE 2363.59m in
1987, in current prices growing at an annual ARG of 133% despite the
difficulties mentioned above. In contrast NBE, the oldest and largest
bank in Egypt with more than 220 branches all over Egypt (229 branches
in 1987) recorded less than 6 fold rise during the same period increa-
sing from LE1349.74m in 1979 to LE7323m in 1987 at an annual ARG of 24%
It is important here to note that the level of deposits reached by FIBE
in just 9 years (1979-87) took the NBE, 85 years (1898-1982) to reach.
The TLD of OCB grew from LE2820.72m in 1979 to LE21117.41m in 1987
at an annual ARG of 30%. This includes deposits in the Islamic bank,
IBID, which was established in 1980 and which in just 3 years of busi-
ness managed to attract LE256m in 1984 compared to LE61m in 1981 (see
IBID annual reports, 1981-1984) and the deposits in the numerous Isla-
mic branches of Banque Misr and other banks but does not include depo-
sits in Nasser Islamic Bank which is yet to acquire a commercial bank
licence because it was initially established as a social rather than
commercial bank. The EBS total deposits increased form LE4187m in 1979
to LE30804m in 1987, thus recording more than a 7 fold rise and growing
at an annual ARG of 29% (see table 10.10). However, when deflating the
current prices of TLD by the CPI of the period, it was find that while
FIBE's TLD in constant prices grew at an annual ARG of 93%, the NBE's
TLD grew only by 6% and those of OCB and EBS grew by only 11% each.
1980 and 1981 were the years in which not only FIBE recorded the
highest rates of growth but also the NBE, OCB and the EBS as a whole.
This is so because those 2 years witnessed a tremendous increase in
government earnings as a result of the increase in its surplus oil
which it exported in that period and where the oil prices reached their
peak between US$36 and US$40 per barrel. During 1980-81 the Egyptian
government also took several economic and fiscal measures designed to
285
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achieve a higher income growth rate, and to check inflationary pres-
sures, reduce budgetary deficit and alleviate the cost of living bur-
dens as well as to improve the balance of payments and strengthen the
Egyptian pound. Some of these measures were: 1) the rationalising of
imports and public expenditure to restrict necessary imports and unne-
cessary public spending; 2) the raising of the minimum limit of wages
from LE16 to LE20 per month and the cancellation of the defence and na-
tional security taxes levied on workers in the service of the govern-
ment, the public and the private sectors. 3) the encouragement of do-
mestic savings by raising interest rates on deposits and by introducing
new saving pools, as well as activating the stock exchange market.
All the above mentioned factors together led to a general rise in
the level of income in the economy in those years and since there is a
positive relationship between the rise in income and the level of sa-
vings, the volume of deposits in the commercial banks had to rise du-
ring those years. Likewise when the earnings from oil exports dropped
in 1983-84 the rate of growth of the volume of deposits in commercial
banks also slowed down (see table 10.10).
Taking 1980 as a base year, the indices of FIBE's TLD in current
prices increased from 17% in 1979 to 2409% in 1987 while that of the
NBE increased from 75% in 1979 to only 408% in 1987 and those of OCB
and EBS increased from 67% to 503% and from 69% to 506% respectively.
As for the indices of constant prices TLD, they increased from 20% to
841% for FIBE and from 91% to 142% for the NBE. Those of OCB increased
from 81% to 176% and those of the EBS increased form 83% to 177% for
the same period (see Figures 10.3). This clearly shows how FIBE perfor-
med during the last 9 years compared to NBE, OCB and EBS as a whole. It
is quite clear that FIBE did far better than any of these banks.
This can also be seen by the development of its share in the total
deposits of the EBS as a whole as compared to that of the NBE and that
of OCB (see table 10.11). FIBE's share in the aggregate deposits of the
EBS increased from 0.4% in 1979 to 11.5% in 1984 thereafter it declined
to 7.7% in 1987, growing on average at an annual ARG of 106%, while
that of the NBE declined from 32.2% in 1979 to 20.1% in 1984 thereafter
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rose to 23.8 in 1987 growing at an annual ARG of -3%. As for OCB's
share in the total deposit of the EBS, itincreased from 67.45% in 1979
to 74.3% in 1982 thereafter decreased back to 68.6% thus hardly growing.
Table 10.11 The Shares of FIBE, NBE and OCB in the TLD of EBS (in %)
FIBE % change NBE % change OCB % change EBS
1979 0.4 32.2 67.4 100
1980 1.6 300 29.5 -8 68.9 2 100
1981 3.7 131 24.5 -17 71.7 4 100
1982 5.6 51 20.1 -18 74.3 4 100
1983 6.9 23 20.6 2 72.5 -2 100
1984 11.5 67 20.1 -2 68.4 -6 100
1985 10.8 -6 24.3 21 64.9 -5 100
1986 8.3 -23 24.5 1 67.2 4 100
1987 7.7 -7 23.8 -3 68.6 2 100
67 -3 0
Source: Table 10.10
Most of the NBE, OCB, and EBS total deposits are in the form of
demand deposits which are interest-free while most of FIBE's deposits
are in investment deposits that are PLS based and that share in the
Bank's profits and losses (see table 10.12 which shows the relative
importance of TSD and DD in FIBE and NBE's TLD). A question that arises
here again, is why is it that people are so interested in depositing
their savings with a small newly established bank which has little or
no experience in banking and which does not guarantee any return on the
deposits but shares profits as well as losses with the depositors and
leaves the well established banks with years of experience, hundreds of
branches and substantial accumulated reserves and which offer a number
of savings schemes with guaranteed return ranging between 7% and 13.5%.
This can be explained by one of two possible explanations. First,
either FIBE is distributing higher returns on deposits than other banks
are, which is not the case or second, because many of the Egyptian Mus-
lim population prefer investing their savings in the Islamic way and
are more interested in the Islamic Shariah than in getting unlawful
returns from interest, even if this would cause them to lose part of
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their savings in case the bank makes a loss or goes bankrupt. Further-
more, depositors with FIBE were perhaps confident that the bank will
not make losses since it has ample opportunities to diversify its in-
vestments and make good profits if it is well managed.
10.4.5 Performance of FIBE, NBE, OCB and EBS in Terms of TIF
In terms of Total Finance (TLF), FIBE also performed unexpectedly
better than the NBE, OCB and the EBS. This can be seen from Tables
10.13 and 10.14 and from figure 10.4. FIBE's TLF in current prices rose
from LE16.86m in 1979 to LE2543.21m in 1987, recording more than 150
fold increase and growing at an annual ARG of 129%. In the same period,
NBE's TLF grew from LE1132.31m in 1979 to LE5912m in 1987 at an annual
ARG of 23% thus recording a little bit more than 5 fold rise. OCB's TLF
went up from LE3792.83m in 1979 to LE16019.79m in 1987 recording a
little bit more than 4 fold increase and growing at 21%. As for EBS's
TLF, this went up from LE4942m in 1979 to LE24475m in 1987 recording a
little bit less than 5 fold increase and growing at an annual ARG of
23%. Even after deflating the current prices by the corresponding CPI
to obtain the constant prices of the TLF of each of FIBE, NBE, OCB and
EBS, it was found that while FIBE made a real annual average rate of
growth of 94%, NBE made a real growth of only 3%. As for the real ARG
of OCB and EBS, these were 4% and 5% respectively (see table 10.13).
The comparative analysis of their performance can also be seen
from the comparison of the indices of their current and constant prices
TLF, taking 1980 as a base year. FIBE's indices of current prices TLF
went up from 16% in 1979 to 2345% in 1987 and the indices of its cons-
tant prices TLF rose from 19% in 1979 to 1119% in 1984 thereafter dec-
lined to 818% in 1987 as a result of high rates of inflation. At the
same time NBE indices of current and constant prices TLF went up from
88% and 106% in 1979 to only 459% and 160% respectively in 1987. OCB's
indices went up from 61% to 257% for current prices and from 78% in
1979 to 138% in 1985 followed by a decline to 112% in 1987 for constant
prices TLF (see 10.13 and figure 10.4).
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Table 10.14 shows the development of the market shares of FIBE,
NBE and OCB in the aggregate TLF of the EBS during the period 1979-87.
FIBE's market share rose from 0.3% in 1979 to reach 12.1% in 1984 then
declined to 10.4% in 1987 probably as a result of the aftermath of the
clampdown on the Islamic investment companies and its effects on FIBE.
However, even getting only 10% of the EBS's total finance is not small
considering the number of banks and banks' branches in Egypt and consi-
dering the problems it faced and the obstacles made in its way. FIBE's
market share grew during the period under review at an annual ARG of
82% compared to that of the NBE which went down from 22.9% in 1979 to
16.9% in 1980 then climbed up to reach 24.2% in 1987 perhaps as a
result of its involvement in international banking and of opening about
20 branches every year. On average its market share grew at 1% per
annum. As for OCB's market share, this went down from 76% in 1979 to
65.5% in 1987 at a negative ARG of -2% per annum (see table 10.14).
Table 10.14 The Market Share of FIBE, NBE and OCB in the TLF of EBS
Year	 FIBE -6 Change NBE .6- Change OCB ‹, Change	 EBS
1979 0.3 - 22.9 - 76.8 - 100
1980 1.4 367 16.9 -26 81.7 6 100
1981 2.6 86 17.5 4 79.9 -2 100
1982 6.1 135 17.5 0 76.4 -4 100
1983 7.9 30 18.6 6 73.5 -4 100
1984 12.1 53 19.6 5 68.3 -7 100
1985 10.6 -12 19.8 1 69.6 2 100
1986 11.1 5 22.4 13 66.5 -4 100
1987 10.4 -6 24.2 8 65.5 -2 100
ARG 82 1 -2
10.4.6 Performance of FIBE, NEE, OCB and EBS in Terms of Other Proxies
Table 10.15 exhibits a number of ratios such as intermediation,
deposits, capital, profitability and efficiency ratios. In terms of in-
termediation as measured by TLF to TLD ratios OCB recorded the highest
average ratio of 106.4% for the period under review followed by FIBE
with 101.9%, EBS with 99.9% and NBE with the lowest average ratio of
81.3%. When measuring intermediation by the ratio TLF/TLA, FIBE recor-
ded the highest average ratio for the period (77%) followed by those of
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OCB (60.8%) and EBS (58.6%). NBE again had the lowest average ratio
(48.5%). The NBE low rates of intermediation may be explained by its
high level of liquidity compared to FIBE (see table 10.15).
The average capital ratios of FIBE are higher than those of NBE,
OCB and EBS. In 1979/80 because FIBE was still in its first year of bu-
siness and deposits were just starting coming in and while most atten-
tion was towards the bank capital subscription, its capital ratio was
obviously very high (34%. when measured by the K&R/TLA ratio and 55.7%
when measured by the ratio K&R to TLD). The oversubscription to the
bank's capital probably gave more confidence to the general public and
induced them to deposit their savings with FIBE so after four years
this ratio dropped to about the national average level due to a very
high annual ARG of its deposits of 133% (see table 10.11) compared to
the annual ARG of its capital and reserves of 50% (see table 10.9). In
1984 and 1985, FIBE's capital ratios were less than the average of the
EBS and perhaps that is why, it had to increase its paid up capital in
1984 and 1986 to LE40m and LE70m consecutively.
Because there is no available separate data on the aggregate pro-
fits, liquidity, operating costs and number of branches of the EBS, the
remaining comparative analysis, in table 10.17, is made only as far as
FIBE and the NBE are concerned.
As can be seen from Table 10.15 different results are obtained
when comparing the profitability of FIBE to that of the NBE depending
on which proxy is used in the measurement. Measuring profitability by
the ratio of net profit to total assets it is found that on average
FIBE did better than the NBE, but when measuring profitability by the
return on equity ratios (PBT/K&R) it is found that the NBE performed
far better than FIBE. This may be explained by the fact that most of
NBE's deposits (61%) are demand deposits on which no return is paid to
depositors whereas 96% of FIBE's deposits are investment deposits on
which a share in the bank profit is paid to the depositors (see table
10.12). This can also be seen from the comparison of the Depositors'
share in FIBE's profit to total deposits and the interest paid to total
deposits for the NBE in Table 10.15 which shows clearly how relatively
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the cost of funds for FIBE is much greater than that of the NBE.
However, this indicates a better and juster distribution of profits in
FIBE than in the NBE where most of the profits went to the shareholders
whose share in the bank's total assets is only 2.2% and where 60% of
the total assets belong to the depositors (see table 10.15).
Because FIBE is an Islamic bank that is supposed to be more invol-
ved in its finance operations than the NBE since it has to evaluate the
feasibility of the projects financed, participate in their management
or at least supervise them and do the follow up, its relative operating
costs should be greater than those of the NBE which, just grants loans
to creditworthy customers without real concern over how a customer in
question is going to spend the loan so long as it is reasonably sure of
the repayment of the loans with its interest, and the NBE, being the
oldest (more than 90 years old) and largest bank in Egypt, should enjoy
more economies of scale on its operations than FIBE which is only 10
years old, because as Agu (1984:326) pointed out, 'Generally speaking,
larger banks stand the chance of achieving greater economies of scale
than smaller banks mainly because of the greater disability of the lat-
ter to spread overhead costs, pool risks and specialise among employees
as well as their higher transaction costs of moving funds in smaller
amount than in the former'. but, perhaps, because the NBE expanded its
branch network from 108 in 1979 to 229 branches in 1987 (ie an increase
of 121 branches in 9 years) while FIBE was not given the permission to
open its 13 ready branches (since 1983) and it has only 10 operating
branches, the NBE operating costs to total assets ratio is greater than
that of FIBE (see table 10.15). Perhaps, for the same reason, the
efficiency of FIBE, as measured by the ratios: TLA/NOB, TLD/NOB and
TLF/NOB, seems to be greater than that of NBE (see table 10.15).
In addition to its business operations, FIBE distributed more than
LE18m as Zakat during 1979-87 at an annual average of LE2m per annum to
needy people. The amounts distributed were made partly of the Zakat on
the shareholders' funds and partly from the Zakat and donations of in-
dividuals who entrusted FIBE to channel it to those who really need it.
297
10.5 CONCLUSION
From the comparative analysis in Section 10.4 above concerning the
performance of FIBE as compared to the NBE, OCB and the EBS as a whole
it was found that although the period, of the analysis 1979-1987 (ie 9
years only) which represent the first 9 years of FIBE's life, is very
short and although FIBE had only 10 branches during this period it has,
relatively speaking, performed better than the NBE, the oldest and lar-
gest bank in Egypt, OCB taken togetherand the EBS as a whole. In fact
it has performed better than expected encouraging thus the movement of
Islamic Banking not only in Egypt, where more Islamic banks have been
established and where many of the interest-based banks are offering the
choice to their customers by running Islamic banking services alongside
their ordinary business to keep their competitiveness, but in the whole
world. It was also found that within this very short time FIBE has not
only managed to mobilise substantial amounts of savings that were idle
because of the reluctance of Muslims to deal with interest-based banks,
but it has also contributed to the economic growth and development of
the country. In spite of not promising any guaranteed return to depo-
sitors, FIBE's volume of business, volume of deposits and volume of
finance have recorded considerable growth that took other banks in the
country longer periods to achieve. Just after three years of business
it has managed to get the seventh rank among the 44 commercial banks
doing business in Egypt, most of whom are more than 15 years old. This
indicates that what is needed for Muslim countries like Egypt to
develop is the promotion and establishment of institutions that do not
contradict the beliefs of the majority of people but that agree with
them. This also indicates that interest is not necessary to mobilise
savings for development and that PLS systems may lead to better mobili-
sation of savings in Islamic countries where the people are concerned
in observing the injunctions of Islam, thus when Islam prohibits inte-
rest it does not curb development but on the contrary encourages it
through lawful means such as PLS systems which as we saw above is more
just and may lead to greater growth and development.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
PERFORMANCE OF FAISAL ISLAMIC BANK OF SUDAN (FIBS)
11.1 INTRODUCTION
FIBS is the oldest Islamic Bank to be established in Sudan in 1978
and one of the oldest in the world, after DIB (in UAE), IDB (in Saudi
Arabia), KFH (in Kuwait) and FIBE (in Egypt). The purpose of this chap-
ter is to analyse its performance as compared to the performance of the
largest and oldest bank in Sudan: Bank of Khartoum (BOK), Other Com-
mercial Banks (OCB that is the SBS excluding FIBS and BOK) and the
Sudanese commercial Banking System (SBS) in the same way as was done
for KFH and FIBE in the preceding chapters, starting with an overview
on the Sudanese economy and another one on its banking system.
11.2 THE SUDANESE ECONOMY: AN OVERVIEW
Sudan is the largest country in Africa with 2.55m sq. km  and a
population of 22m in 1986. Its considerable size, which represents more
than 8% of the African Continent and almost 2% of the world's total
land area, displays a variety of geographical, climatic and tribal
features which influence the structure of the economy and its course of
development. The Nile River is the dominant feature and represents the
vital link between the North and the South. With its tributaries, it
provides a resource of great importance for irrigation, transportation
and hydroelectric generation.
This range of climates and geographical positions is favourable for
the expansion and diversification of agricultural activities of various
forms. But despite the huge tropical and potentially cultivable area,
estimated at more than 200m acres, and the abundance of water resources
from rivers and from rainfall (before the drought), the land under cul-
tivation is only about 20m acres (ie 10% only). Sudan is also believed
to be rich in mineral resources but the political instability of the
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country, the shortage of foreign exchange and of skilled labour and
other problems have all resulted in their under exploitation. Mining is
conducted only on a small scale and contributes little to the overall
economy. In addition there are 60m acres of pasture land which is used
by traditional herdsmen (Encyclopedia Britannica 1974:Vol.17).
Sudan's fate has worsened in the last few years because of the
plagues that have stricken the country since the beginning of the 1980s
such as the man-made disaster: desertification (the spread of desert
over arable land), caused by deforestation, unsuitable farming techni-
ques and overgrazing, forcing numerous farmers and villagers to aban-
don their homes and farms in search of a living elsewhere; the drought
which lasted for more than four years and was followed by locusts and
by a big damaging flood in 1988 that devastated the country and made
things even worse. Consequently Increasing numbers of Sudanese are be-
coming homeless and destitute.
The population suffers from a high rate of illiteracy and from a
very low level of vocational and professional training. Associated with
the population situation is the added problem of ethnic, religious and
linguistic heterogeneity. This is, as Sayigh (1978) argued: "not equal
to pluralism, which is a useful quality, in as much as pluralism can be
enriched in cultural and social terms, and in terms of motivation and
performance, once certain basic features are shared by the whole popu-
lation... The divisiveness is reflected most strongly in the north-
south schism and conflict. The Problem of the South involves political
unrest, blockage of social homogenisation and the build up of social
and economic frustrations. The north-south war which plagued the coun-
try since independence in 1956 is costly in both men and money and has
delayed development considerably".
The majority of the population (80%) depends on agriculture which
contributes about 30% of the GDP and more than 90% of the country's fo-
reign exchange earnings. Cotton is the most important cash crop, con-
tributing more than 50% of the exports. "Since 1974, realising all the
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hazards of developing a one crop economy such as vulnerability to price
fluctuations, adverse demand conditions and weather changes, emphasis
has been gradually placed on the production of oil seeds, wheat and
sugar cane" (El-Zubair 1983:77). Other major crops are: gum arabic,
shorgum, millet, corn, sesame seeds, peanuts and castor beans. Recently
rice, tobacco, coffee and oil palm have all been cultivated but prima-
rily on an experimental basis.
The livestock wealth of the country contributes about 10% to the
GDP, but is also underexploited, as well as primitively exploited. Pre-
liminary estimates indicate that there is about 48m heads of livestock
of which 18m cattle, 15m sheep, 13m goats and 2m camels. It is worth
noting in this connection, that the exports of livestock are always on
the hoof. This is because the country does not have the facilities to
deep freeze meat to export it in properly equipped carriages. Further-
more importers prefer live animals owing to their greater confidence in
their ability to exercise better sanitary control.
Industrialisation in Sudan did not begin until late 1950s when the
government invested in industry for the first time. Since then there
have been some relatively extensive investments both by the private and
public sectors but mainly dominated by 2 or 3 sub-sectors which are
typical for most LDCs in the early stages of industrialisation, these
are food processing, tanning, textile and tobacco.
Industry in Sudan is operated on a small scale and most of the
production is used within the country. It is still underdeveloped and
under-utilised and plays only a secondary role in the GDP of the
country by contributing less than 10% (see Table 11.1). The other fea-
ture which one can think of and which may not be exclusive to the Sudan
is the failure of identifying priorities in projects needed and of
choosing between the different means to achieve them. Besides, the
under-utilisation of the capacity may be attributed to obsolete and
inefficient machinery, lack of spare parts and imported raw materials,
lack of skilled labour, etc..
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Table 11.1 The Sudanese GDP (in LS million and in %) for 1983-86
Sector 1983
Value Share
1984
Value Share
1985
Value Share
1986
Value Share
Agriculture 2,320 31 2,664 30 2,792 26 4,486 32
Commerce 1,755 24 2,088 23 2,553 24 3,056 22
Manufact. & Mining 627 8 783 9 1,071 10 1,392 10
Transport & Communic. 754 10 887 10 1,153 11 1,466 10
Construction 390 5 502 6 589 5 620 4
Electricity & Water 160 2 203 2 273 3 356 3
Government Services 806 11 969 10 1,294 11 1,481 10
Other Services 709 9 900 10 1,095 10 1,240 9
Total GDP 7,521 100 8,996 100 10,822 100 14,097 100
Source: BOS, Annual Report 1986.
The downward trend in the contribution of the agricultural sector
to the GDP between 1982 and 1985 was mainly due to the drought and
desertification in the rainfed areas. Recently Sudan suffered even more
from severe economic crises in the 1980s. Inflation has been running at
more than 80% per annum. Its debt burden is over US$10bn. There is a
widening gap between production and consumption, income and expendi-
ture, savings and investment as well as between imports and exports.
Economists attribute this crisis to the failure of the economic, mone-
tary and financial policies (A.A Ali 1985:9). Table 11.2 shows the de-
teriorating Sudanese trade balance for the period 1981-86).
Table 11.2 Sudan's Trade Balance between 1981 and 1986 (in LSm and in %)
Exports	 Imports	 Balance
Year
Value Change Value Change Value Change
1981 357.0 31.6 1,177.6 49.4 -820.6 -
1982 483.1 35.3 1,278.1 8.5 -795.0 2.8
1983 810.7 67.8 2,129.6 66.6 -1,318.9 -65.9
1984 817.3 0.8 1,803.7 -15.3 -986.4 25.2
1985 844.7 4.1 2,128.8 18.0 -1,284.0 -30.2
1986 833.2 -1.4 2,402.2 12.8 -1,569.0 -22.2
Source: BOS, Annual Report 1986
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Beside all this, There are structural, organisational, financial
and physical constraints, among which one can mentions the following:
1- Structural rigidities: Geographical dispersion of the popula-
tion within the huge size of the country and lack of suffi-
cient transportation, communication and storage facilities;
2- Shortage of foreign exchange to buy spare parts and essential
inputs and the consequent negligence of maintenance;
3- Inadequate farm machinery and lack of spare parts;
4- Inadequate credit facilities especially for small peasants
who have no collateral to present to the IBBs which do not
accept to provide them with the seeds and machinery required
and share with them the crop or the profits and losses.
5- High worsening rates of inflation, sharply increasing the
ces of vital basic needs and of imported inputs such as
fuel, fertilisers and pesticides, thus, severely impeding
investment, production and employment.
6- The shortage of both skilled and unskilled labour. The skil-
led ones have been attracted by better earning opportunities
in neighbouring oil producing countries (Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf Emirates). The unskilled labour on the other hand, did
not find earning opportunities in cotton picking and in agri-
cultural jobs sufficiently attractive (El-Zubair 1983:86).
11.3 THE SUDANESE BANKING SYSTEM (SBS)
Like all Islamic countries, Sudan's experience with modern banking
is of recent origin. According to El-Beheiry (1981), Modern financial
institutions were first introduced to Sudan with the advent of the Bri-
tish colonial rule. The first recorded fully fledged bank was the Na-
tional Bank of Egypt (NBE) which opened a branch in Sudan in 1901. This
was followed by Barclays Bank DCO in 1913. The government accounts were
maintained by the NBE, and after 1914 the issue of Sudan currency was
also entrusted to NBE. The NBE obtained notes from Cairo (Egypt) and
coins from the U.K. The seniorage from printing and minting accrued to
both Egypt and the UK. Until 1949, the NBE and Barclays Bank DCO, were
the only 2 banks operating in Sudan, but the unprecedented export boom
which was experienced between 1946 and 1951 and which was brought about
by the rise in the value of cotton exports, encouraged more banks to
come to Sudan and so the Ottoman Bank opened a branch in Sudan in 1949,
followed by four banks in the 1950s: the Egyptian Banque Misr (1953),
the French Credit Lyonnais (1953), the Jordanian Arab Bank (1956) and
the Ethiopian Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (1956). Thus, until the inde-
pendence in 1956 the whole banking system was under foreign domination
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and was concentrated only in the big towns: Khartoum, Kessala and the
Blue Nile. It was not until 1960 that a wholly owned Sudanese bank, the
Sudanese Commercial Bank was established. In 1964, the French Credit
Lyonnais was transformed into a joint-venture: El-Nilein Bank whereby
Credit Lyonnais maintained (40%) and the government of Sudan (60%). And
in 1969 the Ottoman Bank was replaced by a branch of the British
National and Grindlays Bank.
The credit policy of these foreign banks was, as described by BOS
(nd:10), cautious, conservative and old fashioned, particularly towards
development projects which required medium or long term financing...
80% of commercial bank loans to the private sector were short term and
mainly concentrating on financing foreign trade. The failure of the
banking system during this period is evident from the meagre contribu-
tion to the indigenous economic development and from the huge transfer
of profits abroad (see Table 11.3 showing the high rates of profits
expatriation by the foreign banks before they were nationalised).
Table 11.3 The Expatriation of Profits Before Nationalisation (in LS000)
Bank K&R FK TLD TP TP/K&R
Barclays Bank DCO 1,240 1,240 23,010 1,630 131
National & Grindlays 250 250 7,032 507 202
Corn. Bank of Ethiopia 300 300 313 45 14
Arab Bank 150 150 1,760 219 145
El-Nilein Bank 3,000 1,200 7,637 1,221 101
Banque Misr 3,200 3,200 2,563 na na
Corn. Bank of Sudan 1,099 - 7,569 - -
Source:BOS The Nationalisation of Banks in the Sudan, (nd).
Notes :K&R = Capital and Reserves; FK = Foreign Capital;
TLD = Total Deposits; TP = Transferred Profits.
These huge profits realised by the foreign banks from the deposits
of the Sudanese citizens were not invested in Sudan but were transfer-
red abroad in foreign currencies. Not only that but the foreign banks
transferred also other funds in the form of insurance of their assets
in foreign companies, administration costs, provident funds and commis-
sions to their headquarters abroad (ibid). At the same time the small
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scale industries had been unable to obtain finance from these banks for
their working capital because of the inherent limitations of these
industries to provide a suitable security, the uncertain prospects of
their business which makes them poor credit-risk and the difficulty of
assessing the demand for their products. This and other reasons made
the nationalisation of these banks inevitable. Thus, the seven opera-
ting banks became in May 1970 as follows:
1- Barclays Bank DCO became the State Bank for Foreign Trade;
2- National and Grindlays Bank became the National Bank of Oumdurman;
3- The Ethiopian Commercial Bank became the Commercial Bank of Juba;
4- The Arab Bank became the Red Sea Commercial Bank;
5- Banque Misr became the People's Co-operative Bank;
6- Bank El-Nilein remained unchanged and
7- The Sudanese Commercial bank also remained unchanged
In 1973, following a new law concerning the organisation of banks
and of savings, the National Bank of Oumdurman was merged with the Com-
mercial Bank of Juba under the name of Bank Juba-Oumdurman and the The
Red Sea Commercial Bank was merged with El-Nilein Bank under the lat-
ter's name. In 1975, the State Bank for Foreign Trade (ex. Barclays
Bank DCO, the oldest bank in Sudan) was renamed Bank of Khartoum (BOK).
In 1977, foreign banks were allowed again to operate in Sudan for
the first time after the Nationalisation. At the same time the Sudanese
banks were allowed to open branches outside Sudan, thus the National
Bank of Abu-Dhabi opened a branch in Sudan and El-Nilein Bank started
operating abroad by opening a branch in the UAE.
Towards the end of 1978, the Sudanese Investment Bank started its
operations as a joint venture with French capital, by opening 2 bran-
ches in Khartoum and port Sudan. Moreover, Citibank that was licensed
in 1977, started its banking business during 1978. In addition, FIBS
also commenced its business according to the Islamic Shariah during
the second half of the year, as the first Islamic bank in Sudan.
Towards the end of 1980 a number of banks (Habib Bank, Bank of
America and the Islamic Bank for Finance and Investment) were licensed
to establish branches in Sudan. Moreover a number of applications for
establishing commercial banks (4 of which were Islamic) were approved.
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In 1982 the authorised capital of BOK was increased from LS3m to
LS10m and the paid up capital from LS2m to LS6m with the objective of
strengthening the financial position of the bank. And on 18th April
1983, the People's Co-operative Bank (PCB) was merged with the BOK.
This made the TLA of BOK rise from LS475m at the end of 1982 to
LS1,049m in 1983 (ie an increase of 121.1%). BOK's TLD for the year
went up from LS360.7m in1982 to LS746.2m in 1983 but this figure
includes according to BOK 1983 annual report, LS303m cash margins and
inter-branch accounts and therefore the increase in actual total depo-
sits was LS82.5m only ie an increase of 22.9% only instead of 106.9%.
Another reason why perhaps the TLA of BOK was very high in 1983 as
compared to 1982 is due to the devaluation of the Sudanese pound in
relation to the US dollar from LS0.9 to LS1.3 for the official market
and LS1.8 for the free market. This made the balances due to foreign
banks increase from an equivalent of LS35.9m to an equivalent of
LS51.6m in 1983 an increase of 44%. BOK's balance sheet for 1983 also
include L8106m representing bad and doubtful debts of the formerly PCB
were charged to the Bank of Sudan) and appeared in the BS as loans
under collection on behalf of the BOS. Besides, five new banks were
licensed and authorised to operate in the country in 1983. These are
(3) the Tadamon Islamic Bank, (4) the Sudanese Islamic Bank and (5) the
Islamic Co-operative Development Bank. In addition 16 commercial banks'
branches were opened, thus bringing the total number of banks' branches
in Sudan to 160 by the end of 1983.
The most notable development in the Sudanese Banking System in
1984 was the abolition of interest and the switch over to the Islamic
Banking System. Moreover, 3 more Islamic banks were licensed to operate
in Sudan, these are the Western Islamic Bank, the Saudi-Sudanese Bank
and the El-Baraka Islamic Bank. However, credit ceilings were forced on
banks that year. This blocked to a great extent the trend of the growth
in bank investment. This, together with the economic recession, affec-
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ted the banks' activities very badly. Due to this and to the ferocious
propaganda and accusation made by EL-Ayam newspaper against FIBS in
this year, accusing FIBS to be responsible for what is called 'the
dhura crisis' by way of speculation, FIBS's operations decreased drama-
tically. The case was taken to court and FIBS was cleared and the news-
paper apologised in a press release on the 3rd of October 1985. In
1985 another big devaluation of the Sudanese pound was undertaken. The
Sudanese pound was devalued from LS1.3 to LS2.5 to one dollar and at
the same time the private currency exchanges were closed. Dealings in
foreign exchange were allowed only through official government commer-
cial banks like BOK, while private commercial banks were subject to in-
quest committees since late 1985. This indirectly hindered their opera-
tions and inflicted a significant damage to their images and credibi-
lity. Only lately, both the BUS and the office of the Attorney General
came to realise the significant damage that have been done by these
inquest committees. International businesses and money circles as well
as local bankers' associations were deeply concerned with this attitude
and condemned it. Some of the other factors that hindered banking ope-
rations in the second half of the 1980s and consequently obstructed
economic growth and development, are:
1- The tight monetary and fiscal policies of the government;
2- The import and export policies which give the public sector
banks a monopoly hand over other banks. For instance the
private banks were deprived of export earnings in addition to
the transfer of foreign currency purchased and forwarded to
the committee for dealing in free market resources;
3- The new unrealistic business tax law that imposes retrospec-
tively a 70% tax rate on banks' profits;
4- The excessive restrictions on credit to the extent that tra-
ding on essential commodities has been severely handicapped.
5- The prohibition of refinance of local trade.
6- The unjust treatment of private banks as compared to the
public ones. For instance public sector banks were given 43%
of the local trade volume in contrast to other banks.
The total effect of these factors have been severely negative on
the investment activities of the private sector banks such as FIBE. It
is against this background, that the performance of FIBS is to be
assessed in comparison to those of BOK, OCB and SBS.
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11.4 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF FIBS, BOK, OCB AND SBS
11.4.1 The Establishment and Objectives of FIBS
FIBS started operating as a joint-venture company in May 1978 with
an authorised capital of LS6m divided into 600,000 shares valued at
LS10 each or the equivalent thereof in convertible currencies. 40% of
the shares were alloted to Sudanese nationals; 40% to Saudi nationals
and 20% to Muslims from other countries. Three months later, the
authorised capital was raised to SL10m, as a result of an unexpected
oversubscription. The percentages of share holding were amended to 40%
to the Sudanese citizens and 60 % to the Muslims from other countries.
Two years later the authorised capital of the bank was raised once
again to LS100m, thus becoming the most capitalised bank in Sudan.
FIBS's objectives is to endeavour to stimulate social and economic
development through the performance of all banking services, financial
transactions, commercial operations and all other investment activities
in conformity with Islam. According to its status the Bank may not only
establish affiliate companies but also participate in any social or
economic development projects inside or outside Sudan. In 1986, FIBS
had 20 operating branches, and 10 others waiting for the BUS approval.
FIBE has also 3 subsidiary companies: The Islamic Insurance Company,
The Islamic Trade and Service Company and The Real Estate Development
Company. Now FIBS stands on the top of the private banks and ranks
third in the total banking system in terms of capital, deposits,
Finance and number of customers after Bank of Khartoum and Unity Bank.
11.4.2 Performance in Terms of Capital and Reserves (K&R)
As can be seen from Table 11.4 FIBS's K&R in current prices rose
from LS4m in 1979 to about LS133m in 1986 recording thus, a 33 fold
increase in the first 8 years of business at an ARG of 96.4%. This is
mainly due to the oversubscription to the bank's authorised capital and
the raising of this from LS6m to LS100m in such a short time. BOK's K&R
in current prices rose during the same period from LS4m to LS38m, thus,
recording only nine and a half fold increase despite the fact that it
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increased its authorised capital in 1982 from LS3m to LS10m and despite
its merger with the People's Co-operative Bank in 1983. The OCB's K&R
increased during the same period from LS13m in 1979 to LS602m in 1986
recording, thus, a 46 fold increase and growing at an annual ARG of
86.2%. This is mainly due to the establishment of a number of new banks
of which six are originally Islamic. The same may be said about the
SBS's K&R which grew from L521m in 1979 to LS773m in 1986 at an annual
ARG of 76% and recording about 37 fold increase during the same period.
The striking feature is that FIBS was growing at phenomenal rate of
growth between 1979 and 1983 and that it stagnated between 1984 and
1986 because of the reasons mentioned above, namely the competition
from the six new Islamic banks whose shares are, unlike those of FIBS,
held almost exclusively by Sudanese citizens and from all banks which
became Islamic in 1984, the accusation of FIBS of speculating in dhura.
The other striking feature is that in 1985 the low rate of growth of
FIBS is not exclusive to FIBS, it is also observable in the case of
BOK, OCB and SBS (see Table 11.4). After allowing for the effect of
inflation which is very high in Sudan, by calculating the constant
prices of the K&R of each of FIBS, BOK, OCB and SBS, taking 1980 as a
base year, it was found that the K&R of FIBS grew from LS5m in 1979 to
LS65m in 1983 then decreased dramatically to L926m in 1986 because of
high rates of inflation but on average it grew at an annual ARG of
52.1% during the period under review. Likewise the K&R of BOK grew from
LS5m in 1979 to LS14m in 1984 then dropped to LS7.5m in 1986, growing
at an ARG of 11.9% during the same period. As for the K&R of OCB and
SBS, they grew from LS16.4m and LS26.5m in 1979 to LS119.4m and
LS153.3m in 1986 at annual ARG of 44.5% and 36.5% respectively.
The performance of each of FIBS, BOK, OCB and SBS may better be
seen from Figure 11.1 showing the relative development of the K&R in
current and constant prices of each of FIBS, BOK, OCB and SBS and from
Table 11.5 showing the market share of each of FIBS, BOK and OCB in the
K&R of the SBS. It is clear that FIBS was doing very well compared to
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BOK and OCB before 1984 and that it did badly after that. In the first
5 years of business it managed to take over about 54% of the K&R of the
SBS as a whole but then its share declined sharply to stand at 17.2% in
1986, however on the whole its annual ARG was 7.5%. BOK's K&R kept
declining during the whole period from 19.1% in 1979 to 4.9% in 1986 at
an annual ARG of -15.7%. As for OCB, although its share declined from
about 62% in 1979 to 34.8% in 1983, it recovered and increased sharply
after that to reach 77.9% in 1986, growing at an annual ARG of 7.6%.
Table 11.5 The Market Share of FIBS, BOK and OCB in The K&R of the SBS
FIBS
Share	 Growth
BOK
Share	 Growth
OCB
Share Growth
SBS
Total
1979 19.1 - 19.0 - 61.9 - 100
1980 17.8 -6.8 16.6 -12.6 65.5 5.8 100
1981 25.7 44.4 13.2 -20.5 61.1 -6.7 100
1982 29.1 13.2 12.1 -8.3 58.8 -3.8 100
1983 53.8 84.9 11.5 -5.0 34.8 -40.8 100
1984 40.8 -24.2 9.4 -18.3 49.8 43.1 100
1985 40.2 -1.5 9.9 5.3 50.0 0.4 100
1986 17.2 -57.2 4.9 -50.5 77.9 55.8 100
ARG 7.5 -15.7 7.6
Source: Table 11.4 above
11.4.2 Performance in terms of Total Assets (TLA)
In terms of TLA in current prices, FIBS managed during the first 8
years of business to record more than 16.5 fold increase, growing from
LS31.14m in 1979 to LS517.57m in 1986 at an annual ARG of 71.1%, while
at the same time BOK managed to record 7 fold increase from LS225.84m
in 1979 to LS1,795.78m at an annual ARG of 38.4%. The OCB's TLA also
grew by 7 fold during the same period, from LS713.01m in 1979 to
LS5,060.28m in 1986 at an annual ARG of 33.1% and the TLA of the SBS
grew more than 7.5 fold rise from LS969.98m in 1979 to L27,373.63m in
1986 at an annual ARG of 34% (see Table 11.6 and Figure 11.2). Allowing
for inflation, FIBS's TLA grew from LS39m in 1979 to reach LS215.79m in
1984, thus, recording a 5.5 fold increase in real terms in the first
five years of business, then decreased sharply to LS102.65m in 1986 to
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make the overall increase equal to 2.6 fold increase in real terms in
comparison to the 16 fold rise it recorded in nominal terms because of
the very high inflation in the country which eroded the value of its
assets, but on average the annual ARG of FIBS's TL A was 21.9% compared
to that of BOK, OCB and SBS which were 6.4%, 2.1% and 3% respectively.
The BOK's TLA also increased from LS283m in 1979 to reach LS512.98m in
1983, thus, recording about 2 fold increase but it decreased the
following years to stand at LS356m in 1986 making the overall increase
1.2 times that of the 1979. The TLA of OCB and SBS were also hit by the
high inflationary effects which reduced their annual ARG from 33.1% and
34% to 2.1% and 3% respectively (see Table 11.6). This inflationary
effect is clearly seen from Figure 11.2 exhibiting the relative deve-
lopment of each of the TLA of FIBS, BOK, OCB and SBS.
The market share of FIBS in the SBS's TLA went up from 3.2% in
1979 to 12.7% in 1983, then went down to 7.7% in 1986 growing at an
annual ARC of 16.6%. BOK's market share fluctuated between 19% and 30%.
It went up from 23.3% in 1979 to reach 25.2% in 1982, declined sharply
to 19% in 1983, improved in 1983 to reach 30.1% as a result of its
amalgamation with the PCB and then declined back to 24.4% in 1986
because of the improvement of the OCB's TLA which, though declined in
the first 5 years from 73.5% in 1979 to 57.3% in 1983, recovered to
reach 68.6% in 1986 in view of the establishment of other Banks.
Table 11.7 The Market Shares of FIBS, BOK and OCB in the TL A of the SBS
FIBS
Share	 Growth
BOK
Share	 Growth
OCB
Share	 Growth
SBS
Total
1979	 3.2 - 23.3 - 73.5 - 100
1980	 5.2 62.5 24.1 3.4 70.7 -3.8 100
1981	 7.7 48.1 25.2 4.6 67.1 -5.1 100
1982	 11.1 44.2 19.0 -24.6 69.9 4.2 100
1983	 12.7 14.4 30.1 58.4 57.3 -18.0 100
1984	 10.7 -15.7 29.9 -0.7 59.4 3.7 100
1985	 7.7 -28.0 26.5 -11.4 65.8 10.8 100
1986	 7.0 -9.1 24.4 -7.9 68.6 4.3 100
ARG 16.6 3.1 -5.6
Source: Table 11.6
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11.4.3 Performance in terms of Total Deposits (TLD)
The TLD in current prices of FIBS grew from LS21.8m in 1979 to
LS319.4m in 1986, thus, recording an almost fifteen fold increase and
increasing at an annual ARC of 54.5%. That of BOK grew from LS191.3m in
1979 to LS1,364.5m in 1986 recording a little bit more than seven fold
increase in the 8 years under review and growing at an annual ARG of
34.3%. During the same period, the OCB's TLD grew from LS335m in 1979
to LS3,453m in 1986 recording 10 fold rise and growing at an annual ARG
of 47.4%. As for the TLD of the SBS, it increased from LS548m in 1979
to LS5,137m in 1986, registering a little bit less than 10 fold rise
and growing at an annual ARG of 38.6%. However, after allowing for inf-
lation which is very high in Sudan and especially from 1983 onwards,
FIBS' TLD grew from LS27.3m in 1979 to only LS129.2m in 1982, then dec-
lined towards LS63.3m in 1986, growing at an annual ARC of 68.3% in the
first 4 years and at an annual ARG of -15.9% in the following 4 years,
thus, making the overall annual ARC for the whole period equal to 20.2%
only. The TLD in constant prices of BOK grew from LS239.7m in 1979 to
LS258.8m in 1981, declined to LS246.9m in 1982, improved to LS364.9m in
1983 because of the merger with the People's Co-operative Bank, then
declined again to LS270.6m in 1986, growing on average at an annual ARG
of 3.4% only. OCB's TLD in constant prices increased from 1S419.8m in
1979 to only L8429.4m in 1980 at a rate of growth of 2.3%, declined in
1983 to LS415.5m at a negative rate of growth of -3.2%, improved to
LS479.3m in 1982, declined again in the following two years but this
time very sharply to reach a low level of only LS294.0m in 1984.
However, in the following two years it reversed the trend and went up
very sharply to reach a high level of LS684.9m in 1986, growing thus at
an annual real ARC of 11.9% instead of the nominal ARG of 47.4%. And
the TLD in constant prices of the SBS grew from LS686.8m in 1979 to
LS871.1m in 1983, decreased the following year at a negative rate of
growth of -13.6%, then increased sharply to reach LS1,018.8 in in 1986,
thus growing at an annual ARC of 6.3% during the period 1979-1986.
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Figure 11.3 Performance of FIBS, BOK, OCB & SBS in Terms of TLD
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The relative growth of TLD in current and constant prices of each
of FIBS, BOK, OCB and SBS is perhaps better gauged by their indices
taking 1980 as a base year and can be seen from Figure 11.3 or can be
also gauged by the market share of each of FIBS, BOK and OCB in the SBS
aggregate total deposits (see Table 11.9 below).
Table 11.9 The Market Share of FIBS, BOK and OCB in the TLD of the SBS
FIBS	 BOK	 OCB	 SBS
Share	 Growth Share	 Growth Share	 Growth Total
1979	 4.0 - 34.9 - 61.1 - 100
1980	 6.9 72.5 33.4 -4.3 59.7 -2.3 100
1981	 10.9 58.0 34.2 2.4 54.9 -8.0 100
1982	 15.1 38.5 28.9 -15.5 56.0 2.0 100
1983	 14.4 -4.6 41.9 45.0 43.7 -22.0 100
1984	 13.4 -6.9 47.5 13.4 39.1 -10.5 100
1985	 8.1 -39.6 30.8 -35.2 61.1 56.3 100
1986	 6.2 -23.5 26.6 -13.6 67.2 10.0 100
ARG 13.5 1.1 3.6
Source: Table 11.8
11.4.5 Performance in terms of Total Finance (TIF)
Table 11.10 and Figure 10.4 exhibit the comparative analysis of
the TLF of each of FIBS, BOK, OCB and SBS in current and constant pri-
ces. It is quite apparent that, although FIBS recorded very high rates
of growth in the first four years (1979-82), in terms of current prices
TLF, growing from LS14.7m in 1979 to LS137.8m in 1982 at a staggering
annual ARG of 113.5%, it slowed down in 1983 and even declined in 1984
and 1985 for the reasons mentioned in section 11.3 above, however it
managed to record a positive rate of growth in 1986 but this was not
enough to be a real one because when allowing for inflation the TLF of
FIBS recorded positive rates of growth only in the first 4 years (1979-
82) and recorded negative rates of growth in all the following years
(1983-86). As for the TLF of BOK, OCB and SBS, they all increased at
positive rates of growth for the current prices, growing from LS75.5m,
LS426.2m and L3516.6m in 1979 to LS798.1m, LS1,748.4m and LS2,697.8m in
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1986 growing at annual ARG of 46.3%, 22.9% and 27.2% respectively.
However, they all experienced a decline in their TLF in constant prices
for the years 1984 and 1985, because of the very high inflation. Conse-
quently, their real annual ARG for the whole period (1979-1986), were
12.9%, -5.2% and -1.7% respectively compared to that of FIBS which was
21.3%. The effect of inflation may clearly be seen from Figure 11.4
exhibiting the relative development of the TLF of each of FIBS, BOK,
OCB and SBS in current and constant prices.
As Table 11.11 shows, The market share of FIBS, in the TLF of the
SBS, went up in the 4 four years from 2.9% in 1979 to 11.5% in 1982,
growing at a staggering annual ARG of 60.5% in the first 4 years; then
went down the following 4 years to reach 5.6% in 1986 at an annual
negative ARG of of -18.9%, making thus, the overall annual ARG equal to
15.1% for the 8 years under review.
Table 11.11 The Market Share of FIBS, BOK and OCB in The TLF of the SBS
FIBS
Share	 Growth
BOK
Share	 Growth
OCB
Share Growth
SBS
Total
1979	 2.9	 - 14.7 - 82.5 - 100
1980	 5.7	 96.6 14.3 -2.7 80.0 -3.0 100
1981	 7.5	 31.6 14.5 1.4 78.0 -2.5 100
1982	 11.5	 53.3 13.2 -9.0 72.3 -7.3 100
1983	 10.1	 -12.2 28.2 113.6 61.6 -14.7 100
1984	 8.2	 -28.7 25.7 -8.9 66.1 7.1 100
1985
	 6.9
	 -15.9 25.6 -0.4 67.5 2.1 100
1986	 5.6	 -18.8 29.6 15.6 64.8 -4.0 100
ARG	 15.1 11.2 3.2
Source: Table 10.10
BOK's market share fluctuated in the first 4 years between 14.7%
and 13.2%, more than doubled in 1983 because of the merger, declined
the following two years (1984 and 1985) and then improved in 1986 to
29.6%, thus growing at an annual ARG of 11.2%, while the market share
of the OCB declined in the first 4 years because of what it lost to
FIBS and declined further in 1983 because of the merger of the BOK and
the PCB, and though they gained ground in the years 1984 and 1985
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because of the operations of new banks, they lost ground in 1986 to the
BOK which benefited as a public bank from the discriminatory treatment
against the private banks that were given only 10% of the local trade
as compared with 43% to the public banks and because of the other
discriminations mentioned in the end of section 11.3 above.
11.5 Performance of FIBS, BOK, OCB and SBS in terms of Other Proxies
Table 11.13 exhibits the comparative analysis of the performance
of FIBS, BOK, OCB and SBS in terms of intermediation, deposits mobili-
sation and capital adequacy as measured by a number of ratios. Because
there is no detail on the liquid assets, profits and number of branches
for the SBS and consequently for OCB, the liquidity, profitability and
efficiency comparative analysis is made only as far as FIBS and BOK are
concerned. In terms of intermediation as measured by the ratios TLF/TLD
and TLF/TLA, OCB performed better than FIBS, BOK and SBS, however FIBS
performed better than BOK. In terms of deposit ratios as measured by
TLD/TLA, BOK with an average ratio of 75.9% outperformed the others
followed by FIBS with an average ratio of 66.6%; then SBS (with 55.8%)
and lastly comes OCB (with 46.7%). FIBS did not do better than BOK,
partly because it was the most capitalised bank in the Sudan during the
period under review, its capital ratios, as measured by the ratios
K&R/TLA and K&R/TLD, are very high in comparison to those of BOK, OCB
and SBS. BOK's capital ratios are the lowest (see Table 11.13).
The comparative analysis of the profitability of FIBS and BOK
reveals different results depending on the ratio used. When measured by
PBT/TLA, FIBS with an average ratio of 2.9%, performed better than BOK
with 2.5%. But when measured by the ratio PBT/K&R, BOK with a
staggering 131% outperformed FIBS with only 24.8%. This is so because
as mentioned above FIBS is highly overcapitalised and BOK is highly
undercapitalised. The other reason is that the depositors' share in
FIBS profits is far much greater than the interest paid by BOK to its
depositors. The average ratio of FIBS's depositors return is 2.6% com-
pared to the average ratio of depositors' return in case of BOK which
323
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is only 1.6% for the period 1979-86. Because there was no information
on the number of staff as far as BOK is concerned, the efficiency com-
parative analysis is proxied only by the ratios total assets, total
deposits and total finance to the number of branches (ie TLA/NOB,
TLD/NOB and TLF/NOB). From 1979 to 1983 the efficiency of FIBS as
measured by all ratios was far greater than that of BOK, however after
1983 when many political and discriminatory problems faced it and after
the amalgamation of PCB with BOK, BOK outperformed FIBS in terms of
efficiency but on the average FIBS have higher average ratios for the
period 1979-87.
11.5 Conclusion
FIBS did not perform well as did KFH in Kuwait or FIBE in Egypt,
perhaps because of the many problems that it faced especially after
1983. In fact FIBS did perform quite well in its first four years of
business; it is only after Sudan as a whole was struck by the many
problems mentioned in section 11.3 above and the introduction of unjust
and discriminatory treatment against non public banks, that FIBS did
badly in comparison to BOK, OCB or SBS though on the average. Thus, the
problem that faced FIBS are not inherent to the Islamic way of doing
banking but were the result of the Sudanese policies and circumstances.
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GENERAL CONCLUSION
The main trend of thought in this thesis is that, Islam is not an
obstacle to economic growth and development although it prohibits inte-
rest, the corner stone of western modern banking. This is because inte-
rest is not a necessary component of banking as it is believed and that
banking could be based on other mechanisms such as profit and Profit
and Loss Sharing (PLS) system. These not only comply with Islam but may
prove to be a lot more useful as they may lead to a greater saving
mobilisation in Islamic countries than interest and to a greater level
of investment and consequently of employment, production and growth.
Basically, it is argued that The Islamic Banking System could be
structured, organised and implemented in the same way as interest based
banking, except that the Islamic banks will not deal in interest based
financial instruments. Moreover, the adoption of PLS system of finance
may be of greater benefit than the Interest Based System, since it does
not stand as a hurdle in the way of fuller exploitation of available
resources, investment and employment. Besides Islamic banking could be
adopted without harming the effectiveness of monetary policy or of the
central banks in the performance of their traditional roles. With the
exception of the discount rate, all other monetary policy tools would
be available to the central banks with little changes.
It is pointed out that the implementation of Islamic Banking may
prove to be costlier and difficult than interest based banking,
however, the benefits behind the high costs and the difficulties in its
implementation could be worthwhile in view of the expected benefits.
Besides, in its implementation lies the Islamic test for as Prophet
Mohammed (PBUH) said: "Paradise is surrounded with hardship and thorns
and Hell Fire with desires and flowers".
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The conclusions that may be drawn from this study are:
First, Islamic Banking is only a tiny part of the Islamic Economic
System which is itself a tiny part of the comprehensive Islamic way of
life stipulated by the sources of Islam namely the Koran, the Sunnah
and the rtihad of Muslim scholars. This is different from all the
other ways of life or economic systems such as capitalism or communism.
Second, although no one knows when banking operations first appea-
red, historical evidence shows that Banking was known far much earlier
than thirteenth century Italy and so is not 'Italian by birth' as many
economists hold. There is evidence that banking was known to the Mus-
lims, the Romans, the Greeks, the Egyptians and even to the Babylonians
and the Sumerians who lived about thirty four hundred years B.C.
Third, the recently emerged Islamic banking movement was the re-
sult of the Islamic resurgence that appeared in many Muslim countries
after their independence and is also the consequence of the first suc-
cessful experiment that took place in Egypt in the early 1960s.
Fourth, the prohibition of interest and the permission of profit
and PLS are not exclusively Islamic, these were known in earlier reli-
gions such as Judaism and Christianity and civilisations like those in
Mesopotamia, Egypt and Greece.
Fifth, although a great number of theories were advanced in order
to justify interest on loans and profits from sales, none of them is
free from flaws and criticisms and none has explained exactly why
interest or profits should be paid. It is argued in this thesis that no
theory can succeed in justifying interest which is an unnatural prede-
termined return on loans (the exchange of present money or of a commo-
dity against a future greater money or commodity of the same kind). It
is also argued that although the advanced theories of profits did not
also escape criticisms, an attempt is made in this thesis to explain
profits with what is called: the 'Theory of Sale Residual' (TSR). This
attempt has tried to explain why Allah has prohibited interest and
permitted sale. Profit is only one of the three outcomes of sale: Pro-
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fit, Loss or no profit and no loss which are the natural results of the
necessary exchange of goods and services against money. Besides, it is
contended that it is quite possible to run a developed economy without
recourse to interest but no economy can go beyond the subsistence eco-
nomy if profits from sale is not allowed. Profit is thus, justified on
the basis of sale (the exchange of goods and services against money)
since without sale there would be no profit no matter how much risk,
uncertainty, advantages, superintendence, etc., are involved and since
sale is the main incentive that encourages investment, employment,
production and consequently progress and development.
An advanced Islamic Financial System could be organised, structu-
red and run in the same way as an advanced Interest Based Financial
System and could adopt many of the techniques of the latter and benefit
from them except that no Interest Based Financial Instruments, specula-
tion or other prohibited operations are allowed. Interest based instru-
ments would be replaced by interest-free or PLS instruments that,
although may prove to be difficult to implement in the beginning of the
process, would perhaps lead to greater social and economic benefits to
the savers, investors and the society as a whole.
Although, it is difficult if not impossible to empirically compare
the impact of PLS and interest on the different aspects of the economy
in view of the fact that there is still no real Islamic Financial Sys-
tem anywhere in the world that is applying PLS instruments, a number of
theoretical hypotheses were advanced in this thesis that need further
research. It is theoretically argued that PLS system of finance, if
implemented in an Islamic Society that believe in Islam and in the
superiority of its way of life, may lead to a greater mobilisation of
savings, greater involvement of banks and other financial institutions
in the promotion of entrepreneurship, employment, production and growth
than interest based allows. It is also argued that PLS system may lead
to a greater justice in the distribution of income and greater stabi-
lity in the national and international financial systems than the inte-
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rest based system. It is argued that had the LDCs' debts been in the
form of PLS finance there would have been no problems of the extent
that there is today since the banks would have been more careful in
offering finance and more involved in preventing the diversion of funds
from the original projects to other purposes and in helping the reci-
pient generate greater benefits of the finance with lesser risk.
From the apparent success of the already established Islamic banks
in attracting substantial amounts of savings in very short time as com-
pared to the slow performance of interest-based banks in Muslim count-
ries, one can conclude that Islamic banking is the relevant banking
system that serves best the requirement of the economic development at
least in the Muslim world. This apparent success has been described by
the American magazine Newsweek (7/6/1984, p.52) as follows:
From Malaysia to the Bahamas banks and investment houses foun-
ded on the principle of Islamic law are emerging as a force
with clout. These institutions vary in size from tiny savings
banks to multinational houses... and though most of them are
less than a decade old, they already manage assets worth more
than $9bn. In keeping with the Koran's ban on usury, Islamic
bankers have devised an unorthodox interest-free system. It is
not only gaining acceptance at home but is forcing conven-
tional western banks eager for Muslim dollars to adapt some of
their own entrenched rules.
The performance of some of the oldest existing banks (Kuwait
Finance House, Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt and Faisal Islamic Bank of
Sudan) shows that despite the fact that these are working in somewhat
hostile environments, they have managed to compete with the interest
based banks and performed better than expected. Although they have a
long way to go, Islamic banks have prove that interest is not a neces-
sary component of banking and that Islam is not an obstacle to economic
development but is a promoter of economic growth and development since
Islam allows better alternatives to interest: Sale and PLS that may
prove to be better instruments which promote investment, employment,
entrepreneurship and social justice.
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